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Abstract 
 
The International Monetary Fund has often been accused of adopting a one-size-fits-all 
approach to the resolution of financial crises. However, its programs present substantial 
differences in terms of their relative size and conditionality among other characteristics. 
This dissertation examines the causes and consequences of this variation through the 
lenses of two cases in which the contrast between the Fund´s interventions was 
particularly marked: Argentina and Uruguay during the period that surrounds the 
financial crash of 2001-02.   
The first part of this study analyses the determinants of these multilateral interventions 
through an adaptation of Robert Puntam´s two level games, exploring the way in which 
national politics interacted with international priorities to produce distinct outcomes in 
Argentina and Uruguay. The two experiences confirm that domestic ratification 
processes impose significant constraints on the negotiation of IMF programs, potentially 
conferring localized bargaining advantages to borrowing governments. Beyond a certain 
point, however, an intensification of these ratification constraints can result in a 
suspension of the Fund´s support, after which borrowers´ bargaining position weakens 
dramatically. That this point of rupture was reached in Argentina but not in Uruguay 
was due primarily to the different propensity to cooperate exhibited by political actors 
in these two countries, itself the product of certain institutional conditions such as the 
strength of their systems of checks and balances or a varying distribution of veto power. 
In turn, the second part of this thesis applies a hypothetical counterfactual approach to 
assess the consequences of the multilateral decisions adopted during the 2001-02 crisis 
in the Southern Cone. Although the contrast between the suspension of the Argentine 
program in December 2001 and the Uruguayan bailout of August 2002 had surprisingly 
modest macroeconomic consequences, its impact on politics and institutions was 
profound both in the short and in the medium-term. As a result of these findings, this 
dissertation argues that a better understanding of the implications of multilateral crisis 
resolution loans on the political economy of the countries concerned is still needed.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1.1  Research topic and questions 
 
After three years of recession and several months of negotiations, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended its financial support to Argentina in late November 
2001. A few weeks later the country had descended into chaos, triggering an almost 
immediate contagion effect on neighbouring Uruguay. But the international community 
responded very differently to that crisis, approving a financial rescue package which 
until recently was the largest IMF program in history if measured against the size of the 
recipient economy. This dissertation looks at these contrasting experiences in order to 
shed some light on the causes and consequences of the multilateral response to financial 
crises. More specifically, the main research questions that will be addressed are the 
following: what accounts for the longitudinal and cross-sectional variation in the Fund’s 
interventions in Argentina and Uruguay? How and why did the multilateral response to 
the 2001-02 crisis impact the Argentine and Uruguayan economic, political and 
institutional trajectories in the medium-term?              
 
This dissertation, therefore, will focus on multilateral crisis lending, which can be 
characterized by the three instruments with which the international community can help 
or induce borrowing countries to close their financing gap: (i) the financial assistance 
provided by the IMF alone or in conjunction with other international organizations or 
national governments; (ii) the domestic adjustment and/or structural reform 
commitments accepted by debtors as part of the Fund’s conditionality; (iii) private 
sector involvement (PSI), i.e. the losses more or less voluntarily absorbed by private 
creditors in order to alleviate the borrower’s financial distress. Given that the private 
sector does not take part in the negotiations with the IMF, considering that this third 
element is a constituent of multilateral loans may seem counterintuitive. However, when 
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the international community decides on the terms of a program, on occasions it is also 
adopting an implicit or explicit stance about the losses that the borrowing country’s 
private creditors will have to absorb in order to maintain or restore debt sustainability.
1
 
In fact, depending on the context, PSI could be the most relevant ingredient for the 
success of an IMF program.  
 
The subject of this dissertation is relevant for various reasons. First of all, the 2001-02 
financial crisis is one of the most traumatic events in the modern economic histories of 
Argentina and Uruguay and, therefore, these two case studies deserve attention in their 
own right. The Argentine crisis and, to a lesser extent, the case of Uruguay, have 
received a considerable amount of journalistic and scholarly attention. However, most 
existing contributions have tended to provide historical narratives without delving deep 
into the chain of causation that led to the crucial multilateral decisions that were taken 
in 2001 and 2002 (Mussa, 2001; IEO, 2004; Paolillo, 2004; Blustein, 2005). 
Furthermore, a comparative perspective has rarely been adopted to study the Argentine 
and Uruguayan experiences with the IMF. Therefore, cross-sectional variation in these 
two case studies has seldom been exploited to analyse the causes and consequences of 
the Fund’s interventions and, hence, the risks and opportunities associated with the 
IMF-centred multilateral financial safety net.  
 
Moreover, multilateral crisis lending has become more pertinent in the context of the 
global financial turbulences of the last few years. Prior to that crisis, the Fund’s 
relevance as the linchpin of the international monetary system seemed to be on the 
decline. However, in successive G-20 summits the international community has restored 
the Fund’s leading role in the management of the world economy. Studying the causes 
and consequences of past multilateral interventions can only help to gain a better 
understanding of the multiple financial programs in which the IMF is currently involved 
in Europe and elsewhere. In fact, it has been common to draw analogies between the 
cases covered in this dissertation and the Greek, Spanish, Portuguese or Italian crises, 
and some scholars have presented the Argentine and the Uruguayan debt restructuring 
models as alternative strategies to cope with sovereign debt problems in the Eurozone 
                                                          
1
 Ceteris paribus, the higher the volume of the financial package and/or the higher the level of domestic 
adjustment required by the program’s conditionality, the lower the need to involve private creditors in the 
resolution of the crisis. 
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(Levy-Yeyati et al. 2011). The lessons yielded by these two case studies could therefore 
be of more immediate policy relevance than was foreseen when this research effort 
began in September 2008. 
 
In addition, the Argentine and the Uruguayan experiences present various analytical 
puzzles. First of all, the contrast between the multilateral response to the two crises 
constitutes a puzzle for those who place powerful states’ material interests at the centre 
of the study of international cooperation. Whereas by the turn of the century Argentina 
had attracted large volumes of capital inflows and, as suggested by its status as a 
founding member of the G-20, was perceived to have become a systemically important 
emerging economy, Uruguay was practically irrelevant on a global scale. Therefore, the 
G-7 and other creditor nations had reasons to be much more concerned about the 
potential spill-over effects of a full-blown financial crisis in Argentina than about the 
collapse of the Uruguayan banking system. Furthermore, while the Argentine embrace 
of the neo-liberal doctrine during the 1990s had been widely praised by international 
financial institutions and by the architects of the Washington Consensus, Uruguay’s 
more modest market reform process had gone largely unnoticed. How to explain, then, 
that the international community eventually decided to suspend its support to Argentina 
while such extraordinary measures were taken to rescue the Uruguayan economy? 
 
The comparison between the Argentine and the Uruguayan economic trajectories is also 
puzzling for those that believe that a strong multilateral safety net is crucial to help 
emerging markets cope with the risks associated with financial globalization. If such a 
collective insurance scheme was an effective tool to mitigate these risks, the Uruguayan 
rescue package should be expected to have significantly reduced the impact of the crisis 
in that country and to have facilitated the subsequent recovery. But the economic 
contractions experienced in Argentina and Uruguay during the worst years of the crisis 
were almost identical and Argentina exhibited a somewhat higher cumulative GDP 
growth in the aftermath of the 2001-02 events. If the rescue package did not enable the 
Uruguayan economy to perform better than that of Argentina, what was the impact of 
the contrasting multilateral response to the two crises?  
 
On the methodological side, another reason to have selected Argentina and Uruguay for 
comparison is that these case studies fit the logic of the “most similar system design” 
15 
 
(Przeworski and Teune, 1970). Indeed, these countries have close social and cultural 
identities and share other characteristics such as their level of economic development, 
their economic structures as traditionally important exporters of meat, soy and other 
primary products and their exposure to comparable types of external shocks. 
Furthermore, at the onset of the crisis Argentina and Uruguay were at a similar 
historical juncture having recently completed a political transition from an authoritarian 
regime to a democratic system and an economic transition from an import substitution 
industrialization model with extensive state intervention to a more open and market-
based political economy. The two episodes of financial instability themselves were also 
relatively similar, combining elements of a currency, banking and sovereign debt crisis. 
Moreover, the Argentine and the Uruguayan crises took place almost simultaneously 
implying that the rules and state of the art that guided the Fund’s interventions were 
essentially the same in the two episodes. This case study selection, therefore, maximizes 
cross-sectional variation in the outcome of interest (the Uruguayan rescue package vs. 
the suspension of the Argentine program) while minimizing the number of potential 
explanatory dimensions, which is aimed at mitigating the problem of over-
determination that inevitably characterizes small-N empirical exercises. 
 
1.2      On the causes of IMF interventions 
 
In the analysis of the causes of the Fund´s interventions in Argentina and Uruguay, this 
dissertation tries to go beyond the traditional separation between the domestic and the 
international levels of analysis that dominates the study of international relations, which 
has constituted a matter of growing concern for IPE theorists since the 1970s 
(Katzenstein, 1978; Gourevitch, 1978; Putnam, 1988; Cohen, 2008). The literature on 
the IMF is no exception in this respect, and most theoretical and empirical contributions 
have either focused on the domestic or on the international determinants of multilateral 
crisis lending, tending to produce rather partial interpretations of these interventions. 
However, some recent contributions such as Vreeland (2003a), Stone (2008) or Pop-
Eleches (2009) have tried to integrate the two levels of analysis. Pulling in that 
direction, this dissertation applies an analytical framework based on Robert Putnam’s 
two-level games, which is aimed at gaining a more holistic understanding of the 
dynamics that shape the negotiations of IMF-supported programs (Putnam, 1988). 
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The two-level game metaphor rests on the idea that the outcome of international 
negotiations is largely determined by the constraints facing negotiators as a result of the 
need to secure the domestic ratification of whatever they agree with their foreign peers. 
This idea is operationalized through the concept of win-sets, which refer to all the 
international agreements that are domestically ratifiable by each of the negotiators. The 
overall constraint of the two-level game is given by the intersection between all the 
individual negotiators’ win-sets, generating the following two hypotheses: (i) 
international cooperation depends on the existence of a win-set overlap and will be 
easier to sustain when individual win-sets are large (i.e. when domestic ratification 
constraints are loose); (ii) a narrow win-set (i.e. tight domestic ratification constraints) 
on one side of the negotiations can be turned into a bargaining advantage at the 
international table.    
 
The empirical analysis conducted in this dissertation is partly aimed at testing the 
validity of these hypotheses in the specific context of the Argentine and the Uruguayan 
negotiations with the IMF. However, win-sets are inherently unobservable and the two-
level game analytical framework is for the most part agnostic about what might 
determine the intensity of domestic ratification constraints. As a result, these hypotheses 
cannot be examined unless a causal relationship is established between other observable 
variables pertaining to the ratification process and the design and implementation of 
IMF-supported programs. Subsequent chapters will cover the cases of Argentina and 
Uruguay in an attempt to unearth such causal relationships and, therefore, should be 
understood as a hypothesis generating exercise rather than as a hypothesis testing task. 
In order to identify the most relevant explanatory dimensions to be explored, the point 
of departure will be a review of the rich literature on the IMF and on the politics of 
macroeconomic adjustment and reform, which has already emphasized a number of 
factors that may have played a significant role in these two cases. Particular attention 
will be placed on the interests of powerful creditors, on bureaucratic politics, on the role 
of veto players and on the determinants of political actors’ ability to cooperate in times 
of crisis. 
 
Relying primarily on 41 interviews conducted in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, 
Washington DC, London and Madrid with direct participants in the negotiations and 
with other privileged observers (see Appendix A), this dissertation will use both 
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process-tracing and comparative methods in order to exploit the longitudinal and cross-
sectional variation observed in the Argentine and the Uruguayan case studies. A 
process-tracing approach will be applied to the longitudinal analysis of the Argentine 
and the Uruguayan negotiations with the IMF, which will initially be treated as 
independent cases in an attempt to identify the cause-effect relation between the 
dependent variable, i.e. the Fund’s interventions, and a number of potential explanatory 
variables. Given that this first part of the analysis on the determinants of IMF 
interventions will focus on longitudinal variation, the emphasis will be placed on those 
factors that exhibited variation over time, such as the outcome of electoral processes, 
the evolving strength and cohesiveness of governing coalitions or changing rules in the 
issue area of international crisis lending. 
 
In turn, the comparative method will be used to analyse cross-sectional variation. This 
empirical strategy relies on the idea that, as mentioned above, these two case studies fit 
the logic of a most similar system design reasonably well. Therefore, causation will be 
inferred from the co-variation between the outcome of interest and the explanatory 
dimensions that have not been controlled for as a result of the similarities between the 
Argentine and the Uruguayan cases. Given that this second part of the analysis will 
concentrate on cross-sectional variation, the emphasis will be placed on more static 
explanatory variables differentiating the Argentine and Uruguayan case studies, such as 
the size of the two economies, the location of veto-players within their political systems, 
or other structural institutional features. 
 
The empirical analysis presented in subsequent chapters confirms that domestic 
ratification constraints at the level of debtor nations can have a significant impact on the 
design and implementation of IMF interventions. In certain contexts, these constraints 
are exploited by debtors in the negotiations with the Fund, which can have an effect on 
the financial and non-financial terms of multilateral programs. Beyond a certain point, 
however, the loss of domestic political room for manoeuvring can result in a collapse of 
the international negotiation’s cooperative equilibrium, after which domestic ratification 
constraints become an obstacle to resume a program relationship rather than a 
bargaining tool to soften the conditionality associated with these loans. In other words, 
this dissertation will argue that there is a non-linear relationship between the intensity of 
domestic ratification constraints and borrowers´ bargaining power vis-à-vis the IMF. 
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Given the above, much of the focus will be placed on the determinants of domestic 
ratification constraints. In this sense, the longitudinal analysis of the Argentine and the 
Uruguayan case studies will explore the relationship that exists between the outcome of 
electoral processes and the ratification constraints facing debtor nations´ negotiators, 
which played an important role at various junctures of the two processes. However, 
other more subtle causal relationships will also be emphasized in the comparative 
analysis. More specifically, a crucial factor to explain the contrast between the 
Argentine and the Uruguayan negotiations with the IMF is the different propensity to 
cooperate exhibited by political actors in these two cases. In turn, I will argue that this 
propensity to cooperate was influenced by certain structural features of their polities, 
such as the different strength of their systems of checks and balances, which encouraged 
the Uruguayan government’s stakeholders to engage in intertemporal bargaining 
processes to a much greater extent than in Argentina.    
 
Another factor that contributed to shape the negotiations with the IMF through the 
constraints facing the Argentine and the Uruguayan negotiators was the location of veto 
players within these two countries’ political systems. It will be argued that these actors 
tend to focus primarily on those conditions that are likely to affect their interests and not 
on the whole policy package negotiated with the Fund. As a result, the conditionality 
associated with IMF loans will tend to be weaker and more difficult to implement in the 
areas that are of direct concern to the veto actors empowered by specific configurations 
of political institutions. This is why in the decentralized Argentine state the veto-power 
of the provinces contributes to explain the failure of the fiscal adjustment programs 
negotiated with the Fund, while Uruguayan unions’ prerogative to launch referenda 
weakened the structural conditionality associated with IMF loans. Mapping out the 
location of veto actors and anticipating how conditionality is likely to impact them, 
therefore, might be instrumental to anticipate where IMF interventions will tend to be 
more problematic.       
 
Among the international variables considered in this dissertation, an emphasis will be 
placed on the cost of no agreement perceived by the Fund´s constituents and its 
relationship with the autonomy of IMF officials in their negotiations with borrowing 
countries. If the cost of no agreement is perceived to be high, powerful nations will be 
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more likely to interfere in the negotiations. By contrast, if the cost of no agreement is 
perceived to be low, technical considerations and bureaucratic politics at the level of the 
IMF will tend to dominate the process. In this context, it is hardly surprising that at 
various points the very different size of the Argentine and the Uruguayan economies 
contributed to shape the negotiations. However, on the basis of the evidence provided 
by these two case studies I will argue that borrowers’ economic might as such is not a 
consistent predictor of the multilateral response to financial crises because mobilizing 
the resources that are needed to bail-out small countries is easier and might pursue other 
equally relevant strategic objectives. 
 
The role of rules will also be explored in subsequent chapters. Although multilaterally 
agreed rules are found to have imposed a generally soft constraint on the negotiations of 
the Argentine and the Uruguayan programs, the position of powerful constituents vis-à-
vis these two interventions was influenced by a desire to influence the reform of the 
international financial architecture according to their policy preferences. This became 
particularly relevant during the discussions on the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (SDRM), which contributed to shape the preferences of the US and other 
G7 countries on the Argentine and the Uruguayan programs through channels that will 
be examined in detail. As a result of this issue-linkage, it will be argued that the causal 
association between rules and the design of the IMF programs under analysis was more 
complex and bi-directional than might be expected at first.  
 
1.3       On the Consequences of IMF interventions 
 
Moving on to the consequences of the multilateral response to the Argentine and the 
Uruguayan crises, the empirical approach adopted here is based on the contention that 
these two case studies can be used as hypothetical counterfactual scenarios. More 
specifically, I will argue that what happened in Argentina after the suspension of the 
program provides an indication of what would have occurred in Uruguay had its 
program been suspended rather than augmented. Equivalently, what happened in 
Uruguay after the financial rescue was approved provides an indication of what may 
have occurred in Argentina had its IMF program been massively augmented rather than 
suspended. Therefore, comparing the Argentine and Uruguayan trajectories after these 
crucial multilateral decisions is instrumental to overcome a common shortcoming 
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present in most of the case study contributions that have tried to assess the impact of 
specific IMF interventions: the failure to establish a valid yardstick against which to 
compare observed outcomes.  
 
As already mentioned, the contrasting response to the Argentine and the Uruguayan 
crises had a modest impact on real economic variables such as GDP growth or 
unemployment. However, the medium-term evolution of capital flows towards these 
economies was heavily influenced by the multilateral decisions adopted in 2001 and 
2002. Whereas Uruguay recovered access to international financial markets relatively 
fast, Argentina has received a negligible volume of foreign investment since the 
suspension of the IMF program forced it to default in late 2001. Together with the fact 
that from that point onwards the Fund lost its ability to influence the design of 
Argentina´s economic policies, Uruguay´s greater integration into international financial 
markets might contribute to explain why this country has maintained a much more 
orthodox and anti-inflationary monetary stance after the crisis. By contrast, few 
differences have been found in the orientation of the fiscal policies implemented by the 
Argentine and the Uruguayan governments, suggesting that variation in the Fund´s 
interventions had a reduced impact on this policy-making dimension.   
 
Finally, I will show that the contrasting response to the Argentine and the Uruguayan 
crises influenced these two countries´ post-crisis political and institutional trajectories. 
In the short-term, whereas the suspension of the Argentine program preceded the 
collapse of the De la Rúa administration, the Uruguayan rescue enabled President Batlle 
to complete his term in office. But these multilateral decisions had other more subtle 
and longer-lasting effects both on the policy preferences and on the policy space of 
subsequent administrations, contributing to explain the moderation of the Uruguayan 
left while in government vs. the progressive radicalization of the Kirchners in 
Argentina. In addition, there is ground to argue that institutions were much more 
affected by the crisis in Argentina than in Uruguay, another outcome that may be partly 
attributable to the Fund´s interventions. All in all, therefore, these case studies indicate 
that in spite of the fact that most attention has focused on the economic consequences of 
IMF loans, the impact of crisis resolution programs on the political economy of the 
countries concerned may be particularly pronounced.  
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1.4     Chapter plan 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 will review the 
literature and present an adaptation of the two-level games´ analytical framework. 
Chapter 3 will provide a first approximation of the contours of the Fund’s win-set, 
identifying the structural constraints facing IMF negotiators during the period under 
analysis. More specifically, it will describe the institutions and constituencies that shape 
the Fund’s ratification process as well as the evolution of rules in this particular issue 
area. Afterwards, Chapters 4 and 5 will present the cases of Argentina and Uruguay in 
isolation, applying a process-tracing approach to identify the causal paths that 
determined the longitudinal variation observed in this study’s dependent variable. In 
turn, Chapter 6 will compare the two experiences, identifying other sources of cross-
sectional variation and completing the empirical analysis on the causes of the Fund’s 
interventions in Argentina and Uruguay. Chapter 7 will concentrate on the 
consequences of these interventions. It will begin with a review of the literature on the 
effects of IMF programs. Then, applying a counterfactual approach, it will carry out a 
comparative analysis in order to determine whether variation in the Fund’s interventions 
had an impact on the Argentine and Uruguayan economic, political and institutional 
post-crisis trajectories. Finally, Chapter 8 will conclude, summarizing this dissertation’s 
main contributions and identifying directions for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Towards a two-level interpretation of IMF programs 
 
 
 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature on the determinants of IMF 
interventions in financial crises and presents an analytical framework that will be 
applied to the analysis of the Argentine and Uruguayan case studies. Scholars in the 
field of international relations distinguish between three levels of analysis: the 
individual level, which focuses on the explanatory power of statesmen’ personal 
characteristics; the domestic level, which concentrates on the impact of national 
political processes on international outcomes; the international level, which focuses on 
the position of states in the international system. The literature on the IMF and, more 
generally, on international organizations is no exception and most contributions fall 
either in the domestic or the international levels of analysis. The review of scholarship 
presented in this chapter is structured around that distinction, beginning in section 2.1 
with international explanations of IMF interventions and continuing in section 2.2 with 
the contributions that have focused on the domestic level of analysis.  
 
In line with some recent contributions, this dissertation argues that in order to gain a 
more holistic understanding of multilateral lending it is necessary to bridge the gap 
between these two levels of analysis, shedding some light on how domestic and 
international factors interact to shape the design and implementation of IMF programs. 
Among the most prominent attempts to integrate the domestic and the international 
levels of analysis, Putnam’s two-level games stand out in particular, which is why the 
empirical exercise presented in subsequent chapters applies this analytical framework 
(Putnam, 1988). In order to set the stage for the case studies, section 2.3 presents the 
logic of two-level games, explores some of the implications of applying this framework 
to the issue-area of multilateral crisis lending and provides a stylized representation of 
the model from which a number of hypotheses will be derived. Finally, the chapter will 
briefly conclude. 
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2.1  The international level of analysis 
 
This section reviews some of the most salient international-level theoretical and 
empirical contributions that have analysed the role of the IMF among other multilateral 
organizations. The various approaches presented here emphasize different explanatory 
variables as the key driver of multilateral interventions. Neo-liberal and public choice 
scholars share a focus on the role of material interests. However, whereas the former 
concentrate on states and their reasons to cooperate through international organizations, 
the latter are more interested in these institutions’ bureaucracies and the ways in which 
they pursue their own self-interested objectives. Constructivists, instead, interpret 
multilateral organizations as social constructs that need to be explained in terms of 
knowledge, ideas, beliefs or identities. In turn, neo-realist scholars, where they are 
interested in international cooperation, focus on the distribution of power capabilities 
among states as the key determinant of the actions of multilateral institutions.     
 
2.1.1 The neo-liberal and public choice approaches 
 
Since the late 1970s neo-liberal scholars have been particularly interested in explaining 
the factors that sustain international economic cooperation. This research agenda was 
originally motivated by the observation that important shifts in the international 
distribution of economic power were not resulting in the debilitation of institutions such 
as the IMF, the World Bank or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Dunne et 
al., 2007). Why, against the prediction of Hegemonic Stability Theory, was this 
international economic infrastructure maintained in spite of the perceived decline of the 
United States (Kindleberger, 1973)? In order to address this puzzle, international regime 
theories provided a framework to explain the mutual adjustment of states’ behavior or 
policies and their acceptance of certain obligations in the absence of a supra-national 
authority with the ability to hierarchically enforce the rules of the game.
2
 
 
                                                          
2
 International regimes are broadly defined as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” 
(Krasner, 1982) 
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Neo-liberal theories of international cooperation are rooted in an individualist and 
rationalist ontology and often apply economic methodologies to analyze problems of 
collective action. Robert Keohane’s contractualism, for instance, interpreted 
international regimes as mechanisms enabling participating states to overcome the type 
of prisoner dilemma situations that arise in international relations (Keohane, 1984). In 
the absence of a regime, these collective action problems can prevent groups of states 
from achieving pareto-efficient cooperative outcomes resulting from their common 
interest in specific issue-areas. Individual states’ rational choices can be compatible 
with Pareto-inferior solutions because of the presence of immediate incentives to defect 
in the first place and because these incentives to cheat may lead states not to trust 
others’ willingness to stick to cooperation in the second place. International regimes 
provide a framework for negotiation that reduces transaction costs, creates iteration in 
the game and lowers uncertainty about the actions of others, thereby altering incentives 
and catalyzing co-operation. As a result, the pareto-superior outcomes are more likely to 
be realized, which forms the backbone of Keohane’s functionalist theory: because 
countries anticipate the potential welfare improvement generated by co-operation they 
create international regimes.
3
  
 
Various scholars have analyzed the role of the IMF through the lenses of this 
international regime approach. Cohen (1982) described the Fund’s provision of finance 
as an international regime “governing access to external credit for balance of payment 
purposes”. The basic foundation of this regime was the premise that an appropriate 
balance between domestic adjustment and external financing should be sought in order 
for countries to correct their balance of payments disequilibria. Under the Bretton 
Woods system the IMF managed a pool of national reserve currencies and gold, 
providing external financing on a limited scale. This tranched financial support was 
conditioned on the implementation of a number of policies, which ensured that recipient 
countries would not overtly postpone domestic adjustment as would otherwise be their 
tendency. The central question addressed by Cohen was whether the rise of private 
lending as the most important source of funding to cover external imbalances during the 
1970s had effectively marked the end of this regime. Indeed, as opposed to the IMF, 
                                                          
3
 Various contributions have refined or extended this argument. Robert Axelrod (1984), for instance, 
showed that iteration and reciprocity in the Prisonner’s Dilemma game can induce cooperation without 
central enforcement. Other scholars have focused on the potential for regimes to address other types of 
collective action problems (Hasenclaver et al., 1997).  
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private creditors were unable (or unwilling) to impose policy conditions and the 
question arose as to whether the system had mechanisms in place to continue promoting 
an appropriate balance between domestic adjustment and external financing. However, 
because private banks did gradually come to the realization that countries need to adjust 
in order to remain creditworthy, they increasingly required the presence of an IMF 
program in order to continue lending. As a result, Cohen argued that the rise of private 
markets did not fundamentally challenge the IMF’s role as an “arbiter for access to 
financing”. In other words, although the regime had changed, he contended that this was 
a change in degree rather than a change in kind.
4
 
  
According to Biersteker (1993), developing countries’ loss of access to international 
financial markets during the 1980s proved that Cohen was right: “(…) the petrodollar 
recycling by the commercial banks during the 1970s was more of an interruption in the 
post-war balance of payments regime than an indication of its profound 
transformation”. In his view, the management of the 1980s debt crisis can be best 
interpreted as an international regime broadly re-establishing the principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures described earlier by Cohen. The 1980s debt 
regime, therefore, was another stage in the evolution of the regime established at 
Bretton Woods. The most substantial addition to that regime was the gradual 
consolidation of the principle that in exchange for debt relief countries would pursue 
market oriented reforms (Brady plan). 
 
Gould’s theory of supplementary financiers is also related with Cohen’s idea of the IMF 
as an arbiter for access to financing (Gould, 2003). Her main insight was that the IMF 
has historically complemented its programs with resources provided by states, private 
creditors and other international organizations such as the World Bank. Without 
supplementary financing, its programs would have failed to cover countries’ balance of 
payment needs and the IMF would have lost leverage over its members. However, 
Gould showed empirically that supplementary financiers have gradually acquired the 
power to demand the inclusion of certain conditions in IMF programs. In her view, this 
                                                          
4
 Using the terminology developed by Ruggie (1983), the rise of private lending is seen by Cohen as a 
“norm-governed change” affecting rules and decision-making procedures, but leaving principle and 
norms essentially intact. 
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mechanism explains why the scope of conditionality has expanded so markedly in spite 
of the Fund’s staff and Executive Directors’ repeated attempts at reversing this trend. 
 
Mainstream neo-liberal scholars tend to be state-centric and view international 
organizations as structure rather than agents. However, some contributions have treated 
these institutions as semi-autonomous actors exerting their own influence over 
international outcomes. This is the case of the theories of delegation rooted in the 
principal-agent model. According to this approach, delegation to a multilateral 
institution is a specific variant of international cooperation. States may opt to delegate 
for different reasons: to exploit gains from specialization, especially for repetitive or 
technical tasks; to overcome collective action problems and capture policy externalities; 
to pursue legitimacy and not to bear the full blame for the potential consequences of 
specific courses of action; to enhance the credibility of their policy commitments and 
reduce the incidence of time inconsistency problems; to facilitate collective decision-
making or dispute resolution in specific issue-areas (Hawkins et al., 2006). Along with 
these potential benefits, the act of delegating authority to an international institution 
generates agency problems because the preferences of principals (states) and agents 
(international organizations) are never exactly aligned. Furthermore, contracts 
delegating authority are imperfect and monitoring and control mechanisms costly 
meaning that, in the presence of information asymmetries, there is always room for the 
agent to act opportunistically. In other words, once authority has been delegated, 
international organizations can shift policy away from states’ preferred outcomes, 
giving rise to agency “slack”.  
 
Principal-agent models have been used to study the relationship between the IMF and 
its member states from various angles. Killick (1997) applied it to argue that 
conditionality is an ineffective tool to improve the quality of policy-making in 
developing countries. In his framework, the Bretton Woods Institutions are principals 
and their member states agents with a clear incentive to depart from the policies agreed 
upon in specific loans. Alternatively, Martin (2006) treated states as principals and IMF 
staff as their agent. Analyzing the historical development of rules concerning the use of 
conditionality, she tested a number of hypotheses relating distributional and 
informational concerns with the autonomy of the IMF. She found that staff discretion 
tends to be greater when: there is a strong dissatisfaction with the status quo, as tends to 
27 
 
be the case during a crisis; states’ preferences diverge; the design of a successful 
program requires high quality information and the recipients of such programs are 
concerned with the leakage of confidential data. Similarly, Copelovitch (2008) treated 
the five largest IMF shareholders (the G5) as a collective principal and the Fund’s staff 
as its agent. Consistent with Martin, his empirical analysis found that the size and 
conditionality of IMF programs tend to be closer to the Fund’s preferred outcome when 
there is a higher degree of heterogeneity in the preferences of the G5. 
 
Although agency models provide a powerful instrument to study the interactions 
between states and international organizations, they usually fail to explain why the 
preferences of both actors may come to diverge. Instead, public choice scholars focus 
on international bureaucrats’ incentive structures as an explanation for this divergence 
and, more generally, for public policy failures. Roland Vaubel departed from the 
premise that “bureaucracies are interested in power, prestige and amenities” to explain 
certain patterns in the evolution of IMF lending and conditionality, the scale and scope 
of which are instrumental for bureaucrats to maximize their budget and autonomy 
(Vaubel, 1986, 1991, 1996). In a similar vein, Dreher (2004) argued that the Fund’s 
Executive Board is used by countries to resist the staff’s drive for more conditionality 
and, therefore, more power. In this context, countries’ bargaining capacity at the Board 
should be negatively correlated with the scope of the conditions imposed on them. 
However, because until recently the largest IMF shareholders were no longer considered 
potential borrowers, the Board has gradually given in to the staff lobbying for more 
intrusive conditionality. Other scholars focusing on the bargaining process between the 
various stakeholders of multilateral organization have adopted more nuanced views on 
the motivations of international officials. Bruno Frey (1997) for instance, claimed that 
“international bureaucrats pursue those policies that give them more prestige and 
influence within the reference groups with which they are connected”. Willett (2002), in 
turn, contends that international officials’ main objective is to progress in their 
professional careers, which incentivizes them to adopt their managers’ preferences.  
 
In conclusion, mainstream neo-liberal theories are particularly useful to understand why 
the IMF was created in the first place and how the institution has evolved over time. But 
this strand of the literature is more limited when it comes to analyzing cross-sectional 
variation in IMF interventions, especially when these interventions take place 
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simultaneously, as was the case in Argentina and Uruguay. Nevertheless, the 
contributions reviewed above identify some potential sources of variation. For Gould 
(2003) it is important to look at the interests of supplementary financiers, which may 
have been different in the cases of Argentina and Uruguay. Following the logic of 
principal-agent models, the multilateral response to these two crises could also have 
differed because the international community was keener to delegate authority to the 
IMF in one case or another, maybe as a result of more or less convergent creditors’ 
preferences (Martin, 2006; Copelovitch, 2008). Public choice scholars, in turn, would 
emphasize the role of bureaucrats’ incentives during the management of the Argentine 
and the Uruguayan crises, which may have varied as a result of these two countries’ 
different systemic importance. 
 
2.1.2 The constructivist approach 
 
Constructivist scholars argue that international cooperation is a social construction 
rather than the product of purely rational calculations on the part of egoist states with 
static preferences and ideas. In other words, they view international relations as a 
“world of our making” in which agents and structure are mutually constituted and 
interact on the basis of widely shared intersubjective beliefs (Onuf, 1989; Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 2001). As a specific form of international cooperation, constructivist 
scholars view multilateral organizations themselves as social facts that cannot be 
studied in isolation from the environment, culture and ideas in which they are 
embedded. Furthermore, once they are created international organizations also originate 
a distinctive social knowledge that influences the beliefs of their creators. In this way 
these institutions gradually become autonomous and purposive actors in world politics.  
 
Departing from a Weberian conception of bureaucracy as the embodiment of the 
technical rationality demanded by modern societies, Barnett and Finnemore (1999) 
concentrated on the reasons why international organizations exercise power 
autonomously. It is precisely this “rational-legal authority” together with their control 
over knowledge and expertise what turns these institutions into independent actors 
exercising their own power in a variety of ways: they “define shared international tasks 
(like ‘development’), create and define new categories of actors (like ‘refugees’), create 
new interests for actors (like ‘promoting human rights’) and transfer models of political 
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organization around the world (like markets and democracy)”. However, international 
organizations are prone to misusing this power because their distinctive cultural features 
tend to breed dysfunctional or even “pathological” behavior. Drawing from sociological 
institutionalism, Barnett and Finnemore identify five bureaucratic mechanisms that 
yield such undesirable outcomes: the “irrationality of rationalization” that occurs when 
norms become ends in themselves; the inattention to local contexts and concerns arising 
from international organizations’ tendency to develop universal rules and categories; 5 
the “normalization of deviance” that comes with the gradual acceptance of exceptions as 
rules; the insulation from other competing worldviews affecting bureaucrats belonging 
to specific organizations; the contestation between various sub-cultures within a 
multilateral institution.  
 
Babb (2003) also adopted a sociological approach to study the process through which 
international organizations come to gradually diverge from the objectives and goals of 
their creators. In her view, this “organizational slippage” is partly the result of 
ambiguous charters arising from the complexities of the multilateral negotiations 
establishing these institutions. In the case of the IMF, the ambiguity of the Articles of 
Agreement materialized in conflicting interpretations and disagreements about the role 
of conditionality in financial programs. Eventually, however, the Fund has played a 
relatively stable role in international financial affairs shaped by three sources of 
structure: external pressure from the US Treasury; “mimetic isophormism” understood 
as the replication of pre-IMF arrangements to cover countries’ balance of payment 
needs;
6
 shifting dominant paradigms among economists, the dominant professional 
category at the IMF. According to Babb, these three factors combine to explain the 
IMF’s gradual departure from its original Keynesian mandate to embrace the objective 
of promoting free markets and macroeconomic austerity as its main raison d’être. 
 
In a similar vein, Jeffrey Chwieroth (2010) explored the dynamics that gradually 
modified the Fund’s staff position on capital controls in spite of the absence of formal 
                                                          
5
 The example offered by Barnett and Finnemore to illustrate this “universalism” is the imposition of 
conditions of fiscal austerity in IMF programs to address the Asian financial crisis. The IMF exported a 
Latin American mode of action to an Asian context in spite of the fact that fiscal profligacy was not a 
cause of the Thai, Korean and Indonesian crises.  
6
 The loans agreed between central banks during the Gold Standard, which also imposed policy 
conditionality.  
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rules about the institution’s role in the promotion of financial liberalization.7 Based on 
surveys, archival research and extensive interviews he tracked the formation of beliefs 
and the internal debates that led to this normative change, emphasizing the following 
dynamics. Professionalization refers to the process through which by the 1970s 
economists had gradually reconstructed their discipline’s mainstream understandings 
about the desirability of capital mobility. As a result of the generational renovation of 
IMF economists that took place in the 1980s and 1990s, these new beliefs were inserted 
in the Fund’s decision-making process. The emerging market crises of the 1990s 
triggered a process of adaptation that fed an internal debate about how to proceed (the 
sequencing vs. big bang approach) but failed to question the long-term objective of 
fostering capital freedom.
8
 Chwieroth also emphasized the ways in which norm 
entrepreneurs within some of the Fund’s subcultures strategically exploited agency 
slack to construct technical interpretations of events that called for policy initiatives 
compatible with their principles and beliefs. 
 
As was the case with some of the mainstream neo-liberal contributions described in 
section 2.1.1, constructivist scholars have tended to concentrate on the forces behind the 
emergence and evolution of the IMF as an institution rather than on the determinants of 
specific multilateral interventions. In fact, given that the Argentine and the Uruguayan 
crises took place almost simultaneously and were relatively similar in nature, it would 
be difficult to argue that ideational variables were a significant determinant of the 
variation observed in the Fund’s interventions in these two countries. Furthermore, 
because the same IMF department handled the negotiations (the Western Hemisphere 
Department) and because of the cultural proximity between Argentina and Uruguay 
there is no a priori reason to emphasize the explanatory potential of diverging inter-
subjective beliefs.
9
 The constructivist view of the world, therefore, appears ill-equipped 
to study the causes of the contrasting multilateral response to the Argentine and the 
Uruguayan crises.    
 
                                                          
7
 During the 1990s there was an attempt to amend the Fund’s Articles of Agreement in order to formalize 
the objective of liberalizing the capital account. However, this attempt was dropped after the Asian 
financial crisis. 
8
 As opposed to adaptation, a learning process would have entailed a change in beliefs about the 
desirability of capital mobility as a policy objective. 
9
 On the other hand, as will be argued in Chapter VII, the contrasting response to the Argentine and 
Uruguayan crises may have had a significant effect on the evolution of inter-subjective beliefs in 
Argentina and Uruguay.  
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2.1.3 The realist approach 
 
As opposed to constructivists, realist scholars tend to consider that international 
organizations are epiphenomenal to states interests and, therefore, have a limited 
explanatory role of their own. In fact, realists consider that power is central to explain 
most international outcomes, yielding a rather pessimistic view about the resilience of 
cooperative arrangements between states. This skepticism is grounded in three 
presumptions about the nature of the international system: states care about relative 
rather than absolute gains (Grieco, 1988); international anarchy poses too binding a 
constraint on cooperation (Waltz, 1979); states always fear others cheating on their 
commitments (Grieco, 1993).  This is not to say that international regimes and 
multilateral organizations cannot exist. However, it means that realists view such 
arrangements as “little more than ciphers for state power” (Koremenos et al., 2001). In 
other words, international organizations may constrain behavior, but only that of weaker 
states. 
 
Both realist and institutionalist contributions adopt a state centric rationalist approach. 
This concord reflects the neoliberal objective of departing from realist assumptions to 
reach different conclusions about the feasibility of cooperation between states 
(Keohane, 1984). In 1991, however, Stephen Krasner articulated a powerful realist 
counter-critique to the neo-liberal research agenda which is illustrative of the debate 
between both schools of thought (Krasner, 1991). His basic point was that the prisoner’s 
dilemma fails to depict many of the situations that arise in international affairs. Instead, 
a more realistic characterization of a usual challenge in the formation of international 
regimes is the Battle of the Sexes game, where there is agreement on the undesirable 
outcomes but not on the preferred one. In this setting there are various possible co-
operative possibilities along a Pareto frontier, each of which has different distributional 
outcomes which are likely to generate conflict and discord. According to Krasner, these 
are dilemmas of common aversion rather than common interest, and give rise to 
institutional arrangements that are “better explained by the distribution of power 
capabilities than by efforts to solve problems of market failure” (Krasner, 1991). Power 
can be used to solve such distributional conflicts in various ways: to impose who sits at 
the negotiating table; to impose the rules of the game and thereby determine which 
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particular point will be realized in the Pareto frontier; to alter other states’ incentives 
(the ‘payoff matrix’), for instance through threats or promises.   
 
Several empirical contributions have tested realist hypotheses about IOs and, more 
specifically, about the IMF. In an influential paper Thacker (1999) tested 
econometrically whether political proximity to the US or the political realignment 
towards US positions at the United Nations General Assembly increase countries’ 
probability of entering into an IMF program. He found robust evidence to support the 
political realignment hypothesis: “the US has been more concerned with attracting new 
allies and punishing defectors than rewarding loyal friends”. Barro and Lee (2005) 
extended this analysis to show that political proximity to other major IMF shareholders 
also increases the probability of receiving a loan. Economic proximity with such 
countries (proxied by bilateral trade) is also found to be a significant determinant of 
IMF lending in their study. Similarly, Oatley and Yackee (2004) found that IMF lending 
tends to be directed towards countries to which American banks are more exposed. In 
turn, Reynaud and Vauday (2009) illustrated the importance of geopolitical factors in 
IMF lending decisions. Finally, Stone (2008) found that countries that are important 
recipient of US aid are more likely to have an IMF program approved and are subject to 
a less intrusive conditionality. However, the US is willing to exert its leverage on the 
design of IMF programs only for important allies, and borrowing governments only 
request the US support when they are in a highly vulnerable situation. According to 
Stone, in other circumstances IMF economists have much more leeway in the program 
negotiations with borrowing countries. 
 
The neo-realist approach offers a more promising avenue to study variation in the 
Fund’s response to specific financial crises. In fact, it yields a rather straightforward 
prediction: those countries in which the US and other important creditors have more 
material and political interests will receive a better treatment from the IMF. But as 
argued in Chapter 1, this prediction does not fit well with the Argentine and Uruguayan 
experiences. Indeed, there is little doubt that at the time of the 2001-02 crises the 
Argentine economy was systemically much more important than that of Uruguay. In 
this context, why did the G-7 end up suspending its support to Argentina fall while 
adopting extraordinary actions to rescue Uruguay a few months later? Powerful states’ 
material interests and, more generally, international variables on their own seem to have 
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a limited potential to explain that outcome. A close examination is therefore needed on 
the scholarly contributions that have concentrated on the domestic level of analysis.   
 
2.2 The domestic level of analysis 
 
The IMF lends only to countries that request participating in a program. Furthermore, 
once an agreement has been reached between the Fund and a borrowing government, 
the policies and measures on which disbursements are conditioned have to go through 
domestic political and bureaucratic institutions in order to be ratified and implemented. 
Therefore, domestic variables are likely to play a significant role in the allocation of 
IMF credit and in the design and implementation of its programs. This section presents 
the contributions that have focused on the domestic level of analysis.
10
 Because the 
countries that sign an IMF program are usually going through a financial, fiscal and/or 
balance of payment crisis, it begins with a selective overview of the literature on the 
politics of economic adjustment and reform. Then, it will continue with the 
contributions that have concentrated more specifically on the role of domestic political 
variables in the negotiation and implementation of IMF arrangements.  
 
2.2.1 The politics of domestic adjustment 
 
The domestic political processes that shape states’ response to an economic crisis have 
received much scholarly attention. This literature was kick-started by the 1980s debt 
crisis and by the realization that countries facing relatively similar shocks ended up 
taking different macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform paths.
11
 More 
specifically, variation was identified in the timing of the measures adopted to address 
the debt crisis, the content of these measures and the extent to which countries 
persevered with adjustment and structural reform. Early contributions tended to 
emphasize the collective action problems stemming from the distributional 
consequences of macroeconomic adjustment. In the words of Alesina and Drazen 
(1991), such distributional effects tend to feed a “war of attrition” between the various 
groups affected by these measures, resulting in substantial delays in the decision-
                                                          
10
 In this section the domestic level of analysis focuses on debtor rather than creditor nations. 
11
 Good summaries of this early literature are provided in the volumes edited by Nelson in 1990 and by 
Haggard and Kaufman in 1992 (Nelson, 1990; Haggard and Kaufman, 1992). 
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making process which carry a cost for society as a whole. Furthermore, potential 
winners are not only more dispersed but also more uncertain about the potential benefits 
of the reforms than the groups that lose, which weakens the incentives of the former to 
mobilize against the status quo (Fernández and Rodrik, 1991). Supporting the 
contention that democratic governments are likely to be more exposed to such interest 
group pressures, various case study analyses argued that authoritarian regimes were 
more successful at initiating reforms (Kaufman, 1985; Kahler, 1986). However, the 
broader comparisons and statistical studies that looked at this issue failed to provide 
consistent evidence that democracy systematically impairs governments’ economic 
adjustment efforts (Haggard and Webb, 1993) 
 
Going beyond the democracy vs. authoritarianism debate, politicians and technocrats’ 
autonomy from the pull of distributive politics has long been emphasized as a crucial 
requirement for the initiation of the reform process (Kaufman and Haggard, 1992). 
However, various contributions have also argued that once such processes of change are 
launched their consolidation will depend on whether the state elites that are behind the 
reforms are able to construct supportive and relatively stable coalitions of beneficiaries. 
In an attempt to reconcile these two apparently contradictory necessities, Peter Evans 
(1992, 1995) developed the notion of “embedded autonomy”. This referred to the 
beneficial effects of bureaucracies that are insulated from the pressures of particularistic 
interests but sufficiently integrated in a network of social and institutional ties with non-
governmental actors, enabling the state to fine-tune its policies and to generate the trust 
and support that is needed to sustain reform processes.
12
 According to this argument, 
those governments that reach an appropriate balance between autonomy and 
embeddedness will be better placed both to foster economic development and to 
adequately respond to economic shocks.   
 
More recently, some scholars have built upon Tsebelis’ veto-player theory to identify 
the factors that determine governments’ capacity to adapt when policy changes become 
necessary (Tsebelis, 1995, 2002). Part of the reason why this approach has received so 
much attention is that it provides a general framework applicable to all types of political 
systems, making it possible to go beyond the pairwise comparisons that had previously 
                                                          
12
 Evans argued that this embedded autonomy is behind the success of developmental states such as South 
Korea. 
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dominated the literature and opening the way to broader statistical analyses. Indeed, this 
analytical framework uses only two dimensions to characterize polities: the number of 
veto-players and their policy preferences. Veto-players are defined as “individual or 
collective actors whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo” (Tsebelis, 
1995).  Such actors can have different forms. Institutional veto players are individual or 
collective decision-making bodies such as presidents or the chambers of parliament, 
which derive their power from the constitution. In turn, partisan veto players are parties 
or factions within parties endogenously empowered by the political game. Other 
potential veto-players are the judiciary, the army, particularistic interest groups or actors 
with the prerogative of launching a referendum. Tsebelis’ model predicts that departing 
from the status quo will be more difficult when the number of veto-players is high and 
when their preferences (their “ideal points”) diverge. The internal cohesiveness of 
collective veto players will also tend to impair polities’ responsiveness to economic 
shocks.   
 
Having a small number of like-minded veto-players, therefore, should be expected to 
facilitate the process of policy adjustment. However, the presence of checks and 
balances underpinning the credibility of the executive’s policy commitments has long 
been identified as an important determinant of economic development, providing the 
necessary stability and predictability for private investment to flourish (North and 
Thomas, 1973; North and Weingast, 1989; Henisz, 2000; Stasavage, 2002). This 
suggests that there is a trade-off between policy stability and policy adaptability. In the 
words of Haggard and Mc Cubbins (2001: 27): “as the effective number of veto-players 
increases, the polity becomes more resolute and less decisive”.  Building upon this idea, 
MacIntyre (2001) has argued that countries in an intermediate situation are better placed 
to address a crisis. The reason is that an excessive concentration of veto authority tends 
to generate policy volatility whereas institutional configurations with an excessive 
dispersion of veto authority tend to generate policy rigidity, both of which feed 
investors’ panics in a situation of crisis. In order to substantiate this point, MacIntyre 
compared the response of international investors to the Asian financial crisis in four 
countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. He attributes the fact that 
the Philippines suffered the least severe capital flows’ reversal to its intermediate 
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distribution of veto authority.
13
 Angkinand and Willett’s econometric analysis brought 
support to this hypothesis: out of a sample of 45 episodes in 27 emerging economies 
they found that banking crises were costlier in those countries with an absence of veto-
players or with too many such actors (Angkinand and Willett, 2008).     
 
However, building upon the theory of repeated games, some contributions have 
challenged the view that policy stability and policy adaptability are necessarily 
conflictive objectives. A recent example is Scartascini et al. (2010) who emphasize the 
inter-temporal nature of the policy-making process to argue that under certain 
conditions and depending on the needs of the moment, cooperation between political 
actors can produce both outcomes at different points in time. According to this line of 
thought, polities’ responsiveness to an economic crisis does not depend on the number 
of veto-players but on their ability to engage in an inter-temporal bargaining process. In 
their set-up, adding veto-players to the game does not undermine the ability of 
governments to adjust their policies, but rather the opposite. The reason is that if veto 
players fear that they may lose that condition while knowing that the preferences of 
those that will succeed them differ from theirs, they will not only concentrate their 
political activity on the content of public policies but also on the adoption of decision-
making technologies that constrain future choices.
14
 The uncertainty that they face is 
more marked when checks and balances are weak, providing veto players an incentive 
to “write policy in stone today” in order to insure against the risk of opportunistic one-
sided behaviour tomorrow. Instead, the presence of strong checks and balances 
increases the likelihood that current veto players will retain their sit at the table, 
weakening their incentives to introduce additional rigidities. Hence, a larger number of 
veto players may be associated with more flexible decision making procedures and, 
therefore, with greater policy adaptability.  
 
The critical question for these authors is what conditions make cooperation among 
political actors more likely, yielding both policy stability and policy adaptability. In 
their repeated game model it is easier to sustain a cooperative equilibrium when there 
                                                          
13
 Instead, Indonesia and Malaysia had the most centralized veto authority, which generated problems of 
policy volatility, whereas Thailand had the most decentralized veto authority, yielding policy rigidity. 
14
 For instance, policies can be constitutionalized, international agreements with high exit costs can be 
signed and heavy delegations structures can be set up. An obvious example is the currency board adopted 
in Argentina in the 1990s. 
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are more veto players but a lower number of political actors affected by policies’ 
distributional impact, when players are more patient and when they have an element of 
common interest (Scartascini et al., 2010). Stein and Tommasi (2008) looked at this 
issue from an empirical perspective, adopting a case study approach to identify the 
institutional features that foster cooperation in the policy-making processes of eight 
Latin American countries. Their study found substantial longitudinal and cross-sectional 
variation in the dependent variable, with countries like Chile and Brazil much more 
capable of sustaining cooperation than others like Argentina and Ecuador. Among the 
various factors that influence that outcome, they emphasized the presence of 
policymaking institutions that provide an arena where political actors interact repeatedly 
during sufficiently long periods of time.
15
 The degree of institutionalization of these 
policymaking arenas and the availability of enforcement technologies such as 
professional and politically neutral bureaucracies or independent judiciaries was also 
found to weaken actors’ tendency to defect from cooperative arrangements. Finally, 
cooperation will be easier to sustain in policy areas in which the short-term payoff of 
deviating from inter-temporal agreements is low.    
 
In sum, the literature reviewed in this section identifies various factors that may 
significantly influence the implementation of the macroeconomic adjustment and 
structural reforms associated with IMF conditionality. In particular, the number and 
preferences of veto players together with political actors’ ability to cooperate may have 
constituted potentially important sources of variation in the Argentine and the 
Uruguayan case studies. But this literature is not concerned with the specific context of 
IMF programs and, therefore, leaves some important questions unanswered about the 
causal link between domestic politics and multilateral crisis lending. As described in the 
following section, however, this issue has received increasing scholarly attention in 
recent years. 
 
2.2.2 Domestic politics and IMF programs 
 
The contributions that have looked at the relationship between domestic political 
variables and the Fund’s program engagement in emerging economies have 
                                                          
15
 This point is substantiated by the finding that more cooperation is found in countries where legislators 
are replaced less frequently.  
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concentrated primarily on the following three questions. The first one is related with the 
decision to participate in an IMF program. Why do countries request the Fund’s 
financial support? Are IMF programs merely a response to an economic necessity or do 
political calculations come into play? The second is related with the design of these 
programs. To what extent do domestic political constraints influence the negotiation of 
the policy conditions attached to an IMF program? The third question is related with the 
implementation phase. What are the domestic political and institutional variables that 
determine countries’ capacity to comply with conditionality and to successfully 
implement an IMF program? 
 
Focusing on the first question, the dominant view has been that there is a stigma 
attached to participating in a program because IMF conditionality is painful, unpopular, 
and often perceived as an imposition from abroad. Therefore, requesting the Fund’s 
financial support carries a political cost and national governments tend to resort to it as 
a last resort when they face a crisis situation. This is consistent with the fact that 
governments tend to request an IMF program right after they are elected, partly in order 
not to be held electorally accountable for that decision in the short term (Stone, 2008). 
Supporting the contention that requesting the Fund’s support is a matter of necessity, a 
substantial body of evidence has identified various economic variables that are 
significantly associated with countries’ propensity to participate in a program. As 
shown in table 2.1, most studies find that weak external accounts (proxied by the stock 
of foreign exchange reserves and the current account balance) and a stagnant economy 
(proxied by GDP growth) increase the probability that countries will turn to the IMF for 
assistance. In turn, countries’ debt burden appears to have an ambiguous effect. On the 
one hand, various studies find a positive correlation between the probability of 
participating in an IMF program and the ratio of debt servicing to GDP. On the other 
hand, different contributions find opposite results about the impact of total debt to GDP 
and of the budget balance. Finally, a number of studies have found that trade openness 
and a lower per capita income make it more likely that a country will enter an IMF 
program.  
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Table 2.1 
Macroeconomic determinants of participation in IMF programs
16
 
 
However, some scholars have also argued that governments may request an IMF 
program not only because they need to but also because, under certain circumstances, 
they may have a political incentive to do so. Although this public choice argument was 
originally put forward by Roland Vaubel, it has been developed primarily by Allan 
Drazen and James Vreeland (Vaubel, 1986; Drazen, 2002; Vreeland, 2003a, 2003b, 
                                                          
16
 The table reports the signs of the statistically significant correlations between countries’ propensity to 
enter an IMF program and macroeconomic variables found in the relevant literature.  
F/X 
Reserves
GDP 
growth
Current 
account 
balance 
over GDP
Debt 
service 
over GDP
Debt/GDP Budget 
balance
Change in 
exchange 
rate
Trade 
openness
GDP per 
capita
Investment
Garuda, 2000 - - +
Przeworski & 
Vreeland, 
2000
+  -
Bird & 
Rowlands, 
2001
- - -
Hutchinson, 
2003 - +
Bird et. al., 
2004 +
Brune et al., 
2004 - + +
Jensen, 2004 - - +
Sturm et al., 
2005 - - -
Barro and 
Lee, 2005 - -
Edwards, 
2005 - - +
Eichengreen 
et al., 2006 - + + + +
Nooruddin & 
Simmons, 
2006
- - -
Dreher, 2006 + -
Broz & 
Hawes, 2006 - +
Atoian & 
Comway, 
2006
- -
Stone, 2008 - + + -
Source: Steinward & Stone (2008)
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2007).
17
 Drazen developed a theoretical model in which he showed that even when the 
IMF and its borrowers agree on the policies to be attached to a program, conditionality 
can play an important role by reinforcing the government’s bargaining position vis-à-vis 
the interest groups opposed to adjustment and reform. In turn, according to Vreeland 
there are three main reasons why governments can have a desire for IMF 
conditionality.
18
 First, national policy-makers may use the IMF as a scapegoat to lessen 
the political cost associated with the adoption of unpopular adjustment measures or 
structural reforms.  Second, some governments may want to become subject to 
conditionality in order to send a positive signal to private investors about the quality of 
their economic policies. Third, along the lines of Drazen’s model, national politicians 
may desire conditionality in order to gain leverage in the domestic political process, 
tipping the balance in favour of the ratification of certain policies that, in the absence of 
an IMF program, would have been blocked by veto players opposed to a departure from 
the status quo. Vreeland emphasized this third mechanism, which creates an additional 
cost for veto-players to oppose the policies covered by the Fund’s conditionality if the 
possibility of a disruptive program suspension is credible enough.
19
  
 
Most of the studies that have tried to identify the determinants of conditionality have 
focused on international factors such as the interests of powerful countries and 
supplementary financiers or the bureaucratic incentives of IMF negotiators. However, 
the impact of domestic political constraints on the bargaining process between 
borrowing countries and the IMF has also been explored recently. Randall Stone (2008) 
interpreted conditionality as the result of a negotiation in which the IMF is given space 
to bargain autonomously when US strategic interests are not at stake. His econometric 
analysis found that domestic political conditions matter.
20
 More specifically, the IMF 
appears to impose less policy conditions to democracies, presidential regimes and 
                                                          
17
 This is not to say that these scholars disregard the political cost of signing an IMF program. However, 
they argue that the political benefits of conditionality may sometimes surpass this cost, especially in 
countries that are “used” to being in an IMF program. According to Vreeland, this is why even after 
economic factors are controlled for, having been under an IMF program in the past (recidivism) is a 
significant predictor of participation in IMF programs (Vreeland, 2007). 
18
 Drazen uses this model to illustrate why the ideas of program conditionality and country ownership are 
not necessarily contradictory. 
19
 This is why Vreeland argues that domestic political calculations will matter less in countries that count 
on the support of the US or other large IMF shareholders, where the threat of a program suspension is not 
credible (Vreeland, 2004). 
20
 This econometric analysis is conducted using the Fund’s MONA (Monitoring of Fund Arrangements) 
database, which contains information about programs’ conditionality and countries’ performance with it. 
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coalition governments. According to Stone, the reason is that under these circumstances 
governments face stronger political constraints domestically, which they use as a 
bargaining tool in their negotiations with the IMF. Therefore, Stone interprets this result 
as evidence of a causality that runs in the opposite direction of Vreeland’s contention 
that governments facing strong veto players domestically tend to exploit the Fund’s 
conditionality as an instrument to gain leverage in the domestic political process.  
 
Focusing next on the third question, various studies have identified some domestic 
political and institutional variables that compromise borrowing governments’ capacity 
to successfully implement an IMF program. Ivanova et al. constructed three measures of 
program performance: a binary variable that captures whether programs are temporarily 
or permanently interrupted, a quantitative indicator that reflects the extent to which 
borrowing countries comply with conditionality and the ratio of the resources 
committed by a program that are actually disbursed (Ivanova et al., 2003).
21
 Their 
econometric analysis found that the presence of strong interest groups in parliament, 
political instability, ethnic fragmentation, a lack of political cohesion and poor quality 
bureaucracies significantly undermine the implementation of IMF programs. 
Furthermore, once they control for these political and institutional variables, economic 
conditions in borrowing countries have a statistically non-significant impact on the 
success prospects of IMF programs. Using a similar specification, Arpac et al. (2006) 
also emphasized the important role of political variables in the implementation of IMF 
programs. More specifically, they found that the presence of veto players is a 
particularly significant predictor of program interruptions.  In line with Ivanova et al., 
borrowing countries’ macroeconomic conditions are not found to affect the likelihood 
that a program will be successfully implemented.
22
 Another contribution that builds 
upon Ivanova et al. is Nsouli et al. (2004), who found that government corruption is 
negatively associated with the likelihood of success in program implementation. 
 
Summing up the literature on the domestic politics of IMF programs, there is some 
evidence to argue that borrowing governments do not only request the Fund’s financial 
assistance because they need to but also because under certain conditions they may have 
                                                          
21
 They find that 44 percent of the programs they analysed were irreversibly interrupted while 70 percent 
experienced at least one minor or major disruption. 
22
 Only trade openness positively affects program implementation in their study. 
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a domestic political incentive to do so. Indeed, conditionality can be an instrument used 
by politicians to reinforce their leverage against the interest groups that are opposed to 
their desired policies. On the other hand, the possibility that causality runs in the other 
direction has also been emphasized: borrowing countries may exploit domestic political 
constraints to strengthen their bargaining position vis-à-vis the IMF. There is broad 
evidence to argue that domestic political and institutional variables have a marked 
impact on the implementation of IMF programs. What is perhaps more surprising is that 
when these variables are controlled for, borrowing countries’ ability to comply with the 
Fund’s conditionality appears not to be influenced by economic conditions.   
 
2.3 Bridging the gap: the two-level game analytical framework 
 
Although most scholars with an interest in the IMF continue to concentrate either on the 
domestic or on the international level of analysis, a number of recent contributions have 
tried to integrate these two approaches. A case in point is the aforementioned exchange 
between James Vreeland (2003a) and Randall Stone (2008) about the direction of the 
casual relationship between domestic political constraints and the negotiation of the 
Fund’s conditionality. Another attempt to integrate the domestic and international 
politics of IMF interventions is Pop-Eleches (2009), whose study provides a holistic 
account of the multilateral response to financial crises in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe during the 1980s and 1990s. This dissertation pulls in a similar direction, 
applying a two-level game approach to test and generate hypotheses about the ways in 
which domestic and international factors jointly interact to shape IMF interventions in 
emerging economies. This section begins with a summary of Putnam’s 1988 seminal 
paper on two level games. It continues with some preliminary considerations about the 
application of this approach to the negotiations between the IMF and its borrowing 
members. Finally, in order to set the stage for the empirical analysis presented in 
subsequent chapters, a stylized representation of this analytical framework is provided. 
 
2.3.1 Putnam’s two-level games  
 
The two-level game approach developed by Robert Putnam in 1988 constitutes one 
of the most prominent attempts to integrate the domestic and the international levels 
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of analysis in the study of international relations (Putnam, 1988).
23
 This analytical 
framework focuses on the figure of “chief negotiators”, who participate in two 
negotiations that may be conceived as taking place either sequentially or 
simultaneously: a “level I game” in which they bargain with their foreign peers in 
order to coordinate policies in a specific issue-area and a “level II game” in which 
they bargain with their constituents in order for the level I agreement to be ratified 
domestically. The crucial link between the domestic and the international levels of 
analysis is provided by the need for consistency between the outcomes of the two 
games: whatever is agreed at the level I game needs to be ratified domestically by all 
the chief negotiators in order to be brought into fruition. As a result, a re-alignment 
in any of the two games can trigger re-alignments in the other, which provides fertile 
ground for analysing strategic interactions between the international negotiations’ 
various stakeholders. 
 
In order to operationalize the two-level game metaphor, Putnam introduced the 
concept of win-sets, which refer to all the possible level I agreements that negotiators 
can ratify domestically. The contours of their respective win-sets, therefore, 
determine the constraints that domestic ratification politics impose on each chief 
negotiator. Because the outcome of the level I game needs to be ratified by all the 
chief negotiators, the universe of feasible agreements is given by the intersection 
between all the individual win-sets, which is the overall constraint of the two-level 
game. Departing from a number of initial assumptions (each chief negotiator has 
perfect information about the contours of his own and on his peers’ win-sets; the 
payoff structure of the various games is fixed; chief negotiators are “honest brokers” 
with no agendas of their own), this basic framework enabled Putnam to articulate 
two central hypotheses. The first one is that international cooperation (i.e. a level I 
agreement) is more likely to be achieved if win-sets are large, the corollary of which 
being that conflict is likelier when win-sets are small. In iterative two-level games 
this implies that transitions from cooperation to conflict can be explained in terms of 
shrinking win-sets and vice versa. The second hypothesis is that chief-negotiators 
with a smaller win-set have a bargaining advantage over chief-negotiators with 
                                                          
23
 Another important attempt is Gourevitch second-image reversed theory (Gourevitch, 1978).  See 
Caporaso (1997) for an in-depth review of this literature. 
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larger win-sets. In other words, difficulties to ratify an international agreement 
domestically can be used as a bargaining tool in the level I negotiation. 
 
A difficulty associated with these two hypotheses is that the size of win-sets is an 
abstract and rarely observable concept. Hence, in order to be testable, the two-level 
game framework requires a theory or the generation of additional hypotheses to link 
the size of win-sets with other observable variables. More specifically, Putnam 
considered three broad categories of possible determinants of win-sets. The first one 
refers to domestic ratification procedures and to the institutions that shape them, 
which may empower certain constituencies at the expense of others and give rise to 
specific veto-players with the capacity to derail an international negotiation. The 
second category of variables refers to the distribution of power between the various 
coalitions and interest groups that are affected by the international agreement and 
that may have an influence over the ratification process. This second category of 
determinants will be particularly relevant if the cost of agreement or of non-
agreement in the level I negotiation is unevenly distributed among level II 
constituents. Domestic ratification politics will matter especially if obtaining “more” 
in the level I negotiation is not necessarily “better” for all the level II constituents. 
The third category of variables refers to the strategy adopted by chief negotiators, 
which may have tools at their disposal to alter the size both of their own and of their 
opponents’ win-set. For instance, chief negotiators may use side payments or 
“generic good-will” in an attempt either to increase the likelihood of domestic 
ratification or to gain leverage in the international negotiation.    
 
Putnam’s article on two-level games also explored the implications of relaxing the 
framework’s initial assumptions. Introducing uncertainty makes involuntary 
defection feasible, an idea that is more difficult to integrate in the theories of 
international cooperation that treat states as unitary and purposeful actors. Indeed, as 
opposed to the more traditional concept of opportunistic or voluntary defection, 
involuntary defection refers to situations in which well-intentioned chief negotiators 
overestimate the size of their win-set and fail to obtain the domestic ratification of an 
international agreement to which they have already committed. According to 
Putnam, involuntary defection could be as significant an obstacle to international 
cooperation as opportunistic defection because some chief-negotiators may decide 
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not to take part in a level I agreement if they become sceptical about their peers’ 
chances of obtaining domestic ratification. On the other hand, some chief-negotiators 
may exploit uncertainty about domestic ratification as a strategic tool to gain 
leverage in the level I game. If pushed too hard, however, this bargaining tactic can 
lead to the failure of the international negotiation. 
 
Another relaxation of the framework’s initial assumptions is that in which pay-off 
structures are considered an endogenous element of the two level game rather than 
fixed and externally determined. Indeed, level I negotiations may “reverberate” 
within domestic politics if they serve to legitimize or to de-legitimize a certain 
course of action, hence altering the pay-off structures of specific constituents and 
therefore the size of win-sets. Alternatively, chief-negotiators may try to 
“restructure” their peers’ win-sets by strategically taking actions that resonate with 
foreign swing constituencies. Finally, dropping the “honest broker” assumption 
recognizes the possibility that chief-negotiators may have an agenda of their own, 
and that they may use international negotiations as an instrument to pursue some 
domestic political purpose such as enhancing their reputation or overcoming 
opposition to their preferred policies.       
 
Some preliminary considerations 
 
Although Putnam’s 1988 article focused primarily on the application of the two-level 
game framework to the negotiation of a treaty between states (more specifically, the 
1978 Bonn accord between the United States, Germany and Japan), it also 
considered other types of agreements in which one, some, or all of the chief 
negotiators represented other types of organizations. Putnam did not seem to 
consider that such alternative scenarios required any fundamental qualification of his 
arguments. In fact, throughout his paper he used the negotiation of the Italian 1977 
SBA as an example to illustrate some of his main points. In spite of Putnam’s 
apparent disregard for the specificities of such scenarios, it is worth exploring 
whether an application of his framework to the case of IMF interventions has 
relevant implications for the dynamics of the two-level game.  
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A first specificity of such cases is that, as opposed to most international treaties, IMF 
programs cannot be understood as single discrete agreements followed by 
implementation (Kahler, 1993). Because of their tranched structure, the 
implementation of an IMF program requires periodic (usually quarterly) re-
negotiations: each disbursement has to be approved by the Executive Board 
following subsequent re-enactments of the level I bargaining process between 
finance ministers and IMF officials. Hence, this set-up is likely to display more 
variation in the dependent variable than other applications of the two-level 
framework focused on a single Level I agreement.   
 
A second set of implications is derived from the asymmetries that are present in the 
case of the negotiations of an IMF program, which are likely to be more pronounced 
than in inter-state applications of the two level game framework. In fact, few 
parallelisms can be established between the institutions that shape the ratification 
politics of the IMF and of the borrowing country. As we shall see in Chapter 3, 
program-related decisions are always ratified by the Fund’s Executive Board. 
Instead, no single institution monopolizes the power to ratify or to reject program-
related decisions in borrowing countries. In most cases, borrowing from the IMF as 
such does not require approval from the legislative branch of government. In other 
words, borrowing country chief negotiators can enter into IMF arrangements 
unilaterally (Vreeland, 2004). But the various policy conditions that are attached to 
an IMF program do usually require some form of subsequent ratification. Some of 
these conditions, such as certain fiscal adjustment measures, the adoption of new 
laws or the modification of existing ones, may require congressional approval. In 
turn, depending on countries’ degree of political and administrative de-
centralization, some other conditions may have to be ratified and implemented at the 
sub-national level. Even when there is no formal constraint to implement the Fund’s 
conditionality, there may be some informal mechanisms at play preventing the 
borrowing government from successfully implementing a program. As pointed out 
by Putnam, an example of such informal ratification processes is that in which labour 
unions or civil society at large mobilize against an austerity program negotiated with 
the IMF (Putnam, 1988). As a result of this multi-faceted ratification process, the 
outcome of the level II game is likely to be more uncertain in borrowing countries 
than at the IMF. 
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The asymmetric nature of this negotiation is reinforced by the different composition 
of level I constituencies. Whereas finance ministers are likely to be constrained 
primarily by those coalitions and interest groups that are affected by the program and 
that are capable of mobilizing for or against it, IMF negotiators’ main constituents 
are the institution’s “principals”, i.e. its member states. Therefore, an interesting 
feature of the two-level game framework as applied to an IMF program is that 
borrowing countries’ governments are present both in the level I game and in the 
Fund’s level II game. Although for reasons that will be explored in Chapter 3 
borrowing countries have a very limited influence in the IMF’s Executive Board, this 
specificity may have important informational implications. Indeed, because they 
have representatives at the IMF with direct exposure to the institution’s decision-
making process, finance ministers do presumably have more information about the 
Fund’s level II game than IMF officials do about the borrowing country’s level II 
game. Hence, imperfect information should be expected to be more of a concern for 
IMF negotiators than for borrowing governments, which implies that finance 
ministers are more likely to use uncertainty as a bargaining tactic and that the IMF is 
more likely to refuse to agree on the basis of a program’s uncertain ratification at the 
country level.  
 
In fact, the Fund’s concern about uncertainty contributes to explain the 
aforementioned tranched structure of its programs: periodic program reviews are 
largely aimed at determining whether the borrower is complying with conditionality. 
To some extent, therefore, reviews are conceived as a “disciplining” device 
providing a disincentive to voluntary defections. However, even in cases in which 
countries do not comply with conditionality (hence partially defecting on their 
agreement with the IMF) the Board has discretion to grant waivers in order to 
approve the program review. A relevant question is whether the distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary defection emphasized by Putnam plays a role in this 
process. It might be that the Board tends to be more tolerant with those governments 
that are able to prove their commitment to a program, in which case involuntary 
defection would be less of an obstacle to the approval of a review than voluntary 
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defection.
24
 This would create incentives for the government to signal that domestic 
ratification is being difficult. However, it may also be the case that the Board does 
not approve a review because it comes to perceive that the ratification of conditions 
that it considers crucial for the success of a program is highly unlikely even if the 
government supports them. In this case, the strategy of exaggerating domestic 
ratification difficulties would backfire, making the distinction between voluntary or 
involuntary defection less relevant.  
 
Another implication of the asymmetries present in this game lies in the types of 
transnational alliances that can emerge between chief negotiators and their 
counterparts’ constituents. The key transnational alliances for borrowing countries’ 
finance ministers are built upon their governments’ diplomatic ties with the countries 
that have more influence over the Fund’s decision making process, i.e. the creditors. 
Consistent with the predictions of Thacker (1999), Barro and Lee (2005) or Reynaud 
and Vauday (2009), the potential for such transnational alliances to tip the balance in 
the Fund’s ratification process is likely to depend on factors such as whether 
borrowers are geo-politically relevant, whether they are political allies of the US and 
other G7 countries and/or whether the G7 has strong material interests in these 
countries. In turn, the IMF’s chief negotiators should be expected to develop 
transnational alliances with the domestic interest groups that are closer to their own 
positions, for instance business groups or central bankers. Given that the Fund’s 
main interlocutors are borrowing country governments, these channels are likely to 
be less well developed than the diplomatic ties described above. However, since the 
IMF has increasingly tried to reach out to civil society and other stakeholders in 
recent decades, these transnational alliances could be meaningful.  
 
2.3.3 A stylized representation  
 
After having reviewed the logic of the two-level games approach and some of the 
implications of its application to the study of IMF lending, this sub-section provides a 
stylized representation of this analytical framework. Chapter 1 argued that multilateral 
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 Another type of non-compliance with the Fund’s conditionality may not be attributed to defection as 
such but to some exogenous factor invalidating the projections on which these conditions were based. For 
instance, it might be that GDP growth is lower than expected, turning fiscal targets unattainable. 
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interventions in emerging economies have three components: official finance, policy 
conditionality and private sector involvement. In order to map the possible outcomes of 
the level I game in a two-dimensional space it is necessary to drop one of these three 
components. Given that, as opposed to official finance and policy conditionality, private 
sector involvement does not form part of all IMF programs, it makes sense to drop this 
component rather than the other two.
25
 Hence, the horizontal axis in figures 2.1 to 2.4 
represents the volume of official finance provided by the IMF and the vertical axis the 
conditionality associated with this financial support. Conditionality takes the form of 
macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform and is measured in terms of the impact 
that these actions have on the balance of payments. For simplicity, one unit of 
adjustment and reform is assumed to be equivalent to one unit of official finance.  
 
The negotiation between the two sides’ chief-negotiators begins when an exogenous 
shock hits the borrowing country, generating a balance of payment need of a magnitude 
determined exogenously. For each shock there are infinite combinations of official 
finance and adjustment/reform that can potentially cover the resulting balance of 
payments need, which are represented by the isolines IL in figures 2.1, to 2.4. By 
construction, the further away isolines are from the origin, the largest is the impact of 
their corresponding shock on the balance of payments. Both chief-negotiators are 
assumed to have the same information about the shock and to agree on the impact that 
the various combinations of adjustment/reform and official finance have on the balance 
of payment. Therefore, the isoline corresponding to the shock that the borrowing 
country is undergoing constitutes a first restriction in the level I game that is known to 
both players.  
 
The level II games generate additional restrictions on the two sides of the negotiation. 
WSIMF represents the frontier of the Fund’s win-set in such a way that the institution’s 
chief-negotiators can only secure the ratification of level I agreements located to the left 
of that curve. Whereas adjustment/reform provides a utility to the Fund’s constituents, 
official finance generates a disutility given that it puts multilateral resources at risk. As 
a result, WSIMF is upward sloping: at the frontier, an increase in official finance will 
                                                          
25
 Both in the Argentine and the Uruguayan cases, however, the involvement of private creditors was a 
crucial element of the multilateral intervention and the empirical chapters devote much attention to this 
component of the IMF programs. 
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only be approved in exchange for a more demanding conditionality. The convexity of 
WSIMF results from the assumption that official finance has an increasing marginal 
disutility, which is rooted in the idea that the Fund’s constituents are likely to be more 
reluctant to augment programs that are already large in order to avoid an excessive 
concentration of risk in their institution’s balance sheet. Therefore, the additional units 
of adjustment and reform that they will demand in exchange for one more unit of 
official finance will tend to increase with the size of the program.  
 
In turn, WSBC represents the frontier of the borrowing country’s win-set in such a way 
that all the possible level I agreements ratifiable domestically are located to the right of 
that curve. WSBC is upward sloping because adjustment and reform constitutes a 
disutility for the borrowing country’s constituents. In turn, the concavity of that curve 
results from the assumption that adjustment/reform has an increasing marginal disutility 
for these same constituents. The rationale behind that assumption is that the domestic 
political opposition to intensify adjustment tends to be stronger when substantial 
austerity measures have already been implemented. Therefore, the additional units of 
official finance needed to convince domestic constituents of the need to ratify one 
additional unit of adjustment will increase with the level of effort that borrowing 
countries have already undertaken.  
 
The set of feasible level I agreements is defined as the combinations of 
adjustment/reform and official finance that satisfy the three restrictions outlined above, 
which are superposed in Figure 2.1. The striped area in between WSIMF1 and WSBC1 
captures the combinations of adjustment/reform and official finance that can be ratified 
in the level II games of both the IMF and a first borrowing country. If that country was 
hit by a shock depicted by isoline IL, the set of level I agreements that would 
simultaneously satisfy the three restrictions would be given by segment A1B1. In turn, 
WSIMF2 and WSBC2 correspond to the domestic constraints faced in the bargaining 
process between the Fund and a second borrowing country. For some exogenous reason, 
it is more difficult for the two sides’ chief negotiators to obtain their respective 
constituencies’ support in this second situation, which is why WSIMF2 is located to the 
left of WSIMF1 and WSBC2 to the right of WSBC2.
26
 If that country was hit by an 
                                                          
26
 For instance, it might be that the second borrowing country has more veto players and less geo-political 
importance than the first borrowing country. 
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exogenous shock of the same exact magnitude as that undergone by the first borrowing 
country (therefore represented by the same isoline IL), the set of level I agreements that 
would simultaneously satisfy the three restrictions would be given by A2B2. It is clear 
from Figure 2.1 that A2B2 covers a smaller portion of IL than A1B1. This illustrates the 
rather obvious first hypothesis outlined in Putnam’s 1988 article: it will be easier to 
achieve a cooperative equilibrium in the level I game if win-sets are large and, 
therefore, when the political constraints faced domestically by chief-negotiators are 
loose.  
  Figure 2.1 
The cooperative outcome 
 
Another factor that affects the likelihood of reaching a cooperative equilibrium in the 
two-level game is the magnitude of the macroeconomic shock undergone by the 
borrowing country. This is illustrated in figure 2.2, where isoline I1L1 represents a low 
magnitude shock and isoline I2L2 a high magnitude shock. If win-sets remain unchanged 
both on the side of the IMF and of the borrowing country, an amplification of the shock 
from I1L1 to I2L2 shifts the subset of level I agreements that can satisfy the three 
restrictions simultaneously from A1B1 to A2B2. It is clear from figure 2.2 that, as a result 
of the marginal disutility assumptions, A2B2 covers a smaller portion of I2L2 than A1B1 
does of I1L1. This implies that the more intense is the impact of the exogenous shock on 
the balance of payments, the more unlikely will it be that a cooperative equilibrium is 
reached and sustained in the negotiations.  
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Figure 2.2 
Amplification of the shock 
 
So far, this representation of the two level game analytical framework has ignored the 
possibility that chief-negotiators have preferences of their own. Instead, Figures 2.3 and 
2.4 introduce ideal points IPIMF and IPBC to capture these exogenously determined 
preferences. The game presented in figure 2.3 explores the consequences of a narrowing 
win-set on the side of the borrowing country combined with a constant win-set on the 
side of the IMF. This may be the result of an election that forces the executive to govern 
in coalition, thus adding a veto-player to the game. If this development shifted the 
country’s win-set frontier from WSBC1 to WSBC2, the sub-set of level I agreements that 
satisfy the three restrictions would contract from A1B to A2B. If the original equilibrium 
of the game was located in segment A1A2, the restoration of a cooperative equilibrium 
would require a move toward the borrowing country’s ideal point. However, if the win-
set continued to narrow, the likelihood of maintaining the cooperative equilibrium 
would gradually fall and, eventually, disappear. In figure 2.3, this happens when WSBC2 
shifts to WSBC3, making it impossible to find a level I agreement that simultaneously 
satisfies the three restrictions. Therefore, the two-level game framework predicts a non-
linear relationship between domestic political constraints and chief-negotiators’ 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the IMF. Ceteris paribus, and in line with the second 
hypothesis outlined by Putnam in 1988, the intensification of these constraints can be 
turned into a bargaining advantage. Beyond a certain point, however, an excessively 
constrained ratification process will result in the collapse of the cooperative equilibrium 
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and, therefore, in a suspension of multilateral support to the country hit by the 
macroeconomic shock. 
 
Figure 2.3 
Narrowing win-set 
 
The mechanism described above is consistent with Randall Stone’s contention that 
borrowing countries can exploit domestic political constraints as a bargaining tool in 
their negotiations with the IMF. However, Vreeland’s hypothesis that IMF 
arrangements are used to gain leverage in the domestic political game can also be 
captured with this analytical framework. In Figure 2.4, the borrowing country’s chief 
negotiator’s ideal point IPBC is located out of its win-set area, which is delimitated by 
WSBC1. This implies that the government cannot ratify its desired level of adjustment 
and reform. Furthermore, if that country was hit by a macroeconomic shock represented 
by isoline IL, it would be impossible to reach a cooperative equilibrium in the 
negotiations with the IMF given that there is no combination of adjustment/reform and 
official finance that simultaneously satisfies the three restrictions. However, the 
borrowing country’s chief-negotiator could use its prerogative to enter an IMF program 
unilaterally in the hope of altering domestic constituencies’ willingness to acquiesce to 
certain policies. If that strategy paid off, the borrowing country’s win-set would expand 
as a result of the program. This may be due to domestic constituents’ fear of the 
consequences of a suspension of multilateral financial support. In figure 2.4, this occurs 
with the shift from WSBC1 to WSBC2, which has two related effects. The first one is that 
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it makes a cooperative equilibrium possible given that segment A2B simultaneously 
satisfies the three restrictions. The second is that reaching a cooperative equilibrium 
within that segment would entail a move towards the borrowing country’s chief 
negotiators’ ideal point. In other words, in this game entering an IMF program is 
strategically exploited to alter domestic pay-off structures in such a way as to make 
cooperation possible and to approximate policies to the government’s ideal point. 
 
Figure 2.4 
Political instrumentation of IMF programs 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed existing scholarly debates about IMF lending. Much of this 
literature has concentrated either on the domestic or on the international level of 
analysis, producing a rich body of theory and empirical evidence about the role played 
by specific explanatory variables in the provision of multilateral credit. However, in line 
with some recent contributions, this dissertation argues that in order to gain a more 
holistic understanding about the multilateral response to emerging markets’ crises it is 
necessary to take simultaneous account of domestic and international factors and to shed 
some light on how these variables interact to shape the design and implementation of 
IMF programs. It is precisely in order to create a logical link between the two levels of 
IPBC
IPIMF
Official finance
Adjustment
& 
Reform
B
WSIMF
WSBC2
WSBC1
A2
A1
I
L
55 
 
analysis that Putnam’s two level games analytical framework is applied in the upcoming 
empirical chapters on the causes of IMF interventions in Argentina and Uruguay. 
 
A stylized representation has also been presented in order to illustrate the usefulness of 
this analytical framework, from which a number of hypotheses have been derived: (i) 
cooperation between the IMF and its members will be easier to achieve and sustain 
when win-sets are large; (ii) the larger the impact of the shock that gives rise to the 
Fund’s intervention, the more difficult will it be to sustain the cooperative outcome of 
the negotiations; (iii) narrow win-sets can be turned into a bargaining advantage, but 
beyond a certain point the intensification of domestic political constraints will result in 
the collapse of the negotiations between the IMF and its borrowers; (iv) borrowing 
governments can strategically exploit their prerogative to enter an IMF program 
unilaterally in order to expand the size of their win-set and, hence, to overcome 
domestic opposition to some of their preferred policies. 
 
Subsequent chapters will try to test these hypotheses. But the concept of win-sets 
around which two-level games are constructed is inherently unobservable. Therefore, 
other observable variables will have to be identified in order to proxy the size of win-
sets, without which it would be impossible to isolate the causal relationship between 
ratification processes and the Fund’s interventions in Argentina and Uruguay. In this 
way the testing of the above hypotheses becomes a hypothesis generating exercise: what 
are the specific factors that influenced chief-negotiators’ win-sets and, hence, the design 
and implementation of IMF programs in Argentina and Uruguay? The review of the 
literature presented above has already highlighted a number of variables that may have 
played a significant role in this respect. Among the factors emphasized by the 
contributions that have concentrated on the international level of analysis, the interests 
of powerful states and of supplementary financiers, the extent to which creditors’ 
preferences converged and the bureaucratic incentives of the Fund’s staff and 
management stand out in particular. In turn, at the domestic level of analysis the number 
and preferences of veto players together with the factors that determine political actors’ 
ability to cooperate in times of stress have been emphasized and will be taken into 
consideration in the upcoming case study analysis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
Approximating the Contours of IMF Negotiators’ Win-sets:                            
Institutional Design and Rules in Multilateral Crisis Lending 
 
 
 
 
What are the structural constraints that IMF officials faced in their negotiations with 
borrowing countries during the decade that followed the Mexican (Tequila) crisis of 
1994? This chapter addresses this question in an attempt to provide a preliminary 
approximation to the contours of IMF negotiators’ win-sets. This analysis is generic in 
the sense that it focuses on the constraints that should be expected to apply across the 
board, irrespective of the additional constraints that may be present in specific 
negotiations, which will be explored in subsequent chapters for the cases of Argentina 
and Uruguay.  
 
Structural constraints can fall into two categories. First, IMF negotiators are structurally 
constrained by the arrangements that define their institution’s decision-making process, 
through which their constituents interact to determine what level I agreements can be 
ratified. These arrangements constitute the structure within which the Fund’s level II 
game unfolds. In this regard, the key issues that this chapter will try to clarify are which 
constituencies take part in the Fund’s ratification process and what is the relative power 
that existing institutional arrangements provide to each of them. Second, IMF 
negotiators are structurally constrained by the rules present in this particular issue area. 
The decade under analysis witnessed significant changes in these rules given that after 
the Mexican and Asian crises the international community embarked on a coordinated 
effort to prevent future crises, and to deal with them as they occur (Rubin, 1998). The 
key aspects to be clarified are the content of the rules that emanated from this so-called 
reform of the International Financial Architecture (IFA), and whether these rules were 
clear and specific enough to have constituted a binding constraint on the discretion of 
IMF negotiators.  
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In order to address these issues, section 2.1 begins with a description of the decision-
making process that governs multilateral crisis lending, introducing the constituencies 
that take part in this process as well as the distribution of power that is derived from the 
Fund’s institutional design. Subsequent sections adopt a chronological approach to 
describe the gradual adoption of rules in the three areas that define multilateral 
interventions in emerging market crises: the provision of official finance (section 2.2), 
private sector involvement (section 2.3) and the design of policy conditionality (section 
2.4). In order to do so, this chapter has relied primarily on IMF policy papers and on G7 
and IMFC Communiqués.
27
 Finally, the chapter concludes by offering an assessment of 
the significance of the Fund’s institutional design and of the rules adopted in the context 
of the IFA initiative as determinants of IMF negotiators’ win-sets. 
  
3.1 Chief-negotiators, constituents and power at the IMF 
 
A first issue that needs to be clarified in order to analyse the power relationships that 
shape the framework within which the Fund’s level II game takes place is who are the 
institution’s chief-negotiators. Within the IMF’s organizational chart, the five Regional 
or Area Departments (African Department, Asia and Pacific Department, European 
Department, Middle-East Department and Western Hemisphere Department) are 
responsible for the design of financial programs and, hence, conduct the negotiations 
with borrowing countries. Within these Departments, specific countries are covered by 
teams of economists headed by a mission chief who comes close to fulfilling the role of 
chief-negotiator contemplated in Putnam’s two-level game framework. However, it is 
often the case that higher ranked officials do also take part in the negotiations, 
especially in more sensitive cases or in situations in which senior country officials such 
as finance ministers or heads of state are also involved. Under such circumstances the 
Regional Departments’ Directors as well as the Fund’s Managing Director and the 
Deputy Managing Director tend to participate in the negotiations with borrowing 
countries either directly or indirectly. To some extent and to varying degrees, therefore, 
the Fund’s senior management shares the role of chief-negotiator with mission chiefs.    
 
                                                          
27
 Appendix B offers a more extensive description of the key measures that were adopted to reform the 
IFA during the decade under analysis. 
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There is a broad spectrum of actors that can have a more or less direct and influential 
part in the decision-making process through which the Fund’s financial programmes are 
ratified. Chart 2.1 summarizes the actors that participate in this process as well as the 
relationships that link these actors. It distinguishes between three spheres of influence: a 
political sphere formed by national authorities; a technocratic sphere formed by IMF 
staff and by other specialized bureaucracies such as the World Bank or the regional 
development banks; a civil society sphere formed by private creditors’ lobbies such as 
the Institute of International Finance (IIF) and by a loose group of activists and NGOs. 
Of these three spheres of influence, the political one is by far the most powerful, which 
reflects the fact that in the context of the limited accountability that tends to characterize 
international organizations, the Fund’s architects assigned a great importance to the 
presence of a political counterweight constraining the discretion of international 
bureaucrats. Indeed, the remainder of this section as well as subsequent chapters treat 
member states’ governments as the IMF’s key constituents and, hence, as the actors 
determining which Level I agreements are ratified. 
 
Figure 3.1 
Actors and relationships in the IMF’s decision-making process 
 
 
 
Although the Fund’s design is such that the political sphere of influence dominates the 
institution’s Level II game, the role played by the actors belonging to the other two 
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spheres of influence should also be acknowledged. The technocratic sphere of influence 
is particularly important because it constitutes a crucial source of legitimacy for the 
IMF. The Fund’s central role in international monetary and financial affairs rests to a 
large extent on its staff’s technical expertise, which is expected to underpin the 
decisions that are ultimately adopted by the formal decision making bodies described 
below.
28
 In fact, all of the decisions adopted by the Executive Board are systematically 
supported by a technical document prepared by the Fund’s staff.29 This implies that 
even though some of the decisions that are ratified through the Fund’s level II game 
may be political in nature, all of them need to be formally justified on technical grounds 
in one way or another. In this context, the Fund’s management is often required to 
mediate between the political and the technocratic spheres of influence. In contrast, the 
actors that belong to the civil society sphere of influence do not have a formal role in 
the Fund’s decision-making process neither at the negotiation nor at the ratification 
levels. However, private interests have occasionally managed to successfully mobilize 
for or against specific courses of action and the anti-globalization movement exerted a 
substantial pressure on the IMF in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, implying that this 
third sphere of influence should not be disregarded.   
 
Focusing now on the formal decision making process, the Bretton Woods system relies 
on various forums to ensure national governments’ control over the operations 
conducted by international civil servants at the IMF and the World Bank. The IMF’s 
highest ranked body is the Board of Governors, where each of the Fund’s 184 member 
states is represented individually either by a Finance Minister or by the head of the 
Central Bank. In principle, the role of the Board of Governors is to provide high level 
political endorsement, a sense of ownership and strategic guidance. In practice, 
however, due to its large size and to the fact that it only meets once a year, the Board of 
Governors’ tends to focus on very general issues and is directly involved only in a few 
                                                          
28
 In addition, officials from other multilateral or national agencies have increasingly influenced the 
design of specific IMF interventions in recent decades, thus also taking part in this technocratic sphere of 
influence. The World Bank and the US Treasury have been particularly active in this respect, partly 
reflecting their role as “supplementary financiers”, which has given them an implicit right to have a say 
on programs’ conditionality (Gould, 2006). 
29
 Although as mentioned above, the Fund’s chief-negotiators belong to the regional departments, they 
may also rely on the expertise of functional departments such as the Research, Fiscal Affairs or Policy 
and Review Departments for the design of financial programmes. In fact, as we will see in Chapter IV on 
the Uruguayan financial crises, different departments may not always agree on the best strategy to address 
a specific financial crisis. 
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critical decisions such as the acceptance of new members, the revision of country quotas 
or the setting of income targets for the IMF (Santor, 2006). In this context, the Board of 
Governors has delegated most of its authority to other decision making bodies such as 
the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) and the Executive Board 
(EB).  
 
The IMFC is an advisory forum with no statutory power of its own that functions as a 
bridge between the Board of Governors and the EB (Shakow, 2008). A first key feature 
that has enabled the IMFC to function as such a bridge is that it is formed by the most 
powerful Governors of the IMF and, therefore, has a sufficient leverage to make sure 
that the Board of Governors will almost systematically endorse its recommendations. A 
second key feature is that its constituency composition mirrors that of the EB. 
Therefore, the IMFC is small enough (24 members as opposed to 184 in the Board of 
Governors) to generate some meaningful discussions. Furthermore, each of the 
participants in the IMFC is hierarchically the superior of his constituency’s 
corresponding Executive Director at the EB. In this context, it is not surprising that 
IMFC communiqués tend to be interpreted as guidelines on the strategic priorities to be 
followed by the EB and, consequently, by the IMF’s management and staff (IEO, 
2008a).  
 
In its bi-annual meetings, the IMFC has usually acted either as an agenda setter or as the 
penultimate endorser of the final policy choices to be made by the IMF. In other words, 
the IMFC does usually become involved at the beginning and at the end of the process 
by which important decisions are made. This implies that the IMFC has tended to deal 
primarily with strategic issues such as the reform of the IFA rather than with the design 
of specific programs. However, the IMFC has occasionally also provided political 
endorsement to the Fund’s interventions in some of the most prominent emerging 
market crises. 
 
The day-to-day oversight of the Fund’s operations is conducted by the Managing 
Director and by the Executive Board (EB). The Managing Director, which has 
traditionally been appointed by the European members of the EB, plays a crucial 
leadership role by interacting face to face with the heads of state and senior officials of 
the Fund’s most influential members and by providing the institution with a sense of 
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purpose and direction (Bossone, 2008).
30
 In turn, the EB is a resident committee sitting 
in continuous session to “conduct the business of the Fund” (IMF Articles of 
Agreement, Article XII, Sections 3-4). It is formed by 24 Executive Directors (EDs), 
eight of which are appointed by a single country (the United States, Japan, Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, China, Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation), while 
the remaining 16 represent mixed constituencies of the other 176 members of the IMF.  
 
An interesting feature of the Fund’s institutional design is that, once appointed, 
Executive Directors become employees of the IMF and, at least de jure, should owe as 
much allegiance to the institution as to their governments. Such an institutional design 
was agreed upon at the Bretton Woods conference in order to foster the IMF’s role as a 
genuine technocratic provider of international public goods (Gianviti, 1999). Indeed, 
during its first decades of existence, the EB enjoyed a fair amount of autonomy, at least 
from principals other than the US. However, in more recent decades, and partly as a 
result of the development of modern communication technologies, the Board has lost 
much of this independence (Martinez-Diaz, 2008). This means that, nowadays, most of 
the positions defended by Executive Directors have been coordinated with their 
corresponding national authorities. The extent to which capitals are eager to influence 
the positions of their Executive Directors depends on whether the issues discussed at the 
EB directly affect their national interest, which tends to be the case for large rescue 
packages or for important strategic decisions such as those concerning the IFA 
initiative.  
 
Each of the EB chairs has a voting power which is determined on the basis of the 
country quotas of the members that are represented in it, plus the combined number of 
basic votes assigned to them (see Figure 3.2).
31
 These quotas, therefore, allocate power 
among constituents within the political sphere of influence of the IMF. However, formal 
voting is rare at the EB and only used as a last resort if the Chairman (the Managing 
Director) cannot informally ascertain what in IMF jargon is referred to as ‘the sense of 
                                                          
30
 The IMF has had three Managing Directors during the period under analysis: Michel Camdessus from 
1995 to May 2000, Horst Kohler from May 2000 until June 2004, and Rodrigo Rato thereafter. 
31
 Basic votes are assigned to individual countries irrespective of their country quota. This was the 
instrument used in the original design of the IMF to mitigate disparities in members’ voting power. 
However, throughout the Fund’s history, basic votes have remained constant, while country quotas have 
been regularly reviewed. As a result, the weight of basic votes has decreased over time, which has 
intensified disparities at the Board. In order to mitigate these disparities, the number of basic votes has 
been recently tripled. 
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the meeting’. Partly because of this consensus-based decision-making culture, and 
partly because as members of a resident committee Executive Directors are closely 
involved in the day-to-day operations of the IMF, what precedes EB meetings is at least 
as important as what happens during these meetings. Indeed, the Board’s decisions are 
largely based on a continuous deliberation in which Executive Directors interact among 
themselves and with their corresponding country authorities, with the Fund’s staff and 
with the Managing Director. Ultimately, most EB meetings do simply provide a seal of 
approval on decisions on which a sufficient support has been secured in advance (IEO, 
2008a). As a result, informal practices are a central element of the Fund’s governance, 
which is one of the reasons why the US government wields so much influence over the 
Fund (Stone, 2008). 
 
Figure 3.2 
Voting power of constituencies and of selected coalitions at the EB (% of total) 
 
          Source: IMF 
 
In spite of this consensus decision making culture at the EB, quotas remain crucial to 
assess whether a sufficient support has been gathered to ratify specific courses of action. 
The Fund’s Articles of Agreement establish that different types of decisions require 
different majorities. Those decisions that do structurally affect the IMF as an institution 
or the functions that it performs require special majorities of 70% or 85%. Instead, those 
decisions that are related with individual country programs require only simple 
majorities. As can be seen in Figure 3.2, the United States is the only country with a 
quota large enough to exert a veto power over decisions requiring an 85% majority. For 
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all other decisions, cross-constituency coalitions need to be formed in order to ratify a 
specific course of action. Such coalitions can emerge on a case by case basis depending 
on the issues that are being debated.  
 
However, a number of stable coalitions with a voting power equivalent to the combined 
quotas of the countries that take part in them have tended to dominate the Fund’s 
decision making process. Of these, the most powerful one has unambiguously been the 
G-7, whose combined quota was close to 47% during the decade under analysis, 
enabling its members to form winning decision-making coalitions for almost all the 
issues that were debated at the EB.
32
 This was facilitated by the fact that the G-7 is 
formed by a compact group of relatively homogenous creditor countries with aligned 
interests at the IMF. Therefore, and although as this and subsequent chapters will 
illustrate the world’s richest countries have not always agreed, the G-7 constituted the 
key locus of power for issues such as the IFA initiative, the allocation of IMF credit and 
the design of specific financial interventions in important emerging markets.  
 
There are various mechanisms through which the G-7 countries coordinate their 
positions. At the highest level, the periodic ministerial and leaders’ meetings have 
played a crucial endorsement role for the more strategic decisions regarding the Bretton 
Woods institutions. In fact, it is certainly not a case that G-7 ministers have traditionally 
met prior to the joint IMF-World Bank spring and fall meetings.
33
 For those decisions 
that affect specific financial interventions in crisis countries, the G-7 deputies 
conference calls have also played a prominent role (Woods and Lombardi, 2006). 
Finally, the G-7 Executive Directors meet on a regular basis to coordinate their 
positions in the most sensitive discussions held at the EB.  
 
Another important creditor coalition at the EB is that formed by the members of the 
European Union, whose combined voting power exceeds 30% of total, thus enabling it 
to veto all the decisions of structural importance for the IMF. In order to reach a unified 
position and to exploit this collective voting power, the European governments have 
                                                          
32
 As a result of recent reforms, the combined quota of the G-7 has fallen slightly, currently amounting to 
about 45% of total. 
33
 To a large extent, these G-7 meetings have been aimed at coordinating positions prior to the IMFC 
meetings, which implies that IMFC communiqués can to some extent be interpreted as a reflection of the 
G-7 positions: “once the G-7 ministers have agreed on a position, they seek a broader endorsement for it 
through the IMFC” (Shakow, 2008). 
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relied on forums such as the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) and its 
Sub-Committee for IMF issues (SCIMF) or the International Relations Committee 
(IRC) of the European Central Bank. In addition, the EURIMF gathers the European 
Executive Directors in Washington DC.  
 
In spite of this complex coordination infrastructure and of its large combined voting 
power, the European coalition has not been able to match the influence exercised by the 
US government on the IMF (Woods and Lombardi, 2006; Bini Smaghi, 2006). To a 
large extent, this has been due to a lack of consensus among European countries on IMF 
issues neither with regard to fundamental reforms nor with regard to specific 
interventions in emerging markets. In addition, the French, German, British and Italian 
governments have tended to prioritize their participation in the G-7, which has 
somewhat undermined the broader European efforts to consolidate a unified position at 
the Fund. Nevertheless, as we will see below, on some occasions the European coalition 
has tried to overcome its differences in order counter US power at the IMF. This has 
tended to be the case in situations in which the US was perceived to be using the system 
to pursue narrow national interests or when the largest European governments did not 
share the US preferences regarding the reform of the IFA. 
 
As opposed to the creditor coalitions described above, debtor nations lack a coalition 
with sufficient voting power to tip the balance in the Fund’s decision-making process. A 
case in point is the Inter-Governmental Group of 24 or G-24, created in 1971 to 
coordinate the positions of the developing world in international monetary and financial 
issues.
34
 The G24 has reached a very limited relevance in the overall multilateral 
decision making process for various reasons. First of all, its combined voting share at 
the EB does not surpass the 15% threshold that is required to block the most important 
decisions adopted by the IMF’s governing bodies. Second, the members of the G-24 
often have a small share of voting power within the multi-country constituencies in 
which they are represented at the EB. As a result, even if the G-24 reaches a consensus 
on a particular issue, its members struggle to have their positions voiced at the EB 
because that requires going through another difficult layer of policy coordination with 
                                                          
34
 The G-24 is formed by Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, D.R. Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Iran, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Pakistan, Philippines, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.  
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the countries with which they share their constituency. Third, these countries have often 
lacked cohesion, which is largely due their divergent interests in financial affairs 
(Shakow, 2008). Indeed, the G-24 includes both low income countries very mildly 
integrated in international financial markets and some of the middle income countries 
that have attracted the bulk of emerging market finance over the last two decades. 
Another coalition of developing countries is the G-11, which gathers Executive 
Directors from developing countries. As the G-24, the G-11 is hampered by its low 
combined voting power and by the heterogeneity of its members. A more fruitful 
attempt at mobilizing the capabilities of developing countries was the creation of the G-
20 in 1999, which brought together the G-7 countries with systemically relevant 
emerging economies. However, the G20 has only recently begun to play a central role in 
international financial affairs, which is why this chapter takes little notice of it.  
 
Summing up, with its reliance on the quota system, the Fund’s design has consolidated 
a highly asymmetric distribution of power between the institution’s constituents. It is 
somewhat paradoxical that this system of quotas was originally designed upon the 
‘principle of mutuality’ (Giannini, 2002). Indeed, the basic idea that underpinned the 
concept of the IMF as a credit union was that members’ right to borrow from their peers 
from time to time should constitute a corollary of their commitment to lend at other 
times, which would ensure the revolving nature of the Fund’s resources (Kenen, 1986). 
In order to ensure that such a system would treat members uniformly, both this right to 
borrow and this commitment to lend were defined in terms of objective quotas 
reflecting member’s weight in the world economy on the one hand and the potential 
scale of their balance of payment needs on the other hand. The adoption of such a 
lending framework, therefore, was based on the presumption that all members had 
broadly homogenous interests and expectations. This may have constituted a relatively 
realistic assumption during the first decades of operation of the IMF in the context of a 
smaller membership, limited convertibility and fixed-but-adjustable exchange rates.  
 
However, as new members joined the Fund and as the Bretton Woods monetary system 
was dismantled, it became increasingly rare for advanced economies to borrow from 
their peers, which consolidated an increasingly large category of systematic debtors 
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among emerging and developing economies.
35
 This trend has marginalized debtors for 
two reasons. First, the principle of mutuality on which the quota system was originally 
designed has ceased to operate in practice, turning the framework governing the IMF 
into an ineffective mechanism to mediate between members’ increasingly 
heterogeneous interests. Second, the combined voting power of systematic debtors has 
fallen drastically over the years: while the added quotas of the countries that borrowed 
at least once from the IMF during the 1950s was close to 50% of total, in between 2000 
and 2006 it did not surpass 17% (Irwin et al., 2008).  As a result, those borrowing 
countries that were more dependent on multilateral crisis lending during the decade 
under analysis were also the constituents that had a lesser capacity to influence the 
Fund’s decision-making process. 
 
    Official finance  
 
During the first years of the IFA initiative, international policy-makers focused 
primarily on upgrading the facilities and institutional mechanisms by which financial 
assistance could be made available to countries in distress. This process was heavily 
influenced by the Mexican financial crisis, which was interpreted early on as a turning 
point both in the way future crises were to unfold in emerging economies and in the 
way the international community was to deal with them (Calvo, 1998). Indeed, the 
rescue package provided jointly by the IMF and the US Treasury was much larger than 
any previous crisis resolution programme in history: US$48 billion, a substantial part of 
which was made available almost immediately in order to cover Mexico’s short-term 
sovereign obligations.
36
 Ultimately, this bailout can be considered a success in the sense 
that it prevented a disastrous sovereign default from happening, that macroeconomic 
stability, growth and access to international financial markets were restored relatively 
fast and that the loans provided by the IMF and the US Treasury were repaid ahead of 
schedule.
37
 It is in this context that the so-called Rubin Doctrine of International 
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 Most developing countries joined the IMF in 1960s, with the bulk of transition economies joining in the 
1990s. Until the recent Icelandic program, Italy and the United Kingdom were the last countries to have 
borrowed from the IMF in 1976. 
36
 Of these, the United States provided about US$ 30 billion and the IMF the remaining US$18 billion. 
37
 However, it is worth noting that the Mexican bailout was not free from criticism. Indeed, several 
conservative economists argued that this rescue package severely distorted incentives in the international 
financial system and enabled the Mexican authorities to postpone a necessary restructuring of the 
domestic financial system, thereby increasing the long-term cost of the crisis for the domestic economy 
(Calomaris, 1998; Vásquez, 2002).  
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Finance began to take shape: in a world of free capital mobility, the official sector 
should stand ready to provide exceptionally large volumes of financial assistance in the 
event of a sudden stop in capital flows so as to bridge emerging markets’ liquidity needs 
and restore investors’ confidence. In Rubin’s words: “Money is no substitute for strong 
policy, but there are times when it is more costly to provide too little money than to 
provide too much” (Rubin and Weisberg, 2003: 251).  
  
Nonetheless, the Mexican bailout did also leave many policy-makers on both sides of 
the Atlantic with a sour aftertaste which contributes to explain the dynamics of the 
debate that followed. In the US, the Congressional battle to mobilize the resources 
needed to rescue Mexico was fierce. Eventually, the Treasury took the controversial 
move of circumventing Congressional opposition by using the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund (ESF) to intervene in this crisis.
38
 Given that the US Congress subsequently 
retaliated with the imposition of constrains on the Treasury’s ability to tap the ESF (the 
so-called d’Amato restrictions), one of the Clinton administration’s priorities in the 
aftermath of the Mexican crisis was to create mechanisms to multilateralize financial 
rescue packages (Roubini and Setser, 2004). This would serve the double purpose of 
implementing the Rubin doctrine while at the same time reducing the amount of 
resources to be provided bilaterally by the US.  
 
In Europe, however, the Mexican bailout was interpreted as an abuse of power on the 
part of the US, providing further evidence of the American propensity to use 
International Financial Institutions to pursue its own narrow national interests. The 
European members of the G-7 were outraged to have been excluded from the decision 
to provide Mexico with an IMF program three times as large as any other one in the 
institution’s history (Rubin and Weisberg, 2003).39 This constitutes a central factor 
behind Europe’s subsequent insistence on the importance of a rules-based IFA 
framework with which it often opposed the Clinton administration’s emphasis on 
flexibility. In other words, experience with the Mexican bailout shaped the Fund’s 
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 The ESF is an emergency fund created in the 1930s for foreign exchange intervention purposes. 
Following a reform in the 1970s, the US Treasury Secretary gained discretion over the use of the ESF 
resources.  
39
 As a result to the discontent with the American interventionism during this episode, 6 European 
Executive Directors abstained from voting at the EB meeting in which the Mexican program was 
approved (Rubin and Weisberg, 2003). 
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major constituents positions in the debate on whether rules or discretion should 
determine crisis countries’ access to official credit. 
 
Given the importance that it attached to the policy implications of the Mexican crisis, 
the Halifax G-7 Summit of June 1995 can be considered to have officially launched the 
IFA initiative. As regards the role to be played by multilateral financial assistance in the 
international architecture, two were the immediate priorities identified by the G-7 
leaders at that time: accelerating the speed at which the IMF could intervene to address 
an emerging market crisis and increasing the Fund’s overall lending capacity (Group of 
7, 1995). In order to address the first of these objectives, the so-called Emergency 
Financing Procedure was introduced by the EB in September 1995. This procedure was 
aimed at fast-tracking negotiations with countries facing an exceptionally urgent need 
for IMF assistance. Essentially, it contemplated a series of measures to bring about an 
early dialogue between governments, the EB and staff and ensure that a quick 
agreement could be reached on some critical aspects of financial programs such as the 
appropriate level of access to the Fund’s resources or the conditionality to be attached to 
these loans (Kenen, 2001). During the decade under analysis, the Emergency Financing 
Procedure was activated five times: for the Philippines, Indonesia, South Korea and 
Thailand in 1997 and for Turkey in 2001. In turn, the pool of resources available for 
crisis lending was to be expanded in two ways: doubling the size of the General 
Agreements to Borrow (GAB) and completing a new quota review to increase member 
states’ contributions to the IMF.40 However, the implementation of these two measures 
eventually lagged behind as the international community and/or national legislatures 
(i.e., the US Congress) could not agree on their concrete terms once the pressures 
exerted by the Mexican crisis gradually waned (Roubini and Setser, 2004). 
 
In fact, the G7 Lyon and Halifax Summits’ Communiqués made little mention to 
measures related with the reinforcement of the multilateral financial safety net, 
reflecting the period of relative calm that preceded the devaluation of the Thai Baht in 
July 1997 (Group of 7, 1996; Group of 7, 1997). However, the Asian financial crisis 
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 The GAB constitutes a network of bilateral borrowing agreements between the IMF and a number of 
industrial economies which can be used in case of an emergency in the international financial and 
monetary system. This financing scheme dates back from 1962, committing 11 participating countries to 
lend an amount of hard currency specified in advance. The key goal of the GAB was to complement the 
IMF’s lendable resources in case of need. 
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provided the stimulus that was needed to reignite the multilateral effort to reform the 
IFA. First of all, the two aforementioned measures to increase the Fund’s lending 
capacity were implemented. The New Agreements to Borrow (NAB) entered into force 
in November 1998 to complement the GAB, jointly constituting a US$48 billion backup 
credit line to the IMF.
41
 In addition, the US Congress finally approved a pending 
increase of the US subscription at the IMF, which was instrumental to bring the 11
th
 
review of IMF quotas into effect. As a result, the IMF’s lending capacity was expanded 
by more than 50%. On top of these two measures, the Asian financial crisis brought 
about the adoption of other significant innovations in the IMF’s financial intervention 
toolkit. Of these, the introduction of the Supplementary Reserve Facility (SRF) in 
December 1997 and the creation of the Contingent Credit Line (CCL) on April 1999 
were of particular relevance. 
 
The SRF was aimed at providing the IMF with an instrument to address “exceptional 
balance of payments difficulties due to a large short-term financing need resulting from 
a sudden and disruptive loss of market confidence reflected in pressure on the capital 
account and the member’s reserves” (IMF, 2000a). In other words, the SRF was 
targeted at crises rooted in a sudden stop in capital flows, fully bringing the Rubin 
doctrine of international finance into implementation. This normalized the exceptionally 
large interventions that were approved on an ad hoc basis to address the Mexican, Thai 
or South Korean crises (Kenen, 2001).  
 
As such, the SRF did not really constitute a new independent facility in itself, but a 
mechanism to complement the reserves provided under the traditional Stand-By 
Arrangements (SBAs), allowing the overall amount of resources made available to the 
crisis country to surpass the “normal” access limits contemplated by the Fund’s lending 
rules.
42
 This higher level of access, however, was to carry demanding financial 
conditions. Indeed, countries borrowing under the SRF would be expected to repay 
faster than under other more traditional facilities. Furthermore, the SRF was to carry a 
surcharge of 300 basis points over the Fund’s normal lending rate, which would 
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 The NAB was signed with 25 countries and, therefore, is much broader than the GAB. The reason why 
the NAB was created instead of enlarging the GAB is that the countries participating in the GAB were 
unwilling to dilute their control over this line of credit (Kenen, 2001). 
42
 Up until the 2009 review, normal limits to the IMF resources were of 100% of quota annually or 300% 
of quota cumulatively. 
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gradually increase up to a maximum of 500 basis points. This emphasis on the provision 
of incentives for early repayment reflects the underlying belief that briefly covering up 
for a temporary loss of access to international financial markets would be sufficient to 
catalyze rapid turnarounds in investors’ confidence (Roubini and Setser, 2004).43 
 
In turn, the CCL pursued the goal of preventing the sort of contagion episodes that had 
swept through the emerging world in the aftermath of the August 1998 Russian default. 
As opposed to the Fund’s traditional facilities, the CCL would be negotiated prior to a 
balance of payment need actually taking place, explicitly insuring members against the 
risk posed by international spill-overs and other shocks to the international financial 
system beyond their control. In order to articulate such an insurance scheme, the new 
facility was made subject to a new type of ex ante conditionality instrumented through a 
number of pre-qualification criteria. In this way, access to the new facility was restricted 
to countries having received a positive assessment in the Fund’s yearly bilateral 
surveillance exercise (Article IV Consultation). Potential signatories, therefore, were 
required to be implementing policies unlikely to give rise to a balance of payment 
problem, to be making progress with the standards and codes initiative and to maintain a 
constructive relationship with their private creditors.
 44
 In other words, the CCL was 
designed for countries in a rather solid situation, but facing vulnerabilities stemming 
from their growing integration in international financial markets. As regards the new 
facility’s financial conditions, the signing of the CCL was subject to a ‘commitment 
fee’ charged before the member made actual use of the Fund’s resources. Once 
activated, the financial terms of the CCL were similar to those of the SRF both in terms 
of maturity and in terms of cost. 
 
The CCL, however, was never requested by any country, turning this facility into one of 
the most resounding failures of the IFA initiative. On top of its demanding financial 
terms and qualification criteria, there are various factors that explain the failure of the 
CCL. First of all, it did not provide automatic access to the IMF resources given that the 
                                                          
43
 However, in recognition of the fact that overcoming a capital account crisis might take longer than 
envisaged in the design of the SRF, the new facility allowed for semi-automatic roll-overs enabling 
countries to post-pone repayments if their balance of payments position remained weak at the time of the 
expiration of the SRF.  
44
 The Standards and Codes initiative was jointly launched by the World Bank and the IMF in the context 
of the IFA initiative. It was aimed at assisting countries in the reinforcement of their economic institutions 
and to produce better and more readily available financial data. 
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first disbursement under a CCL required the EB to agree on an ‘activation review’. As a 
result, it was argued that the difference between this and other more traditional ‘ex post’ 
IMF facilities was more apparent than real. In addition, several emerging markets 
voiced concerns about the so-called entry and exit problems associated with the CCL. 
The entry problem referred to the fear that investors may interpret the request of a CCL 
as a sign of weakness rather than a sign of strength, thereby pressing sovereign spreads 
upwards. In spite of the intense diplomatic efforts undertaken to convince potential 
signatories to request the CCL, no country was ever willing to be the first to take that 
risk. The exit problem, in turn, referred to the fear that losing eligibility to the CCL may 
have a devastating impact on market access, precipitating the very financial crisis that it 
was aimed at preventing (Díaz-Cassou et al., 2006). In spite of the various attempts to 
reform the CCL, it was eventually allowed to expire in 2003.
45
  
 
In any case, as the financial turmoil that characterized the late 1990s did gradually 
subside there was a tendency to re-assess the merits of international rescue packages. 
During these years a growing awareness developed among academics and policy-
makers about the potential distortions that bailout expectation could induce on 
sovereign debtors’ and private creditors’ incentives (Calomaris, 1998). In fact, some 
observers went as far as arguing that the Mexican bailout had induced such a disregard 
to the risks associated with emerging market finance that it was a crucial factor to 
explain the Asian financial crisis (Friedman, 1998).  
 
In order to mitigate this moral hazard problem, the G-7 Cologne and Okinawa Summits 
emphasized the need to involve the private sector in the resolution of financial crises 
(see below) and to clarify the rules governing access to IMF resources (Group of 7, 
1999; Group of 7, 2000). However, the real turning point of the IFA initiative took 
place in January 2001 with the change of administration in the US. After all, 
Republicans had opposed large scale IMF interventions ever since the Mexican rescue 
package and soon after taking office the Bush administration made it clear that the US 
was about to profoundly reorient its IMF policy. Illustrating the ideological stance of 
the Bush administration, John Taylor, the new Undersecretary of the Treasury for 
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 Efforts to introduce a genuine insurance facility have continued after the failure of the CCL. However, 
it is not until the most recent global financial crisis erupted that the IMF has been able to successfully 
launch such an instrument: the so-called Flexible Credit Line.  
72 
 
International Affairs, had gone as far as calling for the abolition of the IMF in the 
1990s. In his memoirs, the first Treasury Secretary of the Bush administration, Paul 
O’Neill, summarizes the Republican critique to Clinton’s policies: “Many conservative 
economists (…) felt the international lending of the Clinton era had placed too much of 
taxpayer’s money at risk and done more risk than good (…) The Rubin and Summers 
gravy train, they felt, created a moral hazard problem.”(Suskind, 2006: 173).  
 
Two were the main measures subsequently promoted by the US in order to limit 
international crisis lending. First of all, a policy of not topping up IMF programs was 
adopted early on by the Bush administration (Roubini and Setser, 2004).
46
 Ultimately, 
the other G7 countries also embraced this principle during the G8 Finance Ministers 
meeting held in Rome in 2001 (Group of 7, 2001). At least de jure, this measure 
completed the multilateralization of rescue packages while consolidating the Fund’s 
lending capacity as an overall cap on international crisis lending. Second, the US began 
to advocate for tightening the criteria determining the circumstances in which countries 
in distress should be allowed to borrow above normal access limits. This move was 
expected to reduce the uncertainty surrounding multilateral rescue packages which, in 
the view of some senior officials in the US administration, had aggravated previous 
crises by rendering investors’ expectations even more volatile (Taylor, 2007a). In 
addition, it was aimed at limiting the size of these loans, restricting the use of high 
access programs to very specific circumstances and mitigating potential moral hazard 
distortions. Eventually, this resulted in the adoption of the so-called exceptional access 
framework by the EB in September 2002 and October 2003 (IMF, 2002b). 
 
The exceptional access framework defined four criteria for the IMF to lend above 
normal access limits. First, members should be experiencing exceptional pressures in 
their capital account. Second, their debt should be sustainable and expected to remain so 
in the future. Third, they should have a high probability of regaining access to 
international financial markets quickly after the IMF’s interventions. Fourth, the policy 
roadmap backing these IMF program should have a strong prospect of success. In order 
to assess whether each of these criteria were met, additional safeguards were established 
on the IMF’s decision-making procedure in order to foster accountability and a higher 
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 However, as we will see in Chapter IV, the US government breached this policy during the Uruguayan 
crisis.  
73 
 
burden of proof. In this way, the exceptional access framework was trying to restrict 
large access programmes to quite a specific setting: for crises of liquidity and not of 
solvency, and for countries with strong policies in place and, thereby, a high likelihood 
of being able to catalyze private capital inflows through a large IMF intervention. 
Because this framework was aimed at dealing with such a specific type of crises, it was 
presented as part of a broader effort to adapt the IMF’s policies, the other side of the 
coin being the development of new mechanisms to involve the private sector in the 
resolution of emerging market crises.  
 
     Private Sector Involvement 
 
Private sector involvement (PSI) refers to the efforts undertaken by private creditors in 
order to help prevent, mitigate or overcome a financial crisis. PSI actions are 
instrumented through an agreement between private creditors and their debtors to 
partially write off outstanding credits, to reduce interest payments, or to lengthen 
repayment schedules (International Relations Committee Task Force, 2005).
47
 Even 
though these actions are likely to influence the secondary market value of specific debt 
instruments, the losses (or gains) stemming from such fluctuations are not considered 
PSI because they don’t affect the country’s debt burden or its repayment profile.  
 
There is a wide array of actions through which private creditors can be involved in the 
resolution of an emerging market crisis. On the mildest end of the spectrum in terms of 
coerciveness, certain specific categories of creditors may agree to rollover their loans, to 
maintain their exposure to a given country or to take part in a pre-emptive voluntary 
debt exchange aimed at re-establishing the sovereign’s creditworthiness and avoid 
future losses. On the most coercive end of the spectrum, the sovereign may simply opt 
to declare a moratorium on the servicing of its obligations, forcing private creditors to 
absorb losses and in so doing restore debt sustainability (Cline, 2002).  
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 Although the term PSI is relatively recent, the IMF had already tried to share the crisis resolution 
burden with the private sector before. During the 1980s, for instance, the IMF did often require private 
banks to “involuntarily” lend to crises countries in order to provide multilateral financial support. The 
Brady Plan which ultimately solved the debt crisis was another coordinated PSI exercise promoted by the 
IFIs and the US Treasury. 
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PSI is to be distinguished from catalytic official finance (COF), which refers to the idea 
that “the announcement of an economic programme backed up by a limited amount of 
IMF resources (as compared to the size of potential capital outflows) may increase the 
propensity of investors to lend to the country concerned” (Cottarelli and Giannini, 2002: 
6).  PSI and COF are closely related concepts because both refer to international 
investors’ actions that contribute to close a country’s financing gap. However, these 
actions are different in nature in the sense that whereas COF is a spontaneous reaction 
to an IMF program, PSI entails altering debt contracts in a way that is possible only if 
creditors are collectively convinced or constrained to relieve the pressures undergone by 
their debtor.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Mexican crisis, relatively little attention was paid to 
PSI as a crisis resolution instrument. To a large extent, this reflects the prevailing 
optimism about COF embodied in the aforementioned Rubin doctrine of international 
finance: private creditors would not need to be bailed-in because they were expected to 
spontaneously respond to an IMF program by maintaining their exposure to the crisis 
country. However, even at this early stage in the IFA initiative, some academics were 
already exploring the potential for PSI to substitute large Mexican style rescue 
packages. As early as 1995, Jeffrey Sachs argued that IMF practices should be 
reorganized in order for the institution to “play a role far more like an international 
bankruptcy court and far less like the lender of last resort to member governments” 
(Sachs, 1995: 14). This triggered a short-lived debate on the possibility of replicating a 
Chapter 11 procedure for sovereigns at the international level.  
 
However, this proposal was considered impractical early on by the G-10 when the so-
called Rey Report on the Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises was endorsed in 
1996 (G-10, 1996). Among this report’s various recommendations, it is worth noting 
that the possibility of promoting the inclusion of Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in 
bond contracts was contemplated for the first time. As is described below in more 
detail, this is an option that was to capture policy-makers’ attention years later. At that 
time it fell into oblivion relatively soon given that the international community was 
focused on the provision of emergency financial assistance as the main instrument to 
address emerging market crises. 
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As mentioned above, the Asian financial crisis raised awareness about the potential for 
PSI to mitigate the moral hazard problem potentially associated with large rescue 
packages, the idea being that only if private creditors were forced to absorb part of the 
cost of a crisis would they devote sufficient resources to evaluate and monitor their 
investments’ risk. Another reason behind the international community’s emphasis on 
PSI at that juncture is that, as opposed to the Mexican crisis, a distinctive element of 
various Asian countries’ crisis resolution strategies was precisely their successful 
attempts to bail-in external private creditors. In particular, this was the case of South 
Korea, where an agreement reached with a group of international commercial banks to 
maintain their exposure to that country, and not so much the Fund’s rescue package in 
itself, constituted the turning point of the crisis (Blunstein, 2003). Such an agreement 
was made possible by an unprecedented concerted effort on the part of the G-10 
monetary authorities, which exerted moral suasion on the banks under their jurisdiction 
to roll-over the cross-border short-term inter-bank loans that were at the origin of the 
Korean crisis (International Relations Committee Task Force, 2005). This experience 
convinced the G-7 to initiate discussions on how to incorporate PSI into crisis resolution 
policies. In fact, the May 1998 G-7 Birmingham Communiqué was the first to insist on 
the need to achieve an appropriate burden sharing between the public and the private 
sectors’ contributions to the resolution of financial crises. (Group of 7, 1998). 
 
A first consequence of this change in tone was the reform of the Policy of Lending Into 
Arrears (LIA) ratified by the EB on October 1998. This policy was originally 
introduced in 1989 to abolish the non-toleration of sovereign arrears that had 
traditionally characterized IMF programs. It basically legalized the Fund’s loans to 
countries in arrears with commercial banks as long as a negotiation process could be 
discerned between sovereigns and their creditors (IMF, 1999). The 1998 reform, in turn, 
broadened the scope of the LIA policy, encompassing arrears on bonded debt and 
thereby acknowledging the changing composition of capital flows toward emerging 
markets that had taken place during the 1990s. The basic criterion conditioning these 
LIA programs was also modified in order to soften what came to be perceived as a 
private creditors’ pseudo ‘veto power’ over the Fund’s lending decisions: the 
requirement of an on-going negotiation process to have started for the IMF to lend into 
arrears. Instead, under the reformed policy, countries would only be required to be 
making a ‘good faith effort’ to reach a collaborative agreement with their creditors. This 
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reform paved the way for a much more active IMF involvement in the new generation 
of sovereign debt restructurings that were expected to take place in a world of 
securitized debt. However, the 1998 reform was partial in the sense that it did not 
systematize the role that LIA programs were to play during a debt restructuring or to 
specify the channels through which the IMF could influence the outcome of solvency 
crises (Díaz-Cassou et al., 2008).  
 
It was not until the Cologne Summit of 1999 that the G-7 began to outline the principles 
and tools required to articulate a comprehensive strategy for PSI. In this exercise, the G-
7 tried to reconcile two apparently contradictory principles: that in order to promote 
market discipline, prudent lending and thorough risk assessment, the conditions should 
exist for creditors to absorb occasional losses, and that governments incentives to meet 
their obligations in full and on time should not be undermined by PSI (Group of 7, 
1999).  In order to do so, the Summit’s Communiqué established that the appropriate 
role to be played by the private sector would depend on the gravity of each crisis and on 
the nature of outstanding debt instruments. Where possible, an emphasis would be 
placed on “market-based, voluntary solutions”. However, the Communiqué did also 
envision situations in which “more comprehensive approaches may be appropriate to 
provide a more sustainable future payments path”.  
 
One of the tools originally contemplated by the G-7 to promote PSI was the imposition 
of an international reserves floor in IMF programs. Such a floor would function as a 
pseudo trigger forcing debtors and their private creditors to negotiate in order to avoid 
the suspension of the Fund’s financial support should the intensity of liquidity pressures 
reach a certain critical point. In addition, the G-7 proposed the establishment of more 
explicit conditions linking the provision of official financial assistance with countries’ 
efforts to seek voluntary commitments of support from private markets or to restructure 
and refinance outstanding obligations. One of the first practical implications of the 
mandate set out by the G-7 in Cologne was the adoption of the so-called 80/20 rule. 
Under this rule, countries under an IMF program would have to restructure 80% of the 
obligations coming due during the duration of the program (Roubini and Setser, 
2004)
48
.  
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 This contributes to explain why Ukraine was asked to carry out a partial debt-restructuring in 1999 and 
why Ecuador did not receive the Fund’s financial support until it defaulted in October of that same year. 
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In addition, the G-7 entrusted the IMF with the task of working out the technical and 
legal details associated with the various PSI options contemplated in the Cologne 
Communiqué. The months that followed this Summit, therefore, witnessed an intense 
effort on the part of IMF officials to come up with a coherent multilateral framework for 
the inclusion of private creditors in the resolution of financial crises. On November 
1998 the US Congress did also establish its own advisory commission named after its 
chair, Allan Meltzer, which was to come up with recommendations about the future role 
to be played by the IMF, the World Bank and the other regional development banks. In 
the realm of the official finance vs. PSI debate, one of the Meltzer Report’s most 
important recommendations was that the IMF should limit its crisis resolution financial 
role to that of a quasi-lender of last resort, lending at short maturities and a penalty rate 
only to solvent members having temporarily lost access to international financial 
markets (International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, 2000). What matters 
to this analysis is that suspending or restricting the provision of official financial 
support to countries with an unsustainable debt burden did implicitly assign PSI a 
central role in the resolution of solvency crises.  
 
These various arguments were wrapped by the G7 in the fall of 2000, when the so-
called Prague Framework for Crisis Resolution was disclosed at the annual IMF-World 
Bank meetings. This framework did essentially distinguish between three possible 
scenarios: (i) A pure liquidity crisis in which “the combination of catalytic official 
financing and policy adjustment should allow the country to regain full market access 
quickly”; (ii) Intermediate cases in which the “emphasis should be placed on 
encouraging voluntary approaches, as needed, to overcome credit coordination 
problems”. (iii) Pure solvency crises in which “the early restoration of full market 
access (…) may be judged unrealistic, and a broader spectrum of actions, including 
comprehensive debt restructuring, may be warranted. (…) in certain extreme cases, a 
temporary payments suspension or standstill may be unavoidable” (International 
Monetary and Financial Committee, 2000).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
The 80/20 rule, however, was dropped relatively soon as the focus was shifted to medium-term debt 
sustainability. 
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Therefore, the Prague framework interpreted financial crises as a continuum from the 
pure illiquidity scenario to the pure insolvency one. The closer to an illiquidity crisis, 
the more the IMF was to resort to catalytic official finance. Conversely, the closer to a 
pure insolvency scenario, the more the IMF was to resort to PSI measures such as 
standstills and comprehensive debt restructurings. In turn, in intermediate scenarios a 
combination of the two would have to be applied, the IMF providing official finance to 
be complemented by less coercive PSI measures (inter-bank concerted roll-overs, pre-
emptive market-friendly restructurings, etc…). This finally provided a complete albeit 
broad roadmap to guide IMF’s intervention in emerging market crises and to shape 
agents’ expectations. However, the framework did not specify how the international 
community was to judge the degree of solvency of a country, which generated an 
important element of ambiguity.
49
 
 
As mentioned above, after the Bush administration took office in January 2001, the 
debate on PSI further intensified because a corollary to the new policy of limiting the 
availability of international rescue packages was that other mechanisms would have to 
be sought in order to address debt overhangs. It is in this context that Paul O’Neill 
publicly argued in favour of a new ‘international bankruptcy law’ in September 2001 
and that the new First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF Anne Krueguer proposed 
the creation of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) in November of 
that same year (Suskind, 2004). The rationale behind that proposal was that the 
securitization of sovereign debt had made it more difficult to coordinate private 
creditors in the event of an insolvency crisis and, therefore, more difficult to carry out 
an orderly debt restructuring. As a result, it was argued that debtors in distress tend to 
‘gamble for redemption’, postponing the inevitable as much as possible, and increasing 
the ultimate cost of the crisis both for domestic economies and for international 
investors. An SDRM, instead, would be instrumental to bring about prompt collective 
action to deal with unsustainable debt burdens, “helping preserve asset values and 
protect creditors’ rights, while paving the way toward an agreement that helps the 
debtor return to viability and growth” (Krueguer, 2002: 2). Essentially, the SDRM 
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 Partly in order to address this ambiguity, the IMF has developed various debt sustainability analysis 
templates and methodologies after the Prague framework was agreed upon. However, because the scale of 
the financial assistance provided by the IMF can be such a relevant element to determine the ex post 
solvency of a country, basing the design of financial programs on countries’ ex ante solvency introduces 
an element of circularity which is difficult to solve.   
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proposal revisited Sachs’ idea of an international bankruptcy court, incorporating 
features that would entitle the IMF or another international body to sanction a standstill 
on debt payments, deter creditors from litigating during a ‘legitimate’ restructuring and 
bind all creditors to the restructuring terms agreed with a qualified majority of them. 
  
The SDRM proposal was extensively debated in 2002 and 2003. However, in spite of 
Paul O’Neill’s initial enthusiasm, the SDRM did eventually fail to gather the support 
that would have been necessary for it to be adopted. For a start, there was a lack of 
consensus about its desirability even within the US administration. Indeed, ever since it 
was proposed, the influential Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, 
John Taylor, advocated for other contractual market-based decentralized alternatives to 
the creation of an SDRM (Taylor, 2002a). Partly as a result of the pressure exerted on 
them by private financial institutions, the other members of the G-7 were also rather 
tepid in their support to the SDRM initiative. The main concern was that such a scheme 
could have been tantamount to making it easier for emerging economies to breach their 
contractual obligations. In the absence of other enforcement mechanisms applicable to 
international debt contracts, it was argued that the lack of a formalized debt 
restructuring framework was necessary to increase the expected cost of defaulting, 
thereby reinforcing emerging economies’ incentives to service their obligations in full.  
 
On their part, the emerging markets that were expected to become the beneficiaries of a 
sovereign bankruptcy regime also opposed its creation, fearing that such an innovation 
would structurally increase the cost of their access to international financial markets 
(Roubini and Setser, 2004). In this context, it is not surprising that at the IMF-World 
Bank 2003 spring meetings, the international community eventually abandoned this 
project: “the truth was, with the emerging market countries, the bankers, and the 
investors so adamant in their objections to the SDRM, there was no way it was going to 
be implemented” (Taylor, 2007b).50 
 
However, the SDRM discussions gave way to a very significant landmark in the 
international financial architecture: the almost systematic inclusion of collective action 
                                                          
50
 For a more in depth discussion about the factors that have recurrently prevented the international 
community from creating an international sovereign bankruptcy mechanism, see Helleiner (2008). 
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clauses (CACs) in bonds issued under New York law.
51
 CACs are contractual 
provisions establishing that in case of a debt restructuring the terms agreed between the 
sovereign and a supermajority of bondholders (usually 75 or 85%) will be applicable to 
all the holders of a given bond. Their main purpose, therefore, is to address the 
collective action problem posed by holdout creditors, and to avoid situations in which a 
minority of bondholders can block a debt restructuring process (IMF, 2002b). However, 
a crucial difference between the SDRM and CACs is that the latter do not permit to 
aggregate across bond issues, as a result of which it constitutes a much more partial 
instrument to overcome creditor coordination problems. To a large extent, CACs were 
embraced by private creditors and emerging markets’ governments in order to derail the 
SDRM proposal. In fact, it has been argued that this was the main reason why the 
Mexican government strategically decided to become the first large emerging market to 
launch a bond issue including CACs in New York on February 2003 (Helleiner, 2009). 
Eventually, the market did not penalize Mexico for taking such a step and CACs 
became a common feature of most emerging markets’ bonds within a matter of years: 
90% of all sovereign issues in terms of value issued in 2005 already included CACs 
(IMFa, 2005). The practical effectiveness of CACs, however, has not yet been tested 
given that this instrument has never been used in a major sovereign debt restructuring.
52
  
 
   Conditionality 
 
The IMF defines conditionality as “the various policies that require, as a condition for 
the use of Fund’s resources, a member to implement measures that enable it both to 
resolve its balance of payment difficulties and to repay the Fund.” (IMF, 2009). Central 
to enforce these policies is the tranche structure of financial programs, which allows the 
IMF to condition successive periodic disbursements on the adoption of observable 
measures  proving that members are making a sufficient effort to generate the 
international reserves required to honour their multilateral obligations in due time. 
Conditionality pursues the complementary objectives of preventing members under a 
program from using the Fund’s financial support to unduly postpone a necessary 
adjustment, safeguarding the IMF’s resources and preserving their revolving character. 
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 CACs were already a common feature in bonds governed under English and Japanese law. 
52
 The only case in which CACs were used to facilitate a sovereign debt restructuring was that of Belize 
in 2006-2007 (Díaz-Cassou and Erce, 2008). 
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Conditionality has traditionally focused on macroeconomic policies. Indeed, ever since 
the monetary approach to the balance of payments was developed by IMF economists in 
the 1950s and 60s, the adoption of a contractionary fiscal and monetary stance has 
remained a central element of the institution’s strategy to induce a reduction in 
countries’ absorption and, in this way, restore their external sustainability (Polak, 1998).  
 
However, starting in the early 1980s the scope of conditionality has gradually expanded 
as the Fund’s financial programs have increasingly tried to influence members’ 
structural and institutional policies (IEO, 2008b). To some extent, this reflects some of 
the concrete circumstances that the IMF has confronted over the last three decades such 
as the protracted balance of payment needs facing some of its poorer members, the need 
to assist formerly planned economies’ transition to a market economy or the financial 
instability associated with the liberalization of international capital flows. It can also be 
considered the product of an evolving paradigm as supply-side models have gained 
prominence and economists have sharpened their focus on the microeconomic 
foundations of external disequilibria.  
 
Another reason behind the expanding scope of conditionality has been the IMF’s need 
to complement its programs with the resources provided by supplementary private and 
public financiers, who have gradually acquired a more or less explicit ‘right’ to demand 
the inclusion of additional conditions in IMF programs (Gould, 2006). As already 
mentioned, this trend has been particularly apparent during the decade under analysis 
given that the rescue packages that addressed some of the major emerging markets 
crises included a large amount of resources provided by other official creditors like the 
World Bank or the US Treasury.
53
 Furthermore, because the resumption of access to 
international financial markets was crucial to the resolution of these crises, the inclusion 
of policy conditions aimed at restoring investors’ confidence was increasingly seen as a 
key factor for the success of rescue packages.   
 
                                                          
53
 Rubin and Weisberg (2003) offer an account of the US Treasury’s role in the negotiations of the 
conditionality attached to the Mexican rescue package. In this case, the US went as far as requiring 
Mexico to pledge future oil exports proceeds as collateral. 
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In fact, the initial years of the IFA initiative were characterized by the large number and 
invasive nature of the strings attached to the Fund’s financing. This trend is illustrated 
in Figure 2.3, which shows that the average number of structural conditions per program 
more than tripled during the 1990s. This process reached its peak during the Asian 
financial crisis as the South Korean, Thai and Indonesian programs included as many as 
94, 73 and 140 structural conditions respectively (Buira, 2003). Given that neither the 
G-7 nor the Fund’s governing bodies did initially discuss conditionality as an element to 
be considered under the IFA initiative, this can be considered a spontaneous process. It 
would seem, therefore, that the international community quite simply contemplated the 
expanding scope of conditionality as a quid pro quo of larger rescue packages.  
 
Figure 3.3 
Average number of structural conditions per program 
         Source: IEO (2008b) 
 
However, by the late 1990s, the IMF was being heavily criticized for its handling of the 
Asian crisis and, more specifically, for an excessively stringent conditionality. In 1998, 
for instance, Martin Feldstein argued that “a nation’s desperate need for short-term 
financial help does not give the IMF the moral right to substitute its technical 
judgements for the outcomes of the nation’s political process” (Feldstein, 1998: 27). 
Two years later, the Meltzer report also made the point that IMF conditionality had 
made programs “unwieldy, highly conflictual, time consuming to negotiate, and often 
ineffectual” (International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, 2000: 7).54 
                                                          
54
 The Meltzer commission report also advocated for a transition toward a model of ex ante 
conditionality, imposing four pre-conditions for members’ access to the Fund’s resources: that members 
liberalize the entry and operations of foreign financial institutions, that members disclose the maturity 
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In response to this torrent of criticism, the G-7 Okinawa Summit of July 2000 squarely 
incorporated the reform of conditionality in the on-going IFA Initiative. In fact, this 
summit’s Communiqué was the first to emphasize the importance of ‘country 
ownership’ for the successful implementation of IMF programs (Group of 7, 2000). 
Later that year, at the Prague 2000 World Bank-IMF annual meetings, the IMFC went 
further, urging the EB to review all aspects of policy conditionality in order for it to be 
refocused on macroeconomic policies and only on those structural reforms that may 
have an unambiguous macroeconomic impact (International Monetary and Financial 
Committee, 2000).  
 
The IMF’s Managing Director responded to this mandate issuing in September 2000 an 
Interim Guidance Note aimed at streamlining conditionality (IMF, 2000a). This note did 
essentially orient staff on the criteria to be applied in the design of programs’ structural 
conditionality. It established that, as a general rule, only those structural reforms that are 
macro-relevant and considered critical to meet a program’s objectives should be 
included as part of the Fund’s conditionality. On occasions, the note argued that the 
IMF was entitled to condition its financial support on the completion of reforms in areas 
that fall outside of the Fund’s core responsibilities. However, in such circumstances the 
note commended staff to cooperate with the World Bank or other organizations with the 
sufficient know-how to design and monitor these conditions.  
 
In any case, in this facet of the IFA Initiative the main reform was the EB’s approval of 
new conditionality guidelines in September 2002. These new guidelines updated the 
framework governing conditionality, which had remained unchanged since 1979. The 
two key principles emphasized by the new guidelines were country ownership and 
parsimony. According to the former, national governments should have the “primary 
responsibility for the selection, design and implementation of its economic policy” and 
the IMF should pay “due regard to the domestic social and political objectives, 
economic priorities, and the circumstances of members, including the causes of their 
balance of payment problems and their administrative capacity to implement reforms” 
                                                                                                                                                                          
structure of all outstanding, guaranteed and off-balance sheet debt, that commercial banks are adequately 
capitalized and that the sufficient guarantees exist to make sure that the Fund’s financial support will not 
be used to sustain irresponsible market policies. 
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(IMF, 2002c). In turn, the principle of parsimony established that the Fund’s 
conditionality should only include policies and measures under the member’s control 
considered crucial to achieve the program’s objectives or to monitor progress in its 
implementation. The guidelines did also establish certain restrictions on conditions 
outside of the Fund’s core responsibilities, whose inclusion in a program would require 
staff to prove their criticality for the program’s success. This new framework tried to 
refocus conditionality toward the Fund’s traditional areas of expertise, namely 
macroeconomic and financial stabilization and only those structural measures deemed 
strictly necessary to correct external disequilibria. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has offered a descriptive account of the two key structural constraints 
facing IMF officials in their negotiations with borrowing countries during the decade 
under analysis: the arrangements that define the Fund’s decision making process and the 
rules governing multilateral crisis lending. The Fund’s institutional design has been 
described as one which enabled the institution’s most powerful members to tightly 
oversee chief-negotiators. In this context, the intense efforts undertaken by these same 
constituents to develop a rules-based crisis resolution framework become somewhat 
paradoxical. Indeed, if the Fund’s institutional design enabled principals/constituents to 
control the day to day operations of their agents/chief-negotiators, the less prevalent 
should agency problems have been, which should have been expected to result in a 
lesser demand for rules. Why was this not the case in this particular issue area?  
 
To some extent, this chapter has argued that a rules-based multilateral crisis lending 
regime was demanded on technical grounds, a common concern being that an absence 
of rules could turn IMF interventions into an additional source of uncertainty during 
financial crises, thereby exacerbating their effects and maybe even increasing their 
likelihood (Rajan, 2005). The development of a rules-based framework, therefore, was 
advocated as a signalling device to shape investors’ expectations, which was expected 
to improve the functioning of the international financial system (Taylor, 2007a). Partly 
related to this point, strict rules governing access to IMF credit were also emphasized as 
an instrument that could potentially limit the moral hazard distortion that a discretionary 
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multilateral financial safety net was suspected to have generated on creditors and 
debtors’ incentives (Calomaris, 1998). 
 
However, there were other political and ideological motivations behind the demand for 
rules in this particular issue area. As this chapter has described, the Fund’s governance 
structure is characterized by the asymmetric influence that different constituents can 
exert on chief-negotiators. This does not only apply to creditor vs. debtor countries, the 
latter having a very limited say over the Fund’s decisions, but also to the US vs. Europe. 
It has been argued that for a variety of reasons European countries have not managed to 
build a stable coalition capable of matching the power held by the US in the Fund’s 
decision making process. Especially after the experience of the Mexican bailout, this 
explains why the European members of the G7 advocated for rules as a means to 
constrain the US government’s ability to shape multilateral interventions according to 
its own political agenda (Porzcecanski, 2002; Giannini, 2002).  
 
Eventually, this demand for rules would also resonate among conservatives in the US, 
which in the late 1990s became increasingly vocal about the idea that in the absence of a 
rules-based framework, the IMF would always tend to succumb to political pressures, 
intervening irrespective of the economic rationality of these interventions, and in so 
doing unnecessarily putting tax-payers’ money at risk (Calomaris, 1998; Suskind, 
2006). In this ideological context, the 2001 change of administration in the US 
constituted a turning point in the reform of the IFA which had an impact on the 
structural determinants of IMF negotiators’ win-sets.  
 
In fact, two clearly distinct phases can be discerned in the IFA initiative regarding both 
the relative importance of rules versus discretion and the specific content of rules. The 
first one corresponds to the Clinton administration and the Rubin-Summers team at the 
US Treasury. During this period the US government tended to favour flexibility, 
reflecting not only its views about how emerging market crises and cross border 
contagion should be addressed, but also a willingness to act as decisively as possible 
whenever American interests were put at stake (Rubin and Weisberg, 2003). The IFA 
initiative, therefore, focused on the reinforcement of a multilateral financial safety net 
through the introduction of new facilities and through the upgrading of existing 
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institutional mechanisms, which made larger volumes of financial assistance more 
readily available to countries in distress.  
 
The second phase corresponds to the George W. Bush administration and the O’Neill-
Snow-Taylor team at the US Treasury. During these years, and more in line with the 
preferences of the European members of the G7, the US government leaned in favour of 
rules. Reflecting a growing criticism about the distortions caused by the international 
rescue packages of the Clinton era, stricter limits on the provision of emergency 
financial support were adopted and an emphasis was placed on the need to involve 
private creditors in the resolution of financial crises. In addition, new conditionality 
rules were adopted in order to promote country ownership and parsimony in the policy 
strings attached to IMF programs. 
 
What does all this imply for the contours of IMF negotiators’ win-sets? Ceteris paribus, 
the policy stance adopted by the Clinton administration could be expected to have 
increased IMF negotiators’ win-sets given that new instruments were added to their 
crisis resolution toolkit and that the rules governing access to multilateral credit were 
made more flexible. Instead, a greater reliance on rules during the Bush administration 
could be expected to have reduced the IMF negotiators’ win-sets.  
 
This conclusion, however, should be qualified for a number of reasons. First, the greater 
flexibility promoted by the Clinton administration was aimed at increasing its own 
discretion rather than that of IMF negotiators. Hence, it is not necessarily the case that 
flexible rules resulted in an expanded IMF win-set, at least in those cases in which the 
US administration had an incentive to intervene. Second, most of the rules adopted by 
the international community during the decade under consideration failed to provide a 
clear guideline for IMF chief-negotiators. A case in point is the Prague Framework for 
the resolution of financial crises. Although this framework envisaged the adoption of 
different strategies for different types of crises, the criteria to distinguish between 
solvency and liquidity crises were never entirely clarified. As a result, whether this 
framework created an unambiguous association between specific circumstances and 
specific courses of action is open to discussion. Third, in the absence of a supra-national 
authority with the ability to hierarchically enforce the IFA rules, the largest IMF 
constituents retained discretion to break or to amend these rules after they were adopted. 
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In other words, rules in this issue area were only binding to the extent that IMF 
constituents wanted them to be. 
 
Summing up, whereas the fact that the Fund’s institutional design imposed a hard 
constraint on IMF negotiators is unambiguous, whether rules in this issue area were 
really binding is an empirical question. The subsequent case studies, therefore, take the 
institutional design described in this chapter as the structure within which the IMF’s 
Level I game unfolded while considering the IFA rules as one among other possible 
determinants of the multilateral response to the Argentine and the Uruguayan financial 
crises.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
Argentina and the IMF 
 
 
 
 
Argentina has been one of the most recurrent users of the Fund’s financial support, 
being under a program for about 38 years since it joined the IMF in 1956 (Amadeo, 
2003). From a historical perspective, the number of IMF interventions in Argentina 
during the decade that followed the Tequila crisis does not stand out in particular: five 
new programs were signed between 1996 and 2005 against four during the previous 
decade or five in between 1982 and 1991. Various factors, however, render this an 
exceptional decade in Argentina’s relationship with the IMF. Most of all, the scale of 
the Fund’s financial involvement was unprecedented: whereas the support that 
Argentina obtained from the IMF during the entire 1980s debt crisis totalled SDR 5 
billion, had it not been suspended, the 2000 SBA alone would have provided access to 
more than SDR 16 billion. In fact, the Fund´s loans became the government’s last 
remaining lifeline, and the suspension of the program in late November 2001 was the 
final trigger of the subsequent economic meltdown. Fairly or not, this placed the IMF in 
the difficult position of being often referred to as the cause rather than the solution to 
the worst crisis in Argentina’s modern economic history. This has left deep scars in the 
relationship between Argentina and the IMF which are best exemplified in the 
Kirchners administrations’ anti-IMF rhetoric.   
 
The case of Argentina provides fertile ground for studying the patterns of IMF 
involvement in emerging markets. Indeed, the decade under analysis (from the approval 
of the 1996 SBA until the early cancellation of the last active financial program in 
January 2006) exhibits a wide variation in the nature, scope and cooperativeness of the 
relationship between the Argentine government and the IMF, which this chapter 
analyses using a two-level game framework. Given this chapter’s longitudinal approach, 
it will focus primarily on those explanatory factors that varied more clearly over time, 
such as the outcome of electoral processes, the strength and cohesion of governing 
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coalitions, bureaucratic interests or multilateral rules. Instead, other more static 
explanatory factors, such as some structural features of Argentina’s polity and 
institutions, will be the focus of the cross-sectional analysis presented in Chapter 6. 
 
The evidence provided in this chapter brings support to the hypothesis that there is a 
non-linear relationship between domestic political constraints and borrower’s 
bargaining power in the negotiations with the IMF. Indeed, instances are found in which 
Argentine negotiators exploited the presence of domestic political divisions in order to 
obtain a better deal with the IMF. Eventually, however, growing difficulties to secure 
the domestic ratification of a coherent crisis resolution policy package eliminated the 
overlap between the Argentine and the Fund’s win-sets, resulting in the collapse of the 
cooperative equilibrium. In addition, the Argentine experience evidences that, 
depending on the government’s preferences and on public perceptions about the IMF, a 
program relationship can serve different domestic political purposes. If the preferences 
of both sides’ negotiators converge and the Fund is not too stigmatized in the domestic 
political debate, the conditionality associated with IMF programs can be exploited by 
borrowing governments as an instrument to legitimize certain unpopular courses of 
action. But if negotiators’ preferences diverge and the IMF is stigmatized in the 
domestic political debate, a conflictive program relationship can be exploited to garner 
public support for courses of action that depart from the Fund’s prescriptions. 
 
The Argentine case study also suggests that the perceived cost of no agreement is 
negatively associated with the autonomy of IMF officials in the negotiations with 
borrowing governments. In other words, the higher the cost of no-agreement, the more 
significant will the Fund’s constituents’ strategic priorities become. Instead, when the 
cost of no-agreement is perceived to be low, technical considerations and the Fund’s 
internal bureaucratic politics tend to play a more prominent role in the program’s 
negotiations. Similarly, the Argentine experience indicates that the cost of no agreement 
perceived by the Fund’s constituents is associated with the explanatory significance of 
rules. Indeed, powerful nations seem to be more willing to consider breaching existing 
rules when the potential de-stabilizing consequences of the issues at stake are clearer. 
Instead, when the negative spillovers plausibly associated with a particular multilateral 
decision are perceived to be milder, rules tend to be more binding, thus imposing a 
harder constraint on the program negotiations.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 starts by offering a 
descriptive account of the evolution observed in this case study’s dependent variable: 
the outcome of the “level I” international negotiation. This chapter distinguishes 
between three phases during each of which IMF programs pursued different objectives: 
crisis prevention; crisis management; restoration of debt sustainability. Subsequently, 
sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 introduce the level II game, analysing these three phases in 
terms of the evolving preferences and win-sets of both sides’ chief negotiators. Finally, 
the chapter concludes summarizing the hypotheses that this case study helps unveil 
about the relationship between domestic ratification politics and the bargaining 
interaction between the IMF and its borrowing members.   
 
4.1  A decade of financial programs 
 
During the first phase of the decade under analysis, which lasted until late 2000, the 
relationship between Argentine and IMF officials was one of close cooperation aimed at 
preventing future financial crises and at consolidating a process of market-oriented 
reforms that had been initiated in the early 1990s. As shown in Figure 4.1, the 
‘precautionary’ nature of the 1996 and 1998 programs implies that net IMF 
disbursements were small or even negative during this period. The second phase of 
crisis management starts when adverse market developments forced the government to 
begin making extensive use of the Fund’s financial support late in 2000. In spite of two 
sizeable augmentations of that program, the Fund’s crisis resolution intervention in 
Argentina failed and was eventually suspended in December 2001. Notwithstanding the 
economic collapse that took place subsequently, the government was forced to make net 
repayments to the IMF and to the other IFIs throughout 2002. After very contentious 
negotiations a new program was approved in January 2003 giving way to the third 
phase analysed in this chapter, during which policy discussions were centred on the 
unsustainable stock of sovereign debt that the Argentine government had accumulated 
previously with private and public creditors. This continued to be a tense period in 
Argentina’s relationship with the IMF, with recurrent threats on the part of the IMF to 
suspend the program and on the part of the Argentine government to default on its 
multilateral obligations.   
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Table 4.1 
IMF programs in Argentina (1996-2005) 
 
Source: IMF  
Program Type
Date of 
Approval
Duration
Amount 
committed in 
SDR and in % 
of quota
Amount 
disbursed in 
SDR and in % 
of total
Macroeconomic conditionality Structural conditionality C ompliance with conditionality
Apr-96 21 months SDR 720mn SDR 613mn
48% of quota 85%
Feb-98 3 years  SDR 2,080mn 0
135% of quota 0%
Mar-00 3 years SDR 5.4bn SDR 1.567bn
255% of quota 29%
Jan-01 -  SDR 5.2bn SDR 4.219bn
246% of quota 81%
Of which 
SDR 2.3bn under 
the SRF
Aug-01 - SDR  6.3bn SDR 3.97bn
300% of quota 63%
Of which         
SDR 3.8 bn 
under the SRF
Jan-03 8 months SDR  2,174.5mn SDR 2,174.5mn
103% of quota 100%
Sep-03 3 years SDR  8.9bn SDR 4.171bn
424% of quota 47%
Focus on fiscal consolidation: support to the 
zero deficit rule. The program envisaged a 
restructuring of sovereign debt and earmarked 
US$ 3 billion for that purpose
Primary surplus of 2.5% of GDP.
Minimum primary surplus of 3% of GDP in 
2003. No fiscal targets defined for 2004 and 
2005.
No formal structural conditionality. However, 
the IMF pressed the authorities to  reform the 
labour. market in the first and second reviews of 
the program.
Tax reform; Labor market reform; new anti-trust 
law; privatization of Banco Nacion; lease of 
airports to private operator
Labor market reform; Tax reform; new revenue 
sharing agreement with provinces; social 
security reform; new central bank charter and 
banking law
Strengthening of tax payments facilities; 
Creation of a tax fraud tribunal; protection of 
competition law; new regulatory framework for 
the telecom sector; pension reform; restructuring 
of social security allowances 
New legislation for revenue sharing with the 
provinces
Draft legislation for fiscal reform; new banking 
regulations; appointment of an external advisor 
for the debt restructuring; revision of utilities 
tariffs
Fiscal reform; establishment of a new revenue 
sharing system with the provinces; 
compensation to banks for asymmetric 
pesoization
Focus on fiscal consolidation.
Focus on fiscal consolidation
Focus on fiscal consolidation. Growth 
projections overtly optimistic: real GDP was 
projected to grow by 3.8% in 2000. Instead, it 
contracted by 0.8%. The program's fiscal targets 
had to be accomodated in Sept. 2000 
Relaxation of fiscal conditionality. Budget 
deficit allowed to increase in the short term. 
Stabilization of long term debt dynamics 
targeted.
Dismal compliance as a result of rapidly 
worsening economic conditions
Good compliance with macroeconomic 
conditionality. Weak compliance with structural 
conditionality
Good compliance with macroeconomic 
conditionality. Weak compliance with structural 
conditionality
Fiscal slippage in spite of the relaxation of 
macroeconomic conditionality. Various 
measures included in the program's structural 
conditionality were not met due to opposition 
from Congress
Weak compliance with macroeconomic 
conditionality in spite of strong economic 
performance
Weak compliance with both macroeconomic 
and structural conditionality in spite of strong 
economic performance
Very weak compliance with macroeconomic 
conditionality due to a worsening economic 
performance. Relatively good compliance with 
structural conditionality
SBA
SBA
EFF
SBA
Transitory SBA
2d augmentation 
(with SRF)
1st augmentation 
(with SRF)
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Figure 4.1 
Financial transactions between Argentina and the IMF (US$) 
 
Source: IMF 
 
4.1.1   Crisis prevention 
 
The first phase begins with the approval of a 21 months SBA in April 1996 for an 
amount of approximately US$ 1,000 million (see table 4.1). This program was signed 
after the effects of the Tequila crisis had subsided, and was primarily aimed at bringing 
confidence to international investors on the resilience of the convertibility regime and at 
supporting the continuation of the government’s market-oriented reform strategy.55 Yet, 
this SBA did not include any structural condition, although the IMF claims to have 
encouraged the Argentine authorities to embark on a labour market reform at the time of 
the program’s second review (IMF, 2003a). In spite of a strong economic performance 
during the period of implementation of this SBA (GDP growth was 5.5% in 1996 and 
8.1% in 1997) Argentina did not meet the program’s fiscal targets in spite of which the 
                                                          
55
 Largely as a result of its rigid macroeconomic framework, the Mexican crisis hit Argentina particularly 
hard. Indeed, investors’ concerns about fixed exchange rates and the government’s ability to sustain 
Argentina’s currency board fed an attack on the peso, a sudden stop in capital flows and ultimately a real 
GDP contraction of 2.2% in 1995. This did initially raise awareness about the need for further reforms. A 
rapid recovery in 1996, however, created a renewed sense of optimism about the resilience of the 
convertibility regime which was to substantially slow down the pace of reforms during the last years of 
the Menem administration.  
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Executive Board systematically approved subsequent reviews (Allen, 2003). This 
failure to press Argentina to tighten fiscal policy in good times has been criticized as 
one of the main failings of the IMF during the period that preceded the 2001 crisis 
(José-Luis Machinea. Personal interview. July 13, 2010; Mussa, 2002; Blunstein, 2003; 
IMF, 2003a; IEO, 2004).    
 
The three-year US$ 2.8 billion Extended Fund Facility approved on February 1998 was 
similar in spirit to the 1996 SBA. It was declared as precautionary, making it clear that 
its main purpose was to signal the Fund’s support to Argentina’s policies and 
macroeconomic framework without disbursing financial resources. Its conditionality 
focused on fiscal adjustment and on a number of targeted structural reforms. 
Argentina’s compliance with these conditions was generally weak in spite of which the 
Board continued to approve subsequent reviews with minor delays. As will be seen later 
in more detail, various factors contribute to explain this weak compliance. First of all, 
the combined effect of the Russian default in August 1998 and of the collapse of the 
Brazilian real in January 1999 abruptly pushed the Argentine economy into recession 
(real GDP contracted by 3.8 per cent in 1999) making the program’s fiscal targets 
difficult to attain. In addition, the 1999 general elections fed a fiscal expansion and a 
growing reluctance to engage in unpopular reforms (Mussa, 2002). A case in point is 
the labour market reform included in the program’s conditionality. Although a new 
labour law was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on September 1998, the Fund’s 
staff made it clear that it fell short of expectations, which did not prevent the Board 
from approving the program’s first review a few weeks later (IEO, 2003).  
 
The administration of Fernando de la Rúa began negotiating a new program with the 
IMF soon after taking office in December 1999. It is precisely in order to secure the 
Fund’s support and to signal the new administration’s views on fiscal adjustment that a 
very significant tax increase was announced in January 2000: the so-called Impuestazo. 
A new US$ 7.2 billion SBA was signed in March. Like its predecessor, this program 
was intended to be precautionary, with a focus on fiscal consolidation and labour 
market reform. Eventually, however, the economy performed much worse than 
anticipated: instead of growing by 3.8% as projected in the program, real GDP 
contracted by 0.8% in 2000. The prolonged recession made it increasingly difficult to 
meet the program’s fiscal targets in spite of some drastic actions such as a 13% 
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reduction in civil servants’ salaries decreed in May 2000. Partly because of their pro-
cyclical effect, not even with these measures did the government manage to regain 
control over public finances, and the IMF regularly accommodated higher than expected 
deficits. Compliance was better with structural conditionality: a new employment law 
was passed on April 2000. However, this reform had the unintended consequence of 
severely weakening the governing coalition: on October 2000 Vice-President Álvarez 
resigned after allegations that various senators had accepted bribes to vote in favour of 
the new law. As a result, country risk peaked, further deteriorating the government’s 
fiscal position and making it almost impossible to tap international financial markets in 
order to roll-over debt obligations as they came due. This would eventually lead to a 
fundamental reappraisal of the program, giving way to a new phase in the Fund’s 
involvement in Argentina. 
 
4.1.2   Crisis management 
 
A crucial landmark in Argentina’s relationship with the IMF was the quasi-doubling of 
the SBA in December 2000. As opposed to past program-related announcements, this 
operation emphasized an urgent need for external financial assistance to cover the loss 
of access to international financial markets. Together with other multilateral, bilateral 
and private commitments, it was claimed that this augmentation would provide a total 
amount of US$ 40 billion: a so-called ‘armour-plate’ (Blindaje) expected to bolster 
market confidence.
56
 The new strategy agreed between IMF and Argentine officials was 
to temporarily relax fiscal policy in order to avoid the contractionary impact that past 
adjustment measures had had. In addition, the Argentine authorities committed to an 
ambitious agenda of structural reforms which were expected to spark an economic 
recovery in the medium term (José-Luis Machinea. Personal interview. July 13, 2010). 
Although the new program brought about a few weeks of relative stability, the situation 
began to deteriorate again in February 2001. This was primarily due to contagion from 
the Turkish crisis and to the growing realization that the government would not be able 
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 The IMF program was augmented to almost US$ 14 billion; the World Bank and the IADB provided 
US$ 5 billion; the government of Spain provided US $1 billion. The US $20 billion corresponding to 
private financiers was constituted by pledges on the part of a number of market-makers to place 
Argentine sovereign Bonds in 2001 and thereafter.   
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to fulfil its commitments even under the relaxed terms of the augmented program.
57
 The 
resignation of Minister Machinea and the failed fiscal adjustment attempted by Minister 
López Murphy during his brief tenure further aggravated the situation, and when 
Domingo Cavallo took over the Economy Ministry in March 2001 it was clear that, 
once again, the IMF program was severely off-track. 
 
Cavallo’s tenure at the Ministry was rich in policy innovations such as the introduction 
of a financial transactions tax, the modification of the convertibility regime that pegged 
the peso both to the euro and the dollar, the ‘mega-swap’, the zero deficit law or the 
introduction of a system of taxes and subsidies that was intended to mimic the effect of 
a devaluation (see Appendix C). Most of these measures were adopted with little or no 
consultation with the IMF as a result of which Argentina’s relationship with the 
institution became increasingly strained during these months (Daniel Marx. Personal 
interview. June 28 2010; Mussa, 2002; Blustein, 2003). Yet, and although Cavallo’s 
measures did little to reconcile Argentina’s macroeconomic performance with the 
program’s targets, the Executive Board approved two further reviews. The last 
important operation undertaken during this cooperative stage of Argentina’s relationship 
with the Fund was the second augmentation of the program approved in August 2001. 
Although this augmentation was expected to provide an additional US$ 8 billion 
bringing the total size of the Fund’s support to US$ 22 billion, it was approved in the 
context of severe disagreements with the measures that were being implemented by 
Minister Cavallo (IEO, 2004). A novel feature of the augmentation was that it 
earmarked US$ 3 billion for the specific purpose of supporting a sovereign debt 
restructuring.   
 
After the IMF’s disbursement to Argentina in September 2001, the situation continued 
to deteriorate with no respite in sovereign spreads, a dismal fiscal performance in spite 
of the zero-deficit law, and an intensifying depositors’ run on the banking system. It is 
in this context that the IMF decided not to approve the SBA’s fifth review, thus 
suspending scheduled disbursements and severing access to the last remaining source of 
hard currency available for the Argentine government. The weeks that followed 
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 The Turkish lira was devalued in mid-September. The fiscal deficit was projected to reach US$ 10 
billion as opposed to the targeted US$ 6.5 billion. The Argentine judiciary suspended two decrees that 
had been issued to comply with structural conditions in the areas of pension and health care system 
reform. 
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witnessed a wave of social unrest that culminated in the resignations of Minister 
Cavallo and President de la Rúa. A chaotic succession of short-lived governments 
ensued, during which some extraordinary measures were adopted such as the 
declaration of a comprehensive moratorium on sovereign debt repayments or the 
abandonment of the convertibility regime. Given that the prevailing institutional 
instability temporarily impaired communication with the IMF, there is little doubt that 
these decisions were taken unilaterally by the Argentine government. Once the 
Argentine Congress elected Eduardo Duhalde as ‘caretaker’ president on January 1st 
2002, however, it took only a few days for senior government officials to resume talks 
about a new program (Jorge Todesca. Personal interview. July 19, 2010).  
 
The negotiations of a new program to succeed the 2000 SBA proved to be frustratingly 
lengthy: it was not until August 2002 that a proper Letter of Intent began to be officially 
drafted, and it would take five more months to reach a final agreement. As a result, the 
only financial support that the Duhalde government obtained during the worst months 
of the crisis was the roll-over (extension of repurchase expectations) of the SRF, but not 
of its entire outstanding stock of IMF credit.
58
 This implies that in 2002 Argentina was 
forced to make net repayments to the IMF for a total amount of over US$ 1,300 million. 
Because other agencies tend to require the presence of an IMF program in order to lend 
to crisis-stricken countries, the failure to agree on a successor arrangement curtailed 
Argentina’s access to other sources of official finance: in 2002 net debt service to the 
World Bank and to the Inter-American Development Bank amounted to US$ 672 
million and US$ 938 million respectively (IMFb, 2005). In this context, it is hardly 
surprising that 2002 proved to be such a tense year in the relationship between 
Argentina and the IMF, with each side of the negotiations blaming the other for the 
delays in reaching a final settlement. 
 
Although the policy discussions between Argentine and IMF officials addressed a very 
vast array of issues, a number of stumbling blocks stand out in particular. First of all 
was the monetary and exchange rate regime with which to substitute convertibility. On 
                                                          
58
 As seen in Chapter III, the SRF is a facility that was introduced to address sudden reversals in capital 
flows. Because of its short term profile and because it has more demanding financial terms than other 
facilities, its design contemplates the possibility to roll-over obligations as they come due for up to one 
year. Although the Executive Board has to agree to such extensions, these roll-overs have always 
constituted a quasi-automatic feature of SRFs since they were first used during the Asian financial crisis.     
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January 6, 2002, the Duhalde administration adopted a floating rate for financial 
transactions and a fixed rate for current account transactions. Given that dual exchange 
rate regimes are explicitly banned in the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, this became a 
first obvious obstacle to resuming a program relationship. Although the exchange rate 
was unified a few weeks later, the decision of whether to fix or to float continued to be 
controversial throughout 2002. Because the risk of triggering a hyperinflation process 
loomed large after the demise of convertibility, the Argentine authorities supported the 
central bank’s interventions in foreign exchange markets in order to moderate the 
depreciation of the peso. Instead, the IMF advocated for freely floating exchange rates 
on the grounds that defending the peso would merely deplete the remaining stock of 
international reserves, which were by and large constituted by the remnants of the 2000 
program’s disbursements. The government eventually complied with the IMF demands 
in late February. In May, however, the central bank’s interventions were resumed in 
order to burst what the Finance Ministry referred to as a “dollar-bubble” (Ministerio de 
Economía y Producción, 2004).   
 
A second area of contention was related with the management of the banking system, 
which was essentially paralyzed after the introduction of the Corralito (playpen) and the 
Corralón in December 2001 and January 2002.
59
 The IMF was very critical about the 
asymmetric ‘pesoization’ of banks’ assets and liabilities decreed in February 2002, 
which was interpreted as a measure that arbitrarily redistributed the burden of the crisis 
away from debtors and onto creditors, severely compromising the future solvency of the 
banking system.
 60
 During the months that followed, senior government officials claim 
that the IMF pressed for the adoption of a shock therapy à la Indonesia: removing 
banking restrictions as fast as possible, compensating banks for the asymmetric 
‘pesoization’, letting insolvent institutions fall and compulsorily exchanging time 
deposits for bonds (Jorge Todesca. Personal interview. July 19, 2010; Lisandro Barry. 
Personal interview. September 13, 2010). Although Minister Remes Lenicov tried to 
comply with some of the Fund’s demands, the Argentine Chamber of Deputies rejected 
his plan to exchange time deposits for bonds in April 2002, a few days after which he 
presented his resignation. Instead, under Minister Lavagna the Argentine government 
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 The ‘Corralito’ introduced by Minister Cavallo capped weekly withdrawals from sight deposits at 
US$ 250. The ‘Corralón’ introduced in January reprogrammed time deposits. 
60
 The asymmetric ‘pesoization’ refers to the conversion of banks’ liabilities at a rate of 1.4 pesos to the 
dollar and the conversion of banks’ assets at a rate of 1 peso to the dollar. 
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insisted on the adoption of a piecemeal approach based on the gradual removal of 
banking restrictions, which was expected to give time for financial institutions to adjust 
and for depositors to regain confidence in the system (Nielsen, 2006). In December 
2002, the government could finally suspend the Corralito, which was a very significant 
breakthrough for the millions of Argentine depositors that regained access to their 
savings. 
 
Another difficult issue was the overhaul of the fiscal relationship between the federal 
government and the provinces (the so-called ‘coparticipación’), which the IMF made 
clear early on would constitute a prior action for a new program. In February, the 
government and the provinces’ governors agreed on a general framework to create 
harder budget constraints and stop the issuance of provincial quasi-currencies. In 
addition, bilateral agreements were negotiated with each of the provinces in order to 
deal with their specific circumstances. However, the IMF considered that such 
agreements failed to consolidate a rules-based system strong enough to sufficiently 
constrain sub-national spending and indebtedness. Other disagreements between 
Argentina and the IMF were centred on two laws which, according to the IMF, 
constituted a fundamental threat to judiciary security. The first one was the bankruptcy 
law adopted by the Duhalde administration in order to weaken creditors’ rights and, in 
so doing, avoid the widespread bankruptcy and fire sale of Argentine businesses. The 
second one was the removal of the economic subversion law, which some judges were 
threatening to use against the “speculators” that were being blamed for having caused 
the crisis.
61
 The government eventually managed to repeal both laws in May. In contrast 
with all the difficult issues described above, macroeconomic adjustment proved to be 
less of a problem. This was due to the contractionary fiscal and monetary stance 
adopted by the Duhalde administration, as a result of which and in spite of the recession 
a consolidated surplus would eventually be obtained in 2002 while inflationary 
pressures were gradually brought under control.  
 
As will be explored later in more detail, the stalemate in the negotiations could only be 
overcome in the final months of 2002 when the Argentine government threatened to 
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 The economic subversion law was introduced in 1974 in order to criminalize business decisions 
detrimental to the “common good”. Although never applied since the restoration of democratic rule in 
Argentina, in 2002 there was a popular demand to use it in order to take legal actions against those 
bankers responsible for the capital flight that was perceived to have caused the crisis. 
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default on its multilateral obligations. It is in this context that a US$ 805 million 
payment due to the World Bank was delayed in November 2002, signalling the 
government’s willingness to risk international financial ostracism if needed in order to 
force the hand of the Bretton Woods institutions. In January 2003 the authorities went 
further, communicating that a payment of US$ 681 million due to the Inter-American 
Development Bank and another payment of US$ 998 million due to the IMF would also 
be missed until the approval of an IMF program (Amadeo, 2003: 332-337). Eventually, 
the program was approved in January 2003, giving way to the reluctant cohabitation 
that was to characterize the relationship between Argentina and the IMF during the 
years to come.  
 
 4.1.3   Restoring debt sustainability  
 
The third phase analysed in this chapter broadly coincides with the onset of an 
economic recovery and with the approval of a new program in January 2003. During 
this period negotiations were centred on the resolution of the government’s debt 
overhang, which required agreeing on a strategy to soften the amortization of 
multilateral credits and to restructure the bonds in default. The SBA approved in 
January 2003 had a duration of only 8 months, which was aimed at providing some 
breathing space to the Duhalde administration until the April general elections and to 
give time for the newly elected government to negotiate a longer-term more standard 
arrangement.  
 
This transitory program rolled-over Argentina’s obligations to the IMF falling due until 
September 2003 (a total of about US$ 2,980 million). Its conditionality set a primary 
surplus target of 2.5% of GDP and included a number of structural measures such as the 
adoption of new banking regulations, the preparation of a fiscal reform, and the revision 
of the utility prices frozen since January 2002. Given that Argentina’s sovereign debt 
was in default since December 2001, this program was subject to the policy of lending 
into arrears (see Chapter 3), implying that the Fund’s disbursements were formally 
conditioned on the government’s ‘good faith’ in its negotiations with private creditors.62 
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 This is why the new program included the obligation to appoint an external advisor to deal with the 
debt restructuring. On February 2003 the government appointed the firm Lazard Frères as its external 
advisor. The fact that such a small institutions was selected to handle the largest sovereign debt 
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In stark contrast with its predecessors, this program’s fiscal and monetary targets were 
outperformed, which was made possible by a stronger than expected economic recovery 
and by the government’s commitment to a prudent macroeconomic management. 
Instead, compliance with the program’s structural conditionality was weak, especially 
with regard to the revision of utilities’ tariffs (IMF, 2003b).    
 
A key development in the transition from the Duhalde to the Kirchner administration 
was that Roberto Lavagna retained the post of Economy Minister. This sent a clear 
signal about the new administration’s intentions of continuity, at least with regard to 
economic policy. In this context, it is not surprising that the change of government did 
little to improve the relationship between Argentina and the IMF which, if anything, 
became tenser during the Kirchner presidency. Indeed, the negotiation of a new program 
after the April elections was extremely difficult, especially when it came to agreeing on 
the terms of a medium-term macroeconomic framework (Leonardo Madcur. Personal 
interview. 29 July, 2010; Ministerio de Economía y Producción 2004). Eventually, the 
government resorted to old tactics when it missed a US$ 2,900 million payment in 
September 9 (Bonelli, 2003: 304-308). One day after this temporary default the IMF’s 
Managing Director Horst Köhler announced that an agreement had been reached with 
the government and that, upon the clearance of Argentina’s arrears to the Fund, he 
would recommend the approval of a new program (IMF, 2003c).  
 
On September 20, a new three years SBA was approved by the Board. As had been the 
case with the transitory SBA, this program rolled over Argentina’s obligations with the 
IMF until 2006 (US$ 12.55 billion) without providing new net lending. One of the most 
peculiar characteristics of the new program was that, as opposed to traditional IMF 
arrangements, it did not establish a deterministic adjustment path: it only set a primary 
surplus target of 3% of GDP for 2004 but no targets for 2005 and 2006. The program 
included some structural conditions focused on fiscal reform (including the revision of 
the revenue-sharing mechanisms with the provinces) and on the compensation for the 
asymmetric ‘pesoization’ of banks’ assets and liabilities decreed in February 2002. 
Once again, Argentina outperformed the program’s fiscal and monetary targets but 
                                                                                                                                                                          
restructuring in history was interpreted as a clear sign of the government’s lack of rush to deal with its 
private creditors (Andrés Borenstein. Personal Interview. July 16, 2010). In March 2004 the government 
appointed Barclays Bank, Merryl Lynch and UBS to organize the debt exchange. 
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lagged behind with structural conditionality, especially with regard to the adoption of a 
new revenue-sharing law, which could never be agreed with the provinces.  
 
Two days after the approval of this SBA, the Argentine government unveiled its first 
debt restructuring offer in the context of the IMF-World Bank annual meetings: the so-
called ‘Dubai terms’. Private creditors received this offer with dismay given that, at 
market discount rates, it implied a 90% net present value (NPV) loss on their bonds.
63
 
From this point onward, the assessment of the government’s good faith in the 
negotiations with its creditors became a key point of contention between Argentina and 
the IMF. The first review of the program, which was scheduled for late November 2003, 
was delayed until January on the grounds that the Argentine government was not doing 
enough to settle with its creditors and to comply with the program’s structural 
conditions. On March 2004, the Argentine authorities announced that a US$ 3,100 
million payment would be missed unless the Fund’s management expressed its support 
to the approval of the second review. Eventually, the Board agreed to approve this 
second review after the Argentine government committed to revise its restructuring 
offer and to recognise the Global Committee of Argentine Bondholders (GCAB) as its 
main counterpart in the negotiations (IMF, 2004a). Although the government unveiled a 
new restructuring offer in May, negotiations for the third review continued to be 
extremely difficult due to a growing dissatisfaction with the government bargaining 
tactics and to significant slippages with the program’s structural conditionality. 64  
 
A new turn of events took place in August when Argentina and the IMF agreed to 
postpone the third review of the program until the completion of the debt restructuring. 
In practical terms, and although it was not officially referred to as such, this was 
equivalent to a suspension of the program given that it implied that Argentina would 
continue honouring its obligations as they fell due but that it would lose the right to 
draw from the IMF. It also meant that the Fund’s periodical assessments on the 
Argentine government’s good faith would no longer take place. No third review of the 
program would ever be approved. A few months later, and following the example set by 
Brazil, the government decided to anticipate the cancellation of the SBA. To that effect, 
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 Although the Argentine government offered 25 cents to the dollar, the Dubai terms did not recognize 
past due interests. 
64
 The new offer (the ‘Dubai Plus’ terms) included past due interests and was valued by investors at close 
to 25 cents to the dollar. 
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on January 2006 it repurchased obligations for an amount of almost US$ 10 billion 
which terminated the Fund’s financial involvement in Argentina.  
 
4.2  Crisis prevention 
 
Applying Putnam’s two level game framework, the cooperative outcome of the 
negotiations during the first phase of crisis prevention should be understood as the result 
of an overlap between the Argentine and the IMF win-sets. Such an overlap can be 
explained by converging preferences and/or by a sufficiently large win-set either on the 
Argentine side, on the IMF side, or on both. In the presence of diverging preferences, 
the specific outcome of the level I negotiation observed at each point in time is 
determined by negotiators’ relative bargaining power and hence by the relative size of 
their respective win-sets. This section applies this general framework to identify the 
specific factors that influenced the negotiations of the preventive IMF programs that 
were in place since the approval of the 1996 SBA until the Argentine government began 
to make use of the resources of the 2000 SBA. It initially focuses on the Fund’s 
negotiations with Menem’s second administration, during which the Argentine 
economy gradually lost steam but was not yet undergoing a full-blown financial crisis. 
It will then concentrate on the first few months of the De la Rúa government, after 
which the Fund’s intervention had to switch to crisis resolution mode.  
 
The defining features of the Fund’s pre-crisis negotiations with the Menem 
administration can be summarized as follows. First, both the 1996 SBA and the 1998 
EFF were precautionary, meaning that the government pre-announced its intention not 
to make use of the resources committed by the IMF. This implies that, as opposed to 
more traditional interventions, these programs were not designed to address an actual 
need for financial assistance. Second, their structural conditionality was generally weak. 
Indeed, the 1996 SBA did not include structural benchmarks, and although the 1998 
EFF contemplated some meaningful reforms in the tax system and the labour market, 
overall compliance with these conditions was incomplete (Allen, 2003). Third, in spite 
of the strong performance of the Argentine economy until mid-1998, compliance with 
fiscal conditionality was persistently weak, to which the Executive Board responded by 
modifying fiscal targets and by granting waivers in about half of the programs’ reviews 
(Mussa, 2002).  
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What do these features tell us about chief negotiators’ preferences and win-sets? Since 
the Fund’s interventions did not respond to a financial need, a first relevant issue is 
related with the objectives that these programs were aimed at achieving. According to 
the Vice-Minister of Economy and to the Undersecretary of Finance during the second 
Menem administration, the main objective pursued by the government was to enhance 
Argentina’s access to international financial markets (Carlos Rodriguez. Personal 
Interview. September 20 2010; Miguel Kiguel. Personal Interview. July 29, 2010). This 
was expected to be achieved through two complementary mechanisms. First, the 
precautionary programs would be perceived by markets as a pseudo-insurance scheme 
against the risk posed by exogenous shocks such as the Tequila crisis.
65
 Second, the 
programs would function as a device to signal the government’s commitment to 
implement a set of market-oriented policies periodically sanctioned by the IMF.  
 
There are reasons to argue that the preferences of IMF negotiators and of their 
constituents were closely aligned with the objective of deepening the integration of the 
Argentine economy in international financial markets. Indeed, during those years the G7 
and the IMF were actively promoting financial globalization while exploring 
mechanisms to help emerging markets cope with the risks posed by capital account 
liberalization (Abelal, 2006). Furthermore, by 1996 Argentina had consolidated its 
reputation as a successful stabilizer and market reformer. In the words of the then 
Managing Director of the IMF: “(…) the fact that Argentina was able to withstand the 
Mexican crisis and restore growth and market confidence so quickly thereafter is a great 
tribute to these policies” (Cambdessus, 1997: 3). In this context, it is not surprising that 
the IMF and its main constituents were keen to associate themselves with Argentina’s 
apparent successful implementation of policies so closely aligned with the Washington 
Consensus.  
 
The lack of structural benchmarks in the 1996 SBA and the weak enforcement of this 
program’s fiscal conditionality can be interpreted as further evidence of an initial 
convergence in the preferences of both sides’ negotiators. At this stage the Fund’s 
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 This is not only because precautionary arrangements provide access to the resources committed by the 
program at the discretion of the borrowing country should the need arise, but also because it is usually 
easier to augment an existing program than to negotiate a new one from scratch.  
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willingness to provide insurance without extracting relevant policy concessions from 
the Argentine authorities is consistent with the idea that the institution and its main 
constituents were in broad agreement with the general policy stance adopted by the 
Menem administration. Following this line of thinking, the more demanding 
conditionality attached to the 1998 EFF could be interpreted as a sign of emerging 
divergences between the preferences of Argentine and IMF negotiators. In fact, 
although in early 1998 the Argentine economy was still in a relatively good shape, there 
were growing concerns among IMF officials about a weakening fiscal discipline and 
about the government’s increasing sluggishness in the structural arena, especially with 
regard to labour market reform (Teresa Ter Minassian. Personal interview. 28 April 
2011; Allen, 2003; IEO, 2004).  
 
If the IMF managed to extract stronger concessions from the Argentine authorities in 
the initial negotiation of the 1998 EFF, why was it so tolerant with an increasingly 
apparent weak compliance with this program’s conditionality in subsequent reviews?  A 
first explanation is that the IMF’s leverage over the Argentine authorities was 
constrained by the fact that Argentina was not making use of the resources committed 
by the program (Blustein, 2003: 52; IEO, 2004; Domingo Cavallo. Personal interview. 
21 July 2010; Teresa Ter Minassian. Personal interview. 28 April 2011). Another 
explanation for the aforementioned leniency with Argentina is rooted in other strategic 
considerations on the part of the G7, which sustained a wide IMF win-set during this 
period. Since the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997, the institution had been the 
subject of intense criticism for its handling of the Asian crisis. In this context, the 
general perception of an Argentine success story was used as a vindication not only of 
the Fund’s involvement in emerging markets but also of the liberalization policies that 
were associated with this success and that were under attack in Asia.
66
 In the words of 
the then chief economist of the IMF:  “With the Fund under widespread criticism 
(rightly or wrongly) for its involvement in Asia, it was particularly gratifying to be able 
to point to at least one important program country where the Fund appeared to be 
supporting successful economic policies. In this situation, there was probably even more 
than the usual reluctance for the Fund to be skunk at the garden party, by stressing the 
accumulating failures of Argentine fiscal policy” (Mussa, 2002: 20). Further reinforcing 
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 This was epitomized in the unusual invitation to President Menem to address the international 
community alongside President Clinton during the IMF-World Bank annual meetings in October 1998.  
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these dynamics, in the aftermath of the 1998 Russian default, IMF constituents came to 
fear that pointing the finger at Argentina could intensify an on-going financial 
contagion and trigger another crisis in one of the few remaining bright spots of the 
emerging world (IEO, 2004).
67
 
 
Focusing next on Argentina’s domestic ratification politics during the implementation 
of the two precautionary programs, there are reasons to argue that Menem’s second 
administration departed from a large win-set, which gradually contracted as the 1999 
general election approached. Indeed, President Menem was re-elected in 1995 by a 
landslide and his Justicialist Party (PJ) obtained absolute majorities both in Congress 
and the Senate while retaining control of most of the provinces. Given that these 
elections took place in the midst of the Tequila crisis, such an electoral success 
indicated a strong support for the orientation of the government’s economic policies 
which resulted from the successful macroeconomic stabilization of the early 1990s. This 
should be expected to have facilitated the ratification of the (few) conditions associated 
with the 1996 SBA. The mid-term legislative elections in October 1997, instead, yielded 
very different results as the PJ lost its absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies and 
the newly formed Alianza coalition obtained more than 45% of the popular vote, 
substantially reducing the size of Argentine negotiators’ win-set and making it more 
difficult to ratify the conditions agreed with the IMF.  
 
On top of reducing the size of its win-set, the political weakening of the Menem 
administration pushed Argentine negotiators’ preferences away from those of the IMF. 
Many in the Justicialist Party interpreted the 1997 electoral set-back as clear evidence of 
the growing unpopularity of the IMF-supported neo-liberal agenda with which the 
Menem administration was so closely associated, a trend that became more pronounced 
with the onset of economic recession in late 1998 and with unemployment rates 
reaching 15% (Carlos Rodríguez. Personal Interview. 20 September 2010; Bonelli, 
2003). Furthermore, in the run-up to the 1999 elections and given the declining popular 
support to the Menem administration, the PJ became increasingly focused on the 
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 The Fund’s negotiators seem to have been less permeable to this type of political calculations. Indeed, 
various sources argue that some of the senior IMF officials working on Argentina were keen to adopt a 
tougher stance with regard to conditionality (Blustein, 2003: 50,51; IEO, 2004; Teresa Ter Minassian. 
Personal interview. 28 April 2011 ). However, the Fund’s management and some key Executive Directors 
opposed this strategy, favouring instead the maintenance of a more tolerant approach in order not to put 
relationships with Argentina at risk.  
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mobilization of its Peronist grassroots organizations and patronage networks, which 
weakened the government’s incentives to comply with the program’s conditionality 
(Eaton, 2005). On the macroeconomic side, this resulted in a marked deterioration of 
provincial finances, especially after restrictions were softened for provinces to issue 
debt during Menem’s second administration, a move that was partly aimed at securing 
the political support of the Peronist governors (Jiménez and Devoto, 2000). In the words 
of Domingo Cavallo, this turned provincial bonds into the ‘toxic assets’ of the 
Argentine crisis (Domingo Cavallo. Personal interview. 21 July 2010). On the structural 
side, the need to mobilize the traditional Peronist power bases led to inaction. This point 
was emphasized by the then IMF mission chief, according to whom the main reason 
why the government failed to liberalize the labour market, as had been contemplated in 
the program, was that when the PJ’s electoral prospects got grimmer the support of the 
Peronist labour Union (Confederación General del Trabajo or CGT) became 
increasingly important (Teresa Ter Minassian. Personal interview. 28 April 2011).  
 
Summing up the two-level game interpretation of the Fund’s involvement in Argentina 
during Menem’s second administration, both sides of the negotiations departed from 
converging preferences and relatively large win-sets, which sustained the cooperative 
outcome of the level I game. After the 1997 mid-term elections, however, the 
government was faced with a much stronger opposition and with uncertain prospects in 
the 1999 general election, resulting both in a departure from the Fund’s preferences and 
in a narrowing win-set. Instead, IMF negotiators’ win-sets remained large due to their 
constituents’ political and strategic calculations in the context of the criticism that their 
institution was facing in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. These parallel trends 
reinforced Argentine negotiators’ bargaining power, explaining why an increasingly 
weak compliance with the program’s conditionality was systematically waived by the 
IMF’s Executive Board in 1998 and 1999. This would eventually contribute to the 
build-up of the fiscal vulnerabilities that were to explode subsequently under the De la 
Rúa administration.    
 
What was the impact of the political transition from the Menem to the de la Rúa 
administrations on the negotiations with the IMF? The Alianza government was quick 
to negotiate a new precautionary program, signalling its willingness to preserve the 
nature of the Fund’s previous engagement in Argentina. The SBA approved in March 
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2000, however, was somewhat different from its predecessors. First of all, it was 
significantly larger (see Table 4.1), reflecting a growing awareness about the risks 
facing the Argentine economy. Second, it contemplated a stronger macroeconomic 
conditionality, an early manifestation of which was the contentious Impuestazo 
introduced in January 2000. However, the new government continued to miss the 
program’s targets with the consent of the Executive Board, which systematically 
approved waivers for the non-observance of these targets. These slippages were 
primarily the consequence of a rapidly deteriorating economic situation, of the 
systematically over-optimistic projections on which the program was based and of the 
rigid fiscal relationship with the provinces inherited from the Menem years.
68
 Third, 
structural conditionality was also reinforced, particularly with regard to labour market 
reform. The domestic ratification of these conditions proved to be difficult and 
generated intense frictions in the governing coalition and in the Argentine political 
system as a whole.  
 
There is ground to argue that the change of government re-aligned Argentine 
negotiators’ preferences with those of the IMF. Indeed, De la Rúa’s Radical Civic 
Union (UCR) was initially determined to address the fiscal problem and to reignite a 
structural reform process that had stalled during the last years of the Menemist era. This 
facilitated the preservation of a cooperative outcome in the negotiations of a new and 
larger precautionary SBA (José-Luis Machinea. Personal interview. July 13, 2010; 
Teresa Ter Minassian. Personal interview. 28 April 2011). However, it soon became 
clear that the new government was politically weak and that progressing with its policy 
agenda would be difficult. Indeed, as opposed to the outgoing Justicialist Party, the 
incumbent Alliance for Work, Justice and Education (aka ‘Alianza’) was a coalition 
formed by UCR and the Frepaso (Frente País Solidario), a confederation of left of 
centre smaller parties generally opposed to the neo-liberal policies of the Menem years. 
Although UCR’s preferences on macroeconomic policy and structural reform were 
aligned with the Fund’s recommendations, the leaders of the FREPASO had 
traditionally held critical views about the prescriptions of the Bretton Woods 
institutions. On top of having to reconcile these internal differences, the Alianza 
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 The difficult inter-governmental relationship that characterized these years were partly the consequence 
of the rigid fiscal pact that Menem had reached with the provinces, which established a minimum revenue 
(piso mínimo) to be transferred to the provinces (Eaton, 2005).  
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coalition faced other significant domestic ratification constraints: it lacked an absolute 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies and, as shown in Figure 4.2, it controlled only 7 of 
the 23 Argentine provinces.
69
 In this context, the frictions between the Federal 
government and the provinces became an obstacle to the fiscal consolidation attempts 
launched in 2000 and 2001. 
 
Figure 4.2 
Provincial governments in Argentina (1996-2005)  
 
   Source: Ministerio del Interior, Argentina 
 
De la Rúa’s administration, therefore, had a narrow win-set, which in the logic of the 
two-level game framework could only have reinforced Argentina’s bargaining position. 
However, it has also been argued that preferences converged at this stage, reducing the 
relevance of this bargaining advantage. Illustrating this point, the then mission chief to 
Argentina argues that not only did the De la Rúa administration not resist the Fund’s 
prescriptions, but it also bargained for a tougher conditionality on some issues (Teresa 
Ter Minassian. Personal interview. 28 April 2011). In this context, how did the two 
level games interact with each other? First of all, although Argentina’s narrow win-set 
may not have been exploited in the negotiations of the program’s conditionality it might 
have contributed to explain the bargaining process that resulted in the systematic 
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approval of subsequent reviews in spite of increasingly apparent departures from the 
program’s targets. Even more importantly, there is ground to argue that rather than 
using its domestic political weakness to get a better deal with the IMF, the De la Rúa 
administration initially viewed the Fund’s conditionality as an instrument to generate a 
sense of urgency about the reorientation of Argentina’s macroeconomic and structural 
policies (Domingo Cavallo. Personal interview. 21 July 2010). In other words, at this 
stage the Argentine government might have exploited the Level I game in order to 
facilitate the domestic ratification of the policies that it considered necessary to address 
the economic situation, and not the other way around.
70
 As suggested by the 
congressional approval of two ambitious fiscal adjustments in 2000 and of the labour 
market reform passed later that year, this strategy paid off initially. However, it would 
eventually backfire when tensions within the coalition were laid bare by Vice-President 
Alvarez’s resignation. Indeed, this event triggered the adverse market dynamics that 
forced the complete reappraisal of the program that is analysed in the next section. 
   
4.3  Crisis management 
 
The second phase focuses on the period of the Argentine financial crisis and can be 
divided into two sub-phases during which the negotiations with the IMF had a very 
different outcome. The first sub-period was characterized by the negotiations’ 
cooperative outcome, which resulted in a large increase in the Fund’s exposure to 
Argentina. Instead, the second sub-period was marked by the conflict that followed the 
suspension of the program in late 2001 and by the delays in the approval of a successor 
arrangement. This section does initially focus on the factors that preserved a win-set 
overlap during the first sub-phase. It will then concentrate on the reasons that were 
behind the collapse of that cooperative equilibrium in the two-level game and on the 
factors that prevented the resumption of a program relationship until January 2003. 
  
Focusing on the first sub-period, the main trends observed in the Fund’s involvement in 
Argentina after the resignation of Vice-President Alvarez in October 2000 can be 
summarized as follows. First, the intensification of the financial pressures that the 
Argentine economy was undergoing forced the government to draw from the 
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 This is consistent with Vreeland’s conjecture about the domestic political use of IMF conditionality 
(Vreeland, 2003). 
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precautionary SBA that had been approved in March 2000. Furthermore, with the 
December 2000 and August 2001 augmentations the resources committed by the IMF 
under that program more than tripled, making the Argentine government increasingly 
dependent on the Fund’s financial support in its struggle to save the Convertibility 
regime and to remain current on its sovereign obligations. Second, private sector 
involvement (PSI) constituted an important component of the two augmentations, first 
with the voluntary contributions agreed with private creditors in December 2000 and 
then with the launching of a domestic debt restructuring in September 2001. Third, the 
structural conditionality agreed with the IMF continued to be demanding and difficult to 
ratify domestically. After Minister Cavallo took office in March 2000 significant 
disagreements began to emerge about the direction of the reforms that the government 
was adopting, and no agreement could be reached on the structural conditions to be 
attached to the second augmentation. Fourth, although the first augmentation 
contemplated a temporary relaxation of the program’s targets, fiscal conditionality was 
stringent during this period. Given that the recession continued to get worse during 
2001, complying with this conditionality proved to be impossible. However, until the 
suspension of the program the Executive Board continued to systematically approve 
subsequent reviews in spite of significant departures from the program’s targets.  
 
Of the patterns described above, the most salient one was the increase in the scale of the 
Fund’s financial support, which turned the SBA into one of the largest programs in 
history, fundamentally altering the nature of the relationship between Argentina and the 
IMF. To what extent can the first augmentation of December 2000 be explained in 
terms of converging preferences? The previous section has argued that following the 
election of President De la Rúa there was a re-alignment in the preference of both sides’ 
negotiators about the orientation of Argentina’s economic policies. As emphasized by 
former Minister Machinea, this convergence in preferences facilitated the negotiation of 
the conditionality that made the approval of the first augmentation possible (José-Luis 
Machinea. Personal interview. July 13, 2010). However, Chapter 3 has described the 
growing scepticism that was taking hold at the time about large multilateral bail-outs in 
the debate about the reform of the international financial architecture. This ideological 
trend could only have introduced a wedge between the Argentine and IMF negotiators’ 
preferred outcome, at least with regard to the program’s size. Therefore, a discussion on 
win-sets has to be brought into the picture.   
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There is little doubt that the resignation of Vice-President Alvarez constituted a 
devastating blow to the Alianza coalition, substantially narrowing Argentine 
negotiators’ win-set. Instead, there are various factors that sustained a relatively large 
IMF win-set during this period. First, the Fund’s constituents were conscious that a full-
blown crisis in Argentina was bound to be partly blamed on the IMF, a trend that was to 
become more relevant subsequently (Mussa, 2002). Second, in spite of the 
aforementioned growing scepticism about IMF bailouts, during the negotiations of the 
December 2000 augmentation the Clinton administration was still in power in the US. 
Its ideological inclination to use multilateral financial packages of an exceptional 
magnitude to prop up emerging markets undergoing a sudden stop in capital inflows 
could only have expanded the Fund’s win-set in the direction of Argentine negotiators’ 
preferred outcome (José-Luis Machinea. Personal interview. July 13, 2010).
 71
 Third, 
the opposition of other more sceptical IMF constituents could be overcome with the 
unprecedented inclusion of private commitments for an amount of US$ 20 billion in the 
program, which was presented as an important breakthrough in the implementation of 
the new PSI doctrine adopted with the Prague Framework described in Chapter 3 (IEO, 
2004; Daniel Marx. Personal interview. June 28, 2010).
72
 
 
It will be argued later that the narrowing of the Argentine win-set played a crucial role 
in the collapse of the cooperative equilibrium in the negotiations. Because the Fund’s 
win-set was still large, however, by the time of the first augmentation this trend did not 
yet eliminate the overlap between the Argentine and the IMF win-sets and, therefore, 
the negotiation’s cooperative outcome was preserved. Furthermore, in the logic of the 
two-level game, the evolution of win-sets described above could only have provided 
Argentine negotiators with a bargaining advantage over their IMF counterparts, which 
might contribute to explain some of the outcomes of the negotiations such as the size of 
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 Machinea did also point out concerns in the US administration about the political consequences that the 
Argentine crisis could have domestically and regionally (José-Luis Machinea. Personal interview. July 
13, 2010). 
72
 Whether these private commitments did actually constitute an addition to the package, however, is open 
to discussion. According to former Minister Cavallo, such private contributions were only ‘cosmetic’ 
since the financial institutions that took part in the deal did not guarantee the interest rate at which they 
would place Argentine bonds in 2001 and thereafter (Domingo Cavallo. Personal interview. July 21 
2010). The 2004 IEO report is also critical about the vagueness of the Prague Framework with regard to 
PSI. It argues that because involuntary PSI remained ill-defined, it was difficult for IMF officials to 
meaningfully apply the new doctrine to address the Argentine crisis (IEO, 2004).  
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the augmentation or the terms in which it was approved. Indeed, only one fifth of the 
augmented program was provided under the more demanding financial terms of the 
Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) in spite of the fact that this facility had been 
introduced in 1997 as the instrument to counter the sort of sudden reversals in the 
capital account that Argentina was undergoing. The 2004 IEO on the Argentine crisis 
report mentions that some Executive Directors objected to the composition of the 
augmented program, arguing that Argentina was being treated exceptionally and that the 
Fund was failing to deploy its crisis resolution instruments according to existing rules 
(IEO, 2004). 
 
Of all the program-related decisions adopted during this crisis, IMF insiders have been 
particularly critical of the maintenance and expansion of the Fund’s financial support in 
2001 in spite of the growing realization that the Argentine macroeconomic framework 
had become unsustainable (Mussa, 2002; Allen, 2003; IEO, 2004; Roubini and Setser, 
2004). These decisions constitute a puzzle for the following reasons. First of all, the 
victory of the Republican Party in the 2000 US elections marked a turning point in the 
reform of the international financial architecture. Indeed, senior officials in the Bush 
administration, and in particular the new Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, had 
repeatedly expressed their intention to bring multilateral bailouts to an end while 
adopting an uncompromising rhetoric in their public assessments of the Argentine 
crisis.
73
 Second, as described in section 4.1.2, after the appointment of Domingo 
Cavallo as Economy Minister, the Argentine government began to implement a set of 
increasingly heterodox policies that departed from the preferences of the Fund’s 
negotiators and of their constituents. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that some of these 
measures breached the program’s conditionality, Cavallo did systematically fail to 
consult the IMF prior to launching them (Daniel Marx. Personal interview. June 28 
2010; IEO, 2004).
 74
 In the context of a narrowing IMF win-set and of the government’s 
departure from the Fund’s preferences, how could the Argentine authorities successfully 
bargain for the completion of the May 2001 program review and for the August 
augmentation? 
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 Paul O’Neill famously stated in July 2010 that “Argentines have been off and on in trouble for 70 years 
or more. They don’t have any export industry to speak of at all. And they like it that way. Nobody forced 
them to be what they are.” (The Economist, 2010) 
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 For instance, upon taking office, Cavallo adopted a brief fiscal stimulus which breached the 
government’s macroeconomic commitments with the IMF. 
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According to the 2004 IEO report, the May review was approved in spite of blatant 
departures from the program’s conditionality because both the Fund’s staff and 
Executive Directors understood that a suspension of the program would result in a 
financial collapse of uncertain consequences (IEO, 2004). Furthermore, it was 
considered at the time that Minister Cavallo still deserved the benefit of the doubt given 
his international reputation as the architect of the Convertibility Regime. Although most 
of his early measures had gone against the spirit of the augmented program, in May 
2001 the Fund’s constituents were still willing to assume that these were exceptional 
and transitory actions, and that in the longer-term Minister Cavallo’s preferences still 
converged towards those of the IMF: fiscal discipline and an orthodox economic 
management.
75
 More importantly, the Fund’s constituents might have interpreted that 
the ‘exceptional powers’ that the Argentine Chamber of Deputies had granted Cavallo 
upon taking office provided the government with a minimum room for manoeuvre to 
overcome the domestic ratification obstacles that had stood on the way of the 
implementation of the program augmented in December.
76
 In other words, the Chamber 
of Deputies’ show of support to Minister Cavallo could only be perceived as having 
increased the size of Argentine negotiators’ win-set, reinforcing its overlap with that of 
the IMF and thereby improving the prospects for the maintenance of a cooperative 
outcome in the level I game.  
 
The credibility that the Argentine government had hoped to regain with the appointment 
of Minister Cavallo, however, evaporated within a matter of weeks as his economic 
policies became increasingly erratic and ineffective. The cooperativeness that had 
hitherto characterized Argentina’s relationship with the IMF was also undermined by 
Minister Cavallo’s tendency to conceal relevant information and to present his decisions 
as a fait accompli.  According to the then Finance Secretary Daniel Marx, by the time of 
the August augmentation, the relationship between Argentina and the IMF had turned 
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 This was explicitly recognized by the Fund’s Managing Director, Hörst Kohler, in his assessment of the 
Executive Board’s discussion about the May review: “The IMF recognizes that some policy measures, 
while essential in the circumstances, would be distortionary if maintained for a long period. Therefore, 
the IMF welcomes that the financial transaction tax and the trade tariff increases will be temporary” 
(IMFa, 2001). 
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 During its last few weeks in office, Minister Machinea failed to ratify some of the augmentation’s prior 
actions as the Supreme Court rejected the pension and health reform that had been decreed by the 
government, which contributes to explain his resignation. In turn, Minister López Murphy’s fiscal 
adjustment attempt failed in less than two weeks as a result of widespread political opposition. 
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into “a system of mutual pressures with little or no dialogue” (Daniel Marx. Personal 
interview. June 28 2010). He argues that the August augmentation was not backed by a 
real program in the sense that no agreement could be reached on concrete measures to 
revert the dynamics of the crisis.
77
 One of the few meaningful compromises 
contemplated by the augmentation was the launching of a broad-based sovereign debt 
restructuring, which was a direct request from the US Treasury aimed at signalling that 
the PSI doctrine had not been abandoned (Blustein, 2003: 145-153; Domingo Cavallo. 
Personal interview. July 21 2010). What the Executive Board decided in August was to 
allow Argentina to make use of an additional US$ 6 billion of immediate multilateral 
support and to postpone negotiations on a new medium-term strategy until September. 
In other words, the August augmentation was agreed before the program itself, which 
constitutes a glaring departure from the Fund’s practice. Unsurprisingly, this decision 
was contentious, as suggested by the six informal Board meetings held in August to 
discuss this topic and by the fact that the Dutch and the Swiss Executive Directors took 
the decision of abstaining in the vote in which the augmentation was finally approved 
(Blustein, 2003: 154).  
 
A central factor behind this decision was the reluctance on the part of the Fund’s 
negotiators and constituents to take the blame for the disorderly unravelling of the crisis 
that was expected to be triggered by a program suspension (IEO, 2004; Claudio Loser. 
Personal interview. April 26 2011). Former IMF chief economist Michael Mussa 
accuses Minister Cavallo of having strategically exploited these fears by leaking to the 
press in July that the IMF was about to increase the size of the program even though this 
decision was not even being debated yet (Mussa, 2004: 41-43). In this way, Mussa 
argues that Cavallo manipulated expectations in such a way that a failure to approve the 
augmentation would have unleashed devastating market dynamics, which was bound to 
be identified as the proximate cause of an Argentine collapse. Although former Minister 
Cavallo downplays the importance of such bargaining tactics, he acknowledges that at 
the time of the August augmentation, and even afterwards, he believed that the G7 
would not be willing to assume the political liability of letting Argentina fall (Domingo 
Cavallo. Personal interview. July 21 2010). The perceived cost of non-agreement, 
                                                          
77
 When the augmentation was announced, the Fund’s Managing Director did simply support the zero-
deficit law that had been approved in July, and announced undertakings to negotiate a new revenue 
sharing agreement with the provinces (IMFb, 2001). 
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therefore, played a crucial role in maintaining a sufficiently large IMF win-set to 
accommodate another increase in multilateral support to Argentina. As subsequent 
events were to prove, however, this last cooperative equilibrium in the two level game 
was extremely fragile. 
 
What were the factors that eliminated the win-set overlap, resulting in the suspension of 
the program in November 2001? To some extent, the collapse of the cooperative 
equilibrium was rooted in diverging preferences as IMF negotiators and their 
constituents found it increasingly difficult to support the heterodox measures adopted 
unilaterally by Minister Cavallo. Claudio Loser, the former head the Fund’s Western 
Hemisphere Department (WHD), points out that these divergences became increasingly 
difficult to ignore after new data on the evolution of the stock of foreign exchange 
reserves was issued in September and October, revealing that it would be practically 
impossible to meet the program’s targets unless the Argentine government accepted a 
fundamental overhaul of its economic strategy (Claudio Loser. Personal interview. 
April 26 2011).  
 
On top of these diverging preferences, towards the end of 2001 the Argentine and the 
IMF level II games became increasingly constrained. On the Argentine side, the 
legislative elections held in October constituted another blow to the De la Rúa 
administration given that the Justicialist Party obtained majorities both in the Chamber 
of Deputies and the Senate.
78
 This was interpreted as a rebuke to Minister Cavallo’s 
management of the financial crisis. In addition, some of the desperate measures adopted 
subsequently, such as the so-called Corralito, were met with popular uproar, all of 
which signalled that Argentine negotiators had lost all room for manoeuvre and that 
their win-set was too constrained to stand any chance of successfully implementing an 
IMF program. On the side of the IMF, a crucial factor was the September 11
th
 attacks. 
Daniel Marx recalls how the attacks resulted in the cancellation of crucial meetings with 
the Fund’s management and with the US Treasury Under Secretary for International 
Affairs scheduled to take place in Washington in order to discuss the terms of a medium 
term strategy (Daniel Marx. Personal interview. June 28 2010). Apart from diverting the 
attention of IMF constituents, the feared impact of the attacks on international financial 
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 Reflecting the public disaffection with political parties, the percentage of blank votes reached an 
unprecedented 22% (Levitsky and Murillo, 2005).  
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stability turned the Argentine crisis into a secondary problem, which was explicitly 
recognized by Paul O’Neill in an address to the US Senate for Banking Affairs shortly 
after the attacks: “One week ago, Argentina was top of our agenda, it is no longer in that 
position, or at least not to the same extent” (Russell, 2010: 102). This reduced the 
perceived cost of letting Argentina fall, weakening the last remaining mainstay of the 
cooperative equilibrium that had lasted throughout most of 2001. 
 
The suspension of the SBA turned out to have the devastating impact that, by and large, 
had been anticipated, at least in the short-term. What is perhaps the most puzzling 
aspect of the Fund’s involvement in Argentina during the period under analysis is that it 
took one year to re-establish a program relationship, forcing the government to make net 
repayments to multilateral institutions during the most acute phase of the crisis. In terms 
of the two-level game, how can the evolution of preferences and win-sets explain this 
outcome? With regard to preferences, a relevant factor is related with the emergency 
measures adopted by the Duhalde administration in January, which clearly departed 
from the Fund’s rules and prescriptions. This was particularly clear with regard to the 
adoption of a dual exchange rate regime and to the asymmetric pesoization of banks’ 
assets and liabilities. However, the Argentine former Secretary of Economic Policy and 
the former Finance Secretary argue that, at that time, the resumption of the Fund’s 
financial support was considered crucial to address the crisis and that the Duhalde 
government was willing to compromise for that purpose (Jorge Todesca. Personal 
interview. July 19, 2010; Lisandro Barry. Personal interview. September 13, 2010). In 
fact, early on in 2002, some of the initial measures adopted by the new administration 
were reverted, and other steps were taken as a sign of goodwill vis-à-vis the IMF 
(Amadeo, 2003; Bonelli, 2003; Ministerio de Economía y Producción, 2004). For 
instance, the exchange rate regime was unified in early February, the peso was floated a 
few weeks later, and the federal government reached a preliminary agreement with the 
provinces in order to reform the co-participation system.
79
  
 
Why did the Fund’s negotiators fail to respond to the Argentine administration’s 
overtures? The internal bureaucratic politics of the IMF might have played an important 
role in this respect. According to Claudio Loser, Horst Kohler and Anne Krueguer were 
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 As part of this agreement, Governors relinquished the minimum revenue guarantee (piso mínimo) that 
had caused so many fiscal problems to the De la Rúa administration (Eaton, 2005). 
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determined to maintain an uncompromising negotiating stance “in order to make 
Argentina pay for its sins” (Claudio Loser. Personal interview. April 26 2011).80 In fact, 
the months that followed the Argentine collapse witnessed a complete restructuring of 
the Western Hemisphere Department and most of the chief negotiators of past programs 
were either forced to resign or to change department within the IMF, the general 
perception being that they had been too soft on Argentina (Tenembaum, 2005: 39-43).
81
 
The restructuring of the WHD substituted Latin American senior officials for non-Latin 
American economists, considered less likely to be co-opted by the Argentine 
authorities, which illustrates the suspicions nurtured by the Fund’s management in the 
aftermath of the 2001 events. When the Indian national Anoop Singh became the 
Fund’s chief-negotiator in March 2003, therefore, his mandate was to avoid the 
mistakes of the past and to adopt a tougher negotiating stance (Amadeo, 2003: 101-
103). In addition, after President Duhalde ratified the comprehensive default on private 
debt declared by his predecessor Rodríguez Saá, the IMF had reasons to be concerned 
about its own financial exposure to Argentina. This provided another reason to be 
particularly vigilant about the safeguards offered by the Argentine government. In the 
absence of credible safeguards, IMF officials might have perceived that delaying an 
agreement was a sensible strategy to gradually clean up the Fund’s balance sheet 
(Ernesto Ramírez. Personal Interview. 28 April 2011).   
 
However, the Duhalde administration was hardly in a position to make credible 
commitments as a result of the following factors. First, Duhalde was not popularly 
elected and, therefore, lacked a clear mandate, which reduced the legitimacy of many of 
the radical measures that he was forced to adopt during his administration. Second, in 
spite of the majorities obtained by the Justicialist party in the 2001 elections, both 
houses of Congress were opposed to many of the measures that the government tried to 
ratify in order to comply with the Fund’s demands. A case in point was the rejection of 
Remes Lenicov’s plan to restructure the banking sector. The modification of the 
bankruptcy law and the derogation of the economic subversion law also forced the 
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 This is consistent with the view expressed by the then permanent representative of the IMF in 
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countries systematically breaching the Fund’s conditionality were bound to suffer the consequences of 
their unsustainable policies (Luis Cubeddu, Personal interview, April 22, 2011). 
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 Tenembaum’s book offers an extensive interview with the former head of the Western Hemisphere 
Department, the Argentine Claudio Loser. Loser resigned from the IMF a few months after the December 
events. 
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government to embark on a bitter political battle not only with the opposition but also 
with many Justicialist Deputies and Senators.
82
 Indeed, this was a period of great 
factionalism and confrontation within the PJ, as the party’s failure to agree on a single 
Peronist candidate for the 2003 elections would later demonstrate (Levitsky, 2005). 
Third, although the Justicialist Party controlled most of the provinces, Governors 
became another crucial veto-player given that the reform of the co-participation system 
was considered by the IMF a crucial step to restore the solvency of the Argentine public 
sector. Fourth, year 2002 was marked by the conflict between the Executive and the 
Judiciary branches of government after the Supreme Court ruled the unconstitutionality 
of the Corralito in February, giving way to the thousands of court-ordered injunctions 
(aka amparos) that enabled Argentine families to re-access their savings (Helmke, 
2005). As a result, the run on deposits was allowed to resume, leaving the banking 
system teetering on the brink of collapse one more time. Fifth, the Duhalde 
administration was subject to the un-abating pressure of the Piquetero movement, 
which organized daily blockades and mobilizations in Buenos Aires and the provinces 
to oppose many of the measures adopted by the government.
83
 Summing up, a highly 
adversarial political environment resulted in a narrow Argentine win-set throughout 
2002, which stood in the way of the negotiations with the IMF.  
 
Regarding the Fund’s win-set, with the US attention focused on the geo-political and 
financial priorities that emerged in the aftermath of the September 11
th
 attacks and with 
other countries such as Germany, Italy and Japan aggrieved by the December default, 
the largest constituents of the IMF expressed little support for a new program in the first 
months of 2002.
84
 In fact, after the December events, the G7 adopted a hands-off 
approach to the Argentine crisis, which made sense given the uncertainty that still 
surrounded the orientation of the policies that the Duhalde administration was adopting. 
In addition, given that the handling of the Argentine crisis had proved to be such a 
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 In fact, the Fund’s pressure on these two laws was deeply resented by the Duhalde administration for 
having further eroded the government’s political capital for an issue that it considered far from central 
(Eduardo Amadeo. Personal interview. 26 July, 2010; Ministerio de Economía y Producción, 2004). 
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Interview. April 26, 2011). 
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th
 2002, one of such mobilizations resulted in a brutal police repression and the assassination 
of two leaders of the Piquetero movement in the city of Avellaneda. President Duhalde argues in his 
memoirs that this event convinced him to bring forward the presidential elections scheduled to take place 
in late 2003 (Duhalde, 2007). 
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 There was a large stock of defaulted bonds in the hands of German, Italian and Japanese bondholders. 
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fiasco, there might have been an incentive to divert responsibility away from the G7 and 
onto the IMF as an institution. Furthermore, having already internalized the cost of no 
agreement associated with the suspension of the program in November, the cost of 
continuing not to agree was relatively small. As a result of the wait-and-see attitude 
adopted by the G7, the Fund’s management and staff gained autonomy in the 
negotiations, which gave more prominence to the internal bureaucratic incentives 
described above. In mid-2002, therefore, the prospects for resuming cooperation were 
dire as a result of diverging preferences and narrow win-sets on both sides of the 
negotiations. Nevertheless, various relatively unexpected developments would 
contribute to reshape this bargaining process in late 2002, giving way to a new phase of 
Argentina’s relationship with the IMF. 
 
4.4  Restoring debt sustainability 
 
The third phase analysed in this chapter was marked by the resumption of a program 
relationship between Argentina and the IMF. During this period, the negotiations were 
centred primarily on the restoration of Argentina’s debt sustainability. Initially, the main 
priority for the Argentine government was to roll-over and re-profile its obligations to 
the IMF and to the other IFIs. Once that objective was achieved with the approval of 
two SBAs in 2003, restructuring the debt instruments in default since December 2001 
became the most controversial issue in the negotiations. Disagreements about the 
government’s bargaining tactics with private creditors would eventually result in the 
unilateral suspension of the program in August 2004. 
 
Of the various factors that contributed to unblock the stalemate in the negotiations, the 
unanticipated recovery of the Argentine economy stands out in particular. After several 
quarters of negative growth GDP stabilized in the third quarter of 2002 and began to 
experience a robust expansion thereafter. The hyperinflation that had been so feared by 
the authorities also failed to materialize and the stock of bank deposits stabilized after 
July (Levy-Yeyati and Valenzuela, 2007: 189-212).
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 Furthermore, as a result of the 
depreciation of the peso, of the collapse of domestic absorption and of rising 
commodity prices, the current account balance jumped from a deficit of 1.4% of GDP in 
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 Monthly inflation rates fell from 50% in March to less than 1% in the last three months of 2002. 
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2001 to a surplus of 8.5% of GDP in 2002. In addition, together with the adjustment 
measures undertaken by the Duhalde administration, the introduction of an export tax in 
March 2002 resulted in a substantial improvement in public finances, which registered a 
consolidated surplus of 1.8% of GDP in 2002.  
 
This turnaround in macroeconomic performance had the effect of gradually alleviating 
the external financing needs of the economy as a whole and of the Federal Government 
in particular, which enabled Argentine negotiators to revise their aspirations and 
bargaining tactics vis-à-vis the IMF. Indeed, Minister Lavagna describes how he 
gradually came to the realization that the economy could recover without a massive 
injection of official support (Roberto Lavagna. Personal interview. July 20, 2010). 
Instead of bargaining for a new program in the range of US$ 20-25 billion, Argentine 
negotiators’ focus was redirected to rolling-over existing multilateral obligations. This 
realignment in Argentina’s preferences proved to be an option that the US and the 
international community as a whole were more willing to contemplate.  
 
Another consequence of the economic recovery was that, together with the elimination 
of banking restrictions in December 2002, a renewed sense of stability provided a boost 
to the Duhalde administration, thus increasing the size of Argentine negotiators’ win-
set. This trend was reinforced after the April 2003 elections, which put an end to the 
caretaker administration of President Duhalde. In fact, the electoral victory of Néstor 
Kirchner, a relatively unknown politician and the governor of the sparsely populated 
province of Santa Cruz, was largely attributed to his pledge to maintain the economic 
policies implemented during the Duhalde administration. Indeed, President Duhalde 
explicitly backed his candidacy, and Roberto Lavagna announced that he would accept 
retaining the post of economy minister only with Néstor Kirchner as President. The 
outcome of the elections, therefore, substantially reinforced the political position of 
Argentine negotiators, which could only have facilitated the domestic ratification of the 
conditions that were to be attached to the IMF program. 
 
However, the Argentine government didn’t use this expanded room for manoeuvre to 
compromise with the IMF. In fact, the rhetoric adopted by Minister Lavagna and his 
team during this period as well as the default threats described in section 4.1 suggest 
otherwise. This raises the question of why the Argentine authorities did adopt a tougher 
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negotiating stance precisely when the domestic ratification obstacles that they had 
hitherto faced were beginning to subside. To some extent, the bargaining tactics adopted 
by Minister Lavagna might be explained by the fact that Argentine negotiators felt 
entitled to the temporary roll-over they were bargaining for (Leonardo Madcur. Personal 
interview. 29 July, 2010). However, other strategic calculations might have also played 
a role in this respect, initiating a pattern that gained importance subsequently: because 
the idea that Argentina was being treated unfairly took hold in broad sectors of the 
electorate, cultivating the image of tough negotiators with the IMF turned into an asset 
for politicians. In Putnam’s terms, the international negotiations with the IMF 
reverberated negatively within domestic politics, thus hindering cooperation (Putnam, 
1988). This became particularly relevant in the run-up to the 2003 elections because the 
main opposition candidate was former president Carlos Menem, broadly perceived to be 
a close ally of the IMF (Roberto Russell. Personal interview. June 26, 2010).
86
 There is 
ground to argue, therefore, that although their win-set was gradually expanding, 
Argentine chief negotiators had a political incentive to emphasize their divergence from 
the Fund’s preferences. This trend would become even clearer under the Kirchner 
administration, during which the President’s hardened rhetoric against foreign creditors 
contributed to feed his soaring approval rates (Levitsky and Murillo, 2005).
87
  
 
Focusing next on the IMF’s win-set, various factors contributed to change the position 
of some of the Fund’s most powerful constituents. First of all were the Argentine 
government’s threats to default on its multilateral obligations, which clarified what the 
cost of non-agreement would be if the approval of a new program continued to be 
postponed. There are, however, contrasting views about the extent to which these 
threats truly forced the hand of the Fund’s principals. Whereas former Minister Lavagna 
and the IMF’s former representative in Buenos Aires Ernesto Ramírez attributed a 
central importance to the November 2002 threat and to the September 2003 temporary 
default on Argentina’s multilateral obligations, former Secretary of Finance Leonardo 
Madcur argues that this was a secondary issue and that the agreements that were 
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 In the run-up to the elections, the leaders of the Peronist candidates could not agree on a single 
candidate. As a result, three Peronists contended in the elections: Kirchner, Menem and Rodríguez Saá. 
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 Illustrating Kirchner’s position, in his inaugural address he already warned international creditors that 
his government would not honour its obligations “at the price of the hunger and exclusion of Argentines”. 
A few weeks later he openly blamed the IMF for the Argentine crisis during Horst Kohler’s visit to 
Argentina, and during his first address to the UN General Assembly he stated that “no one is known to 
have succeeded in getting their money back from the dead” (Economist, 2003b; Economist, 2003c). 
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eventually reached with the IMF should be interpreted as the result of the compromises 
made possible by months of policy discussions (Roberto Lavagna. Personal interview. 
July 20; Ernesto Ramírez. Personal interview. 28 April 2011; Leonardo Madcur. 
Personal interview. 29 July, 2010). The then US Executive Director at the IMF’s Board, 
Nancy Jacklin, also considers that the Argentine default threats played a marginal role 
in the Board’s decision to approve both the short and the long SBAs (Nancy Jacklin. 
Personal Interview. 16 May 2011). 
 
A second factor that altered the positions held by some of the Fund’s constituents was 
the pressure that private financiers were beginning to exert on the IMF. Luis Cubeddu, 
former IMF representative in Buenos Aires, describes the controversy that resulted from 
the fact that while the debt instruments in the hands of private investors remained in 
default, the IMF and the other IFIs were being paid in full in spite of which these 
institutions continued to refuse to provide new lending (Luis Cubeddu, Personal 
interview, April 22, 2011). Because this anomalous situation was used as an argument 
to question the IFIs’ preferred creditor status, the US government among other 
constituents began to view the approval of a new program not only as a solution to an 
uncomfortably lengthy conflict with Argentina but also as a necessary step to avoid 
controversies about the Fund’s position in the international financial system (Nancy 
Jacklin. Personal Interview. 16 May 2011).  
 
A third factor that altered the contours of the Fund’s win-set was the rapprochement that 
began to take hold between the Argentine and the US governments as year 2002 went 
by. Former ambassador to the US Eduardo Amadeo describes intense Argentine efforts 
to re-establish transnational alliances with IMF constituents (Eduardo Amadeo. 
Personal interview. 26 July, 2010). He argues that in early 2002 the only relevant allies 
on which the Argentine government could count in the negotiation of a new program 
were middle range powers such as Cardoso’s Brazil or Aznar’s Spain. Given that these 
countries have a limited weight in the Executive Board, their support was insufficient to 
substantially alter the contours of the Fund’s win-set. However, Amadeo argues that 
their collaboration was important to gradually change the perceptions of other larger 
IMF constituents and, in particular, those of the US administration. On top of these 
diplomatic efforts, the Argentine government hired two Washington-based lobbying 
firms to re-establish a dialogue with the US Treasury and the State Department.  
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Although it is impossible to assess the extent to which this strategy paid off, it is clear 
that the US administration’s willingness to become involved in Argentina increased 
during the second half of 2002. This tendency could already be discerned in July 2002, 
when the US Treasury suggested that a panel of independent advisors be formed in 
order to mediate between Argentina and the IMF.
88
 A few weeks later, in August, the 
US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill visited Argentina for the first time. Roberto 
Lavagna argues that during this visit Paul O’Neill was positively surprised to learn that 
the government was only asking to roll-over existing obligations and that the economy 
was exhibiting some signs of recovery (Roberto Lavagna. Personal interview. July 20, 
2010). Soon after a proper draft Letter of Intent for a new program began to be drafted, 
although the negotiations dragged for a few more months (Amadeo, 2003: 254, 255). In 
mid-December the US Treasury took the bolder step of coordinating the position of its 
G-7 counterparts to instruct the Fund’s management to take the necessary steps for the 
roll-over of Argentina’s multilateral obligations (Amadeo, 2003: 326; Bonelli, 2003: 
285-287; Economist, 2003a). 
 
One of the most extraordinary features of the period that preceded the approval of the 
2003 SBAs was that up until a very late stage in the negotiations the Fund’s 
management continued to oppose the temporary roll-over of Argentina’s obligations.89 
How can this divergence between the preferences of the Fund’s chief-negotiators and of 
some of its largest constituents be explained? A first possible explanation is related with 
the fact that in spite of the increased receptiveness of the US administration, a 
consensus on the approval of a new program was far from being reached in late 2002. In 
fact, various G7 countries such as Germany and Japan as well as other industrial 
countries like the Netherlands and Switzerland were still reluctant to compromise and 
explicitly opposed the approval of a new program (Amadeo, 2003: 265). In the face of 
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 This panel was eventually formed by a group of prominent central bankers: Andrew Crocket (General 
Manager of the Bank for International Settlements), John Crow (former Governor of the Bank of 
Canada), Luis Angel Rojo (former Governor of the Bank of Spain) and Hans Tietmeyer (former President 
of the Deutsche Bundesbank). It produced a report that was only partially disclosed. Minister Lavagna 
argues that this “outsourcing” was resisted by IMF staff on the grounds that it undermined its authority.   
89
 In a Board meeting held on December 20
th, 2002, the Fund’s management explicitly recommended not 
to approve the transitory SBA (Amadeo, 2003; Bonelli, 2003). Although the staff report discussed on the 
day in which the transitional SBA was eventually approved recommended the roll-over of Argentina’s 
obligations, it did so reluctantly, the perception being that it was an imposition of the G-7 (Roberto 
Lavagna. Personal interview. July 20, 2010; Economist, 2003a).  
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this fuzzy win-set, the Fund’s negotiators may have overestimated their autonomy in the 
negotiations with Argentina. A complementary explanation is rooted in the Fund’s 
internal bureaucratic politics. At a time in which the institution was being so heavily 
criticized for its past largesse with Argentina, Horst Kohler and Anne Krueguer may 
have perceived that reasserting their independence was of crucial importance (Claudio 
Loser. Personal interview. April 26 2011). A third explanation is related with the fact 
that the cost of no agreement may have been perceived to be larger for the Fund’s 
constituents than for the IMF itself. There is no denying that an Argentine default 
constituted an obvious risk for the Fund’s balance sheet. However, because the Fund’s 
constituents are also the shareholders of the other multilateral institutions, their 
assessment of the costs and benefits of approving the transitory SBA is likely to have 
been influenced by the additional risks posed by the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank’s large exposure to Argentina (Ernesto Ramírez. Personal 
interview. 28 April 2011).  
 
Summing up the discussion about the factors that made the resumption of a program 
relationship possible, it has been argued that the onset of an economic recovery played a 
fundamental role by altering Argentine negotiators’ preferred outcome and bargaining 
tactics. Another central development was the broadening of the Fund’s win-set, which 
was brought about by a rapprochement between the Argentine and the US governments, 
by growing concerns about the Fund’s preferred creditor status and by the government’s 
threats to default on its multilateral negotiations. Although these factors restored a win-
set overlap, this cooperative equilibrium in the two-level game was a fragile one as a 
result of the incentives facing both sides’ negotiators. On the side of the IMF, it has 
been argued that negotiators had a bureaucratic incentive to maintain a hard stance on 
Argentina in order to restore their reputation and reassert their independence. In turn, on 
the Argentine side the negative reverberation of the negotiations with the IMF on the 
Argentine domestic political debate created an incentive for the government to appear 
tough on the institution.  
 
As mentioned above, after the resumption of a program relationship, the Argentine 
sovereign debt restructuring process came to play a central role in the negotiations with 
the IMF, gradually feeding the disagreements that were to result in the unilateral 
suspension of the SBA. Argentine chief-negotiators perceived that an excessive IMF 
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interference in this process stood in the way of the maximization of the haircut to be 
extracted from bondholders (Ministerio de Economía y Producción, 2004; Tenembaum, 
2005). This was due to the fact that setting a deterministic adjustment path in the 
program’s macroeconomic conditionality was feared to leave the losses required from 
private creditors to restore the sustainability of Argentina’s debt as a residual variable, 
thus restricting the government’s discretion to make restructuring offers on its own 
terms. Furthermore, rather than relying on the macroeconomic framework elaborated by 
IMF economists, Argentine negotiators wanted to back their restructuring offers with 
their own intentionally pessimistic growth projections, which would also have an 
impact on the calculation of the necessary haircut (Sebastián Katz. Personal Interview. 
July 19, 2010). On top of these considerations about the SBA’s macroeconomic 
framework, Argentine negotiators were increasingly reluctant to accept the validity of 
the Fund’s assessments on their good faith, which under the policy of lending into 
arrears had become a part of the program’s conditionality (see Chapter 3). In fact, this 
concept’s vagueness became a recurrent source of contention not only with the 
Argentine government but also with private creditors. 
 
It is in this context that the Argentine chief-negotiators refused to include fiscal targets 
for 2005 and 2006 in the three years SBA approved in September 2003. This constituted 
another glaring departure from the Fund’s practice, which explains why both 
management and various IMF constituents opposed the concession of a program in 
these terms. On this occasion, the Argentine government went further than before, 
missing a payment to the IMF and, even more importantly, threatening to leave the 
institution altogether.
90
 However, the key factor behind the approval of this SBA was 
the support of the US government, which was only partially aimed at avoiding the cost 
of no agreement described above. Rather, as emphasized by Helleiner (2005), the US 
position on Argentina was largely motivated by the Bush administration views on the 
role that ‘bail-ins’ should play in the international financial architecture. Furthermore, 
after the demise of the SDRM debate, senior officials in the US administration were 
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 According to former minister Lavagna, the government seriously considered this option because the 
Fund’s charter establishes that those countries that decide to drop their membership have the legal 
obligation to cancel their debt within a period of five years. Leaving the IMF, therefore, would have been 
equivalent to automatically rolling over Argentina’s obligations to the Fund for a maximum of five years 
without requiring the continuous negotiation of new SBAs and the periodic discussions about the 
government’s policies in subsequent program reviews (Roberto Lavagna. Personal interview. July 20, 
2010). 
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committed to the idea that sovereign debt restructurings should be market-based and 
that the IMF should accompany these processes without exerting too great an influence 
on their final outcome (John Taylor. Personal Interview. 5 April, 2011; Nancy Jacklin. 
Personal Interview. 16 May 2011). In the words of the Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for International Affairs Randal Quarles: “(…) it is not the IMF’s role to 
impose the terms of the deal. The fiscal component of the [Argentine] program 
intentionally left the primary surplus for future years unspecified above a 3 per cent 
floor in order to give Argentina and its creditors the flexibility to reach a sustainable 
agreement”.91 Given the ideological inclinations of the Bush administration, it made 
sense for the Argentine chief-negotiators to cultivate a transnational alliance with the 
US Treasury, which by then had become the mainstay of the cooperative equilibrium in 
the two level game.
92
  
 
However, after the government disclosed the Dubai terms, and given the increasingly 
generalized perception that Argentina was not doing enough to settle with private 
creditors, it proved to be increasingly difficult for the US Treasury to coordinate the 
positions of its counterparts at the Executive Board. Indeed, as many as eight Executive 
Directors abstained from voting at the Board meeting that approved the first program 
review, including the representatives of three G7 countries: Italy, Japan and the United 
Kingdom. These growing internal dissentions among the Fund’s largest constituents 
increased the cost for the US to continue siding with the Argentine government, as a 
result of which the reduction in the size of the IMF’s win-set could no longer be 
contained with the transnational alliance described above. After another Argentine 
threat to default on its multilateral obligations, the second program review of March 
2004 was eventually approved following John Taylor’s intervention and the Argentine 
government’s acceptance of the GCAB as a valid counterpart in the debt restructuring 
negotiations. However, this would be the last program review to be approved by the 
Board: after delays in the approval of the third review, the Argentine government 
communicated in August 2004 that it would unilaterally postpone further reviews until 
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 http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1288.htm 
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 According to Roberto Lavagna, the key difference between the Clinton and the Bush administrations 
that made this transnational alliance possible was that the latter was less captured by the interests of the 
financial sector (Roberto Lavagna. Personal interview. July 20, 2010). In his views, the fact that, as 
opposed to Robert Rubin and Larry Summers, both Paul O’Neill and John Snow originated from the 
‘productive’ sector influenced their views about the need for financial investors to absorb the cost of their 
wrong decisions. 
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the completion of the debt restructuring, continuing to honour its obligations to the 
Fund but voluntarily giving up the right to draw from the 2003 SBA (Nielsen, 2006). 
 
The unilateral suspension of the program, therefore, was the result of a narrowing IMF 
win-set after the US Treasury decided not to continue intervening in favour of the 
Argentine government at the cost of antagonizing its G7 counterparts. It constituted 
another innovation in the Fund’s engagement in emerging countries given that it is 
normally the case that the institution suspends a program in the face of departures from 
conditionality rather than the other way around. Why did the Argentine chief-
negotiators resort to such an unusual reframing of their relationship with the IMF, and 
why did the IMF accept it? To some extent, the Argentine decision was made possible 
by a legal vacuum in the sense that the possibility for a country to refuse to take part in 
program reviews at the cost of giving up its right to draw from the program had never 
been contemplated. On the Argentine side, this move made sense in order to prevent the 
Fund from interfering in the debt restructuring process. Although this would have also 
been the result of a more traditional suspension of the program by the IMF, the 
authorities did not want the Board to issue a final negative assessment about their good 
faith, which would have somewhat de-legitimized their bargaining stance with private 
creditors (Leonardo Madcur. Personal interview. 29 July, 2010). On the IMF side, given 
that the government committed to continue honouring its multilateral obligations as they 
came due, the unilateral freeze of the program allowed the institution to gradually 
reduce its exposure to Argentina. Furthermore, the suspension of the program was 
consistent with the US objective of limiting the Fund’s interference with the debt 
restructuring without causing further rifts at the Executive Board. In other words, the 
Argentine move was instrumental to mask the fact that the Fund’s main constituents 
were finding it increasingly difficult to agree on a best course of action for Argentina.    
 
After August 2004, therefore, the innovative unilateral suspension of the program 
described above was the last resort to avoid another collapse of cooperation in spite of 
the fact that the overlap between the Argentine and the IMF win-sets had by and large 
disappeared. Apart from the 2005 Article IV consultation, discussions about the 
government’s economic policies were kept at a bare minimum as suggested by the fact 
that even when the IMF agreed to extend repurchase expectations in September 2004 
and May 2005 it was clarified that such decisions were not based on the assessment of 
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the authorities’ economic program (IMF, 2004b). Although after the completion of the 
debt exchange the Fund’s Managing Director announced the beginning of talks on a 
new program, such negotiations led nowhere (IMF, 2005c). This was partly due to the 
fact that, under the policy of lending into arrears, a new program would have required 
the Argentine government to act in good faith in order to settle with holdout creditors, 
which it was not willing to do. In October 2005, President Kirchner triumphed in the 
legislative elections, obtaining 54% of the vote. Again, rather than using the expanded 
room for manoeuvre that this electoral success provided to compromise with the IMF, 
he adopted a policy stance that  further departed from the preferences of the Fund’s 
constituents.
93
 The reluctant cohabitation between Argentina and the IMF was 
eventually brought to an end in December 2005 when President Kirchner announced 
that his government would anticipate the cancelation of its outstanding obligations 
under the SRF. This final move was presented to the public almost like a second 
declaration of independence, which illustrates the symbolism that the IMF had acquired 
in the Argentine political debate.
94
  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has applied an adapted version of Putnam’s two level games in order to 
study a decade of IMF involvement in Argentina. The period under analysis (1996-
2005) departs from a cooperative equilibrium sustained by converging preferences and 
large win-sets on both sides of the negotiating table. The progressive political 
weakening of the Menem administration, however, gradually eroded the Argentine win-
set, while creating a domestic incentive to depart from the Fund’s preferences in order 
for the government to retain the support of its Peronist bases. Given that the Fund had 
reasons to emphasize at least one success story in the context of the criticism elicited by 
its management of the Asian and Russian crises, its win-set remained large, conferring a 
bargaining advantage to Argentine negotiators. As a result, the Executive Board 
systematically tolerated Argentina’s non-compliance with the programs’ conditionality, 
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 That President Kirchner would harden his rhetoric after the elections became obvious in the fourth 
Summit of the Americas held in November in Mar de Plata, during which he made a heated speech 
criticizing the role played by multilateral organizations in Argentina and elsewhere in Latin America 
(http://www.summit-americas.org/NextSummit_eng.htm). 
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 http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=765314 
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which contributes to explain the build-up of the fiscal fragilities that were to aggravate 
the crisis subsequently.  
 
After the De la Rúa administration took office in December 1999 preferences 
reconverged, but Argentine negotiators’ win-set continued to narrow, especially after 
the contentious resignation of vice-President Álvarez. Although this trend may have 
conferred them a bargaining advantage during the negotiations of the two 
augmentations and of some program reviews, growing concerns about the ability of the 
Argentine government to ratify the measures contemplated in the SBA would eventually 
contribute to destabilize the co-operative equilibrium. In addition, two developments 
altered the contours of the Fund’s win-set, contributing to explain the suspension of the 
program in December 2001. First was the adoption of a new doctrine on multilateral 
bailouts by the Bush administration, which was much less keen to put tax-payers’ 
money at risk in order to rescue emerging markets than its predecessor. Second were the 
September 11
th
 attacks, which turned the Argentine crisis into a secondary issue, 
reducing the perceived cost of non-agreement that had sustained the Level I game’s 
cooperative equilibrium throughout most of 2001.  
 
The subsequent conflict was rooted in diverging preferences on the emergency 
measures required to address the crisis and in narrow win-sets on both sides of the 
negotiation. In Argentina, this period was initially characterized by the political 
weakness of the Duhalde administration and by the profound divisions that the 
economic debacle had unfolded. As a result, ratifying the measures that the IMF 
demanded in order to resume a program relationship was nearly impossible. In turn, the 
Fund’s negotiating position was hardened by the institution’s internal bureaucratic 
political dynamics and by the hands-off approach adopted by the G-7, which increased 
the autonomy of IMF negotiators throughout most of 2002. A new program could 
eventually be approved after the first signs of an incipient economic recovery allowed 
Argentine negotiators to revise their aspirations and to reconstitute a transnational 
alliance with the US Treasury. In other words, shifting Argentine preferences with 
regard to the size of the program together with the broadening of the Fund’s win-set that 
resulted from the support of the US government helped reconstitute a win-set overlap.  
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However, this proved to be a fragile cooperative equilibrium due to the presence of 
domestic political incentives for the Argentine government to depart from the Fund’s 
preferences on economic policy and to increasing dissent among IMF constituents on 
the Argentine program. When the loss of a win-set overlap became obvious, the 
Argentine government avoided a complete collapse of the cooperative equilibrium by 
unilaterally giving up its right to draw from the IMF in order not to be subject to the 
obligations associated with a normal program relationship. This reluctant cohabitation 
lasted until the Kirchner administration considered that the domestic political benefits of 
severing its relationship with the Fund outweighed the financial cost of anticipating the 
cancellation of the program. 
 
What are the hypotheses that this case study helps unveil about the relationship between 
domestic ratification politics and the bargaining interaction between the IMF and its 
member states? Focusing first on borrowing countries’ ratification politics, the 
Argentine case brings support to the hypothesis of a non-linear relationship between the 
intensity of domestic political constraints and chief-negotiators’ bargaining power vis-à-
vis the IMF described in Chapter 2. Ceteris paribus, the emergence or deepening of such 
constraints can be turned into a bargaining advantage. However, beyond a certain 
threshold, difficulties to ratify the program’s conditionality domestically can result in 
the suspension of multilateral support.  
 
Second, depending on the government’s preferences and on public perceptions about the 
IMF, a program relationship can serve different domestic political purposes. If the 
government’s preferences are aligned with those of the IMF and if the IMF is not 
excessively stigmatized in the domestic political debate, as was the case during the De 
la Rúa administration, a cooperative program relationship may be used to legitimize 
certain courses of action consistent with the Fund’s prescriptions. Instead, if the 
government’s preferences are not aligned with those of the IMF and if the IMF is 
stigmatized in the domestic political debate, as was the case during the Kirchner 
administration, a conflictive program relationship may be used to garner support for 
courses of action that depart from the Fund’s prescriptions. The Argentine case study 
suggests that in both situations national politicians tend to exaggerate the importance of 
the IMF in the domestic decision making process. However, whereas in the first 
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scenario this incentive tends to sustain the cooperative equilibrium, in the second 
scenario it tends to undermine it.  
 
Focusing next on the Fund’s ratification politics, the Argentine case study brings 
support to the idea that the perceived cost of no agreement associated with a particular 
intervention is negatively associated with the autonomy of IMF officials in the 
negotiations with borrowing countries. When the cost of no agreement is perceived to 
be high, the Fund’s constituents’ strategic calculations tend to dominate the decision-
making process. Instead, when the cost of no agreement is perceived to be low, the 
Fund’s technical considerations and internal bureaucratic politics tend to dominate. 
Borrowing country chief-negotiators may have some leeway to influence the perceived 
cost of no agreement either by manipulating international public opinion and market 
expectations, as Minister Cavallo allegedly tried to do, or by threatening to default on 
multilateral obligations, as Minister Lavagna did.  
 
A final question that deserves attention is whether the Argentine case study provides 
evidence about the causal relationship between multilateral rules and IMF interventions. 
On the one hand, it can be argued that the reform of the international financial 
architecture described in chapter 3 legalised the sort of large-scale official support that 
the Fund provided with the two augmentations of December 2000 and August 2001. 
Furthermore, the Prague Framework approved in 2000 contributes to explain why these 
two augmentations emphasized the adoption of PSI measures to complement official 
finance in order to handle the Argentine crisis. On the other hand, there are various 
instances in which multilateral rules were breached during the decade under analysis. 
For a start, the macroeconomic conditionality associated with the Fund’s programs 
often failed to constrain the behaviour of the Menem administration in the relevant 
policy dimensions. Later on, the second augmentation of the 2000 SBA was approved in 
the absence of an agreement about macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform, 
and the 2003 SBA established short-term macroeconomic objectives that did not cover 
the entire period of the program.  
 
In sum, although the evolving doctrine on multilateral interventions in emerging market 
crises mattered, rules did not always constrain the negotiations between Argentina and 
the IMF. In this context, the relevant empirical question becomes when and why are 
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rules binding in the issue area of international crisis lending? The Argentine case study 
suggests that rules tend to be breached when they conflict with the interests of the 
Fund’s most powerful constituents. More specifically, there seems to be a negative 
association between the cost of no agreement and the relevance of rules as an 
explanatory factor. When the G7 considered that the cost of not agreeing with Argentina 
was high, as was the case during the Asian Financial crisis or throughout most of 2001, 
rules were easy to breach. Instead, when the cost of not agreeing dropped, as was the 
case after the September 11 attacks, the need to comply with multilateral rules became a 
binding obstacle to resume a program relationship.          
 
The Argentine case study also illustrates how borrowing countries can exploit their 
transnational alliances with powerful creditors in order to breach multilateral rules. This 
was especially clear during the design and implementation of the 2003 SBA, which 
departed from the Fund’s practice on such critical issues as the period to be covered by 
macroeconomic conditionality or the interpretation of the good faith criterion. What is 
particularly interesting about this case is that the transnational alliance between the 
Kirchner and the Bush administrations that made these departures possible was not 
sustained by material interests or political affinity. Rather, the US supported the 
Argentine position because it was more consistent with its own views about sovereign 
debt restructurings and the convenience of limiting the Fund’s influence in such 
processes. In other words, at that particular instance breaking existing multilateral rules 
was instrumental for the US administration to reshape the reform of the international 
financial architecture according to its preferences. Rules, therefore, should not only be 
seen as a possible determinant of specific IMF interventions, but also as a potential 
outcome of these interventions. This gives rise to an endogeneity problem that 
complicates the empirical analysis on the explanatory significance of rules in the issue 
area of multilateral crisis lending.    
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
Uruguay and the IMF 
 
 
 
   
As was the case in Argentina, the decade that followed the Tequila crisis witnessed an 
intense IMF involvement in Uruguay. The Fund’s role in both countries had a similar 
starting point in the precautionary arrangements of the 1990s and some parallels can be 
established between the initial management of their respective financial crises in the 
early 2000s. However, the final outcome of these two interventions turned out to be 
very different. Whereas the defining moment of the Fund’s involvement in Argentina 
was the suspension of the program in December 2001, in Uruguay it was the massive 
multilateral disbursement of August 2002, which put an end to run on the banking 
system that was having devastating economic consequences. As a result, Argentina’s 
relationship with the IMF became much more conflictive than that of its neighbour 
across the River Plate. This is not to say that the Fund’s intervention in Uruguay was 
exempted from disagreements and controversies. Most notably, the aforementioned 
August augmentation was approved against the will of the Fund’s senior management 
after dramatic negotiations that could only be unblocked with the direct intervention of 
the US Treasury. The sovereign debt restructuring launched subsequently constituted 
another important source of contention that resulted in a brief suspension of the 
program. This case study, therefore, also presents a number of instances in which the 
cooperative outcome of the negotiations was extremely fragile.    
   
Following the same structure as Chapter 4, this chapter applies a process tracing 
approach and a two-level game framework to analyse the relationship between Uruguay 
and the IMF from the approval of a precautionary SBA in March 1996 until the early 
cancellation of the 2005 SBA in November 2006. As was the case in Chapter 4, given 
its longitudinal approach, this chapter will concentrate primarily on the time-varying 
factors that contribute to explain variation in the outcome of interest, with an emphasis 
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on electoral processes, bureaucratic incentives or multilateral rules. Other more static 
explanatory factors related with the structural features of the Uruguayan polity and 
institutions will be analysed cross-sectionally in Chapter 6. 
 
The evidence provided in this Chapter challenges the assertion that there is an inevitable 
trade-off between policy stability and policy adaptability (Tsebelis, 2002; Haggard and 
McCubbins 2001). Indeed, the Uruguayan polity was able to provide both outcomes at 
different points in time. During the implementation of the precautionary arrangements 
of the 1990s, the presence of multiple veto-points resulted in a narrow win-set, making 
it difficult to move forward with the structural transformation of the economy that the 
IMF may have wished to catalyze through its programs’ conditionality. However, 
during the worst months of the crisis, Uruguayan political actors were able to 
compromise in order to expedite the ratification of the policy package on which the 
Fund´s bailout was conditioned. This observation is consistent with Scartascini et al. 
(2010), according to whom the presence of strong checks and balances encourages 
political actors to engage in inter-temporal bargaining processes, which may contribute 
to yield policy stability in ordinary times and policy adaptability in extraordinary times.  
 
The Uruguayan case study also illustrates some of the complexities that characterize the 
causal association between multilateral rules and the outcome of specific IMF 
interventions. On the one hand, rules imposed a generally soft constraint on the 
negotiation of the Uruguayan program. This was particularly clear during the Bush 
administration, which was willing to renege on its commitment to impose strict limits 
on the size of its IMF loans during the Uruguayan crisis. On the other hand, this 
decision was linked to broader normative considerations and to the Bush 
administration’s desire to make sure that the sovereign debt regime would be reformed 
according to its preferences. Indeed, not agreeing to a multilateral bailout could have 
turned Uruguay into an obvious candidate to inaugurate a statutory debt restructuring 
mechanism, which by then had lost the support of the US Treasury Department. In other 
words, that the course of action to be adopted in the Uruguayan crisis was linked to the 
SDRM debate may have enabled that country’s government to punch above its weight, 
contributing to explain the crucial multilateral decision of massively augmenting the 
program in August 2002. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 starts by offering a 
descriptive account of the negotiations between Uruguay and the IMF. This is aimed at 
presenting the variation observed in the Level I game that subsequent sections will 
explain in terms of the preferences and win-sets of the parts involved in this process. 
Three different phases are identified in the relationship between Uruguay and the IMF: 
a first phase during which IMF programs were aimed at preventing financial crises, a 
second phase of crisis management and a third phase during which the negotiations 
were centred on restoring the sustainability of Uruguay’s sovereign debt. The chapter 
concludes with a summary of the hypotheses that this case study helps unveil about the 
relationship between domestic ratification processes and the Fund’s interventions in 
emerging economies.  
 
5.1  A decade of financial programs 
 
Uruguay was uninterruptedly under successive IMF programs from March 1996 until 
November 2006 (see Table 5.1). Although this relationship was overall cooperative, the 
nature and intensity of the Fund’s engagement in Uruguay displayed a wide variation. 
Until the early 2000s, the programs were precautionary, carried low access to the 
Fund’s resources and were primarily aimed at providing a seal of approval on the 
government’s policies. A second phase began with the eruption of a severe banking 
crisis in 2002, to which the IMF responded with the approval of a larger SBA and, 
reluctantly, with two augmentations of exceptional magnitude. This culminated in the 
massive multilateral disbursement of August 2002, which succeeded in restoring 
confidence in the banking system and, therefore, put an end to the financial crisis. The 
third phase begins with the stabilization of the Uruguayan economy and with an 
interlude of intense disagreements between the government and IMF officials about 
how best to deal with a sovereign debt burden that had surpassed 100% of GDP. During 
that time, the program was temporarily suspended, threatening to trigger another wave 
of financial instability. An agreement was eventually reached early in 2003, bringing 
about the resumption of IMF disbursements as well as the launching of a comprehensive 
debt restructuring. This program relationship was brought to an end by the Tabaré 
Vázquez administration, which anticipated the cancellation of Uruguay’s outstanding 
obligations to the Fund in late 2006, thus following the steps of Argentina and Brazil. 
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Table 5.1 
IMF programs in Uruguay (1996-2005) 
 
Source: IMF  
Program Type
Date of 
Approval
Duration
Amount 
committed in 
SDR and in %  
of quota
Amount 
disbursed in 
SDR and in %  
of total
Macroeconomic conditionality Structural conditionality Compliance with conditionality
Mar-96 13 months SDR 100mn SDR 0
44% of quota 0%
Jun-97 21 months SDR 125mn SDR 114mn
55% of quota 91%
Mar-99 12 months SDR 70mn SDR 0
31% of quota 0%
May-00 22 months SDR 150mn SDR 150mn
50% of quota 100%
Apr-02 24 months SDR 594.1mn SDR 594.1mn
194% of quota 100%
Jun-02 - SDR 1.16bn SDR 1.16bn
378% of quota 100%
Of which SDR 
386 mn under 
the SRF
Aug-02 - SDR 376mn SDR 376mn
123% of quota 100%
Jun-05 36 months SDR 766.3 mn SDR 263.59
250% of quota 34%
SBA
Maintenance of a discipline fiscal stance, with 
a medium target for the primary balance of 4% 
of GDP
Focus on the financial system; continued 
restructuring of state banks; enhancement of 
central bank independence; measures to 
bolster private investment; tax reform
Fiscal targets outperformed; monetary policy 
slightly loosened with respect to original 
targets; mixed compliance with structural 
conditionality
Good compliance with program conditionality
Good initial compliance with macroeconomic 
conditionality; problems to meet the program 
targets in late 1998 and 1999 as a result of 
recession; mixed compliance with structural 
conditionality
Mixed compliance: as a result of worst than 
expected recession fiscal targets had to be 
reviewed; structural reforms' pace slowed and 
most conditions contemplated by the program 
not observed
2nd augmentation 
(the SRF 
component 
cancelled)
SBA
SBA
SBA
1st augmentation 
(with SRF)
SBA
SBA
Poor compliance with macroeconomic 
conditionality, which had to be 
comprehensively resigned in subsequent 
augmentation; most structural conditions 
observed
The new strategy also failed to solve the 
crisis, and was modified again for the second 
program augmentation
Mixed compliance with macroeconomic and 
structural conditionality. Disagreements over 
the debt restructuring strategy.
Mixed compliance: fiscal targets missed as a 
result of deepening recession but most other 
quantitative performance criteria met; most 
structural conditions observed
More demanding structural conditionality: 
reform and restructuring of banking system; 
rationalization of the tax system; liberalization 
of telecom and oil sectors; reform of special 
pension funds  
Focus on the restructuring of the banking 
sector leading to a modification of the 
government's crisis resolution strategy; 
creation of  FFSB.
Focus on the banking system: creation of 
FESB; reprogramming of time deposits held in 
public banks; suspension of activities of 
intervened banks; tax reform
Gradual reduction of inflation and fiscal 
consolidation.
Gradual reduction of inflation, de-indexation 
of public sector wages and fiscal 
consolidation
Focus on fiscal adjustment 
Fiscal adjustment: halving of overall deficit to 
1.8% of GDP
No formal structural conditionality. However, 
the program supported a pension system 
reform and an efficiency savings seeking 
reform of the central government.
By the time of the second augmentation it 
was understood that some drastic measures 
would need to be adopted in order to address 
the debt overhang
No major structural reforms contemplated: 
reduction of public sector emplyment; sale of 
public bank (Caja Obrera); submission of new 
bankruptcy law to Congress
No major structural reforms contemplated: 
subscription to SDDS; improvement of the 
monetary data produced by the CB and of 
national accounts statistics; audit to three 
State-owned financial institutions
External audit of State-owned banks and 
public enterprises; iniciation of reform of 
special pension funds (banks, universities, 
police, military); study on quasi fiscal 
operations of public sector
(Extended by 
one year on 
March 03)
Focus on fiscal adjustment: overall deficit 
targeted to fall to 2.5% of GDP in 2002
Freely floating of the peso (highly 
controversial decision)
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Figure 5.1 
Financial transactions between Uruguay and the IMF (US$) 
 
         Source: IMF 
 
5.1.1  Crisis prevention 
 
As was the case in Argentina, contagion from the Tequila crisis abruptly pushed the 
Uruguayan economy into recession, after which the government engaged in a series of 
precautionary arrangements with the IMF.
 95
 The first of these SBAs was approved in 
March 1996 for an amount of close to US$ 150 million and had a duration of 13 months. Its 
macroeconomic conditionality envisaged a moderate contraction in the public sector’s 
budget deficit and supported an exchange rate based stabilization strategy aimed at 
gradually bringing inflation down to single digit levels.
96
 In turn, although the Sanguinetti 
administration that took office in 1995 had initiated some reforms, most notably in the 
pension system and the modernization of public administration, the 1996 SBA included no 
                                                          
95
 After various years of robust growth in the early 1990s, real GDP contracted by 2% in 1995. 
96
 This exchange rate based stabilization strategy was adopted in the early 1990s. As opposed to Argentina’s 
hard peg (the Convertibility regime), Uruguay’s strategy relied on a crawling band system that was 
periodically adjusted to targeted levels of inflation. Together with the widespread indexation mechanisms 
present in the Uruguayan economy, this resulted in a much slower reduction of inflation: only in 1998 was an 
inflation rate of less than 10% recorded for the first time.  
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formal structural conditions. The program’s macroeconomic targets and conditionality were 
broadly met, which was facilitated by a faster than expected recovery: real GDP growth 
reached 5% in 1996 as opposed to the 1% expansion originally projected in the SBA. In 
retrospect, however, a 2005 IMF staff report criticized the 1996 SBA for its lack of 
structural conditionality, which it described as a missed opportunity to have pressed the 
Uruguayan government to correct the shortcomings of the financial sector’s regulatory and 
supervisory framework (IMF, 2005d). According to this report, this lack of progress with 
financial reform would later contribute to aggravate the 2002 banking crisis. 
 
The 21 months SBA signed in June 1997 was similar in spirit to the 1996 program. It gave 
access to a credit of US$ 174 million and its conditionality continued to be centred on the 
exchange rate based macroeconomic stabilization described above. Although it also carried 
a light structural conditionality, this program included some benchmarks such as the reform 
of the bankruptcy regime or a commitment to extend the period for adjusting civil-servants 
wages to inflation in order to progress towards the de-indexation of the economy.  The 
1997 SBA remained broadly on track until its expiration. Meeting its macroeconomic 
targets, however, proved to be more challenging after August 1998 as a result of a 
worsening international environment. Indeed, the Russian crisis and the resulting wave of 
contagion that swept through emerging markets impacted Uruguay’s access to global 
financial markets, which prompted the government to make use of the program’s resources 
in spite of having originally committed to treat this SBA as a precautionary arrangement. 
Nonetheless, in 1998 Uruguay remained one of the few Latin American countries with 
investment grade and that year real GDP expanded by 4.5%, suggesting that both the 
government and the IMF still had reasons to believe that the disturbances that followed the 
Russian default would only have a modest and temporary effect.   
 
The 1999 SBA, therefore, did not alter the basic premises of the Fund’s previous 
engagement in Uruguay: it gave access to a US$ 98 million credit in precautionary terms, it 
continued to support the government’s medium-term stabilization effort, and it included 
few structural conditions. Given that presidential elections were scheduled for October 
1999 and that a new government was due to take office in March of the following year, this 
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program had a duration of only 12 months to support the outgoing administration. The 
implementation of the 1999 SBA turned out to be particularly difficult due to the larger 
than anticipated impact of the external shocks that were affecting the Uruguayan 
economy.
97
 Most notably, the sharp devaluation of the real in January 1999 severely 
undermined the competitiveness of Uruguayan exports, a third of which were being 
absorbed by the Brazilian market prior to the crisis. In the face of this unanticipated 
economic slump (in 1999 GDP contracted by more than 3% against a projected 1%) fiscal 
targets had to be revised in July in order for the first review of the program to be approved 
(IMF, 1999c). Compliance with structural conditionality was also incomplete. 
 
In spite of the difficulties undergone during 1999, the new government of President Jorge 
Batlle negotiated another low access precautionary SBA amounting to US$ 197 million that 
was based on rather optimistic projections: a GDP growth rate of 2% for years 2000 and 
2001. This reflected the assumption that the Mercosur economies would recover relatively 
fast from the 1998/99 crisis and that, as had been the case in past episodes of regional 
instability, an acceleration of inflation in Brazil would soon offset the impact that the 
devaluation of the real had had on the competitiveness of Uruguayan exports (Ariel 
Davrieux. Personal interview. July 7 2010; Carlos Steneri. Personal interview. September 
16 2010). The program approved in May 2000, therefore, had a macroeconomic 
conditionality that was similar to its predecessors, focusing on a moderate medium-term 
fiscal adjustment effort. In contrast, however, it incorporated a more demanding structural 
conditionality, including plans to deepen the pension system reform, to improve the 
efficiency of public banks and enterprises and to clarify the scope of their quasi-fiscal 
operations. Due to increasingly de-stabilizing spillovers from the Argentine crisis and to an 
outburst of foot-and-mouth disease in the cattle industry, the Uruguayan economy 
continued to plunge in 2000 and even more so in 2001. As a result, the government was 
forced to request various modifications of the program’s targets as well as some waivers for 
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 However, the government did not make use of the resources committed under the program reflecting the 
fact that in 1999 it still retained good access to international financial markets and, hence, could cover a 
widening external financing gap without resorting to multilateral assistance .  
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the non-observance of fiscal performance criteria.
98
 In spite of these worsening conditions, 
Uruguay retained a relatively good access to international financial markets throughout all 
of 2001, which enabled the authorities not to make use of the resources committed under 
the program. In 2002, however, the situation continued to deteriorate, which would 
eventually give way to fundamental changes in the form and scale of the Fund’s 
engagement in Uruguay. 
 
5.1.2   Crisis management 
 
Uruguay’s banking crisis erupted in the first weeks of 2002 when the introduction of the 
Corralito across the River Plate led cash-strapped Argentine nationals to withdraw a 
significant proportion of the deposits they held in Uruguayan financial institutions.
99
 In 
March, the propagation of the panic to domestic depositors forced the monetary authority to 
pump increasing volumes of liquidity into troubled banks, leading to a downgrading of 
Uruguay’s sovereign debt that resulted in an abrupt loss of access to global financial 
markets.
100
 A central difficulty facing the authorities was the banking system’s degree of 
dollarization (almost 90% of deposits were denominated in US$), which implied that the 
central bank had to use hard currency in order to provide lender of last resort (LOLR) 
assistance. As a result, the stock of foreign exchange reserves was fast to dwindle, 
prompting the government first to draw from the 2000 SBA and then to negotiate a much 
larger program.  
 
A new crisis resolution SBA was approved in early April 2002 giving access to a credit of 
US$ 740 million. Its conditionality included a fiscal consolidation effort as well as a 
number of structural benchmarks centred on the reform and restructuring of the Uruguayan 
                                                          
98
 As opposed to the 2% GDP growth projected by the program for 2000 and 2001, the Uruguayan economy 
contracted by 1% in 2000 and by 3.1% in 2001. In turn, the consolidated public sector deficit reached 3.7% of 
GDP in 2000 compared with a program target of 1.8%. 
99
 The Uruguayan financial system has traditionally functioned as a safe haven in a region used to financial 
instability. Indeed, prior to the crisis 44% of total deposits were held by non-residents, primarily Argentines 
(IMF, 2003f). The 2002 run on deposits by Argentine nationals came as a surprise because even though there 
were obvious concerns about the possibility of a financial contagion, in past episodes of regional instability 
the stock of Uruguayan deposits had tended to increase as a result of capital flight. 
100
 Another trigger of the run on banks was the unearthing of problems at Banco Comercial and Banco 
Galicia, which further undermined the public’s confidence in the resilience of the banking system. (see 
Appendix D). 
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financial system. The new program, however, failed to stabilize the situation. This was 
largely due to the fact that its tranched structure resulted in an upfront disbursement of less 
than US$ 200 million, which guaranteed a proportion of the deposit base that was too small 
to stop the run. Indeed, as the Fund’s staff would later recognize, this intervention tried to 
address a banking panic with an instrument inherently designed to deal with a balance of 
payment problem, resulting in an inadequate disbursement schedule  (IMF, 2005d). 
 
Shortly after the 2002 SBA was approved, therefore, it was already clear that a different 
strategy would have to be sought in order to stop the run on deposits. It is for that purpose 
that an augmentation of approximately US$ 1.5 billion began to be negotiated in May and 
was approved in late June. For reasons that will be discussed later in more detail, one of the 
policy strings attached to this augmentation proved to be particularly contentious: the 
floating of the peso. In addition, this augmentation was conditioned on a second fiscal 
adjustment, although its main focus was on the banking system.  Indeed, together with the 
additional resources provided by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank, the first augmentation of the SBA was used to constitute a fund to provide liquidity 
to the banking system: the so-called Fondo de Fortalecimiento del Sistema Bancario or 
FFSB. However, and even if the total amount of resources committed under the IMF 
program was brought to almost US$ 2.3 billion, only US$ 500 million were disbursed 
immediately. One more time, this proved to be insufficient to guarantee a sufficient 
proportion of deposits. As a result, the FFSB was soon perceived to be underfunded and the 
run on the banking system continued unabated.  
 
By mid-July 2002 more than 40% of deposits had fled the banking system since the 
beginning of the crisis. Further evidencing the failure of the crisis resolution strategy 
adopted so far, the resources of the FFSB were nearly depleted and the central bank was 
running dangerously short of international reserves. This did eventually force the 
resignations of the Economy Minister Bensión and of the President of the Central Bank 
Rodríguez Batlle, which added more uncertainty while making it clear that the adoption of 
new extraordinary measures was urgently needed. At that point, the international 
community was faced with the choice of either substantially expanding and frontloading its 
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support to the Uruguayan government in a last attempt to stabilize the situation or of letting 
it fall. After a week of dramatic negotiations in late July the former course of action was 
adopted and a second augmentation of US$ 500 million was approved.
101
 Even more 
important than the augmentation was the acceleration of disbursements and the additional 
commitments that were obtained from the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank, resulting in a total multilateral upfront disbursement of close to 
US$ 1.5 billion.
102
 This decision was adopted thanks to the support of the US Treasury, 
which not only pressed the IMF to agree on the augmentation but also provided a bridge 
short-term loan of US$ 1.5 billion that turned out to be crucial for the success of this 
intervention.
103
 Given that a GDP contraction of 11% was now projected for 2002, the 
SBA’s macroeconomic targets were substantially altered at that time. More importantly, a 
new strategy was adopted to comprehensively restructure the Uruguayan banking system: 
the FSSB was substituted by a new fund (the Fondo de Estabilización del Sistema Bancario 
or FESB) endowed with the US$1.5 billion provided by the international institutions to 
guarantee domestic banks’ sight and savings deposits; time deposits for a total amount of 
US$ 2.2 billion were re-programmed; the operations of four financial institutions were 
suspended; the government committed not to re-open unviable banks.  
 
5.1.3   Restoring debt sustainability 
 
As opposed to previous interventions, this new strategy succeeded in stopping the run and 
the deposit outflow began to be reversed soon after the August augmentation, giving way to 
the third phase analysed in this chapter. In the context of this successful intervention, it is 
somewhat paradoxical that the relationship between Uruguay and the IMF was so difficult 
during the months that followed. However, agreeing on how best to address what the IMF 
considered a debt overhang proved to be extraordinarily difficult. Indeed, since the mid-
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 Upon deciding that the augmentation would be approved, a banking holiday was declared in order to 
provide some breathing space for details on the large multilateral disbursements to be negotiated.  
102
 In addition, the SRF component of the SBA was cancelled, which made the Fund’s credit cheaper. 
103
 The decision to support Uruguay was made at a time in which Uruguay’s foreign exchange reserves were 
almost depleted. In this context, the US Treasury bridge loan gave the authorities the breathing space that was 
needed to finish negotiating the details of the augmentation with the IMF, the World Bank and the IADB. 
This bridge loan was redeemed with the resources provided by the multilateral disbursement once the 
augmentation was approved. 
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1990s the government’s stock of public debt had jumped from less than 50% of GDP to 
almost 100% of GDP as a result of the long-lasting recession, of the fiscal cost of the 
banking crisis and of the sharp depreciation of the peso (most of the debt was denominated 
in US$). The key point of contention between Uruguay and the IMF was whether such a 
debt burden could be considered sustainable and, hence, whether the authorities were facing 
a liquidity or a solvency problem. By mid-October, the negotiations between Uruguay and 
the IMF had reached a stalemate and the second review of the SBA could not be approved 
on time. For some agonizing months, therefore, the program’s disbursements were 
postponed, generating a renewed sense of uncertainty that was on the verge of reviving the 
banking crisis.
104
 In early March, however, a settlement was reached when the government 
agreed to launch a market friendly preventive debt restructuring in order to alleviate its 
liquidity pressures in the medium term. This allowed for the second review of the SBA to 
be approved and for the Fund’s disbursements to resume.105  
 
The decision to launch a comprehensive restructuring was announced in mid-March. 
Reflecting the government’s intention to act as swiftly as possible, a proactive consultation 
process with creditors was initiated soon afterwards, and a restructuring offer was disclosed 
by mid-April, after which the tender was opened. The exchange was officially closed at the 
end of May, implying that it took less than three months to complete the entire exercise.
106
 
Although the IMF did not take part in the design of this debt restructuring operation, it 
provided incentives for creditors to exchange their bonds. This was done primarily through 
a public letter issued by the Fund’s Managing Director to the members of the financial 
community explicitly stating that the success of the restructuring would constitute a 
precondition for the approval of the third review of the SBA (IMF, 2003d). The 
implications for creditors were clear: an insufficient participation in the exchange would 
cause the suspension of the Fund’s support to Uruguay, which would substantially increase 
the odds of a much costlier default. Participation in the bond exchange reached 92%, which 
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 The potential consequences of a longer-lasting suspension of the program were made clear in late January 
2003 when a new bout of deposit outflows was registered. 
105
 The second review also extended the duration of the SBA by 12 months until March 2005. In addition, the 
program’s disbursements were re-phased and two waivers were granted for the non-observance of fiscal 
conditionality and of one of the structural performance criteria.  
106
 The central bank, however, continued to allow those bondholders that had not participated in the exchange 
to tender their bonds after the official closure of the exchange.  
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was broadly considered a success. As a result, projected principal debt repayments due in 
the period 2003 to 2007 were brought down from US$2.1 billion to US$ 300 million, which 
the government expected to provide enough breathing space to consolidate a solid recovery 
(IMF, 2003f). However, because this operation carried a very moderate haircut in net 
present value terms and no nominal loss at all, the question of whether this debt re-profiling 
strategy managed to restore the sustainability of Uruguay’s debt remained a matter of much 
debate in the aftermath of the exchange.
107
  
 
In the aftermath of the debt restructuring, the Fund’s relationship with Uruguay focused on 
the following three areas. First, it backed an ambitious fiscal consolidation effort targeting a 
primary surplus of 4% of GDP in the medium term in order to ensure the sustainability of 
Uruguay’s sovereign debt. Second, it emphasized the restructuring of the banking system 
and, in particular, the reform of public financial entities and the disposal of liquidated 
banks’ assets. Third, it supported other structural reforms such as the rationalization of the 
tax system or the reform of specialized pension schemes. Progress in these three areas of 
economic policy was uneven. The government’s macroeconomic framework remained on 
track and fiscal targets were outperformed in 2004 and thereafter, which was facilitated by 
an unexpectedly robust economic recovery.
108
 Instead, the reform of the banking system 
lagged behind, becoming a source of friction with the IMF in late 2003 and early 2004. 
These delays prompted the government to request various waivers for the non-observance 
of some of the program’s structural performance criteria and resulted in a slight 
postponement of the program’s fourth review.109 Upon the expiration of the SBA in March 
2005, however, the Fund’s staff recognized that progress in this area was well under way 
and that the programs’ targets for the banking sector had overall been met (IMF, 2005f). In 
turn, very little progress was achieved with the other structural reforms envisaged by the 
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 The Uruguayan authorities’ strategy has eventually been vindicated by the substantial reduction of its debt 
burden that has been observed since 2003.Indeed, by 2006 Uruguay’s debt to GDP already stood at 66% 
(IMF, 2008a). To a large extent, this has been due to an exceptionally positive international environment, a 
surge in the price of primary products and buoyant liquidity in international financial markets.  
108
 By the first half of 2004, the recovery of the Uruguayan economy had already taken hold, and real GDP 
would end up registering a 12% expansion that year. Furthermore, the peso began appreciating sooner than 
had been anticipated, which also contributed to reduce the government’s debt to GDP burden. 
109
 More specifically, the IMF blamed the Uruguayan authorities for being slow to dispose the assets of 
liquidated banks. In order to approve the fourth review (which was eventually approved on February 2004) 
the government was asked to submit a new strategy for the restructuring of the banking system. 
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program. As this chapter will explore below in more detail, this was largely due to 
opposition in the Uruguayan Congress, which blocked the reforms of the tax system and of 
the specialized pension schemes.      
 
In spite of Uruguay’s rebound from the crisis, the last reviews of the 2002 SBA made it 
clear that a new program would be necessary in order to consolidate the recovery (IMF, 
2005e). This was primarily due to the fact that in the absence of a new arrangement, the 
amortization payments due from the Uruguayan government to the Fund were projected to 
average 8% of GDP over the medium-term, threatening to generate severe liquidity 
problems. The SBA negotiated by the new administration of Tabaré Vázquez, therefore, 
was primarily aimed at assuring the sustainability of the government’s external debt 
through a partial roll-over of its multilateral obligations, which would facilitate a more 
gradual exit from the Fund’s financial support. The three years SBA approved in June 2005 
gave access to a credit of US$1.1 billion, covering close to 60% of Uruguay’s outstanding 
obligations falling due during the program period. Although the victory of a left of centre 
coalition (Encuentro Progresista - Frente Amplio – Nueva Mayoría or EP-FA-NM) in the 
2004 elections brought the traditional dominance of the Colorado and the Blanco parties to 
an end, the conditionality that the Tabaré Vázquez administration agreed with the IMF was 
not dissimilar from that of the program that expired in March 2005. Hence, the Fund’s 
intervention in Uruguay continued to target a large primary surplus of 4% in the medium 
term, the restructuring of the banking system and a number of structural reforms aimed at 
encouraging private investment and bolstering growth prospects. 
 
The implementation of the 2005 SBA continued to be aided by a robust recovery that 
allowed the government to outperform the program’s macroeconomic targets. This was 
particularly apparent with respect to the external sector, which exhibited a surge in exports, 
a substantial increase in the stock of international reserves and a faster than expected 
recovery of access to international financial markets. As a result, the government began 
anticipating repayments to the IMF in mid-2006, thus following the pattern set by the 
Argentine and the Brazilian governments a few months earlier. In November of that same 
year, the government took the decision of completing the cancellation of the 2005 SBA, 
 146 
fully honouring its outstanding obligations to the IMF. By that time, progress with the 
program’s structural conditionality had been mixed. Although the government had 
managed to implement some of the measures contemplated by the program, such as the tax 
reform for which the Batlle administration failed to obtain a sufficient congressional 
support, it lagged behind on others such as the reforms of the specialized pension schemes. 
For that reason, various waivers had to be granted to approve the last review of the SBA 
that brought a decade of IMF financial involvement in Uruguay to an end. 
 
5.2  Crisis prevention 
 
As described above, the first phase of the Fund’s engagement in Uruguay was characterized 
by a cooperation of relatively low intensity that lasted for almost 6 years. As presented in 
Chapter 2, in terms of Putnam’s two level games this cooperative outcome should be 
understood as the product of an overlap between the win-sets of Uruguayan and IMF 
negotiators. This overlap could have resulted from converging preferences or, when in the 
presence of divergences, from a sufficiently large win-set on Uruguay’s side, on the Fund’s 
side or on both. In the divergent preferences scenario, the specific outcome of the 
negotiations is determined by the two sides’ relative bargaining power, in turn determined 
by the relative size of their respective win-sets. Using this framework, this and subsequent 
sections try to unveil the dynamics that explain the Fund’s interventions in Uruguay as well 
as the specific factors that fed into actors’ preferences and win-sets to explain the observed 
outcomes of the bargaining process during the decade under analysis.  
 
The key features of the four SBAs signed by the Uruguayan government between 1996 and 
2001 can be summarized as follows. First, these were low access precautionary 
arrangements and, therefore, were not aimed at providing multilateral financial assistance 
to the Uruguayan authorities. Indeed, as described above, the government made use of the 
resources committed under these SBAs only once in the aftermath of the contagion effect 
triggered by the Russian default of August 1998. Second, the four programs consistently 
supported a gradual medium-term exchange-rate based stabilization aimed at bringing 
inflation down from over 50% to single digit levels. This strategy relied on a crawling 
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exchange rate band with a predictable depreciation path and on the implementation of 
prudent macroeconomic policies including a moderate fiscal consolidation effort. Overall, 
Uruguay had a good record of compliance with the programs’ macroeconomic 
conditionality. Toward the end of this period, however, a pronounced and long-lasting 
recession made it increasingly difficult for the government to meet the SBAs’ fiscal targets. 
Third, the programs signed during this period carried a weak structural conditionality. In 
fact, the 1996 SBA did not include a single structural benchmark. Although the structural 
component of subsequent SBAs was moderately reinforced, it remained insubstantial and 
the government complied with these conditions only partially. The only program that 
carried a relatively ambitious structural conditionality was the SBA signed by the Batlle 
government in 2000. 
 
How can the evolution of actors’ preferences and win-sets explain the outcome of the Level 
I game described above? Regarding preferences about these programs’ objectives, the 
precautionary nature of the various SBAs approved during this phase implies that these 
interventions were not aimed at covering an immediate financial need. Instead, as suggested 
by former economy minister Bensión, their main purpose was to improve Uruguay’s access 
to international financial markets, which was achieved through the periodic awarding of an 
IMF seal of approval on the government’s policies in the context of the programs’ reviews 
(Alberto Bensión, Personal interview. July 6 2010). According to Ariel Davrieux, the head 
of the Planning and Budget Office under the Sanguinetti and the Batlle administrations, the 
signalling power of the Fund´s precautionary programs was particularly valued after 
Uruguay attained investment grade status in 1997, the maintenance of which was 
considered of strategic importance (Ariel Davrieux. Personal interview. July 7 2010). Given 
that one of the Fund’s priorities during the 1990s was to facilitate emerging markets’ 
integration into global capital markets, the institution’s preferences converged toward those 
of the Uruguayan authorities on the programs’ central objective. Furthermore, the 
aforementioned investment grade, a rare privilege for a Latin American country at the time, 
vindicated the use of precautionary SBAs to catalyze private capital inflows, a strategy that 
gained momentum in the mid-1990s
 
(IMF, 1995). Combined with the fact that due to their 
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low volume these programs generated very little risk on the Fund’s balance sheet, this is 
likely to have resulted in a relatively wide win-set on the side of the IMF. 
 
In terms of policy-making and conditionality, the precautionary SBAs’ key ingredient was 
their support to a gradual exchange-rate based macroeconomic stabilization. This strategy 
was adopted in 1990 and successive governments supported it until the 2002 crisis brought 
it to an abrupt end. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s the IMF had been an active 
supporter of various disinflation processes based on the use of the exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor, many of which took place in Latin America where central banks had fallen 
in a particularly acute disrepute (Eichengreen, 1999; Singh et al., 2005). The preferences of 
IMF and Uruguayan negotiators, therefore, are also likely to have initially converged with 
regard to this macroeconomic framework, further evidence of which is provided by the 
authorities’ eagerness to meet the program’s fiscal targets during this period and to comply 
with the conditions more closely related with the disinflation strategy.
110
 After the collapse 
of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992-93 and especially following the 
Mexican, Asian and Brazilian crises, however, the bi-polar view on exchange rate regimes 
gradually gained prominence among academic and IMF economists, implying that 
intermediate regimes like the Uruguayan crawling band began to be viewed with increasing 
scepticism (Fisher, 2001).
111
 If anything, therefore, the Fund’s preferences on Uruguay’s 
monetary and exchange rate policies should have progressively departed from those of the 
government in successive SBAs.  
 
In spite of the reservations that IMF economists might have developed about Montevideo´s 
monetary and exchange rate framework, there are no indications of pressures on the 
Uruguayan authorities to reconsider the use of the exchange rate as the disinflation 
strategy’s nominal anchor. In other words, until the eruption of the 2002 crisis, Uruguay’s 
exchange rate regime does not seem to have constituted a point of contention in the 
bargaining process between the IMF and the Uruguayan government (IMF, 2000b; Ariel 
                                                          
110
 A case in point were the aforementioned measures to weaken the link between inflation and wages. The 
de-indexation of the economy was considered important to moderate the appreciation of the real exchange 
rate, a trend that tends to characterize this type of disinflation strategies. 
111
 The bi-polar view on exchange rate regimes argued that “corner solutions” such as free floats or hard pegs 
(currency boards, currency unions or dollarized regimes) were sustainable in the long term. 
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Davrieux. Personal interview. July 7 2010; Carlos Steneri. Personal interview. September 
16 2010). Why wasn´t this issue raised in the negotiations? A first reason is that, albeit 
slowly, the crawling band was successfully bringing inflation down: a single digit rate was 
registered in 1999 for the first time since the high levels of inflation that characterized the 
1980s. In this context, it might have made little sense for the Fund to press for a drastic 
change in Uruguay’s macroeconomic framework motivated by an abstract concern about its 
long-term sustainability (IMF, 2005d). Furthermore, as established in the Fund’s letters of 
agreement, member states are free to choose their exchange rate regime and the IMF tends 
to openly questions exchange rate policies only when a regime change is considered 
necessary for the success of a program.
112
 This usually occurs during currency crises, which 
was obviously not the case of Uruguay in the second half of the 1990s. 
 
Although the Fund’s silence about an exchange rate regime that was falling out of favour 
may be justified, the programs’ leniency with structural reform is more surprising. Indeed, a 
growing awareness about the risks associated with intermediate exchange rate regimes 
could only have encouraged IMF negotiators to insist on the adoption of measures to 
address other underlying sources of vulnerability. However, with the exception of the 
program signed by the Batlle administration in 2000, the precautionary SBAs analysed here 
included few structural conditions. A case in point is the lack of structural conditionality in 
the specific area of financial sector reform, which is referred to by the aforementioned 2005 
staff report on Uruguay’s long-term use of the Fund’s resources as a missed opportunity to 
have addressed the factors that would later contribute to aggravate the 2002 banking crisis 
(IMF, 2005d). In spite of this lack of structural conditionality, various documents suggest 
that IMF negotiators and constituents were not unconcerned about the slow pace of the 
financial reforms undertaken by the Sanguinetti administration. In fact, some of the Fund´s 
communiqués explicitly call for an intensification of the government’s structural agenda. 
During the discussion on the 1998 Article IV consultation and with the occasion of the 
announcement of the 1999 SBA, for instance, Executive Directors enticed the Uruguayan 
government to reform public banks (IMF, 1998; IMF 1999b).  
 
                                                          
112
 There are a few exceptions to this rule. Multiple exchange rate regimes, for instance, are explicitly banned 
under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement.  
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A relevant question, therefore, is why these concerns did not translate into a meaningful 
intensification of the program’s structural conditionality. A possible explanation lies in 
some specific constraints in the Uruguayan domestic ratification process. A first constraint 
is related with the political weakness of the Sanguinetti administration, which lacked an 
absolute majority in Congress and had to govern in coalition with the National Party. 
Furthermore, the factionalism that characterizes the Uruguayan party system implies that in 
order to secure a sufficient legislative support, elected presidents do not only have to 
negotiate with the opposition but also with competing factions within their own party 
(Altman, 2000).
 113
 In fact, the structural transformation of the economy is one of the issues 
on which the different factions of the Colorado party have disagreed more markedly (Jorge 
Batlle. Personal Interview. July 4, 2010; Moreira, 2004; Garcé and Yaffé, 2005).  
 
A second constraint is related with the frequent use of direct democracy mechanisms in the 
Uruguayan political system. As the 1993 referendum on the partial privatization of utility 
companies demonstrated, such mechanisms have constituted a particularly powerful 
instrument for specific pressure groups to slow down the pace of structural reform in 
Uruguay (Bergara et. Al, 2006; Panizza, 2008).
114
 In this context, the perceived risk of a 
potentially successful referendum to revert the implementation of a reform contemplated by 
an IMF program constituted a reason to be particularly cautious in the negotiation of 
structural conditionality.
115
 By reducing the size of the government’s win-set, these two 
constraints may have given rise to a bargaining advantage for Uruguayan negotiators vis-à-
vis their IMF counterparts, explaining the paucity of the structural conditionality included 
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 The factionalism of the Uruguayan party system is primarily due to the fact that parties have well 
institutionalized factions that are individually represented in congress. The Double System Vote has also been 
often identified as a source of factionalism. This system was such that each party could present various 
candidates belonging to different factions, and victory went to the party that accumulated more votes and, 
within the party, to the most voted candidate. Although the Double System Vote was eliminated in 1996, the 
electoral reform adopted that year did not restrict voters’ right to vote for specific party factions in 
parliamentary elections, as a result of which factionalism has continued to be a relevant feature of the 
Uruguayan system. 
114
 Indeed, this referendum not only overturned the privatization of the telecommunication monopoly 
ANTEL. It was also presented as a plebiscite on the Lacalle administration’s (1990-1995) to substantially 
liberalize the Uruguayan public sector. Moving ahead with this reformist agenda proved to be much more 
difficult afterward (Maiztegui Casas, 2010). 
115
 As this chapter explores later in more detail, this is exactly what happened with one of the structural 
benchmarks included in the 2002 SBA, which required the government to liberalize the oil sector, and which 
was overturned by a referendum in December 2003. 
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in the precautionary SBAs. This idea is implicitly recognised in the 2005 staff report: “(…) 
conditionality seems to have been imposed on measures that went in the right direction, but 
only at a speed that the authorities felt would not generate excessive frictions in Uruguay’s 
consensus-based polity” (IMF, 2005d: 23).   
 
A last question about the first phase of the Fund’s involvement in Uruguay is why, in spite 
of the aforementioned constraints, the precautionary SBA signed by the Batlle 
administration included as many as 17 structural conditions as opposed to 5 in the 1999 
SBA, 3 in the 1997 SBA and none in the 1996 SBA. To a large extent, this was due to the 
fact that although they belonged to the same party, President Batlle and his faction (Lista 
15) had a more neo-liberal outlook than President Sanguinetti (Espíndola, 2001; Maiztegui 
Casas, 2010: 477-479).
116
 This implies that the political transition that followed the 1999 
elections resulted in a convergence in negotiators’ preferences about market reform, which 
made it easier for the Fund to demand the inclusion of a more ambitious structural 
conditionality. In addition, as a result of its reliance on coalitions and of the factionalism 
described above, the Uruguayan political system is particularly prone to generating cycles 
of cooperation and stalemate. (Altman, 2000). This creates an incentive for elected 
governments to implement reforms as fast as possible at the beginning of each presidential 
term because of the anticipated difficulties to obtain congressional support as the next 
general election approaches. In this context, the inclusion of a more ambitious structural 
conditionality in the 2000 SBA may have been partly aimed at generating a sense of 
urgency about a structural reform agenda that the Batlle administration knew would only be 
possible to enact at the beginning of its term (Ernesto Talvi. Personal interview. July 27, 
2010). In other words, the government may have viewed the 2000 SBA as an instrument to 
pursue domestic political objectives.  
 
Summing up the main trends observed during this first phase, both sides departed from 
converging preferences about the precautionary nature of the IMF programs and about the 
exchange rate based disinflation strategy, which sustained the cooperative equilibrium. As 
the bi-polar view on exchange rate regimes gained ground, however, IMF preferences 
                                                          
116
 President Sanguinetti headed the so-called Foro Batllista, a faction of the Colorado party that defines itself 
as social democrat and that has tended to favour a stronger role for the state in the economy than Lista 15. 
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began to diverge from the Uruguayan government’s preferred outcome. Although the 
Fund’s mandate makes it difficult for the institution to press for a modification of its 
members’ exchange rate regimes in “tranquil” times, these growing concerns about 
Uruguay’s crawling band should have led to an intensification of the SBAs’ structural 
conditionality. Yet, the reforms contemplated in successive IMF programs were for the 
most part insubstantial, suggesting that the Uruguayan government had the sufficient 
leverage to resist the Fund’s pressures in this area of policy-making. This bargaining power 
was derived from the government’s narrow win-set, itself the result of the Sanguinetti 
administration’s political weakness and of the presence of veto-players empowered by their 
prerogative to trigger referendums against the Fund’s structural conditionality. The SBA 
negotiated by the Batlle administration, instead, carried more ambitious structural 
conditions. This was not due to a stronger IMF bargaining position but to a realignment of 
negotiators’ preferences and to the political instrumentation of the Fund’s conditionality to 
facilitate the ratification of the economic policy reorientation that the new government 
desired. 
 
5.3  Crisis resolution 
 
During the second phase of the decade under analysis the Fund’s interventions in Uruguay 
were centred on the resolution of the 2002 financial crisis. This period’s landmark was the 
second augmentation of the IMF program. Indeed, the multilateral disbursement of August 
2002 successfully stopped the run on deposits and paved the way for what turned out to be 
a swift economic recovery. However, this period was also characterized by the reluctance 
and even opposition with which IMF negotiators and senior management were forced to 
accept some of the key decisions that shaped this multilateral intervention. As a first step in 
the application of the two-level game framework, this section analyses the reasons that 
were behind the divergences between the preferences of both sides’ negotiators. As a 
second step, it focuses on the evolution of win-sets in order to identify the factors that 
preserved cooperation and that explain the ultimate outcome of the negotiations. 
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The preferences of IMF and Uruguayan negotiators began to diverge soon after the 
approval of the 2002 SBA in March when it became increasingly clear that this intervention 
was failing to stabilize the situation of the banking system.
117
 At that point disagreements 
were centred on the SBA’s disbursement structure. Whereas Uruguayan negotiators 
gradually came to the conclusion that the SBA should be exceptionally front-loaded in 
order to signal that the central bank would have the capacity to provide LOLR assistance, 
IMF negotiators were reluctant to depart from the usual template of gradual disbursements 
that characterizes SBAs (Alberto Bensión, Personal interview. July 6 2010). To a certain 
extent, this was due to differences in the diagnosis of the proximate cause of the crisis. The 
Western Hemisphere Department (WHD) leaned towards the view that the Uruguayan 
economy was primarily undergoing the effects of a cross-border contagion from Argentina 
rather than a generalized loss of confidence in domestic financial institutions rooted in the 
central bank’s limited resources to prop up the banking system.118 This contributes to 
explain why that department was disinclined to go beyond the tranched provision of 
balance of payment support that characterizes traditional IMF programs. Nonetheless, 
according to the former president of the central bank Julio de Brun and to the head of the 
Planning and Budget Office Ariel Davrieux not all IMF economists agreed with that view. 
Both argue that after a mission to Montevideo in March 2002 the Monetary and Exchange 
Affairs Department (MAE) concluded that the crisis was rooted in the banking system and 
that it needed to be addressed as such rather than as a balance of payment problem (Julio de 
Brun. Personal interview. July 27 2010; Ariel Davrieux. Personal interview. July 7 2010).  
 
A relevant question, therefore, is why IMF negotiators tended to resist the MAE’s 
recommendation (and the government’s request) to adapt the 2002 SBA to the nature of the 
crisis that was unfolding in Uruguay. To some extent, the pre-eminence of the WHD was 
due to the fact that regional departments are ultimately responsible for the design of 
                                                          
117
 Preferences were still broadly aligned during the initial negotiations of the SBA in February and March. At 
that stage, the Uruguayan authorities believed that the deposit outflows would be a temporary phenomenon. 
Indeed, the stock of deposits in Uruguay had traditionally tended to increase during regional crises as a result 
of capital flight from neighboring countries (Carlos Steneri. Personal interview. September 16 2010). Hence, 
the authorities still had faith in the potential for a “traditional” SBA to restore confidence. 
118
 Gilbert Terrier, the chief of the IMF mission in Uruguay, continues to argue that the Uruguayan crisis was 
essentially a balance of payment crisis. He justifies this point of view arguing that a large proportion of 
deposits were in the hands of foreigners (Gilbert Terrier. Personal Interview. April 26, 2011). 
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financial programs, relegating the MAE to a secondary position. However, given that the 
MAE concentrated most of the Fund’s expertise on banking issues, its hierarchical position 
does not fully explain the WHD’s reluctance to frontload the SBA’s disbursement schedule.  
 
Instead, senior Uruguayan officials tend to attribute this position to the consequences that 
the Argentine debacle was having on staff and senior management. According to Alberto 
Bensión, a central problem was that in early 2002 most of the WHD negotiators were being 
replaced by non Latin-American economists with a shallow knowledge of the Uruguayan 
economic and institutional context (Bensión, 2004: 66-68). As a result, the mutual 
confidence on which the Fund’s relationship with Uruguay had been constructed over the 
years was abruptly lost. Furthermore, Bensión argues that the Argentine crisis generated a 
deep suspicion about the region and that the new WHD team was keen to signal the Fund’s 
willingness to adopt a tougher negotiating stance in the future, for which Uruguay 
constituted a perfect test case (Alberto Bensión, Personal interview. July 6 2010). 
According to Uruguay´s former representative at the IMF, such an approach was supported 
by the Fund’s senior management given that both Helmut Kohler and Anne Krueguer felt 
“personally betrayed” by the Argentine authorities (Carlos Steneri. Personal interview. 
September 16 2010). These internal bureaucratic dynamics increased risk aversion among 
IMF negotiators, making them reluctant to consider the use of the SBA for alternative 
purposes such as the provision of domestic LOLR assistance. 
 
The first augmentation approved in July ended up including elements consistent with the 
two aforementioned diagnoses about the Uruguayan crisis and, hence, is best interpreted as 
a middle ground compromise between the positions defended by both sides’ negotiators. 
On the one hand, it constituted a large increase in the size of the program, which was aimed 
at constituting the FFSB, a fund to assist domestic banks. On the other hand, the 
augmentation did not frontload disbursements and a significant part of its conditionality 
targeted the balance of payment. This was the case of the floating of the peso, which the 
Uruguayan authorities resisted on the grounds that the fall in the stock of international 
reserves registered since January was only marginally due to the central bank’s 
interventions in foreign exchange markets and that a sharp devaluation of the peso would 
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further feed the banking panic (Julio de Brun. Personal interview. July 27 2010; Carlos 
Steneri. Personal interview. September 16 2010).
 119
  
 
When it became clear that the first augmentation was also failing to stop deposit outflows, 
the Fund’s negotiators opposed the Uruguayan request to further augment the program, 
giving way to the dramatic negotiations of July 2002. Against the background of an 
intensifying run on banks and of a nearly depleted stock of foreign exchange reserves, IMF 
negotiators pressed for the introduction of restrictions on deposit withdrawals, an option 
that Uruguayan officials considered would reenact the disaster of the Argentine Corralito 
(Jorge Batlle. Personal Interview. July 4, 2010; Ariel Davrieux. Personal interview. July 7 
2010; Isaac Alfie. Personal Interview. 23 July 2010).
 120
 However, the intervention 
approved in early August ended up being aligned with Uruguayan rather than IMF 
preferences: instead of imposing drastic banking restrictions, it provided the resources with 
which the newly created FESB could guarantee the entire stock of sight deposits.
 121
 At 
some point, therefore, Uruguay’s negotiators gained the leverage that was needed to 
mobilize the multilateral rescue package according to their own terms, which needs to be 
explained in terms of both sides’ evolving win-sets. 
  
On the Uruguayan side, the Batlle administration was in a weak political position 
throughout the negotiations of the 2002 SBA: not only did the Colorado party lack a 
majority in Congress, but differences emerged between the coalition partners as a result of 
the crisis. Reflecting these tensions, the National party forced the resignations of economy 
minister Bensión and of the central bank’s board in July 2002 and in October it withdrew 
its ministers from the cabinet (Paolillo, 2004: 313-320; Maiztegui Casas, 2010: 571-578). 
Nonetheless, the responsiveness and institutional resilience of the Uruguayan political 
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 According to Julio de Brun, of the more than US$2 billion fall in international reserves experienced 
between January and August 2002, only US100 million can be attributed to interventions aimed at sustaining 
the exchange rate. The remainder was due to the provision of LOLR assistance in a dollarized system (Julio 
de Brun. Personal interview. July 27 2010). 
120
 On July 20 2002, the Fund’s Deputy Managing Director of the IMF Eduardo Aninat phoned Jorge Batlle to 
recommend the imposition of a widespread deposit freeze. Uruguay’s President replied that his government 
would never go that route (Jorge Batlle. Personal Interview. July 4, 2010; Maiztegui Casas, 2010: 576; 
Paolillo, 2004: 336).  
121
 The banking holiday holiday decreed in July 30 lasted only for one week and was aimed at providing some 
breathing space to finalize the negotiations of the new augmentation. 
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system is often emphasized as a factor that gave the government substantial leeway during 
the crisis, allowing it to adopt some crucial emergency measures that would have probably 
faced an insurmountable opposition in normal times (Jorge Batlle. Personal Interview. July 
4, 2010; Luis Alberto Lacalle. Personal Interview. July 23, 2010). Indeed, the government 
continued to count on the support of the National Party in Congress, which enabled it to 
pass the two fiscal adjustment packages adopted in February and May 2002 as well as a 
banking restructuring of unprecedented scope, which was launched a few weeks later 
(Alejandro Atchugarry. Personal Interview. July 5, 2010).  
 
Equally important, the subdued unrest that was witnessed during the Uruguayan crisis has 
been attributed to the fact that social discontent could be channelled through the political 
system (Panizza, 2008). Indeed, although the EP-FA-NM was vocal about its opposition to 
many of the measures adopted by the government, it proved willing to exploit its 
connections with civil society and trade unions in order to contain the type of mobilizations 
that had resulted in the failure of various adjustment packages and, eventually, in the 
collapse of institutional order in neighbouring Argentina (Luna, 2007; Maiztegui Casas, 
2010: 585).
122
 There is ground to argue, therefore, that the perceived cost of failing to agree 
with the IMF was such that the actors involved in the domestic ratification process were 
able to reach far-reaching compromises, which more than offset the constraints that the 
government’s political weakness imposed on Uruguay’s negotiators. As a result, their win-
set was sufficiently large to commit to the conditions demanded by the IMF in the 
negotiation of the 2002 SBA and its augmentations.  
 
Although a relatively large win-set on the Uruguayan side may have contributed to preserve 
cooperation, it does not explain the shifting bargaining power that resulted in the approval 
of the second augmentation on terms that departed so markedly from the preferences of 
IMF negotiators. In fact, following the logic of the two-level game, such a broadening of 
the Uruguayan win-set should have reduced the Batlle administrations’ chances to prevail 
in the negotiations. In order to understand this puzzle it is necessary to have a look at the 
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One of the reasons why Alejandro Atchugarry was chosen to replace Bensión was that he was believed to 
be in a much better position to negotiate with the left and hence to reach the political compromises that were 
necessary in the midst of the crisis (Maiztegui Casas, 2010: 578).  
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evolution of the Fund’s win-set. Most IMF constituents appear to have been initially 
willing to intensify cooperation with Uruguay when the 2002 crisis erupted (Nancy Jacklin. 
Personal Interview. 16 May 2011). This may be due to the perception that Uruguay was a 
“serious country” and an “innocent bystander” suffering from a cross-border contagion 
rather than from the consequences of its own misplaced economic policies (Alberto 
Bensión, Personal interview. July 6 2010). Such a relatively large win-set facilitated the 
approval of the SBA in March and influenced the bargaining process that resulted in the 
compromises that shaped the first augmentation.  
 
When this intervention failed, however, much of the initial goodwill vis-à-vis Uruguay 
seems to have evaporated. The government’s financial representative in Washington DC 
contends that most creditors opposed a further increase in the Fund’s exposure to Uruguay 
and that some constituencies (the Italian and Scandinavian EDs in particular) received the 
government’s request of a second augmentation with outright hostility (Carlos Steneri. 
Personal interview. September 16 2010). In his views, memories of the Argentine 
program’s failed augmentations were still fresh, explaining the reluctance of most members 
of the G-7 to engage in what was perceived as another desperate move with uncertain 
prospects. Nonetheless, Nancy Jacklin, the US Executive Director at the time, contends that 
such a negative disposition was offset by the support of the US government (Nancy Jacklin. 
Personal Interview. 16 May 2011). In fact, the support of the US Treasury is the single 
most important factor to explain the success of the Uruguayan authorities in the 
negotiations of the second augmentation. Indeed, in late July the US Treasury put its full 
weight behind Uruguay’s negotiators when the Under Secretary for International Affairs 
John Taylor and his team got directly involved in the design of a new rescue package and 
when the resources of the Exchange Stabilization Fund were mobilized in order to give 
time for the Board to approve this intervention (Taylor, 2007b).
123
 In other words, the 
Uruguayan government managed to exploit its trans-national alliance with the US to 
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 According to Gilbert Terrier, the view that the United States government should back Uruguay the way it 
did was not shared by everybody in the Bush administration. This would explain why the IMF’s Second 
Managing Director Eduardo Aninat told the Uruguayan negotiators that a second augmentation was out of the 
questions days before the Taylor team eventually put that augmentation in place (Gilbert Terrier. Personal 
Interview. April 26, 2011). 
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expand the IMF’s win-set beyond the preferences of the institution’s staff, senior 
management and most other constituents.  
 
Why was the US government willing to impose the adoption of a course of action to which 
most other constituents were opposed? President Batlle attributes this decision to the 
alliance that his government nurtured with the Bush administration in the context of the 
FTAA negotiations (Jorge Batlle. Personal Interview. July 4, 2010; Maiztegui Casas, 2010: 
526-528).
124
 Former Minister Bensión, in turn, emphasizes the working relationship that he 
developed with John Taylor, which created a direct channel of communication with the US 
Treasury that became crucial when the negotiations with the IMF turned sour in July 2002 
(Alberto Bensión, Personal interview. July 6 2010). His successors Alejandro Atchugarry 
and Isaac Alfie, as well as the government’s financial representative in Washington Carlos 
Steneri, consider that the US government was willing to act swiftly because in the 
aftermath of the Argentine crisis and given the difficulties that Brazil was facing prior to 
Lula’s electoral victory there was a growing concern about on-going de-stabilizing trends in 
South America (Alejandro Atchugarry. Personal Interview. July 5, 2010; Isaac Alfie. 
Personal Interview. 23 July 2010; Carlos Steneri. Personal interview. September 16 2010). 
Furthermore, although the August disbursement was large in relative terms, it was small in 
absolute terms, turning the Uruguayan rescue into a “cheap” instrument for the US 
government to signal that it was still willing to support its Latin American allies if 
necessary.  
 
In turn, John Taylor argues that the US willingness to force the hand of the IMF had the 
following motivations. First, the Treasury was quite confident that a multilateral 
disbursement large enough to guarantee the bulk of dollar denominated deposits would 
restore confidence in the banking system (Taylor, 2007b). Second, this intervention was 
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 Furthermore, President Jorge Batlle had developed a strong personal affinity with George W. Bush, which 
was facilitated by an alphabetic coincidence: in these summits the president of the United States sat in 
between the Uruguayan and the Venezuelan leaders. In Jorge Batlle’s view, his support to the FTAA as well 
as his willingness to confront President Chávez impressed George W. Bush on various occasions. In addition, 
Jorge Batlle points out that he mediated in favour of the United States during Jiang Zeming’s visit to 
Uruguay, which happened to take place right after the Hainan Island incident on April 2001. According to 
Batlle, George Bush did personally thank him for that mediation in the Quebec summit of the Americas. 
Another measure adopted by the Batlle administration partly in order to reinforce its alliance with the US was 
the rupture of diplomatic relations with Cuba in May 2002. 
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consistent with the Bush administration’s preferences on how the international community 
should respond to cross-border financial contagions.
125
 Indeed, the augmentations of the 
Uruguayan programs were intended to signal that although the international community 
would not back those countries that were implementing “wrong” policies, it was willing to 
stand behind those with “good” policies but affected by a contagion process (John Taylor. 
Personal Interview. 5 April, 2011; Nancy Jacklin. Personal Interview. 16 May 2011). Third, 
Uruguay was “a friend in need” and “good relations between the presidents of two 
countries led to good cooperative relations between the experts” (Taylor, 2007b: 2).  
 
In sum, during the second phase covered in this section the preferences of both sides’ 
negotiators diverged markedly not only as a result of different diagnoses about the 
underlying causes of the 2002 crisis but also because of the increased risk aversion that the 
Argentine meltdown had unleashed within the IMF. In spite of these diverging preferences, 
a cooperative outcome could be preserved and even intensified during this period. To a 
large extent, this was due to the responsiveness of the Uruguayan opposition, which 
expanded the size of the government’s win-set precisely when the domestic ratification of 
the compromises that were being negotiated with the IMF was more urgent. However, the 
reluctance of the Fund’s negotiators could only be overcome when the Uruguayan 
authorities successfully managed to exploit their transnational alliance with the US in order 
to expand the Fund’s win-set towards their preferred outcome. As a result, the second 
augmentation of the SBA could be approved in extremis, giving way to a new stage in 
Uruguay’s relationship with the IMF.  
 
5.4  Restoring debt sustainability 
 
The massive multilateral disbursement of August 2002 put an end to the banking panic, 
paving the way for the recovery of the Uruguayan economy. However, one of the legacies 
left by the crisis was a sovereign debt burden close to 100% of GDP, which was to become 
the central issue in the policy discussions with the IMF. This section initially focuses on the 
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 Yet, Republicans had consistently been critical of the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund in past 
financial crises. Furthermore, as described in Chapter 3, the Bush administration committed to a policy of not 
topping up IMF programs which was not followed during the Uruguayan crisis. 
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bitter negotiations that were necessary to agree on the launching of Uruguay’s sovereign 
debt re-profiling. It then concentrates on its aftermath, during which the Fund’s intervention 
was primarily aimed at consolidating the recovery and softening the amortization of 
Uruguay’s multilateral credit.      
 
The dispute that characterized the weeks and months that followed the second 
augmentation was centred on whether Uruguay was facing a liquidity or a solvency 
problem. Some IMF economists argued that in order to restore the solvency of the 
Uruguayan State its debt to GDP ratio would have to fall to no more than 60%, which 
would only be possible with a moratorium on debt repayment and a debt restructuring 
imposing substantial losses on private creditors (Ranjit Teja. Personal interview. May 2, 
2011). Instead, the government argued that Uruguay’s debt could be endogenously brought 
down to more sustainable levels with the correction of the exchange rate overshooting that 
had followed the floating of the peso (Ariel Davrieux. Personal interview. July 7 2010; 
Isaac Alfie. Personal Interview. 23 July 2010; Carlos Steneri. Personal interview. 
September 16 2010).
126
 Eventually, the compromise that unblocked these negotiations was 
the government’s commitment to launch a preventive debt restructuring without neither 
defaulting nor imposing nominal losses on creditors. In order to do so, this operation would 
be carried out in as voluntary and market friendly terms as possible, focusing on re-
profiling the debt servicing payments due in the short run rather than on reducing the face 
value of Uruguayan sovereign debt. To some extent, therefore, this strategy was based on a 
middle ground interpretation of Uruguay’s debt problems: the government acknowledged 
that even with the Fund’s support its liquidity shortages called for the adoption of 
extraordinary measures, but it did not accept that restoring sustainability required a 
sovereign default and the imposition of a large haircut on investors (Alejandro Atchugarry. 
Personal Interview. July 5, 2010).
127
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 The exchange rate depreciated by about 27% in the weeks that followed the floating of the peso induced by 
the IMF in June. Given that the bulk of the government´s sovereign obligations were denominated in foreign 
currency, this had a sizeable impact on Uruguay´s debt to GDP ratio.  
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 Julio de Brun, the former President of the Central Bank, argues that there were very few people in the 
Uruguayan administration that had even followed the debate on the SDRM. To some extent, this was due to 
the investment grade status that Uruguay had up until February 2002, which turned a sovereign debt 
restructuring in such a remote possibility (Julio de Brun. Personal interview. July 27 2010).. 
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What were the factors behind this new divergence between the preferences of IMF and 
Uruguayan negotiators? Given the Fund’s position in the international monetary and 
financial system, that IMF negotiators pressed the Uruguayan government to breach its 
contractual obligations seems counterintuitive.
128
 To some extent, however, the position of 
IMF economists was entirely consistent with the Prague framework for the resolution of 
financial crises approved by the international community a few years earlier, which 
established that insolvency crises should be addressed through temporary payment 
suspensions and comprehensive debt restructurings (see Chapter 3). Furthermore, the 
SDRM proposal was being debated at the time, and Uruguay may have been considered a 
perfect candidate to become the first user of the statutory debt restructuring mechanism that 
the Fund’s senior management was advocating for. Indeed, senior government officials 
recall meetings during which IMF negotiators more or less explicitly offered the possibility 
of applying Krueger´s plan to restructure Uruguay’s debt (Ariel Davrieux. Personal 
interview. July 7 2010; Carlos Steneri. Personal interview. September 16 2010).
 129
 The 
government, however, refused to play the role of a guinea pig in the reform of the 
international financial architecture (Alejandro Atchugarry. Personal Interview. July 5, 
2010). This was primarily due to its unwillingness to jeopardize Uruguay’s hard won 
credibility in international financial markets. Furthermore, at that particular juncture the 
government considered that it was essential for Uruguay to distinguish itself from 
Argentina. 
 
In addition, the Uruguayan win-set tended to narrow around the government’s preferred 
outcome on the sovereign debt issue, which may have conferred a bargaining advantage in 
the negotiations with the IMF. Indeed, as these negotiations dragged on and the 
postponement of the SBA’s second review began to generate a growing public concern, a 
consensus emerged domestically about the need to avoid a default.  Revealingly, this 
position was not only supported by the Colorado and National parties, but also by various 
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 In fact, IMF insiders continue to argue that although they considered that imposing a haircut on private 
creditors was necessary, they never explicitly asked the Uruguayan government to default (Ranjit Teja. 
Personal interview. May 2, 2011; Gilbert Terrier. Personal Interview. April 26, 2011). 
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 Ariel Davrieux describes a meeting held in October 2002 in Washington DC to discuss the debt issue with 
about 30 participants on the IMF side. The presence of such a large number of IMF economists coming from 
various departments made the Uruguayan delegation understand that what was being negotiated went beyond 
the Uruguay and the SBA itself (Ariel Davrieux. Personal interview. July 7 2010).  
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factions of the left of centre opposition even though some of the traditional leaders of the 
EP-FA-NM had in the past advocated for the repudiation of Uruguay’s external debt. Most 
notably, Danilo Astori, the leader of Asamblea Uruguay (a social democratic faction of the 
EP-FA-NM) and economy minister between 2005 and 2008, stated publicly in February 
2003 that the entire political spectrum should “close ranks to oppose the line defended by 
the IMF” and that in order to retain Uruguay’s credibility it was crucial to continue 
honouring external debt (La República, 2003). Tabaré Vázquez maintained a more 
ambivalent position, stating on some occasions that he considered a debt re-negotiation 
necessary to restore the solvency of the Uruguayan state and to pave the way for a 
sustainable recovery (Maiztegui Casas, 2010: 600). The leader of the EP-FA-NM, however, 
was criticized for his views on this particular issue both from within and from outside his 
coalition, which may have contributed to moderate his rhetoric in the run up to the 2004 
elections (El Pais, 2003; Panizza, 2008).   
 
The Fund’s win-set, instead, was broader and not centred on the preferences of IMF 
negotiators. To a large extent this was due to the fact that by late 2002 and early 2003 
international support for the SDRM proposal had already faded away. As described in 
Chapter 3, this was especially the case in the United States, where Paul O’Neil’s initial 
hesitations were followed by John Taylor’s counterproposal to deal with sovereign debt 
restructurings through market-based mechanisms such as the generalization of collective 
action clauses in sovereign bond contracts (Taylor, 2002).  It is clear that the Uruguayan 
plan to launch a market-friendly preventive debt exchange fitted the preferences of the US 
Treasury better than IMF negotiators’ idea of using the SDRM (Taylor, 2007b). This is not 
to say that the US officials or other creditor constituencies intervened to force the hand of 
the IMF as they had done at the time of the August 2002 augmentation. In fact, Julio de 
Brun argues that, revealingly, President Batlle obtained no response when he tried to 
involve the US government in the negotiations in late 2002 (Julio de Brun. Personal 
interview. July 27 2010). However, that the statutory approach to sovereign debt 
restructurings had fallen out of favour could only have weakened the bargaining power of 
IMF negotiators, especially given Uruguay´s resolve not to default (Carlos Steneri. 
Personal interview. September 16 2010). In other words, the direction that the debate on the 
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reform of the international financial architecture was taking may contribute to explain both 
the origin and the outcome of the brief conflict that characterized the relationship between 
Uruguay and the IMF from August 2002 to March 2003.   
  
After March 2003 the tensions that had characterized the relationship between Uruguay and 
the IMF during the negotiations on the debt restructuring began to gradually subside. This 
was primarily due to a new convergence between the preferences of both sides’ negotiators, 
which produced an agreement on the terms of a policy mix based on the following three 
pillars: an ambitious fiscal consolidation effort to ensure the long-term solvency of the 
state; the restructuring of the banking system and the upgrading of its regulatory and 
supervisory framework; the implementation of a number of targeted structural reforms 
aimed at accelerating growth and improving the competitiveness of the Uruguayan 
economy (IMF, 2003f). Various factors sustained this re-alignment of preferences. First of 
all was the liberal orientation of the Batlle administration, which paved the way for an 
ideological rapprochement with the IMF once the controversies that surrounded the 
management of the debt crisis had been settled. Second, the robust recovery exhibited by 
the Uruguayan economy created an opportunity for the IMF to capitalize on the success of 
a recent intervention at a time in which the institution was still being heavily criticized for 
its involvement in the Argentine collapse. Third, the size of the 2002 SBA was such that it 
provided incentives for both sides to cooperate in order to find the proper pace at which the 
government could amortize its multilateral obligations without neither jeopardizing the 
recovery of the Uruguayan economy nor putting the Fund’s resources at risk (Carlos 
Steneri. Personal interview. September 16 2010; Ranjit Teja. Personal interview. May 2, 
2011). Given that after the two augmentations Uruguay’s outstanding credit to the IMF 
amounted to close to 18% of GDP, it soon became clear that a new program would be 
required to partially roll-over the 2002 SBA upon its expiration (IMF, 2005d).     
  
During this period, however, the Batlle administration found it increasingly difficult to 
secure the domestic political support that was needed to ratify the structural conditions 
included in the 2002 SBA. This trend became particularly clear after a referendum held in 
December 2003 forced the government to derogate a decree that fostered competition in the 
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oil sector. In addition, as a result of congressional opposition, the reform of public banks 
and the disposal of liquidated assets suffered significant delays and the attempts to reform 
the tax system and the specialized pension schemes were never completed  (Maiztegui 
Casas, 2010: 610, 611; IMF, 2004c; IMF, 2005d).
 130
 The intensifying opposition faced by 
the government during this period was partly due to a popular disaffection with the Batlle 
administration after years of recession, high unemployment and unprecedented levels of 
poverty. In addition, the heated political context that preceded the 2004 general elections 
was much less conducive to the sort of compromises that had been reached during the 
crisis. Given that the National Party was perceived to have stood so close to the Batlle 
administration, as the elections approached it had an incentive to distinguish itself from the 
Colorado Party. As a result, it adopted a more left-leaning political rhetoric and became 
increasingly reluctant to support the government (Altman and Castiglioni, 2006). In turn, 
the EP-FA-NM had a unique opportunity to bring the hegemony of the two traditional 
parties to an end and, therefore, had no reason to cooperate with the government. Finally, 
the stronger than expected economic recovery gradually eliminated the sense of urgency 
that had facilitated the ratification of many of the measures that were adopted during the 
crisis. These trends substantially eroded Uruguayan negotiators’ win-set, which had an 
impact on the bargaining process with the IMF. 
 
A narrowing win-set on the side of the government combined with a relatively wide IMF 
win-set could only have generated a bargaining advantage in favour of Uruguayan 
negotiators, which was evidenced in Executive Directors’ willingness to concede various 
waivers for the non-observance of the program’s structural conditions (IMF, 2004c). As a 
result, these slippages with the program’s conditionality generated minor frictions with the 
government.
131
 What were the factors that sustained a relatively large win-set on the IMF 
side? Given that a priority for IMF constituents was reducing the institution’s exposure to 
Uruguay, Executive Directors were primarily concerned about the fulfilment of those 
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 The reform of the oil sector, of the special pension schemes and of the tax system were structural 
benchmarks under the IMF program. However, the disposal of liquidated assets was a performance criterion 
and, therefore, could give rise to a suspension of the program.  
131
 The only significant friction was the postponement of the fourth review, which was scheduled to take place 
in October 2003 and could only be approved in February 2004. This was attributed to delays with the reform 
and restructuring of the banking system. 
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conditions related with the government’s capacity to repay the Fund. In this sense, the 
outperformance of the SBA’s fiscal targets might have increased Executive Director’s 
tolerance with slippages in other areas of the program’s conditionality. Furthermore, the 
Fund’s constituents had reasons to be cautious about the potentially adverse reactions of 
market participants to the signals sent by the Executive Board. Indeed, the upward 
pressures on sovereign spreads that the non-completion of a review would have triggered 
could not only have undermined the government’s ability to honour its private debt, but 
also to amortize its multilateral obligations.
132
 This was explicitly stated in the 2005 staff 
ex-post assessment of the Fund’s engagement in Uruguay: “a key criterion for exit from 
IMF arrangements over the next few years will be Uruguay’s ability to tap international 
financial markets for the necessary amounts at reasonable spreads” (IMF, 2005d: 27). In 
this context, delaying the program’s reviews was perceived to be not only against the 
interests of the government but also against the interests of the IMF.  
  
What was the impact of the EP-FA-NM electoral victory on the relationship between 
Uruguay and the IMF? A priori, the preferences of the new government could be expected 
to have departed quite substantially from those of the IMF. Indeed, most of the EP-FA-
NM’s factions had traditionally opposed the neo-liberal policies promoted by the Bretton 
Woods institutions. The transition from the Batlle to the Tabaré Vázquez administration, 
however, turned out not to result in major changes in economic policy. The strategic 
considerations and constraints that explain the moderation of the EP-FA-NM go beyond the 
scope of this chapter and have been analysed in various recent academic contributions 
(Panizza, 2005; Panizza 2008; Luna, 2007). What is more relevant to this analysis is that 
the preferences of the new administration in its relationship with the IFIs were quite closely 
aligned to those of the outgoing administration, facilitating the preservation of a 
cooperative relationship with the IMF.  
 
Tabaré Vázquez’s intentions in this respect were made clear during a trip to Washington 
DC in July 2004, 8 months before his government took office. Following Lula’s example, 
he met senior IFI officials in order to signal the future direction of Uruguay’s economic 
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 The Uruguayan government had already issued an international bond by October 2003, implying that 
access to international financial markets was recovered quite fast. 
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policies and to reduce the risk of an adverse market reaction to the political transition. 
Further evidencing his intentions, during that trip Vázquez offered the post of economy 
minister to Enrique Iglesias, the Uruguayan President of the Inter-American Development 
Bank (Altman and Castiglioni, 2006). When Iglesias declined this offer, he announced that 
Danilo Astori, the leader of the social democratic faction of the EP-FA-NM and a moderate 
economist well respected by the market would be his economy minister (Maiztegui Casas, 
2010: 637, 638). The sixth and seventh reviews of the 2002 SBA explicitly welcomed this 
appointment and expressed no concerns about the incoming government’s commitment to 
fiscal discipline (IMF, 2005e; IMF 2005f). Converging preferences, therefore, continued to 
characterize the relationship between Uruguay and the IMF, which could only have 
facilitated the negotiations of an SBA to succeed the 2002 program. 
 
Another factor that contributed to preserve a cooperative outcome in the negotiations was 
the enlarged Uruguayan win-set that resulted from the 2005 political transition. Indeed, the 
EP-FA-NM government obtained an absolute majority in both chambers of Congress and 
maintained strong links with civil society, which was expected to facilitate the domestic 
ratification of the conditions to be negotiated for the new SBA (IMF, 2008a). In fact, the 
program approved in June 2005 included quite an ambitious structural agenda in areas such 
as the reinforcement of the central bank’s independence, the upgrading of the financial 
sector’s regulatory and supervisory framework, the introduction of a deposit insurance 
scheme or the creation of a favourable environment for foreign direct investment. It is 
worth noting that the new SBA did also include some of the conditions that the Batlle 
administration had failed to ratify as a result of its weak political position, such as the 
reforms of the tax system and of the specialized pension schemes (IMF, 2005g). The most 
salient difference between the economic policies outlined in the new SBA and those of its 
predecessor was the creation of an emergency fund to finance a welfare program to 
alleviate the social consequences of the 2002 crisis. In order to make room for that 
program, IMF negotiators accepted primary surplus targets slightly below what they had 
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initially bargained for (IMF, 2008a).
 133
 This was the only meaningful compromise that was 
required on the part of the IMF in order to agree on the terms of the 2005 SBA.  
 
Converging preferences and a relatively large win-set on both sides of the negotiations, 
therefore, created a strong basis for cooperation between Tabaré Vázquez’s administration 
and the IMF. In this context, how to explain the early cancellation of the 2005 SBA? As 
described in section 4.1.3, this cancellation was made possible by a faster than anticipated 
economic recovery led by a surge in exports and foreign direct investment. However, the 
strengthening of Uruguay’s external position does not provide an economic rationale to the 
government’s decision to substitute the Fund’s support with other more expensive sources 
of finance.  
 
Ultimately, this decision was primarily motivated by domestic political considerations. 
Indeed, although the moderation of the EP-FA-NM is crucial to understand the electoral 
success of the coalition in 2004 as well as its economic policies while in office, it also 
alienated some of the coalition’s more leftist constituencies (Panizza, 2008). These tensions 
were laid bare during the congressional ratification of some of the structural conditions 
attached to the 2005 SBA, which proved to be more difficult than had been anticipated 
during the negotiations of that arrangement. For instance, the reforms of the tax system and 
the specialized pension schemes, the adoption of a new law to enhance the independence of 
the central bank or the restructuring of a public housing bank were substantially delayed 
(IMF, 2007). As a result of these difficulties, the Executive Board had to concede ten 
waivers during the implementation of the 2005 SBA (IMF, 2008a). In this context, there is 
ground to argue that anticipating the cancellation of this program was primarily aimed at 
placating internal tensions within the governing coalition. Furthermore, after the early 
cancellations of the Brazilian and the Argentine programs in 2005, such a move also had a 
symbolic content, signifying that Uruguay was taking part in the region’s emancipation 
from the IMF (Ariel Davrieux. Personal interview. July 7 2010; Ernesto Talvi. Personal 
interview. July 27, 2010).      
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 IMF negotiators were initially bargaining for a primary surplus target of 4% of GDP for 2005 and 2006. 
Ultimately the Fund accepted primary surplus targets of 3.5% of GDP in 2005 and 3.7% of GDP in 2006 
(IMF, 2008a). 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has applied Putnam’s two level game framework to analyse the IMF’s 
involvement in Uruguay from early 1996 until late 2006. During the first phase of this 
relationship, the negotiations’ cooperative outcome was sustained by converging 
preferences on a medium term disinflation strategy and on the use of precautionary SBAs 
as a signalling device to facilitate Uruguay’s integration in international financial markets. 
The successive programs signed during the second half of the 1990s were also 
characterized by their weak structural conditionality. This was primarily due to a narrow 
win-set on the Uruguayan side, which constrained the Fund’s leverage in this particular 
area of policy-making. More specifically, the weakness of the coalition government during 
the Sanguinetti administration together with the factionalism that characterizes Uruguayan 
political parties constituted an important obstacle to ratify the type of market reforms that 
are usually included in SBAs’ conditionality. In addition, the threat of referendums being 
called to block such initiatives was another impediment to the structural transformation of 
the Uruguayan economy and, hence, constrained the negotiation of successive IMF 
programs. As a result, the SBAs approved during the late 1990s were focused on 
macroeconomic adjustment but did little to address other underlying sources of 
vulnerability, most notably in the banking system. 
 
When contagion from the Argentine crisis evidenced these vulnerabilities the Fund’s 
intervention successfully put an end to a banking panic that was pushing the Uruguayan 
economy to the brink of disaster. The August 2002 multilateral disbursement broke new 
ground not only because of its size but also because it was ultimately designed to support 
the central bank’s capacity to provide LOLR assistance in a dollarized financial system, a 
function that departed from SBAs’ traditional focus on the balance of payments. The 
decisions that shaped this intervention, however, were only reluctantly accepted and 
sometimes even opposed by the Fund’s senior management, whose preferences 
increasingly diverged from those of the Uruguayan government as the crisis unfolded. To a 
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large extent, this reflected IMF negotiators’ accentuated risk aversion in the aftermath of 
the Argentine program’s debacle.  
 
A first factor that contributed to preserve cooperation was the government’s ability to 
extract compromises from the opposition during the crisis, which increased the size of 
Uruguay’s win-set, thus facilitating the domestic ratification of far reaching emergency 
measures. Ultimately, however, the August disbursement could only be approved when the 
US Treasury decided to put its full weight behind Uruguayan negotiators, expanding the 
Fund’s win-set beyond the preferences of the institution’s senior managers.  
 
Although the second augmentation had an almost instantaneous and positive effect, severe 
divergences between the Uruguayan government and the IMF were fast to resurface, this 
time about the sustainability of the sovereign debt burden. The position of IMF negotiators 
on this issue may have been influenced by the idea that Uruguay constituted a good 
candidate to inaugurate the statutory insolvency regime that was being debated at the time. 
However, the Uruguayan government’s proposal of launching a market based pre-emptive 
restructuring turned out to be a much more appealing option for the most powerful IMF 
constituents given that most of them opposed the SDRM project. This turn of events in the 
international financial architecture debate reinforced the Uruguayan government’s 
bargaining position.    
  
After the completion of the debt restructuring, the Fund’s intervention in Uruguay focused 
on the consolidation of the economic recovery and on smoothening the amortization of the 
government’s multilateral obligations. As the sense of urgency that had characterized the 
crisis period subsided and as the 2004 elections approached, the Uruguayan win-set 
narrowed and the domestic ratification of the program’s structural conditionality became 
more difficult. Nonetheless, the Fund’s constituents were willing to tolerate slippages with 
these conditions because the program’s macroeconomic targets were outperformed and 
because delays in the SBA’s review process could have impaired Uruguay’s recovery of 
access to international financial markets, another crucial requisite for the timely 
amortization of the 2002 SBA.  
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The landslide victory of Tabaré Vázquez in the 2004 elections did not substantially change 
Uruguayan negotiators’ preferences while expanding the size of their win-set. This created 
a strong basis for cooperation evidenced in the scope of the conditionality that was included 
in the 2005 SBA. The moderation of the government’s economic policies, however, 
alienated some of the traditional constituencies of the EP-FA-NM. As a result, the 
ratification of the conditionality included in the 2005 SBA proved to be more difficult than 
had originally been anticipated. It is in order to appease these constituencies that the 
Vázquez administration took the symbolic step of anticipating the cancellation of its IMF 
program, which was made possible by a robust external recovery. 
 
What are the hypotheses that this case study helps unveil about the influence of domestic 
ratification politics on the Fund’s program relationship with emerging economies? An 
analysis of the Uruguayan case before and after the 2002 crisis suggests that a highly 
participative political system and the presence of multiple veto points constitutes an 
obstacle to the domestic ratification of the conditions associated with IMF programs. 
During the 2002 financial crisis, however, the Uruguayan political system proved to be 
particularly adept at producing the type of short-term domestic compromises that was 
required for the timely ratification of the emergency measures on which the multilateral 
bailout was conditioned. This brings support to the hypothesis that a greater reliance on 
consensus decision-making may increase the size of borrowing countries’ win-set during a 
crisis while decreasing it in tranquil times. Such a feature of the domestic political system is 
likely to improve the prospects of cooperation with the IMF when a financial program is 
most needed. However, it may also reduce the likelihood of policy changes being instilled 
by precautionary programs or by other types of multilateral arrangements not designed to 
address a crisis situation. It is worth noting that this hypothesis challenges a common 
assertion in comparative politics: that there is a trade-off between policy stability and 
policy adaptability (Tsebelis, 2002; Haggard and McCubbins 2001). Indeed, the Uruguayan 
case study did not display such a trade-off given the capacity of its political system to 
produce stable outcomes in normal times, but also to adapt in times of crisis. 
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The Uruguayan case study is particularly useful to illustrate the potential divergences that 
can emerge between the preferences of the Fund’s senior management/negotiators and the 
institution’s constituents. As suggested by the August 2002 multilateral disbursement on 
which much of this chapter has focused, these divergences may be due to borrowing 
countries’ ability to exploit their trans-national alliances with powerful constituents in order 
to force the hand of the IMF. However, these divergences may also be rooted in other 
strategic considerations that go beyond the borrowing country itself. Indeed, the Fund’s 
position during the discussion on the Uruguayan sovereign debt overhang was influenced 
by the institution’s preferences with regard to the reform of the international financial 
architecture. In turn, IMF constituents’ scepticism about the SDRM project ended up 
reinforcing the Uruguayan government’s bargaining power in this particular issue. Even 
more clearly than the Argentine case study, this suggests the presence of a reverse causality 
between rules and IMF interventions: it is not only that rules may impose a constraint on 
the design of multilateral rescue operations but also that specific interventions may push the 
reform of the international financial architecture in one or the other direction. As a result, 
IMF negotiators and constituents are likely to have a particularly strong incentive to push 
for a specific course of action when this course of action is perceived to potentially 
influence the rules that will shape future interventions. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Cross-sectional Variation:  
The Argentine and Uruguayan Case Studies in Comparative Perspective  
 
 
 
 
The last two chapters have adopted a process-tracing approach to explore the determinants 
of the longitudinal variation observed in the Fund’s involvement in Argentina and Uruguay 
during the decade that followed the Tequila crisis. This chapter, instead, analyses variation 
across these two cases, comparing the Argentine and Uruguayan experiences in order to 
generate additional hypotheses about the relationship between ratification politics at the 
levels of the IMF and of borrowing countries, and the bargaining process that shapes the 
design and implementation of IMF-supported programs. As was argued in Chapter 1, 
comparing these two case studies makes analytical sense because it maximizes variation in 
the dependent variable while concentrating variation in a limited set of potential 
explanatory dimensions. Applying this most similar system design, the empirical exercise 
presented below tries to infer causation from the covariation identified between the 
outcome of interest and the explanatory dimensions that have not been controlled for as a 
result of the similarities between the Argentine and the Uruguayan cases. 
 
Indeed, the suspension of the Argentine program in December 2001 stands in stark contrast 
with the Uruguayan rescue of August 2002, an outcome that cannot be explained in terms 
of the characteristics shared by these two countries. Among these similarities are their 
common cultural heritage, their middle income status and their exposure to comparable 
external shocks as exporters of agricultural products reliant on international capital flows to 
fund private investment and to cover public deficits.  Furthermore, the episodes of financial 
instability undergone by the two countries in 2001-02 were relatively similar, combining 
elements of a currency, banking and sovereign debt crisis. Finally, at the beginning of the 
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decade under analysis Argentina and Uruguay were at a comparable historical juncture, 
having recently emerged from a military dictatorship and from the 1980s debt crisis. This 
gave way to the overlapping transformation of their political and economic structures, 
namely the restoration of democratic rule and a market reform process that put an end to the 
import substitution industrialization strategy that both countries had followed for decades.  
 
And yet, Argentina and Uruguay are markedly different in some other potentially 
significant explanatory variables. A first obvious difference is their size: whereas Uruguay 
is a small economy with a population little over 3 million, Argentina is a relatively large 
emerging market with 40 million inhabitants and was an important attractor of cross-border 
capital flows during the 1990s. Therefore, whereas a full-blown crisis in Argentina could 
have been feared to have a systemic impact, Uruguay was practically irrelevant on a global 
scale. Other potential sources of cross-sectional variation include some specific features of 
the Argentine and Uruguayan institutional and political frameworks. For a start, the 
Argentine federal structure contrasts with Uruguay’s unitary state, which may have 
influenced the domestic ratification of some of the conditions associated with IMF 
programs. In addition, whereas national referendums are common in Uruguay, direct 
democracy mechanisms are seldom used in Argentina, at least at the Federal level. 
Differences in the democratization and market reform paths followed by Argentina and 
Uruguay may also have played a relevant role. Whereas President Menem concentrated 
executive power in such a way as to expedite the liberalization of the economy during his 
first administration, the Lacalle and the Sanguinetti administrations moved by consensus, 
resulting in a more gradual approach to market reform. The key question addressed here is 
whether these differences had an impact on the Argentine and Uruguayan relationship with 
the IMF, especially during the 2001-02 financial crises. 
 
The evidence provided in this chapter suggests that the size of borrowing countries’ 
economies can exert a substantial influence on the negotiation of IMF-supported programs. 
However, a comparison between the Argentine and the Uruguayan experiences with the 
Fund also indicates that economic might as such is not necessarily a consistent predictor of 
the multilateral response to a specific financial crisis. The fact that Argentina was an 
 174 
important emerging market contributes to explain the Fund’s initial responsiveness to the 
financial difficulties that emerged in that country in the late 1990s. However, Argentina’s 
global relevance at the time did not avoid the suspension of the program in December 2001. 
In the meanwhile, the Fund’s initial reaction to the Uruguayan crisis was somewhat slower, 
which could be partly due to the modest cross-border spill-over effects that this episode of 
financial instability was feared to unleash. However, that Uruguay is a small economy 
made it easier to mobilize the amount of resources that was needed to successfully put an 
end to that country’s banking panic in 2002. In other words, being large or being small 
seems to have constituted an advantage or a disadvantage for Argentine and Uruguayan 
negotiators at different points in time, which illustrates this variable’s ambiguous effect on 
the Fund’s decision-making process.  
  
This chapter’s main conclusion is that a substantial amount of the cross-sectional variation 
observed in the outcome of interest can be explained by certain differences in the 
configuration of Argentine and Uruguayan political institutions. More specifically, the 
different position of veto-players within these two countries’ polities appears to have 
played a particularly relevant role, imposing localized constraints on the negotiations of 
those conditions that threatened to alter the status quo defended by these veto-players, 
which chief negotiators seem to have managed to turn into a bargaining advantage vis-à-vis 
the IMF. This is why the veto power of the Argentine provinces resulted in a weaker fiscal 
conditionality in that case while the right of specific interest groups to trigger referendums 
in Uruguay resulted in a weaker structural conditionality across the River Plate. In addition, 
the comparative study presented below brings further support to the idea that political 
actors’ propensity to cooperate is a significant determinant of policy adaptability during a 
financial crisis. The cross-sectional variation observed in this analytical dimension might be 
associated with the aforementioned differences in the democratization and market reform 
paths followed by the two countries, which contributes to explain why the system of checks 
and balances that was allowed to emerge in Uruguay was stronger than that of Argentina. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 will briefly describe the 
main differences observed in the Fund’s interventions in Argentina and Uruguay during the 
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period under analysis. Section 6.2 will try to explain this variation, concentrating on the 
international level of analysis and identifying the factors that may have influenced IMF 
constituents’ strategic calculations vis-à-vis Argentina and Uruguay during the negotiation 
of the programs. In turn, section 6.3 will concentrate on the domestic level of analysis, 
focusing on the political and institutional factors that determined the bargaining position of 
the Argentine and the Uruguayan governments as well as their ability to ratify and 
implement the conditions agreed with the IMF. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a 
summary of the hypotheses that this comparative analysis helps unveil.  
 
6.1      Cross-sectional variation  
 
Focusing first on the cross-sectional variation observed during the crisis prevention phase, a 
first difference between the two cases is that the Argentine programs were both longer and 
larger (in absolute and relative terms) than the Uruguayan SBAs.
134
 Upon approval they 
had an average duration of 31 months and gave access to 146% of quota, against an average 
duration of 23 months and a size of 45% of quota in Uruguay.
135
 That the program 
approved for Argentina in 1998 was a three year EFF and not a shorter SBA, as was the 
case for Uruguay, suggests the presence of differences in the two countries’ bargaining 
position with the Fund during this period.
136
     
 
A second difference is that Argentine negotiators successfully bargained for the systematic 
accommodation of larger than programmed budget deficits in a way that was much less 
prevalent in the Uruguayan case. Indeed, both during the Menem and the De la Rúa 
                                                          
134
 The larger size of the Argentine programs was partly due to their longer duration, itself partly determined 
exogenously by the electoral cycle. Given that upon taking office new governments tend to re-negotiate the 
conditionality associated with IMF programs inherited from outgoing administrations, the duration of such 
programs is usually influenced by the date at which the next general elections will be held. The Argentine 
1998 EFF, however, had a duration of three years even though the next elections were scheduled for late 
1999.  
135
 If measured in terms of yearly access to the Fund’s resources, the Argentine programs were also 
substantially larger than the Uruguayan SBAs: 57% of quota per year against 36% of quota per year. 
136
 At least de Jure, Extended Fund Facilities are used to address structural balance of payment problems, 
which is why these facilities typically have a longer duration than SBAs together with a more extended 
repayment period. In practice, however, the criteria according to which an EFF or an SBA is approved for a 
given country have never been entirely clear. The Argentine alternation between EFFs and SBAs during the 
1990s is a case in point.  
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administrations IMF Executive Directors repeatedly granted waivers for the non-
observance of the government’s fiscal targets. In the case of Uruguay, Executive Directors 
also proved willing to tolerate some departures from the program’s macroeconomic targets 
as the late 1990s recession got worse. However, these breaches with conditionality were 
both smaller and rarer. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the IMF itself has identified differences in the failures of the 
Argentine and Uruguayan programs approved during this period, which refer to specific 
areas of their conditionality. In Argentina, the IEO argued that successive programs had 
been too soft on the fiscal front (IEO, 2004). In turn, the Fund’s staff recognized that it did 
not pay sufficient attention to Uruguay’s structural reform agenda and, more specifically, to 
the governance of the financial system (IMF, 2005d).  
 
Focusing next on the second phase identified in previous chapters, the IMF was initially 
similarly responsive to the two unfolding crises. By the time of their first augmentation the 
Fund’s programs in Argentina and Uruguay were comparable in size: 546% and 572% of 
quota respectively. Other multilateral and bilateral creditors, however, responded more 
quickly to the Argentine crisis, topping up the additional commitments that the IMF 
provided with the first augmentation. With the second augmentation the overall size of the 
Argentine program reached almost 900% of quota, thus becoming substantially larger than 
the Uruguayan SBA. However, only a portion of this second augmentation was actually 
disbursed, implying that in relative terms the Fund’s exposure to Argentina was never 
much larger than that to Uruguay.  
 
Regarding macroeconomic conditionality, given that the Uruguayan government was in a 
sounder fiscal position, the budget cuts that the Batlle administration was asked to adopt 
were more moderate than in Argentina. But the Uruguayan crisis resolution program was 
more demanding in other areas: whereas the IMF explicitly required the Batlle 
administration to float the peso against its will, the Argentine government systematically 
refused to discuss the possibility of abandoning the convertibility regime. On the structural 
front, the Fund’s interventions in Uruguay were centred on the banking system, while the 
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conditions negotiated with Argentina were more generally aimed at re-igniting growth and 
restoring external competitiveness. Another aspect in which the early response to the two 
crises differed was private sector involvement. Whereas PSI measures were already 
included in the first augmentation of the Argentine program, this issue would only begin to 
be discussed with the Uruguayan authorities after the worst of the crisis was over. 
 
Again, the Uruguayan government had a better record of compliance with macroeconomic 
conditionality. Indeed, the fiscal adjustments approved in Uruguay contrast with 
Argentina´s successive failed attempts to regain control over public finances. Furthermore, 
by August 2001 the negotiations between Argentina and the IMF had entered a chaotic 
stage and the second augmentation was not clearly subject to a specific conditionality, 
which contrasts with the case of Uruguay where all program related decisions were tied to 
precise policy conditions.  
 
But the turning point in the evolution of cross-sectional variation in the two cases came 
with the suspension of the Argentine program in December 2001 vs. the augmentation of 
the Uruguayan program in August 2002. As a result of these decisions, the combinations of 
official financial assistance, conditionality-induced macroeconomic adjustment and 
structural reform, and private sector involvement with which the two crises were ultimately 
addressed turned out to be very different. In spite of these divergences, the restoration of a 
program relationship with the Duhalde administration in January 2003 re-established some 
parallels between the two cases during the third phase of the negotiations. Indeed, once that 
program was approved, both interventions were driven by the same overarching purpose: 
restoring the solvency of the Argentine and the Uruguayan states. However, Argentina’s 
relationship with the IMF continued to be much more conflictive than that of Uruguay until 
the end of the decade under analysis. This was partly due to the fact that whereas Uruguay 
continued to receive net IMF disbursements until 2005, Argentina was forced to make net 
repayments to the Fund from 2002 onwards.  
 
Cross-sectional variation is also apparent in the conditionality associated with the post-
crisis SBAs. Fiscal conditionality was tighter in the Uruguayan programs, which set a 
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primary surplus target of 4% of GDP against 2.5% of GDP in Argentina. Furthermore, 
Argentina’s long SBA established short-term fiscal objectives but left medium-term targets 
undefined. In terms of structural conditionality, the Uruguayan programs were also more 
ambitious than the Argentine SBAs. But compliance turned out to be relatively similar in 
both cases: Argentina and Uruguay outperformed the programs’ fiscal targets but lagged 
behind on structural conditionality. Regarding PSI, although both countries restructured the 
bulk of their bonded debt during this period, these two processes were completed in a very 
different manner. While the Argentine restructuring followed the largest sovereign default 
in history and was extremely contentious, the Uruguayan government remained current on 
its obligations and maintained a market-friendly attitude throughout the process. The role 
played by the IMF in the two restructurings was also very different. Whereas the Argentine 
default was a consequence of the suspension of the 2000 program but not an outcome 
explicitly negotiated with the IMF, the launching of the Uruguayan debt restructuring was 
jointly agreed with the Fund. Furthermore, whereas the Argentine government was keen to 
minimize the Fund’s interference in the negotiations with private creditors, the Uruguayan 
government relied on the support of the IMF to encourage participation in the debt 
exchange. 
 
6.2  The international level of analysis 
 
This section will try to identify the international factors that contribute to explain cross-
sectional variation in the Argentine and Uruguayan case studies. The focus will therefore be 
placed on the side of the IMF and of its constituents rather than on domestic political 
dynamics in Argentina and Uruguay, which will be discussed in the next section. Chapter 2 
argued that the IPE literature that has concentrated on the international level of analysis is 
more helpful to study the origins and evolution of the IMF as an international organization 
than the cross-sectional variation observed in its financial programs. Nevertheless, some of 
the international variables identified in this literature contribute to explain why the IMF 
may respond differently to similar crises, as was the case in Argentina and Uruguay. More 
specifically, the interests of powerful states and the bureaucratic incentives of the Fund’s 
management and staff have been proved to be potentially significant determinants of the 
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multilateral response to financial crises in emerging economies. Therefore, the analysis 
presented below will pay special attention to these two categories of variables. 
 
The comparison conducted in the previous section suggests that during the crisis prevention 
phase the Argentine government had more bargaining power than the Uruguayan 
authorities in the negotiations with the IMF. This materialized in larger and longer 
programs and in a greater willingness on the part of the Fund’s Executive Board to tolerate 
slippages with the programs’ conditionality. Given that supplementary financiers reacted 
faster to the difficulties of the Argentine government at the onset of the crisis and that the 
IMF never really openly questioned the convertibility regime while forcing the Uruguayan 
government to float the peso against its will, this greater leverage is also visible during the 
initial stage of the crisis management phase.  
 
Such a pattern of cross-sectional variation is consistent with the neo-realist hypothesis 
according to which those countries in which powerful nations have more interests at stake 
will receive a better treatment from international organizations like the IMF. As mentioned 
in the introduction, one of the clearest differences between Argentina and Uruguay is their 
size and economic weight. Given that by the late 1990s Argentina had consolidated its 
position as a leading emerging market to the point of becoming a founding member of the 
G-20, the Fund’s most powerful constituents had reasons to be more concerned about the 
possibility of a financial crisis in that country than in Uruguay, which was a minor player in 
international finance. This translated not only into a greater complacency in the Fund’s 
dealings with Argentina but also in a tendency to underestimate the increasingly worrisome 
signs that the Argentine economy was beginning to exhibit in the late 1990s. It seems clear 
that Uruguayan negotiators had none of these advantages, resulting in less leverage in their 
negotiations with the IMF.   
 
However, the crucial multilateral decisions on which much of this chapter is focused can 
seldom be explained from a purely neo-realist perspective. If Argentina had truly become 
such a systemically important emerging economy and Uruguay was so irrelevant, why did 
the international community suspend the former’s program fall while adopting such 
 180 
extraordinary steps to rescue the Uruguayan banking system a few months later? The next 
section will argue that delving into the domestic level of analysis is particularly important 
to explain this outcome. But there are some international factors that also deserve attention.  
 
First of all, the September 11
th
 attacks disrupted the negotiations between Argentina and the 
IMF, which at that time were at a critical stage. As was pointed out in Chapter 4, the attacks 
suddenly detracted attention from the Argentine crisis, reducing the cost of no agreement 
perceived by the Fund’s constituents and contributing to eliminate the win-set overlap that 
had previously sustained the negotiations’ cooperative outcome. Given that a few more 
months had elapsed since September 11
th
, the negotiations of the Uruguayan rescue 
package took place at a slightly less unfavourable time. In fact, right after the attacks the 
Argentine government could never have received the same amount of attention that the US 
Treasury devoted to the Uruguayan authorities in the summer of 2002 (John Taylor. 
Personal Interview. 5 April, 2011). To some extent, therefore, the cross-sectional variation 
observed in this study’s dependent variable was due to differences in the way in which an 
exogenous event impacted on the preferences and interests of the US and other important 
creditors. This illustrates the fact that when negotiating the terms of a crisis resolution 
program, emerging economies have to compete for the attention of the Fund’s constituents. 
As a result, the international conjuncture at the time of the crisis can be a relevant 
explanatory dimension of the negotiations with the IMF. 
  
In addition, the divergence in the multilateral response to the two crises may also be linked 
to differences in the strength of the Argentine and Uruguayan transnational alliances with 
the US government. Whereas Finance Minister Cavallo ultimately alienated many in the 
Washington establishment and the Duhalde administration had a weak connection with the 
US Treasury, President Batlle turned Uruguay’s relationship with the US into the main 
priority of his government’s foreign policy, a strategy that proved to pay off during the 
financial crisis. In fact, his personal connection with George W. Bush was instrumental to 
establish a direct line of communication between Uruguayan and US Treasury senior 
officials, which contributed to unblock the bargaining process that led to the approval of the 
rescue package in August 2002. However, given Uruguay’s irrelevance on a global scale, in 
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and of itself this transnational alliance seems insufficient to explain why the US Treasury 
decided to put its full weight behind the Batlle administration unless this move is linked to 
more pressing international issues or to other strategic calculations.  
 
The fact that the financial crisis that the Brazilian economy was undergoing in the run-up to 
Lula’s first electoral victory broadly coincided with the worst phase of the Uruguayan crisis 
is a relevant factor in this respect. In the context of the uncertainties that characterized the 
regional context in 2002, the Bush administration may have considered that, whatever the 
outcome of the Brazilian crisis, the Uruguayan rescue package could be instrumental to 
signal that Latin America was still in the radar of American foreign policy. Furthermore, 
given that Uruguay is such a small economy, the financial cost of this rescue was relatively 
low in absolute terms while having reasonable chances of success. That rescuing Uruguay 
was ‘cheap’, therefore, constituted an advantage that Argentina lacked in late 2001, which 
goes against the argument that important emerging economies are systematically better 
placed to obtain the financial support of the international community.  
 
In addition, previous chapters have identified various instances in which the US interfered 
in the negotiations of the programs not with the purpose of defending its material or 
political interests in Argentina and/or Uruguay but in order to shape the reform of the 
international financial architecture according to its own preferences. This trend was 
particularly clear during the debate on the SDRM, which coincided with the decisions to 
massively augment the Uruguayan program and to restore a program relationship with 
Argentina. Both of these decisions were consistent with the US Treasury’s views about the 
desirability of a market-based sovereign debt restructuring regime. The Uruguayan rescue 
ruled out the possibility that this country would become the first user of the SDRM, as the 
Fund’s senior management may have had in mind when the government of that country was 
being pressed to default on its obligations. In turn, the Argentine SBAs approved in 2003 
were deliberately vague about macroeconomic adjustment, which the US saw as a way not 
to impose a further constraint on the government’s debt restructuring negotiations with 
private creditors.  
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This illustrates an interesting pattern in the direction of the causal relationship between 
rules and IMF programs: rather than rules constraining the negotiation of crisis lending 
operations, IMF constituents may view specific interventions as opportunities to influence 
the content of rules. Such strategic calculations are more likely to prevail when far reaching 
reform proposals are on the table, as was the case during the SDRM discussions in 2002 
and 2003. However, it would difficult to argue that the Argentine program was suspended 
in 2001 because the US or other G-7 members were trying to re-direct the reform of the 
international financial architecture at that particular juncture. Therefore, this argument can 
only explain part of the story about why the multilateral management of the Argentine and 
the Uruguayan crises ended up diverging so markedly. 
 
Bureaucratic politics at the level of the IMF also contribute to explain cross-sectional 
variation in the Fund’s programs at various stages of the negotiations. Chapter 4 already 
emphasized that as a result of the criticism elicited by the management of the Asian 
financial crisis, the Fund’s senior management was particularly keen to emphasize the 
institution’s role in what by then was still perceived as an Argentine success story. This 
predisposed IMF negotiators to respond quickly to the financial difficulties that the 
government began to experience in the late 1990s and contributes to explain why the IMF 
continued lending after it was already clear that Argentina’s economic policies were no 
longer sustainable (Mussa, 2002; IEO, 2004). Instead, Uruguay was much less relevant in 
the Fund’s bureaucratic political process, at least prior to the Argentine collapse. In fact, 
given the small size of its economy and the more moderate market reforms that had been 
implemented in that country, it would have made little sense for the Fund’s senior 
management to point at the Uruguayan experience in order to boast the institution’s 
involvement in emerging markets. This brings support to the idea that the size and 
international relevance of borrowing countries also influences their bargaining power 
through a bureaucratic channel.    
 
However, it would be difficult to argue that IMF negotiators’ bureaucratic incentives had 
fundamentally changed when the Argentine program was suspended in December 2001. 
This argument is even weaker when it comes to explaining why the Uruguayan program 
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was massively augmented in August 2002. In fact, chapter 5 argued that the Fund’s internal 
bureaucratic political dynamics played against the interests of the Uruguayan government 
during the negotiations of that rescue package. Indeed, one of the consequences of the 
Argentine debacle was that the Western Hemisphere Department was revamped and that 
the mission chiefs to Uruguay were substituted by economists supposedly less likely to be 
co-opted by Latin American governments. This reflected management’s determination to 
adopt a tougher negotiating stance in the future and to avoid the mistakes that were 
perceived to have been made in the management of the Argentine crisis. This line of 
reasoning explains why the Fund’s senior management was opposed to the second 
augmentation of the Uruguayan program and to the re-establishment of a program 
relationship with Argentina. And yet, the mediation of the US Treasury ultimately 
unblocked both negotiations, resulting in the approval of the Uruguayan rescue package 
and of the 2003 Argentine SBAs. Therefore, these two experiences suggest that although 
bureaucratic politics matter, when other strategic considerations prevail, powerful 
constituents can impose the adoption of a course of action on the Fund’s managers and 
negotiators.  
 
Summing up, this section has examined the cross-sectional co-variation between a number 
of international variables and the Fund’s interventions in Argentina and Uruguay. It has 
been argued that differences in these two countries’ economic weight were particularly 
relevant to shape powerful constituents’ preferences as well as the Fund’s internal 
bureaucratic political process during the crisis prevention phase and the beginning of the 
crisis resolution phase. However, these variables’ explanatory power is much weaker when 
it comes to answering why the Argentine program was suspended while the Uruguayan 
program was massively augmented. The September 11
th
 attacks and the different strength 
of the Argentine and Uruguayan transnational alliances with the US government had an 
impact on the bargaining process that led to these two decisions. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that during the discussions on the SDRM proposal, the US Treasury interfered in the 
program negotiations in order to influence the rule-making process, which also contributes 
to explain why Uruguay could punch above its weight at various instances of the 
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negotiations. But, ultimately, the contrasting multilateral response to the two crises cannot 
be understood unless the domestic level of analysis is brought into the picture. 
 
6.3  The domestic level of analysis 
 
This section will focus on the domestic determinants of cross-sectional variation in the 
Fund’s interventions in Argentina and Uruguay. When reviewing the IPE literature that has 
concentrated on the domestic level of analysis, Chapter 2 identified three explanatory 
dimensions that may be relevant for this comparative study. The first one refers to veto-
players and their influence on the politics of macroeconomic adjustment and reform. The 
second one refers to political actors’ ability to cooperate in times of crisis. The third one is 
related with the domestic politicization of IMF-supported programs. To what extent do 
these variables contribute to explain differences between the Argentine and the Uruguayan 
case studies? 
 
In line with Tsebelis (1995), Haggard and Mc Cubbins (2001) or MacIntyre (2001), 
although the presence of veto players is important to underpin the stability and credibility 
of economic policies and institutions, in times of crisis such actors can constitute a major 
obstacle to macroeconomic adjustment and reform. Therefore, a first possible domestic 
explanation for the cross-sectional variation observed in the Fund’s interventions is related 
with the role played by veto-players in different polities: it might be that the intensity of the 
policy constraints imposed by these actors on the Argentine and Uruguayan ratification 
processes differed, thus affecting the negotiation and implementation of successive IMF 
programs. Two are the most common variables used in the relevant empirical literature in 
order to proxy the obstacles to policy change induced by the presence of veto-players. 
CHECKS, from the Database of Political Institutions, counts the number of veto actors 
present in different political system (Beck et al., 2001). In turn, the variable POLCON, 
from the Political Constraint Index Database, captures both the number of institutional veto 
players and the extent to which the preferences of these actors diverge (Henisz, 2000).
137
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 This variable, therefore, is more consistent with Tsebelis’s central hypothesis, according to which 
departing from the status quo is more difficult when the number of veto-players is high and when their 
preferences diverge (see Chapter 2). 
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The evolution of these two variables in Argentina and Uruguay is presented in the 
following table.    
 
Table 6.1 
Veto players 
 
 
No clear picture emerges from the data presented in Table 6.1. According to the variable 
POLCON, Uruguayan chief-negotiators were slightly more constrained than the Argentine 
government throughout the period under analysis. However, the evolution of the CHECKS 
variable suggests that the Menem administration was initially much less constrained than 
the Sanguinetti government, a situation that was reverted after the 1997 mid-term elections 
in Argentina. In turn, the De la Rúa, Batlle and Duhalde administrations faced the same 
exact number of veto actors during the crisis management phase. Based on the evolution of 
these variables it cannot be argued that veto-players were a significant determinant of 
cross-sectional variation in the Argentine and Uruguayan case studies, at least from the late 
1990s onwards. 
 
However, the CHECKS and POLCON variables may be too generic to capture some of the 
complexities that characterize the connection between domestic ratification politics and the 
design and implementation of IMF programs. Indeed, a comparison between the Argentine 
and the Uruguayan experiences suggests that borrowing country negotiators may not be 
equally constrained in all areas of policy-making: whereas the Argentine government was 
primarily constrained in the fiscal front, the Uruguayan authorities’ main constraints were 
centred on structural reform. This can be attributed to differences in the location of veto 
players in the Argentine and Uruguayan institutional and political structures. More 
specifically, the Argentine Federal structure empowered Argentine provinces to veto the 
government’s ability of limiting public spending whereas the constitutional right to trigger 
a referendum empowered certain interest groups to block privatizations and other market 
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04
CHECKS 2 2 5 5 4 4 4 4 2
POLCON 0,5 0,5 0,48 0,48 0,41 0,41 0,47 0,47 0,55
CHECKS 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
POLCON 0,56 0,56 0,56 0,56 0,51 0,51 0,51 0,55 0,55
                  Sources: Database on Political Institutions; the Political Constraint Index Database
Uruguay
Argentina
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reforms in Uruguay. These veto-points reduced the Argentine and Uruguayan room for 
manoeuvre to change the status quo of specific policies. Furthermore, these constraints also 
conferred the Argentine and Uruguayan governments a localized bargaining advantage in 
the negotiation of the programs’ policy conditions that affected the interests of the most 
powerful veto-players that they faced domestically.   
 
That the federal structure undermined fiscal consolidation in Argentina became 
increasingly clear during the second half of the 1990s. To a large extent, this was due to the 
inflexible inter-governmental relations that were inherited from the fiscal pacts signed with 
the provinces in the early 1990s (Eaton, 2005; Jones and Hwang, 2005).
138
 In addition, the 
provinces became more reluctant to cooperate with the Federal government after the 1999 
elections because most of them remained under the control of the Justicialist Party. In this 
context, the De la Rúa administration was forced to concentrate fiscal adjustment at the 
Federal level of government, which further reduced its chances of success. Although the 
Uruguayan budgetary process also exhibited some rigidity, the Sanguinetti and the Batlle 
administrations were confronted by less powerful veto-players in this area of policy-making 
(Bergara et al. 2006).
 
As a result, complying with macroeconomic conditionality and 
reacting to falling tax revenues was comparatively easier. A case in point was the de-
indexation of public salaries, which was a specific condition associated to the 1997 SBA. 
This contributes to explain why fiscal conditionality did not strain Uruguay’s relationship 
with the IMF to the same extent than it did in Argentina.   
 
On the structural front, instead, the Uruguayan government was more constrained. This was 
already evidenced during the Lacalle presidency (1990-1995) when a referendum triggered 
by a labour union blocked a privatization process that was intended to initiate a broader 
economic liberalization program (Maiztegui-Casas, 2010). On top of the fact that President 
Sanguinetti was less inclined to liberalize the economy than his predecessor, the perception 
that a successful referendum could potentially reverse a reform agreed with the IMF 
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 With the 1992 and 1993 pacts provincial governors gave up their entitlement to a fixed share of total 
revenue collection in exchange for a minimum floor (piso mínimo) of revenue transfers to the provinces. 
These arrangements benefited the Federal government during phases of strong economic growth in which tax 
collection exceeded expectations, partially explaining Menem’s fiscal adjustment successes in the early 
1990s.  
 187 
increased the Uruguayan capacity to resist the Fund’s pressure in the negotiation of the 
structural conditionality included in subsequent programs. The shock approach to market 
reform adopted by Menem’s first administration indicates that the Argentine government 
had more room for manoeuvre in this area of policy-making. This is not to say that 
Argentine negotiators were unconstrained with regard to structural conditionality.
139
 
However, the Menem administration managed to compensate and co-opt the labour 
movement as well as other interest groups associated with the old ISI model, successfully 
incorporating them to the reform coalition (Etchemendy, 2005).
140
 In other words, as 
opposed to the Uruguayan case, during the 1990s the Argentine government managed to 
partially neutralize the veto players that opposed the structural transformation of the 
economy. 
 
In sum, the position of veto-players in the Argentine and Uruguayan polities contributes to 
explain cross-sectional variation in IMF interventions during the crisis prevention phase as 
well as the nature of some of the vulnerabilities built up in the run-up to the crises. But this 
variable is less significant when it comes to explaining the contrasting multilateral response 
to the 2001-02 crisis, i.e. the suspension of the Argentine program vs. the Uruguayan 
financial rescue. Instead, differences in the propensity of Argentine and Uruguayan 
political actors to cooperate in difficult times offers a more promising avenue to understand 
the cross-sectional variation observed during the crisis management phase. Indeed, a major 
difference between the cases under analysis is that whereas Uruguayan constituents were 
able to compromise when the need arose, the Argentine political and institutional structure 
repeatedly failed to generate the level of cooperation that would have been needed to ratify 
the terms of a crisis resolution strategy in coordination with the IMF. The key question is 
why domestic constituents were able to cooperate in one case but not in the other.   
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 In fact, the Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT), the Peronist labour union, has traditionally played 
a very significant role in Argentine politics. Its ability to de-stabilize the government was amply demonstrated 
under Raúl Alfonsín, during whose presidency it launched 13 general strikes, bringing it to an early end in 
1989. 
140
 According to Etchemendy, there are four types of payoffs that were required for the unions to be 
incorporated in the reform coalition: the adoption of minor changes in the highly corporatist labour 
legislation; the preservation of the role of unions in the administration of the health care system; a privileged 
position in the private pension funds’ market; a share of the privatizations (Etchemendy, 2005). 
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The timing of the two crises is one of the factors that explain the contrasting patterns of 
domestic political cooperation described above. When the augmentations of the 2002 SBA 
were being negotiated, Uruguayan constituents had already witnessed the chaotic events of 
December 2001 in Argentina, which increased their propensity to cooperate in order to 
avoid a repetition of that outcome across the River Plate. This played a particularly relevant 
role in shaping the position of the Frente Amplio, which maintained a relatively cooperative 
attitude throughout the crisis. As a result, the actors more likely to have opposed 
macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform restrained from triggering a referendum 
against the conditions that the government negotiated with the IMF, at least during the 
crisis management phase.
141
 Partly because there was a much less clear idea of how the 
crisis would evolve in Argentina, neither the Justicialist Party, the provinces nor the 
Piquetero movement compromised to facilitate the adjustment process when the economy 
was teetering on the brink of collapse in 2001. 
 
A more subtle determinant of domestic constituents’ propensity to cooperate is related with 
differences in the Argentine and Uruguayan democratization and market reform processes. 
It has already been argued that the pace and depth of market reform in Argentina contrasts 
with the gradual approach adopted by subsequent governments in Uruguay during the 
1990s (Blake, 1998). The key idea introduced here is that the Menem administrations’ urge 
to expedite this reform process is partly at the origin of an uncooperative political culture 
that undermined domestic constituencies’ ability to compromise in difficult times. In 
Uruguay, instead, a stronger system of checks and balances was allowed to emerge from 
the military dictatorship. This consolidated the position of veto-players with the power to 
block departures from the status quo and, hence, to derail structural reform attempts. 
However, by forcing successive governments to move by consensus, these checks and 
balances also generated a more cooperative political culture, which was turned into a 
decisive advantage during the 2002 crisis, widening the size of the Uruguayan win-set 
precisely when an agreement with the IMF was most urgently needed. 
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 It was not until December 2003, when the recovery was well underway, that a popular initiative triggered a 
referendum to derogate various structural reforms in the oil sector and the banking system.  
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How did President Menem’s “shock therapy” of the early 1990s undermine domestic 
constituents’ ability to engage in an inter-temporal bargaining process in Argentina? For a 
start, the large majorities obtained by the PJ in successive elections, at least until 1997, 
allowed the Argentine executive to disregard the opposition, relegating it to a marginal role 
in the decision-making process that shaped the Argentine reform process. Furthermore, the 
1990 Law of Economic Emergency and State Reform entitled the President to rule by 
decree, sidestepping the Argentine Congress and weakening its oversight capacity over the 
management of the economy (Levitsky and Murillo, 2005). The independence of the 
judiciary was also severely curtailed when the Supreme Court was packed in 1991 in order 
weaken another potential veto-point that could have hindered the ratification of Menem’s 
economic liberalization program 
 
(Helmke, 2005). In addition, that President Menem 
silenced most of the voices that could have opposed the neo-liberal agenda through his 
compensatory policies contributes to explain the development of new forms of protest 
epitomized in the Piquetero movement, which had a huge role in de-stabilizing the De la 
Rúa government (Etchemendy, 2005). 
 
In Uruguay, instead, the National and the Colorado parties were forced to work together in 
successive coalition governments, creating strong connections and even an ideological 
affinity between the two dominant political forces. Although the Frente Amplio did not take 
part in any of these coalitions, its ability to mobilize veto-players ensured that no major 
structural reform could be launched without the Left’s more or less explicit acquiescence. 
This was a consequence of the prevalence of direct democracy in the Uruguayan political 
system, which empowered labour unions and other civil society groups with strong 
connections with the Frente Amplio to initiate popular referendums against specific 
government measures. The constraints imposed by the need to govern in coalition and the 
more or less constant possibility of referendums being triggered slowed down the pace of 
reform, but broadened political participation and reinforced trust among constituents and in 
Uruguayan institutions. As a result, the Uruguayan political environment was more 
conducive to cooperation when it became clear that the economy was teetering on the brink 
in 2002. 
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The analysis presented above is consistent with Scartascini et al. (2010), who argue that the 
presence of strong checks and balances does not necessarily undermine the responsiveness 
of polities to an economic crisis, but rather the opposite (see Chapter 2). Menem’s strategy 
of weakening potential veto-players enabled his first administration to drastically re-orient 
Argentina’s economic policies. But these reforms also introduced severe rigidities in the 
decision-making process, such as the convertibility law or the fiscal pacts reached with the 
provinces, which resulted in a low level of policy adaptability during the crisis. In Uruguay, 
the government was more constrained during the 1990s. But these very constraints 
contributed to consolidate a political arena in which Uruguayan constituents could engage 
in an inter-temporal bargaining process that catalysed cooperation during the crisis. As a 
result, the Argentine and Uruguayan political systems produced policy stability and policy 
adaptability at very different points in time, which had a marked impact on the negotiations 
with the IMF, especially during the crisis resolution phase.  
  
Veto-players and political actors’ propensity to compromise, however, do not fully explain 
why the Fund’s relationship with Uruguay was much more cooperative than that with 
Argentina during the years that followed the 2001-02 events. A first domestic explanation 
for this divergence is related with the financial incentives facing the two governments 
during this period. For a start, whereas Argentina only opted to roll-over its multilateral 
debt, Uruguay was still borrowing in net terms from the IMF and had obvious motives to 
try to avoid losing this crucial source of hard currency. Even more importantly, given that 
Argentina had defaulted on its bonded debt while Uruguay remained current on its 
sovereign obligations, the value that these two countries’ negotiators attached to the IMF’s 
role as a mediator with private creditors was very different.  
 
Indeed, the Argentine and the Uruguayan case studies illustrate the different role that the 
IMF can play in pre-emptive and in post-default sovereign debt restructurings (Díaz-Cassou 
et al., 2008). After the sovereign default of December 2001 the Argentine government 
stopped honouring its private obligations and was in no rush to resume debt repayments: its 
main priorities were to consolidate the economic recovery and to extract the best possible 
deal from bondholders. When the IMF began to insist on the need to comply with the ‘good 
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faith criterion’ (see Chapter 3) it became clear that the program could hinder the objective 
of maximizing the restructuring’s haircut, weakening the government’s incentives to 
cooperate with the Fund. Instead, that the Uruguayan government avoided defaulting 
implied that the debt relief resulting from the restructuring would only be felt after reaching 
an agreement with private creditors. In other words, the Uruguayan government had a clear 
incentive to complete the debt exchange as fast as possible. This turned the IMF program 
into a much more valuable tool to expedite the debt restructuring process and to signal both 
the government’s good faith and the support of the international community to the debt 
restructuring.
142
  
 
A last factor that contributes to explain cross-sectional variation in the two cases under 
analysis is the different way in which the negotiations with the IMF reverberated within 
Argentine and Uruguayan politics after the crucial multilateral decisions of 2001 and 2002. 
Chapter 4 emphasized how cultivating the image of being tough negotiators with the IMF 
and with private creditors gradually became an asset for Argentine politicians in the years 
that followed the suspension of the SBA in December 2001, and especially during Néstor 
Kirchner’s first administration. Partly because of the success of the 2002 SBA’s second 
augmentation in stopping the run on deposits, the international negotiations with the IMF 
never acquired such a symbolism in the Uruguayan political debate. Otherwise, the Frente 
Amplio would not have given publicity to Tabaré Vázquez’s visit to Washington DC in the 
2004 electoral campaign, during which the presidential candidate made clear his intentions 
to cooperate closely with the IMF and the other IFIs should he win these elections. 
Although the Vázquez administration did eventually jump on the regional bandwagon when 
it decided to anticipate the cancellation of the SBA in 2006, most factions of the Frente 
Amplio coalition maintained a relatively moderate rhetoric vis-à-vis the IMF, the other IFIs 
and private creditors during this period. In other words, domestic political incentives to 
depart from the Fund’s preferences were substantially weaker in Uruguay than in 
Argentina.          
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 A clear example of the Fund’s mediating role was the Managing Director’s announcement that the third 
review of the Uruguayan SBA would only be approved if a sufficient proportion of bondholders participated 
in the debt exchange. Given the understanding that a suspension of the IMF program would inevitably result 
in a much costlier default, this provided an incentive for private creditors to tender their bonds. 
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Summing up, this section has focused on the domestic determinants of the cross-sectional 
variation observed in the Fund’s interventions in Argentina and Uruguay. It has emphasized 
four variables that played a significant role at various points of the negotiations. First, 
although changes in the intensity of the constraints imposed by veto-players contribute to 
explain longitudinal variation both in the Argentine and the Uruguayan case study, cross-
sectionally the location of veto-players mattered more. Second, differences in political 
actors’ propensities to cooperate are crucial to explain why the Argentine program was 
suspended in December 2001 while the Uruguayan SBA was massively augmented in 
August 2002. In turn, these differences are related with the way in which the Argentine and 
Uruguayan democratization and market reform processes were conducted during the 1990s. 
Third, the fact that Argentina defaulted on its debt and that Uruguay remained current on its 
sovereign obligations shaped the two governments’ financial incentives to cooperate with 
the Fund during the debt restructuring negotiations. Fourth, the contrasting way in which 
the multilateral response to the 2001-02 crises reverberated within domestic politics 
contributes to explain why the relationship with the IMF continued to be much more 
cooperative in the Uruguayan case towards the end of the decade under analysis. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
Complementing the longitudinal analysis of the causes of IMF interventions in Argentina 
and Uruguay presented in previous chapters, this chapter has compared these two case 
studies in order to identify the variables that co-varied cross-sectionally with the outcome 
of interest. This strategy has been justified on the grounds that the Argentine and 
Uruguayan case studies fit the logic of most similar system designs relatively well: this 
empirical set-up maximizes variation in the dependent variable while controlling for the 
potentially explanatory variables that did not vary across Argentina and Uruguay. In this 
way the problem of over-determination that inevitably characterizes small-N analyses is 
somewhat mitigated.  
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The explanatory significance of a number of international variables has been examined first 
with a special focus on their impact on powerful nations’ interests in specific multilateral 
interventions and on the Fund’s internal bureaucratic political dynamics. Differences in the 
Argentine and Uruguayan weights in the world economy were found to have an unclear 
effect on the negotiation of IMF-supported programs. On the one hand, part of the reason 
why the international community initially responded more decisively to the Argentine crisis 
was that this country had been an important attractor of emerging market finance during 
most of the 1990s. On the other hand, the Uruguayan economy was easier to rescue because 
of its small size, which is one of the reasons why the US Treasury supported this course of 
action. Given that borrowing countries’ size is positively associated both with their 
systemic importance and with the cost of rescuing them, the Argentine and Uruguayan case 
studies yield ambiguous evidence about the causal association between this variable and the 
multilateral response to individual crises. 
 
It has also been argued that the international conjuncture shapes powerful countries’ 
strategic calculations vis-à-vis specific countries and crises, exogenously affecting the 
multilateral negotiation of IMF-supported programs. Indeed, whereas the September 11
th
 
attacks abruptly reduced the cost of not agreeing with Argentina, the Brazilian crisis 
increased the relevance of the Uruguayan rescue package as an instrument to signal that 
Latin America was still in the radar of US foreign policy. In addition, this comparison 
brings support to the idea that the causal association between rules and IMF interventions is 
bi-directional. Although rules can pose a constraint on multilateral negotiations, when 
important proposals such as the SDRM are on the table IMF constituents tend to view 
individual interventions as an opportunity to shape the reform process according to their 
preferences. In these situations, IMF interventions shape rules rather than the other way 
around. 
 
Although the international variables reviewed above mattered at various points of the 
negotiations, delving into the domestic level of analysis has proved to be crucial to 
understand the contrast between the multilateral response to the Argentine and the 
Uruguayan crises. This cross-sectional study brings support to the idea that different 
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configurations of political institutions have a profound impact on the negotiation of IMF-
supported programs. First of all, the position of veto players within the Argentine and 
Uruguayan polities imposed localized rather than global constraints on the negotiation and 
implementation of those policy conditions that challenged the status quo defended by these 
actors. This explains why Argentina lagged behind on the fiscal front while Uruguay was 
slow with structural reform. Second, political actors’ propensity to compromise was a 
central source of cross-sectional variation during the 2001-02 crisis. This variable was 
deeply influenced by some specific features of the democratization and market reform paths 
followed by Argentina and Uruguay. More specifically, it has been shown that although a 
stronger system of checks and balances slows down the pace of reform in tranquil times, by 
encouraging political participation it provides a better institutionalized arena for the type of 
inter-temporal bargaining dynamics that can increase policy adaptability in times of crisis.   
 
Finally, differences in the financial and political incentives facing Argentine and 
Uruguayan negotiators also contribute to explain cross-sectional variation, especially 
towards the end of the decade analysed here. To a large extent, these differences were a 
more or less direct result of the crucial multilateral decisions that were adopted in 2001 and 
2002. First, that Argentina defaulted while Uruguay remained current on its sovereign 
obligations implies that the latter had a much greater interest in engaging the IMF as a 
mediator in the negotiations with private creditors. This illustrates the different roles that 
the Fund tends to play in pre-emptive and in post-default sovereign debt restructurings. 
Second, that Uruguay was rescued while Argentina was left to fall resulted in very different 
political reverberations of the post-crisis program negotiations with the IMF. As a result, 
whereas Argentine negotiators had a political incentive to harden their bargaining position, 
Uruguayan negotiators had an incentive to cooperate with the Fund even after the electoral 
triumph of the Left in 2004.     
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Chapter 7 
 
 
The Consequences of IMF interventions in Argentina and Uruguay 
 
  
 
 
Previous chapters have focused on the causes of the longitudinal and cross-sectional 
variation in the multilateral response to the Argentine and the Uruguayan financial crises. It 
was argued that IMF interventions in these two cases were relatively similar until the 
crucial decisions adopted by the international community in December 2001 and August 
2002: the suspension of the Argentine program and the massive augmentation of the 
Uruguayan SBA. In turn, this chapter will try to shed some light on the consequences of 
this variation on the economic, political and institutional trajectories of Argentina and 
Uruguay. In order to do so, the aftermath of these decisions will be compared, an empirical 
exercise based on the idea that what happened in Argentina after the suspension of the 
Fund’s support provides an indication of what might have occurred in Uruguay had the 
SBA been suspended rather than augmented, and vice versa. In other words, this chapter 
uses the two case studies as counterfactual scenarios in an attempt to overcome a common 
shortcoming of the relevant literature: the failure to identify a valid yardstick against which 
to evaluate the observed outcomes of IMF interventions.  
 
This comparative analysis finds that the economic impact of IMF interventions in the 
Southern Cone is more subtle than at first might be expected. The Uruguayan rescue 
package did not result in a more moderate recession or in a faster economic recovery in that 
country than in Argentina. However, the evidence presented below suggests that in the 
medium term the second augmentation of the program preserved Uruguay’s integration into 
global financial market and that the suspension of the Argentine program contributes to 
explain why this country has never recovered access to international capital markets after 
the crisis. It is also argued that variation in the Fund’s response to the Argentine and the 
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Uruguayan crises had significant political and institutional consequences both in the short-
term and in the medium-term. More specifically, the multilateral decisions adopted in 2001 
and 2002 help explain why the De la Rúa administration collapsed while President Batlle 
could complete his term in office. In addition, the contrasting ways in which the two crises 
were addressed is partly behind the political radicalization of the Justicialist Party under 
President Kirchner and the moderation that has characterized the Uruguayan Left while in 
office. Finally, there is ground to argue that the emergency measures adopted in Argentina 
after the suspension of the Fund’s support, most of which were avoided in Uruguay thanks 
to the August 2002 rescue package, had significant institutional consequences.  
  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 will review the empirical 
literature on the effects of IMF intervention and clarify the empirical strategy that will be 
used subsequently. More specifically, the counterfactual approach will be justified and 
some methodological challenges identified. Section 7.2 analyses the economic 
consequences of the multilateral response to the Argentine and Uruguayan crises. Finally, 
section 7.3 will analyse the politico-institutional consequences of IMF interventions in 
Argentina and Uruguay. This chapter, therefore, has distinguished between different types 
of consequences. However, it is worth noting upfront that the various effects identified 
below are deeply inter-linked and mutually reinforcing. Indeed, the medium-term 
performance of the Argentine and Uruguayan economies or the evolution of capital inflows 
after the crisis was influenced by political developments in these two countries and vice 
versa. As a result, the distinctions around which this chapter is structured are somewhat 
artificial, albeit necessary for presentational purposes given the need to categorize the 
various causal mechanisms at play.        
 
7.1  Review of the Literature and Empirical Strategy 
 
A vast empirical literature has tried to evaluate the economic impact of IMF programs in 
emerging and developing economies. This section begins with an overview of the most 
relevant contributions and continues with a description of the analytical approach that will 
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be used subsequently to assess the consequences of IMF interventions in Argentina and 
Uruguay.  
 
Most of the articles reviewed here have adopted an econometric panel data methodology to 
determine whether IMF interventions affect variables such as GDP growth, capital flows, 
income inequality, social spending, the budget deficit, inflation or the real interest rate. 
Much of this literature yields rather pessimistic conclusions about the effects of IMF 
interventions. In fact, the Fund is rarely found to systematically improve its borrowers’ 
economic performance in any of the dimensions that have received most scholarly 
attention, which is partly attributable to the so-called selection problem. This refers to the 
fact that some of the factors that determine whether countries participate in an IMF 
program will also affect their economic performance after the program is approved. As a 
result, it is only possible to isolate the effect of IMF interventions once the determinants of 
program participation have been properly identified and accounted for (Steinward and 
Stone, 2008). Because the countries that request the Fund’s assistance are usually in worse 
circumstances than those that do not, when not properly addressed the selection problem 
tends to bias coefficients, attenuating, neutralizing or even reversing the true effect of IMF 
programs.
143
 This is compounded by the fact that some of the factors affecting both 
selection into IMF programs and subsequent economic performance are inherently 
unobservable.   
 
Therefore, the econometric specifications that have been used to assess the impact of IMF 
programs are as good as the models and methods adopted to correct the selection problem 
described above, which is why table 2.2 only reports the contributions that have tried to 
address this issue. Starting with the articles that have focused on the most common 
indicators of economic performance, a substantial body of empirical evidence has found 
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 However, not all scholars agree on the direction of this bias. Vreeland, for instance, discusses two 
unobservable factors affecting both selection into treatment and the outcome of IMF programs: the 
government’s political will to reform and levels of public trust (Vreeland, 2003). He argues that because these 
unobservable variables are positively associated both with countries’ decision to participate in a program and 
with the success prospects of the program, they tend to introduce an upward bias on the coefficients that 
capture the relationship between IMF interventions and economic performance. Taking these unobservable 
variables into account, therefore, would result in even more pessimistic conclusions about the economic 
consequences of IMF programs.  
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that IMF programs undermine GDP growth even when the selection bias is corrected. This 
may be an inevitable consequence of the conditionality with which the IMF tries to correct 
its members’ macroeconomic disequilibria. In fact, Atoian and Conway (2005) find that 
IMF programs succeed in reducing budget deficits, which is most likely to have a 
contractionary impact on the broader economy. However, this result also turns participation 
in IMF programs into somewhat of a paradox: why would borrowing countries continue to 
request the Fund’s financial support if these interventions are found to systematically 
worsen economic performance?  
 
One possible explanation for this apparently irrational behavior is related with the 
distributional effects of IMF interventions. If such multilateral loans turn out to benefit 
certain elites (for instance through the structural conditionality associated with multilateral 
loans) these constituencies may have an incentive to press their government to request the 
Fund’s assistance in spite of the program’s overall effect on economic performance. 
Bringing support to this hypothesis, Vreeland (2003a) found that IMF programs increase 
inequality as measured by the income share of labor, implying that borrowing countries’ 
elites may benefit from these multilateral interventions. However, not all empirical 
contributions yield the same results. Garuda (2000), for instance, found that IMF programs 
increase the income share of labor and improve income distribution in countries in which 
the economic situation has not deteriorated too much. The distributional argument about 
countries’ participation in IMF programs, therefore, is not entirely convincing. 
 
An alternative explanation is that spurring GDP growth may not be the main economic 
motivation behind the decision to participate in an IMF program. Instead, borrowing 
countries’ governments may have shorter time horizons, turning to the Fund for assistance 
when they need to cover an urgent balance of payment gap irrespective of the overall 
impact that this decision may have on the broader economy. This motivation is likely to 
have gained importance in the context of financial globalization because reversals in the 
capital account tend to be more abrupt and pronounced than in the current account. 
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Therefore, it is not surprising that the question of whether IMF programs catalyze private 
capital inflows has attracted so much scholarly attention in the last decades.
144
  
 
Table 7.1 
Macroeconomic effects of IMF programs
145
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 This line of research has also been motivated by the fact that catalyzing capital flows has become an 
explicit policy objective of the IMF since the wave of emerging market crises that began in the mid-1990s. A 
case in point is the Prague Framework for the resolution of financial crises analysed in chapter 3. 
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 The table reports the signs of the statistically significant correlations found in the literature.  
GDP Growth Inequality 
(income 
share of 
labor)
Inequality 
(Gini 
coefficient)
Budget 
deficit
Education 
spending
Portfolio 
capital flows
FDI Bond 
spreads
Cross-
border bank 
lending
Private debt
Garuda, 2000 - ¹ +/- ²
Prezeworski and 
Vreeland, 2000 -
Eichengreen and 
Mody, 2001 + ³
Bird and 
Rowlands, 2002 -
Mody and 
Saravia, 2003 - ⁴
Hutchinson, 2003 -
Vreeland, 2003a - +
Jensen, 2004 -
Barro and Lee, 
2005 -
Edwards, 2005 + -
Butkiewicz and 
Yanikkaya, 2005 -
Atoian and 
Conway, 2006 -
Dreher, 2006 -
Eichengreen et al. 
2006 -
Díaz-Cassou et 
al., 2006 + ⁵ -
Nooruddin and 
Simmons, 2006 - -
Source: Díaz-Cassou et al. (2006), Steinward & Stone (2008)
¹ Only for countries in middle to high range of economic health indicator
² Decreasing inequality for countries in middle to high range of economic health indicator. Increasing inequality in low range countries
³ For countries with intermediate credit ratings
⁴ Negative impact on spreads for countries in an intermediate situation 
⁵ For preventive IMF programs
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The literature on the catalytic role of the IMF, however, also yields rather pessimistic 
results and no study has concluded that there is an across the board positive impact of 
multilateral lending on cross-border capital flows. But some contributions find that under 
certain circumstances the IMF can increase the propensity of private investors to lend to a 
country. More specifically, the catalytic effect appears to be more intense in borrowing 
countries that are in an intermediate situation in terms of credit ratings or where the 
economic situation has not deteriorated too much (Eichengreen and Mody, 2001; Mody and 
Saravia, 2003; Bordo et al., 2004). This may be due to the fact that investors interpret 
countries’ request for the Fund’s support as evidence of unforeseen problems in strong 
countries and as insufficient measures to cope with the problems of weaker economies. 
Instead, in intermediate situations requesting the Fund’s support may be interpreted as a 
sign of borrowing governments’ determination to tackle vulnerabilities of which investors 
are to some extent somewhat aware. In addition, there is some evidence to argue that 
precautionary programs do a better job at attracting investment and that the catalytic effect 
is more pronounced in bond markets, where investors allocate less resources to analyze 
conditions in borrowing countries, relying instead on the IMF as their “delegated monitor” 
(Mody and Saravia, 2003; Eichengreen et al., 2004; Díaz-Cassou et al., 2006).  
 
Complementing the econometric literature summarized above, the consequences of IMF 
interventions have also been analyzed using case studies.
146
 This disaggregated approach 
has the advantage of offering a context dependent methodology to capture the complexities 
that characterize specific multilateral interventions. However, most of these contributions 
have a common shortcoming: they have failed to compare observed outcomes with a valid 
counterfactual, i.e. with the outcome that would have resulted had there been no IMF 
program in place. This is hardly surprising given that, by definition, counterfactuals are 
unobservable. But in the absence of such a yardstick, case studies tend to yield weak 
evidence about the causal effect of IMF interventions, which is why some contributions 
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 A few examples are: Brett, 1983; Bird et al., 2000; Mussa, 2002; Stone, 2002; IEO, 2004; Pop-Eleches, 
2009; Arpac and Bird, 2009.  
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have tried to identify or construct hypothetical counterfactuals.
147
 Kaplan and Rodrik 
(2002), for instance, used the economic performance of the countries that participated in an 
IMF program during the East Asian crisis as the counterfactual to evaluate Malaysia’s 
decision not to request the Fund’s support and to rely instead on the imposition of capital 
controls. They found that the Malaysian capital controls produced better economic 
outcomes than the IMF-supported programs with which the other countries of the region 
responded to the crisis.
148
 In turn, Díaz-Cassou et al. analyzed the catalytic effect of IMF 
programs comparing the evolution of capital flows in pairs of countries undergoing 
comparable crises and as similar as possible in terms of their attractiveness to foreign 
investors, one having resorted to the IMF for assistance but not the other (Díaz-Cassou et 
al., 2006).
149
 They found that crisis resolution programs tend to have a positive impact on 
foreign direct investment but a negative one on cross-border bank lending.      
 
The analysis presented in this chapter goes in the direction of the few case study 
contributions that have tried to evaluate the consequences of IMF interventions using the 
yardstick of a hypothetical counterfactual. The basic idea exploited here is that the 
aftermath of the suspension of the Argentine program can be used as a counterfactual to 
assess the impact of the massive augmentation of the Uruguayan SBA, and vice versa. This 
is based on the contention that had Uruguay not been rescued in August 2002, the 
government of that country would have been probably forced to adopt measures similar to 
those to which the Argentine authorities resorted after December 2001, such as a 
moratorium on sovereign debt repayments or a freeze on bank deposits among others. 
Conversely, the Argentine government may not have had to resort to such drastic measures 
had the support of the international community been augmented to cover the entire stock of 
sight deposits, as was the case in Uruguay.  
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 For a discussion of the importance of counterfactuals in case study research see George and Bennett 
(2005). 
148
 The Malaysian economic recovery was faster and the fall in employment and real wages more subdued 
than in the other countries of the region.  
149
 More specifically they compare Malaysia and South Korea around the 1997 crisis and Brazil and Colombia 
around the 1998 wave of financial instability in emerging economies.  
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Therefore, differences in the post-crisis trajectories followed by Argentina and Uruguay can 
be partly attributed to these two multilateral decisions, justifying the use of the comparison 
conducted in the following sections as an empirical strategy to assess the causal impact of 
IMF interventions in the Southern Cone. In doing so, this chapter differs from previous 
case study analyses in two respects. First, rather than concentrating on one or a few 
dependent variables, it adopts a broad perspective, using a wide array of indicators to 
capture the economic, political and institutional consequences of the multilateral response 
to the 2001-02 crisis. Second, instead of focusing on the short-term, it analyses the impact 
of these interventions in the medium-term, covering the decade that followed the onset of 
the crisis.  
 
It was argued in Chapter 1 that Argentina and Uruguay are relatively similar countries, 
which is why the choice of these two case studies helps concentrate variation in a few 
explanatory dimensions. However, as emphasized in Chapter 6, there are some important 
structural differences between these two countries.
150
 Failing to factor in this heterogeneity 
could bias the assessment of the consequences of IMF interventions, which is why the 
comparative analysis presented here tries to adopt a differences-in-difference approach 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Wherever possible, therefore, the focus will be placed on the 
evolution of the differences between Argentina and Uruguay before and after the 
multilateral decisions of December 2001 and August 2002. Another methodological 
challenge arises from the fact that the two units of analysis on which this comparison is 
conducted are not independent. Given the level of integration between these countries, 
events in Argentina tend to have a heavy impact on Uruguay. This implies that the 
hypothetical counterfactual that is being used as a yardstick to evaluate the effects of the 
augmentation of the Uruguayan SBA may have had a causal effect on that outcome. It is 
also worth noting that the economic and the politico-institutional consequences of IMF 
programs are inter-related and possibly mutually reinforcing. This makes it difficult to 
disentangle between the two effects, as the following sections try to do. 
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 For example, institutional resilience, the location of veto players and political actors’ ability to cooperate 
were identified as important differences between Argentina and Uruguay. 
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Finally, the empirical exercise presented below may be subject to an endogeneity problem 
because some of the variables that are analysed as outcomes were identified as explanatory 
determinants of the Fund’s response to the Argentine and Uruguayan crises in previous 
chapters. Although it is impossible to establish the magnitude of the biases to which this 
and the aforementioned methodological caveats give rise, whenever relevant and depending 
on the outcome under analysis, subsequent sections will try to identify their direction. 
 
7.2  Economic Performance 
 
Applying the analytical framework described above, this section reviews the evolution of a 
number of indicators in order to assess the economic impact of IMF interventions in 
Argentina and Uruguay during the period that surrounds the 2001-02 crisis. After 
comparing the recovery from the two crises, the performance of the external sector will be 
analysed, first on the side of the current account and then on the side of the capital account. 
The focus will then be placed on macroeconomic management and on the question of 
whether variation in the multilateral response to the Argentine and the Uruguayan crises 
had a lasting effect on the fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies implemented in these 
two countries. Finally, this section will review the evolution of financial intermediation and 
of various poverty and inequality indicators that may have been affected by these 
interventions.  
 
Figure 7.1 shows the evolution of a number of real economy indicators between 1995 and 
2009. The trajectory of GDP growth in the two countries exhibits a high correlation 
throughout this period and, in particular, before and during the recession associated with 
the 2001-2002 crisis. In fact, the cumulative contraction experienced by the Argentine and 
the Uruguayan economies between 1999 and 2002 was of the same exact magnitude: 18% 
of GDP. The subsequent recoveries were also equally impressive, with growth rates 
peaking at 9% in Argentina and 11% in Uruguay in 2005. Afterwards, however, the 
correlation between GDP growth in Argentina and Uruguay declined, suggesting that the 
two economies may have somewhat decoupled. More specifically, between 2005 and 2008 
Uruguay exhibited a slower economic expansion than Argentina. As a result, Argentina’s 
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cumulative GDP growth during the seven years (2003-2009) that followed the crisis was 
45% against 31% in Uruguay. Subsequently, however, the Uruguayan economy has 
outperformed that of Argentina, albeit by a relatively narrow margin.  
 
Figure 7.1 
Real economy indicators
 
      Sources: International Financial Statistics; World Development Indicators
                                       Source: International Financial Statistics and World Development Indicators
-12
-7
-2
3
8
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
GDP Growth (%)
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Per Capita GDP (PPP 2005 US$)
0
4
8
12
16
20
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Unemployme t rate (%)
ARGENTINA URUGUAY
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP)
 205 
Per capita GDP and gross capital formation as a share of GDP also exhibited a high cross-
sectional correlation during this period. For both variables the gap between Argentina and 
Uruguay changed only marginally before and after the crisis, making it difficult to assign a 
significant explanatory power to the multilateral decisions adopted in 2001 and 2002. A 
different picture emerges with regard to the rate of unemployment. This variable converged 
only in the aftermath of the crises, which is quite a remarkable development given that in 
the mid-1990s unemployment was almost twice as high in Argentina as in Uruguay. 
Together with the data on GDP growth described above, this suggests that the August 2002 
bailout may not have helped the Uruguayan real economy to recover faster than that of 
Argentina. If anything, the evolution of the indicators presented in Figure 7.1 suggests that 
Argentina fared better than Uruguay in spite of the suspension of multilateral support.  
 
Although the absence of a discernible positive impact of the Uruguayan multilateral rescue 
on that country’s economic recovery may seem surprising, it is consistent with the 
econometric literature on the relationship between IMF programs and growth summarized 
above. However, a word of caution is in order. This result could be biased as a result of one 
of the aforementioned methodological caveats: the causal link between the hypothetical 
counterfactual, i.e. the aftermath of the suspension of the Argentine program, and the 
outcome of interest. Given that the Uruguayan economy is so exposed to developments in 
Argentina, the potentially beneficial impact of the SBA’s augmentation may have been 
offset by the economic consequences of the suspension of the Argentine program.
151
 In 
principle, therefore, this bias should be expected to have resulted in an underestimation of 
the role played by the IMF in the recovery of the Uruguayan real economy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
151
 Reflecting the significance of the trade linkages between Argentina and Uruguay, in year 2000 over 30% 
of Uruguayan exports were directed to Argentina. In between year 2000 and 2002 Uruguayan exports to 
Argentina fell by 72%. In contrast, only 6% of Argentine exports went to Uruguay in 2000 (data from the 
IMF’s balance of payments statistics). As the crisis all too clearly illustrated, the financial linkages between 
these two economies are also intense, with a substantial portion of Uruguayan bank deposits in the hands of 
Argentine nationals. 
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Figure 7.2 
Terms of Trade  
 
 
In addition, another factor that contributes to explain why variation was so modest in the 
evolution of the real economy variables under review is that the two recoveries were largely 
driven by the same factor: a terms-of-trade shock that enabled Argentina and Uruguay to 
export their way out of the crisis. Figure 7.2 displays the evolution of exchange rates and of 
the price of key commodities exported by the two countries. The devaluation of the 
Argentine and the Uruguayan pesos that took place between 1995 and 2002 was of a 
comparable magnitude: about 300%. However, this trend was smoother in Uruguay 
because of the nature of its exchange rate regime, which was more flexible than 
Argentina’s currency board. After 2003 the exchange rate stabilized in both countries, with 
the Argentine peso exhibiting a mild depreciating trend and the Uruguayan peso a moderate 
appreciation. On top of these heavily devalued exchange rates, after 2002 the price of key 
                             Source: International Financial Statistics
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commodities began to rise markedly, contributing to alleviate the tight external restrictions 
that both economies had suffered prior to the crises. In particular, the price of soybeans 
more than doubled between 2002 and 2008, unleashing a boom in the Argentine and 
Uruguayan agricultural sectors. This exogenous development has tended to reduce the 
significance of IMF interventions as a determinant of the Argentine and Uruguayan 
recoveries. 
 
Illustrating the significance of the aforementioned terms of trade shock, Figure 7.3 shows 
the evolution of exports as a share of GDP, which doubled in both countries after the crisis. 
However, the behaviour of the Argentine and the Uruguayan current account balances has 
diverged markedly. Whereas after 2003 Argentina has systematically reported surpluses in 
the range of 2 to 4% of GDP, the Uruguayan current account has registered substantial 
deficits since 2005, which contrasts with the second half of the 1990s, during which 
Argentina was systematically running larger current account deficits than Uruguay. This 
divergence is partly due to the different impact that the surge in oil prices that took place 
during the second half of the 2000s had on Argentina, a net exporter of that commodity, 
and on Uruguay, a net importer. However, variation in the trajectory of the current account 
can also be attributed to the Fund’s response to the two crises. As will be argued later in 
more detail, the suspension of the IMF program and the events that followed curtailed 
Argentina’s access to public and private sources of credit, making it more difficult to 
finance current account deficits.
152
 Instead, the augmentation of the SBA helped Uruguay 
persistently run current account surpluses. In addition, the surge in capital flows towards 
Uruguay after 2004, which may also be partly attributed to the confidence instilled by 
Fund’s tight involvement in that country, had a strong impact on the tradable sector and, 
hence, on the current account (IMF, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
152
 In fact, in recent years current account surpluses have been necessary to cover net capital outflows. 
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Figure 7.3 
The Current Account 
 
 
 
In fact, an area where changes in the divergences between Argentina and Uruguay are more 
apparent is precisely the behaviour of capital inflows. Figure 7.4 shows that although 
Uruguay temporarily lost access to international capital markets, by 2005 it was already 
able to issue debt abroad on a substantial scale. Argentina, instead, has not yet been able (or 
willing) to normalize its situation in international financial markets. This contrasts with the 
pre-crisis period, when Argentina was a much more active player in international financial 
         Source: World Development Indicators
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markets than Uruguay. Such a development is primarily related with the contrasting ways 
in which the Argentine and the Uruguayan governments restructured their sovereign debt.  
 
But that Uruguay adopted such a market-friendly debt restructuring approach whereas the 
Argentine authorities maintained an aggressive stance vis-à-vis private creditors can only 
be understood in the context of the multilateral actions on which this chapter is focused. 
Having reached a 100% debt to GDP ratio, it is clear that without the official financial 
support that it secured in August 2002 the Uruguayan government could not have remained 
current on its obligations and restructured on such market-friendly terms, imposing no 
nominal losses on investors and leaving no holdout creditors behind. Instead, had the 
Argentine program been massively augmented rather than suspended in December 2001, 
the government might have had the option of avoiding a default and of offering a better 
deal to bondholders, a larger proportion of which would have probably participated in the 
debt exchange.
153
 The contrasting multilateral response to the two crises, therefore, was a 
significant determinant of the subsequent variation in the Argentine and Uruguayan 
capacity to access international financial markets, which brings support to the idea that IMF 
interventions can have an impact on the behaviour of private capital flows in the medium-
term. 
  
The suspension of the Fund’s program and the subsequent default, therefore, impaired 
Argentina’s access to private finance. However, as was argued in Chapter 4, this sequence 
of events also contributes to explain why the Argentine government adopted such a tough 
stance in the negotiations with private creditors, allowing it to reduce its debt stock faster 
than Uruguay. This is illustrated in Figure 7.5, which shows that although the Argentine 
external debt to GNI ratio was significantly higher during the second half of the 1990s and 
increased much more sharply in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, by 2005 it had 
converged to Uruguay’s level. This illustrates a policy trade-off facing governments in the 
midst of a sovereign debt restructuring: a market-friendly approach such as that adopted by 
Uruguay is likely to improve future access to financial markets, but a more aggressive 
strategy vis-à-vis private creditors such as that adopted by Argentina is likely to bring about 
                                                          
153
 In fact, at the time of the suspension of the program the Argentine authorities had already initiated a pre-
emptive debt restructuring process.  
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a faster public de-leveraging. What matters more to this analysis is that in this case the 
adoption of one or the other strategy was influenced by the choices made available to the 
authorities after the suspension of the IMF program in Argentina and the augmentation of 
the SBA in Uruguay. The multilateral response to the 2001-02 crisis, therefore, contributes 
to explain the subsequent evolution of debt stocks in the two countries.     
 
Figure 7.4 
Gross financing via international capital markets (% of GDP) 
 
 
Figure 7.5 
External debt (% of GNI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Source: World Development Indicators
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Figure 7.6 
Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
 
 
In turn, Figure 7.6 suggests that foreign direct investment flows could also have been 
influenced by the Fund’s interventions in Argentina and Uruguay. Whereas prior to the 
crisis the Argentine economy was attracting more FDI flows, after 2002 Uruguay has 
received proportionally much larger volumes of FDI. There are various direct and indirect 
channels through which the contrasting multilateral response to the two crises may have 
contributed to cause this reversal. It might be that long-term investors were reassured by 
Uruguay’s willingness and ability to maintain a tight engagement with the IMF, which 
stood in stark contrast with the conflict that characterized Argentina’s relationship with the 
Fund in the aftermath of the crisis. Changes in the patterns of FDI flows could also have 
been the result of the evolving confidence on the part of long-term investors in the policies 
implemented by the Argentine and the Uruguayan governments, over which the IMF had a 
very different leverage after the decisions adopted in 2001 and 2002. This comparative 
analysis, therefore, provides some evidence to argue that the IMF also had a medium-term 
catalytic effect on FDI flows. 
 
How did macroeconomic management compare in Argentina and Uruguay during the 
period under analysis? Figure 7.7 displays the evolution of two key variables to capture the 
authorities’ fiscal and monetary stance: the primary balance and CPI inflation. Focusing 
first on fiscal policy, Figure 7.7 shows that Argentina and Uruguay departed from a similar 
         Source: World Development Indicators
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situation in the mid-1990s with, at least in appearance, relatively healthy public finances
154
 
However, the two countries responded differently to the onset of the recession: whereas the 
Uruguayan government could adopt a moderately countercyclical position, Argentina 
tightened its fiscal policy precisely when the situation began to deteriorate in 1999. To a 
large extent, this divergence reflects the different constraints imposed by the two countries’ 
exchange rate regimes, with the Uruguayan crawling band providing more room for 
manoeuvre than the Argentine currency board.  
 
Of more relevance to this analysis, after 2002 both countries have registered substantial 
fiscal surpluses of a comparable magnitude. This outcome has been the result of the robust 
economic recoveries described above, but also of the adoption of a conservative fiscal 
stance both in Argentina and in Uruguay. Although it could be argued that the IMF had an 
influence over the design of Uruguay’s post-crisis macroeconomic policies, it seems clear 
that the institution had little leverage over Argentina. This converging fiscal trend, 
therefore, cannot be explained by the contrasting multilateral response to the two crises. In 
other words, based on the evidence presented above it is difficult to argue that the IMF 
played a disciplining role in this policymaking dimension. 
 
At first sight, Figure 7.7 also suggests the presence of a converging trend in the monetary 
policy stance adopted by the Argentine and Uruguayan authorities. Indeed, the pre-crisis 
period departs from wide inflation differentials that gradually narrowed over time and, in 
particular, after the crisis. Again, these initial differentials were primarily due to the 
exchange rate regimes in place in these two countries: whereas Uruguay adopted a gradual 
disinflation strategy with its monetary policy anchored to a crawling band with a pre-
announced depreciation path, Argentina’s currency board constituted a shock therapy that 
had already brought inflation down to single digit levels by the early 1990s. After the 
collapse of the two countries’ pegs to the dollar, the Argentine and the Uruguayan central 
banks sought a new anchor for their monetary policy, focusing on inflation targets rather 
than on the exchange rate. In spite of the large depreciation of the Argentine and 
Uruguayan pesos that took place during the crisis and of the hyperinflation fears that 
                                                          
154
 As argued in Chapter 4, the situation of public finances in Argentina turned out to be much more 
problematic due to the fiscal relationship between the Federal State and the Provinces. 
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prevailed at the time, both countries managed to keep price pressures under control. This 
was broadly perceived as a crucial achievement differentiating this from past episodes of 
financial instability, an outcome that is difficult to relate to variation in the Fund’s response 
to the two crises.  
 
Figure 7.7 
Macroeconomic Management 
 
 
Although a new inflation differential emerged after 2004 with Argentina experiencing 
significantly more intense price pressures than Uruguay, Figure 7.7 suggests that inflation 
rates re-converged in 2007 and thereafter. However, as a result of the Argentine 
government’s interference with the National Statistics Institute (INDEC), official figures 
are believed to be unreliable (Noriega, 2010; The Economist, 2008). Private estimates of 
Argentina’s yearly rates of inflation are as high as 14.5% for 2008, 20.4% for 2009 and 
         Source: International Financial Statistics and ECLAC
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around 25-30% thereafter.
155
 In other words, rather than narrowing, as official data would 
suggest, the inflation differential between Argentina and Uruguay has continued to widen 
in recent years. This trend indicates that after hyperinflation failed to materialize in the 
immediate aftermath of the crises, price stability has constituted a more important policy 
objective for the Uruguayan authorities than for their Argentine counterpart. Variation in 
this outcome could be partially attributed to the disciplining effect of Uruguay’s active 
engagement with the IMF and, therefore, to the multilateral response to the 2001-02 crisis. 
 
Figure 7.8 
Foreign exchange reserves (US$ million) 
 
 
In turn, the Argentine and the Uruguayan exchange rate policies have tended to converge 
over time. As already mentioned several times, in the second half of the 1990s both 
countries were pegged to the dollar, although the Argentine currency board was much more 
rigid than Uruguay’s crawling band. The crisis forced both countries to abandon their peg, 
in Argentina because sustaining it was impossible after the suspension of the IMF program 
and in Uruguay because floating the peso was a pre-condition to augment the SBA. Since 
then both countries have had a dirty float. Figure 7.8 shows the evolution of the stock of 
foreign exchange reserves held by the Argentine and the Uruguayan central banks, which 
has exhibited similarly robust growth rates after the 2001-02 crisis. This implies that both 
monetary authorities have intervened in foreign exchange markets on a substantial scale, 
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 Source: http://www.inflacionverdadera.com/ 
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leaning against the wind in order to avoid or to moderate the appreciation of their currency 
that the Argentine current account surpluses or the capital inflows to the Uruguayan 
economy would have otherwise generated. However, this trend could also be partly 
attributed to the objective of increasing their self-insurance capacity, which has been 
identified as a common motivation behind emerging economies’ accumulation of foreign 
reserves (International Relations Committee Task Force, 2006). In principle, the Uruguayan 
rescue of 2002 could have been expected to reinforce that country’s confidence in the 
multilateral safety net provided by the IMF. However, the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves was faster than in Argentina, suggesting that this was not necessarily the 
case.    
  
Figure 7.9 
Credit to the private sector (% of GDP) 
 
 
Focusing next on financial intermediation, Figure 7.9 shows the evolution of credit to the 
private sector as a share of GDP. Both countries depart from a relatively similar position in 
the mid-90s, with a ratio of 20% in Argentina and about 25% in Uruguay. After 1998, 
however, substantial divergences emerged as credit boomed in Uruguay, peaking at 70% of 
GDP in 2002 only to collapse thereafter in the context of the banking crisis. Although also 
exhibiting a swing, the evolution of this indicator was much smoother in Argentina. What 
is more relevant to this analysis is that the stock of credit to the private sector has remained 
proportionally higher in Uruguay than in Argentina by a substantial margin that has tended 
Source: World Development Indicators
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to widen in recent years (IMF, 2011).
156
 The low level of financial intermediation in 
Argentina (11-14% of GDP) is mostly due to high inflation, to the uncertainty that 
surrounds price statistics and to the fact that boosting credit has not been a priority for the 
Argentine government.
157
 Instead, the Uruguayan authorities have attached more 
importance to price stability, to transparency and to financial deepening (Adler et al., 
2009). It has already been argued that a tight engagement with the IMF imposed an 
additional constraint on Uruguay’s monetary authorities that was absent in Argentina. In 
addition, Uruguay’s greater integration into global financial markets after the crisis, which 
was also made possible by the 2002 bailout, has eased domestic banks’ access to external 
sources of liquidity, thus contributing to the recovery of financial intermediation. 
Therefore, the contrasting trajectories of domestic credit to the private sector in Argentina 
and Uruguay can be argued to form part of a broader process in which the multilateral 
decisions of 2001 and 2002 played a part.  
 
Table 7.2 
Poverty and inequality 
 
 
Finally, Table 7.2 displays the evolution of various indicators of poverty and inequality. 
Although the series are incomplete and may not be fully comparable, some patterns seem to 
emerge. During the crisis poverty increased more sharply in Argentina than in Uruguay, an 
outcome that may be associated with differences in the volumes of external financial 
support available for the two countries to address social emergencies. More recently, 
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 Uruguay’s credit stock has already surpassed 40% of GDP whereas Argentina’s has remained stagnant. 
157
 Evidence of the low priority attributed to financial intermediation is the fact that the so-called cheque tax 
has not been repealed since it was introduced in 2001. The check tax is a tax on financial transactions 
imposed on both credit and debit operations on bank accounts. 
96 98 00 02 04 06 08
Argentina 2 2 n.a. 9,92 8,4 3,39 n.a.
Uruguay 2 2 2 n.a. n.a. 2 2
Argentina 7,02 8,9 n.a. 19,73 15,98 7,34 n.a.
Uruguay 3 3,09 2,26 n.a. n.a. 4,18 4,25
Argentina n.a. 28,8 n.a. 53 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Uruguay n.a. 24,7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina 48,58 49,84 n.a. 52,52 51,28 48,81 n.a.
Uruguay 43,76 45,18 44,56 n.a. 44,83 46,24 47,06
         Source: World Development Indicators
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day 
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however, poverty ratios and inequality have fallen quite markedly in Argentina while 
continuing to rise moderately in Uruguay. These diverging trends may be a reflection of a 
more ambitious social agenda in Argentina, which in turn could stem from the harder 
constraints facing the Uruguayan authorities as a result their tighter engagement with the 
IMF and with international financial markets.      
 
Summing up, this section has used evidence from the Argentine and the Uruguayan case 
studies to assess the economic consequences of multilateral interventions in financial crises. 
One of the most salient results of this analysis is that both countries recovered similarly fast 
from the crisis, which makes it difficult to argue that the Uruguayan rescue had a 
distinctively positive medium-term impact on economic growth. More variation, however, 
is found in other areas. For instance, whereas Uruguay recovered access to international 
financial markets relatively fast, capital flows towards Argentina have remained low. This 
was primarily a consequence of the different way in which the two debt restructurings were 
completed, which in turn was determined by the crucial multilateral decisions of 2001 and 
2002. As a result, it has been argued that the Argentine and the Uruguayan case studies 
bring support to the contention that in the medium-term IMF programs can have a catalytic 
effect on private investment. Regarding macroeconomic management, little variation is 
found in the realm of fiscal and exchange rate policies, with both countries exhibiting 
primary surpluses of a comparative magnitude and accumulating reserves at a similar pace 
after 2002. However, Uruguay’s monetary policy has been more conservative, which could 
be partly attributed to the disciplining effect of an active engagement with the IMF. Credit 
to the private sector also appears to have stabilized at a substantially higher level in 
Uruguay than in Argentina, which is another outcome that may be partly attributed to the 
multilateral decisions adopted in 2001 and 2002.  
 
7.3  Politics and Institutions 
 
This section tries to shed some light on the political and institutional impact of the 
multilateral response to the Argentine and Uruguayan crises. Focusing first on the political 
dimension, it is convenient to distinguish between the short-term and the medium-term 
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consequences of the multilateral interventions on which this chapter is focused. In the 
short-term, the contrast between the two cases could not be greater: whereas the suspension 
of the Argentine program was followed by the succession of events that culminated in the 
abrupt fall of the De la Rúa government, after the last augmentation of the Uruguayan SBA 
President Batlle was able to complete his term in office. In the longer term the Left has 
come to dominate politics in both countries, implying that cross-sectional variation in the 
Argentine and Uruguayan cases is more subtle. A superficial interpretation of these trends 
would suggest that IMF interventions had a marked political impact in the short-term that 
tended to fade away with time. However, it is argued below that the extent to which short-
term cross-sectional variation in the outcome of interest can be attributed to the Fund’s 
interventions is not entirely clear. In contrast, the medium and long-term consequences of 
the way in which the two crises were addressed by the international community turn out to 
be deeper than at first might appear. 
 
The use of the Argentine case study as a hypothetical counterfactual to assess the short-
term political consequences of the augmentation of the Uruguayan SBA is subject to an 
endogeneity problem stemming from the fact that, as argued in previous chapters, these 
interventions were partly determined by political conditions in the two countries. Indeed, 
the Argentine program was suspended partly because the climate of political disunity that 
prevailed in the second half of 2001 made it virtually impossible to articulate a coherent 
crisis resolution strategy. In turn, the Uruguayan program was augmented partly because 
political actors in that country were able to cooperate in order to make sure that the 
government could commit to implement the policy conditions that were needed to secure 
the financial support of the international community. Therefore, basing this empirical 
exercise on a simple comparison between the aftermaths of the two crises without taking 
into account that political factors had a causal effect on the multilateral treatment received 
by each country would overestimate the real impact of IMF interventions on the outcome of 
interest.  
 
In spite of this potential bias, the Argentine experience following the suspension of the IMF 
program is informative about what might have occurred in Uruguay in the absence of the 
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financial support that this country received in August 2002. As was clear during the 
negotiations with the IMF, given the intensity of the run on deposits that was taking place 
at that time in Uruguay, the only alternative to a massive injection of official financial 
resources would have been the imposition of draconian banking restrictions not dissimilar 
from the ‘Corralito’. In Argentina these restrictions were the ultimate catalyser of the wave 
of social unrest that brought the De la Rúa administration down, and it is unlikely that the 
adoption of such a course of action would have left the Batlle administration unscathed. At 
the same time, there is ground to argue that the very same factors that made political 
cooperation possible when the augmentation was being negotiated with the IMF (see 
Chapters 5 and 6) would have mitigated the short-term political consequences of a 
suspension of the Uruguayan SBA, resulting in less instability than that experienced in 
Argentina right after the program was suspended.
158
  
  
What would have been the political outcome of a suspension of the Uruguayan SBA in 
July-August 2002? Given the strains that already existed in the relationship between the 
Colorado and the National parties, it is likely that the imposition of tight limits on deposits’ 
withdrawals would have resulted in the definitive break-up of the coalition.
159
 In turn, the 
severity of the economic situation combined with the authorities’ limited room for 
manoeuvre in the context of the government’s minority support in Congress would have 
forced President Batlle to call early elections, anticipating the victory of the EP-FA-NM. In 
other words, a failure in the negotiations with the IMF would probably have resulted in the 
fall of the Uruguayan government within a matter of weeks or months. But that political 
transition would have caused less stress on the democratic process than in Argentina, and 
the succession of short-lived presidencies and interim administrations that governed that 
country for more than a year after the suspension of the Fund’s financial support could have 
probably been avoided in Uruguay.  
 
                                                          
158
 Chapter 6 contended that Uruguay’s more gradual approach to market reform had allowed for the 
emergence of a stronger systems of checks and balances, which resulted in a more participative and 
cooperative political culture. 
159
 Illustrating these strains, the National Party forced the resignation of the Finance Minister and the 
President of the Central Bank in July 2002. However, it continued providing congressional support to those 
measures that were required to comply with the Fund´s conditionality.  
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Although its success in the negotiations of the multilateral rescue package constituted a 
vital lifeline for the Batlle administration in the short-term, in the longer term it did not 
avoid the disastrous results obtained by the Colorado party in the 2004 elections.
160
 In other 
words, the Uruguayan government ended up paying a heavy price for its management of 
the crisis, which paved the way for the historical victory of the EP-FA-NM that culminated 
Uruguay’s shift to the Left. As emphasized above, in Argentina the Justicialist Party took 
over right after the events of December 2001, which might lead to believe that the political 
shift to the Left occurred faster in that country. But although under President Duhalde the 
Justicialist Party had already distanced itself from Menem’s neoliberal policies while 
beginning to retrieve some elements of the old Peronist rhetoric, it was not until Néstor 
Kirchner’s administrations, especially after his landslide victory in the 2005 mid-term 
elections, that the Argentine government embraced a left-nationalist discourse (Russell, 
2010).
161
 This preliminary analysis of the Argentine and the Uruguayan medium-term 
political trajectories, therefore, suggests the presence of a converging trend that is difficult 
to attribute to the contrasting multilateral decisions adopted in 2001 and 2002. 
 
In practice, however, there are significant differences between the economic policies 
implemented by the left-of-centre governments of Argentina and Uruguay. In spite of its 
former anti-neoliberal rhetoric, the EP-FA-NM has maintained a cautious stance, adopting 
some ambitious pro-poor redistributive programs but avoiding deep transformations in the 
economic structures that it inherited from previous governments (COHA, 2006). In line 
with Lula da Silva in Brazil or Michelle Bachellet in Chile, Tabaré Vázquez and the 
Uruguayan Left have governed from the centre, sticking to economic orthodoxy rather than 
searching for an alternative development model (Tussie, 2009). In contrast, a backlash 
against neo-liberalism has taken place in Argentina, where the Justicialist Party has adopted 
an incrementally heterodox and interventionist policy mix, overturning some core elements 
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 Guillermo Stirling, the Colorado candidate, obtained 10.6% of the vote, almost 30% less than Jorge Batlle 
in 1999. 
161
 Prior to the 2005 elections, Duhalde remained the Justicialist Party’s strongman, restraining Néstor 
Kirchner’s power and autonomy (Sax, 2004). This internal power struggle within the Justicialist party was 
settled with the 2005 Senatorial contest for the Province of Buenos Aires between Néstor Kirchner’s wife, 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, and Duhalde’s wife, Hilda Chiche González de Duhalde, which was won by 
the former (Jones and Micozzi, 2008). Soon afterwards, Néstor Kirchner asked Finance Minister Lavagna to 
step down, getting rid of Duhalde’s last and most prominent ally in the government and further cementing his 
presidential authority. 
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of the economic liberalization process that was embraced during the 1990s (Riggirozzi, 
2009).
162
 Illustrating these contrasting trajectories, Figure 7.10 displays the evolution of the 
Fraser Foundation’s economic freedom index for Argentina and Uruguay.163 It is clear from 
that figure that although by the turn of the century both countries were in a relatively 
similar position according to that index, in the aftermath of the crisis the Argentine and 
Uruguayan commitment to free markets has diverged quite markedly. In sum, 
notwithstanding their common identification with the Left, substantial differences seem to 
have emerged between the policy preferences of the Argentine and the Uruguayan 
governments.  
 
Figure 7.10 
Economic freedom index (ranking out of 141 nations) 
 
 
Comparing Argentina and Uruguay’s relationship with the United States provides another 
indication of these two countries’ contrasting medium-term political trajectories following 
the 2001-02 crises. In November 2005 Uruguay and the United States signed a bilateral 
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 Riggirozzi (2009: 106) describes this policy mix as follows: “What it all points to is the adoption of a 
qualitatively different approach to state responsibility and state spending that stands in sharp contrast with the 
belief in the market of the 1990s and, that, at the same time, echoes some practices from the past, in particular 
from the Peronist government of the mid-1940s. But instead of a semi-closed economy based on national 
promotion of domestic markets and import-substitution, the post-crisis political economy is based on a strong 
state and (governmental) leadership in the economy while taking advantage of the regional and international 
market dynamics that offered opportunities for Argentine export markets.”  
163
 This index of economic liberalization is constructed from a series of indicators that try to reflect conditions 
in five main areas: size of government; legal structure and security of property rights; freedom to trade 
internationally; regulation of credit, labour and business. For More information, see   
http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html. 
Source: Fraser Institute
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investment treaty which entered into force in November 2006. A few months later, in 
January 2007, a trade and investment framework agreement was signed in order to further 
reinforce Uruguay’s economic ties with the US. At this stage, President Tabaré Vázquez 
and some of his Ministers were openly talking about the possibility of signing a free trade 
agreement with the US, a project that ultimately fell short as a result of the opposition of 
some of the more radical factions of the EP-FA-NM and of Uruguay’s Mercosur allies 
(Porzecanski, 2010). In contrast, the Kirchners’ administrations have consistently refused to 
strengthen Argentina’s commercial ties with the United States. Prior to Néstor Kirchner’s 
victory in the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Argentine government was careful to avoid 
direct confrontations with the United States, which is partly related with the occasional 
support that it obtained from the Bush administrations during the negotiations with the 
Fund (see Chapter 4). However, right after these elections, during the Fourth Summit of the 
Americas held in Mar del Plata in November 2005, Néstor Kirchner staunchly opposed 
President Bush’s plan to re-launch the FTAA negotiations while staging his rapprochement 
to Hugo Chávez’s bloc, which marked a turning point in Argentina’s diplomatic 
relationship with the US (Russell, 2010). Subsequently, the Kirchners’ dissent with 
American unilateralism, neo-liberalism and the rules of the world economy became 
increasingly noisy. A case in point was their rebellious stance vis-à-vis the bilateral 
investment treaties inherited from the 1990s, a result of the wave of cases brought by 
foreign investors to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) against the Republic of Argentina following the crisis.   
 
At this point, the question that poses itself is whether the contrasting multilateral response 
to the two crises contributes to explain this cross-sectional variation in long-term political 
outcomes. There are reasons to argue that this might be the case. Chapter 4 described how 
in 2002 and 2003 the leaders of the Peronist movement gradually came to the realization 
that the economy could survive and even thrive without normalizing Argentina’s 
relationship with the IMF. In the meanwhile, as the popular conviction that the international 
community was treating Argentina unfairly gained ground, it became increasingly attractive 
for politicians to portray themselves as tough negotiators with the international financial 
community, further reinforcing the government’s incentives to depart from the Fund’s 
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orthodoxy. In Uruguay the process was exactly the opposite. The perception that the 
multilateral rescue of August 2002 had prevented Uruguay from following the path of 
Argentina provided support to the idea that a close engagement with the international 
community had to be maintained. As a result, the EP-FA-NM was forced to reconsider 
some of the ideological positions that it had traditionally defended.
164
 Therefore, it can be 
argued that while the suspension of the Fund’s support to Argentina contributed to the 
gradual radicalization of the Justicialist Party, the August 2002 bailout contributed to 
moderate the Uruguayan Left. 
 
In addition, there is another indirect channel through which the contrasting multilateral 
response to the Argentine and the Uruguayan crises had long-term political consequences. 
It was shown in section 7.2 that one of the clearest economic effects of these interventions 
was that whereas Uruguay’s integration into the international financial system was 
ultimately preserved, the Argentine government has been unable or unwilling to recover 
market access after the crisis. Given the need to periodically roll-over substantial volumes 
of sovereign obligations, the leaders of the EP-FA-NM have had obvious reasons to be 
cautious about the potential impact of their policies on international investment flows. In 
contrast, the Argentine government has been much less concerned about market sentiment 
and, therefore, freer to adopt a more ideological stance. In other words, reinforcing the 
effect of the diverging policy preferences analysed above, as a result of variation in the 
multilateral response to the two crises international financial markets have imposed 
different policy constraints on the Argentine and the Uruguayan governments.  
 
Long-term political developments in Argentina and Uruguay can also be related with these 
two countries’ institutional contexts. In his analysis of the resurgence of the Latin American 
Left, Francisco Panizza (2005) argued that radical populism has tended to prevail in 
countries with weak institutions. Substantiating this point, he contends that “the electoral 
victory of Néstor Kirchner has to be framed in the context of the de-institutionalization of 
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 Clear evidence of this trend was the harsh criticism to which Tabaré Vázquez was confronted, also from 
members of his own party, when he insinuated during the crisis that Uruguay might have to reconsider its 
relationship with private creditors. (Panizza, 2008). Partly as a result, Vázquez flew to Washington DC prior 
to the elections that he won in order to reassure international financial institutions about the direction of his 
government’s economic policies in a move that resembled that of Lula in 2002.  
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the country’s party system that followed the 2002 economic collapse” (Panizza, 2005: 722). 
Instead, the Left has leaned towards a more moderate social democratic tradition in 
countries with stronger institutions such as Uruguay, contributing to explain the ideological 
stance adopted by the EP-FA-NM while in government. It follows logically from Panizza’s 
analysis that institutions were less affected by the crisis in Uruguay than in Argentina and 
that this contributes to explain these two countries’ divergent political trajectories. At this 
point, the questions to be addressed are whether this was really the case and whether this 
outcome can be partly attributed to variation in the Fund’s interventions.  
 
In order to compare the Argentine and Uruguayan institutional performance during the 
period that surrounds the 2001-02 crisis, Figure 7.11 displays the evolution of a simple 
average of the six aggregate governance indicators elaborated by the World Bank 
Institute.
165
 The data suggests that the crisis had a heavy impact on Argentine institutions, 
whose governance indicators collapsed after 2001. Instead, Uruguay’s governance 
indicators remained fairly stable throughout this period, suggesting that in this case the 
crisis had a relatively modest impact on institutions.  
 
Figure 7.11 
WBI composite governance indicator (ranked from 0 to 100) 
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 These six indicators cover the following areas: voice and accountability; political stability without 
violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; control of corruption. For more 
information about how these indicators are constructed see Kaufman et al. (2010). 
Source: World Bank Institute
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In order to complement the data analysed above, Figure 7.12 displays a disaggregation of 
the WBI composite indicator, comparing the change experienced by each of its six 
components in Argentina and Uruguay between 2000 and 2003. A contrasting trajectory is 
apparent in four of the six indicators, suggesting that the diverging behaviour of Argentine 
and Uruguayan institutions was rather widespread during the years that surround the crisis. 
Regulatory quality, an area that is often addressed by the conditionality associated with 
IMF programs, exhibited the widest cross-sectional variation. However, substantial 
divergences between the Argentine and the Uruguayan case are also observed in 
dimensions that go beyond the narrow focus of IMF conditionality, such as the rule of law, 
government effectiveness or political stability without violence.  
 
Figure 7.12 
Change in the WBI governance indicators (between 2000 and 2003) 
 
 
It is worth noting that the WBI Governance Indicators have been the subject of recent 
scholarly criticism, among other reasons for reflecting policy choices rather than the quality 
of institutions per se (Knack and Langbein, 2010). In order to contrast the validity of the 
results presented above with different data, Figure 7.13 displays the evolution of an 
alternative indicator that aggregates the following six indexes of the International Risk 
Country Guide (IRCG) database: government stability, investment profile, corruption, law 
Source: World Bank Institute
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and order, democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality.
166
 As was the case with the 
WBI composite indicator, the evidence presented in Figure 7.12 suggests that the 
institutional impact of the crisis was significantly stronger in Argentina than in Uruguay. 
Furthermore, disaggregating the ICRG composite governance indicator, as is done in 
Figure 7.14, also suggests that the institutional impact of the contrasting multilateral 
response to the Argentine and Uruguayan crisis was widespread. Indeed, the contrast 
between the two cases is apparent in all but one indicator: bureaucratic quality. According 
to the ICRG data, the two areas where the diverging trajectories followed by Argentina and 
Uruguay were more profound are law and order, and investment profile.
167
 
 
Figure 7.13 
IRCG composite governance indicator 
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 Given their irrelevance for this analysis, there are six IRCG indicators that are not used to construct this 
composite index: socioeconomic conditions (already analysed in section 7.2), internal conflict, external 
conflict, military in politics, religion in politics, ethnic tensions.  
167
 Law and Order refers to the strength and impartiality of the legal system and to the popular observance of 
the law. In turn, the Investment Profile indicator assesses a number of factors that may affect investment risks, 
such as the viability of contracts or the likelihood of expropriations, profit repatriation regulations and 
payment delays. 
               Source: International Country Risk Guide
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Figure 7.14 
Change in the ICRG governance indicators (between 2000 and 2003) 
 
 
The contrasting institutional developments described above may be partly due to the fact 
that Uruguayan institutions were already stronger in the late 1990s and, therefore, more 
resilient to a crisis. In fact, it has been argued above that a suspension of the Fund’s support 
would have probably had a milder impact on political institutions in Uruguay than in 
Argentina, facilitating the transition to a new democratically elected government. But it is 
also likely that the emergency measures that any Uruguayan government would have had to 
adopt in the absence of the multilateral financial support that was secured in August 2002 
would have tended to erode property rights and other economic institutions in much the 
same way as in Argentina. For instance, strict restrictions on deposits’ withdrawals and, 
hence, the quasi-confiscation of people’s savings would have been very difficult to avoid. 
Furthermore, as a result of the financial collapse that would have followed a suspension of 
the IMF program it is likely that the EP-FA-NM would have been much less keen not to 
alter the basic pillars of Uruguay’s economic model, resulting in more volatility in 
institutions such as the central bank or the financial regulator. At least to some extent, 
therefore, a comparison between the Argentine and the Uruguayan case studies suggests 
that IMF crisis resolution interventions can have a significant impact on long-term 
institutional developments.      
 
               Source: International Country Risk Guide
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Summing up, this section has argued that even after acknowledging the presence of an 
endogeneity problem that may bias the results of this empirical exercise, there is evidence 
to argue that the Fund’s interventions had a significant impact on the Argentine and the 
Uruguayan political and institutional post-crisis trajectories. In the short-term, it is clear 
that the suspension of the Argentine program contributed to the fall of the De la Rúa 
government and that the augmentation of the Uruguayan SBA constituted a vital lifeline for 
the Batlle administration. But because political conditions in the two countries were 
important determinants of these multilateral decisions, simply comparing the aftermath of 
the crisis is likely to somewhat overestimate the short-term political consequences of IMF 
interventions. In the longer-term, although the Left has eventually become the dominant 
political force both in Argentina and in Uruguay, the policy stance adopted by the 
Justicialist Party and the EP-FA-NM have diverged quite markedly. This outcome is partly 
attributable to the multilateral response to the two crises, which had a long-term impact on 
the Argentine and Uruguayan governments’ policy preferences and policy constraints, 
radicalizing Argentine Peronists while moderating the Uruguayan Left. The Argentine and 
Uruguayan institutional post-crisis trajectories also appear to have diverged. This may have 
been a direct result of some of the emergency measures adopted by the Argentine 
government after the suspension of the SBA, which were avoided in Uruguay thanks to the 
official financial support obtained in August 2002. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has compared the aftermaths of the Argentine and Uruguayan crises, using 
these two case studies as counterfactual scenarios in order to evaluate the consequences of 
IMF interventions. It has been found that the massive augmentation of the SBA did not 
enable the Uruguayan real economy to recover faster than that of Argentina, a result that is 
consistent with the findings of the econometric literature on this subject. But variation in 
the Fund’s response to the two crises had other important economic consequences, 
particularly on the behaviour of capital flows. Given that the multilateral rescue enabled the 
government to complete a market friendly restructuring, it has been argued that this 
intervention contributed to preserve Uruguay’s integration into the global financial system. 
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Argentina, instead, has not yet normalized its relationship with international creditors since 
the suspension of the Fund’s program in December 2001 and the subsequent sovereign 
default.  
 
In turn, the analysis on the impact of IMF interventions on macroeconomic management 
has yielded mixed results. Whereas the fiscal and exchange rate policies implemented by 
the two governments after the crisis were relatively similar, Argentina’s monetary stance 
has been significantly laxer than Uruguay’s. This development can be related with the 
policy constraints that have resulted from the preservation of Uruguay’s tight engagement 
with international public and private creditors, which was made possible by the multilateral 
support secured by the Batlle administration during the crisis.     
 
On the political side, variation in the multilateral response to the Argentine and Uruguayan 
crises also appears to have had significant consequences. It seems clear that the Fund’s 
interventions contribute to explain why the De la Rúa administration collapsed while 
President Batlle could complete his term in office. But these multilateral decisions also had 
more subtle and longer-lasting effects. For a start, the way in which the 2001-02 crises were 
addressed had a marked impact on policy preferences, moderating the rhetoric of the 
Uruguayan Left while radicalizing the position of the Justicialist Party in Argentina. On top 
of these diverging policy preferences, variation in the Fund’s interventions has shaped the 
two governments’ policy space. More specifically, Argentina’s rupture with the IMF and 
with international financial markets provided more leeway for the authorities to overturn 
some of the core elements of the neoliberal model. The Uruguayan government, instead, 
has been more constrained by its debtor position and by its willingness to remain 
financially integrated into the global economy. Finally, IMF interventions also had an 
impact on institutions, which collapsed in Argentina and were much less affected by the 
crisis in Uruguay.  
 
The analysis presented in this chapter points at the need to go beyond the narrow scope of 
most of the econometric literature on the consequences of the multilateral response to 
emerging market crises. Although crisis resolution IMF programs may turn out to have a 
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rather modest impact on the real economy variables that have received more scholarly 
attention, the Argentine and Uruguayan experiences suggest that these interventions can 
have profound consequences on the political economy of the countries concerned. Indeed, 
these two case studies confirm that financial crises can be important catalysts of change, 
and given that the Fund’s influence is enhanced during these episodes, a deeper 
understanding on the institution’s impact on its borrowers’ political and institutional post-
crisis trajectories is still needed. A particularly relevant extension of this research, 
therefore, would be the testing of the external validity of the causal links identified in the 
cases of Argentina and Uruguay.  
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Chapter 8 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
  
 
 
Three tasks remain for this concluding chapter. The first is to restate the research questions 
and to justify the analytical framework and the empirical strategy that have been used to 
address them. The second is to recapitulate the empirical findings and to put them in the 
context of the IPE literature. The third is to propose avenues for future research, including 
an approach to test the external validity of some of the causal relationships that have been 
examined and the identification of new case studies for the analysis of which this 
dissertation’s analytical framework could be usefully replicated. More specifically, it will 
be argued that the Eurozone crisis provides fertile ground to continue analysing why and to 
what effects specific countries receive different multilateral treatments during episodes of 
financial instability. 
 
8.1 Recapitulating the research design 
 
Over the past decades the IMF has been extensively involved in the management of several 
financial crises. Conventional wisdom holds that IMF interventions are fairly homogenous, 
forcing crisis stricken countries to adopt painful macroeconomic adjustment programs in 
exchange for the emergency financial assistance that the international community provides 
through the Fund. However, finding differences across multilateral crisis resolution 
interventions is not difficult notwithstanding the presence of certain regularities. Some of 
the most relevant axes of variation include the following: the size of programs both in 
absolute and relative terms; the specific macroeconomic and structural conditions 
demanded from debtor nations; the extents to which countries comply with this 
conditionality and the international community tolerates these slippages; the more or less 
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coerced involvement of private creditors in the resolution of the crises. Contributing to 
identify the factors that are behind this variation constitutes a first aim of this dissertation. 
 
But explaining variation in the multilateral response to financial crises is relevant insofar as 
these interventions have an impact on the trajectories of debtor nations or, more broadly, on 
the performance of the global economy. Identifying divergences in the aftermath of the 
crises and of their multilateral treatment is also relatively straightforward. In most of Latin 
America during the 1980s debt crisis or in Indonesia during the Asian financial crisis, the 
policy package associated with the Fund’s interventions contributed to bring about the 
adoption of new development models and, in some cases, far-reaching political transitions. 
By contrast, in Mexico (1994-95), Brazil (1999) or South Korea (1997-99), the multilateral 
response to the crisis prevented rather than induced a major change in the courses of action 
of the countries concerned. Given this array of potential outcomes, gaining a more precise 
understanding about the economic, political and institutional impacts of IMF loans has been 
the second major objective of this research. 
 
The two central questions that this dissertation has addressed through the lenses of the 
Argentine and the Uruguayan case studies, therefore, can be summarized as follows: what 
accounts for the variation observed in the Fund´s response to financial crises and what are 
the consequences of these multilateral interventions? As shown in Chapter 2, the 
determinants and the impacts of IMF loans have received a great deal of scholarly attention 
on the part of both economists and political scientists. What are this dissertation’s analytical 
and methodological contributions to this vast literature? First, this research has relied on 
primary data gathered from extensive interviews with many of the government and IMF 
officials that were involved in the negotiations of the Argentine and Uruguayan programs, 
providing new insights into the way in which these two crises were handled. Second, as 
opposed to most existing contributions, the Argentine and Uruguayan experiences with the 
IMF have been analysed not only on a stand-alone basis but also from a comparative 
perspective. Third, an adaptation of Robert Putnam’s two-level game framework has been 
used to discern the ways in which national strategies and international priorities interact to 
produce distinct outcomes in the Argentine and the Uruguayan cases. Fourth, a hypothetical 
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counterfactual approach has been adopted to establish an analytical yardstick against which 
to compare observed outcomes and, hence, to better approximate the impact of the IMF 
interventions under analysis. Fifth, rather than focusing only on the short-term and a narrow 
set of potential impacts, a broad perspective has been taken to analyse the causal 
relationship between IMF programs and the medium-term trajectories of debtor nations’ 
political economies. 
 
Various reasons justify the selection of the Argentine and Uruguayan case studies to 
address the research questions summarized above. Most of all, the IMF has been a crucial 
and often controversial actor in the contemporary economic histories of Argentina and 
Uruguay, which was the main motivation behind the choice of this dissertation’s topic. 
Furthermore, the Argentine and the Uruguayan case studies pose an analytical puzzle. 
Although most IPE scholars with a research interest in international organizations would 
tend to agree that systemically important countries are more likely to be rescued than small 
players in the global economy, in these cases the international community chose to do the 
opposite, adopting extraordinary measures to support Uruguay while ultimately letting 
Argentina fall. Adding to this puzzle is the absence of clear evidence to argue that the 
multilateral bailout helped the Uruguayan economy to recover faster than that of Argentina. 
This raises questions not only about the effectiveness of IMF interventions but also about 
the motivation behind national governments’ decision to engage in crisis resolution 
multilateral loans conditioned on painful adjustment programs. 
 
In addition, because the choice of the Argentine and the Uruguayan case studies maximizes 
variation in the dependent variable while concentrating variation in relatively few potential 
explanatory dimensions, it fits the logic of a most similar system design relatively well. 
Indeed, although these two countries and their crises share several characteristics, the 
multilateral treatment that they ultimately received ended up diverging markedly. This 
reduced the number of potential explanatory dimensions that could covary with the 
outcome of interest and, hence, from which causation could be inferred, contributing to 
mitigate the problem of over-determination that is inherent to small-N comparative 
analyses. 
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Finally, the Argentine and the Uruguayan case studies are well suited to apply the 
hypothetical counterfactual approach that is used to assess the consequences of the Fund’s 
interventions in the Southern Cone. Given the similarities between the two crises, had it 
lost access to the Fund´s resources the Uruguayan government would have been forced to 
adopt a policy package not dissimilar from that to which the Argentine authorities resorted 
after its program was suspended in December 2001, including a sovereign default and strict 
controls on deposit withdrawals. In turn, if the Argentine loan had been augmented to 
match the size of the Uruguayan program in relative terms, thus allowing the authorities to 
guarantee the financial system’s entire stock of sight deposits, some of the most drastic 
measures adopted in that country after December 2001 would have probably been avoided. 
The Uruguayan case, therefore, provides a hypothetical counterfactual to assess the 
consequences of the suspension of the Argentine program, and vice versa. 
  
In order to address the research questions summarized above, this dissertation has taken the 
following steps. Chapter 2 presented an overview of the literature on the determinants of 
IMF interventions, arguing that in order to gain a more holistic understanding of the factors 
that shape multilateral crisis lending it is necessary to bridge the gap between the domestic 
and the international levels of analysis. For that purpose, an adaptation of Robert Putnam’s 
two level games was developed, from which a number of testable hypotheses were derived. 
However, it was also argued that because the size of win-sets is unobservable and given 
that two-level games are for the most part agnostic about the factors that determine the 
intensity of domestic ratification constraints, this analytical framework is more useful to 
generate new inductive hypotheses linking observable variables with observed outcomes 
than to test deductive hypotheses. This is why a central objective of this dissertation’s 
empirical chapters has been to identify rather than confirm causal associations between 
observable factors pertaining to the ratification processes that take place at the levels of the 
IMF and of its borrowers, and some of the specific features of the multilateral response to 
the Argentine and the Uruguayan crises. 
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In turn, Chapter 3 analysed the evolution of rules in the issue area of multilateral crisis 
lending in order to approximate the structural constraints facing IMF officials in the 
negotiations of the Argentine and the Uruguayan programs. The decade under analysis 
witnessed an intense debate about the reform of the so-called international financial 
architecture that resulted in several changes to the rules governing access to the Fund’s 
resources, the conditionality associated with multilateral loans, and the involvement of 
private creditors in the resolution of financial crises. However, Chapter 3 also argued that in 
the absence of a supra-national authority with the prerogative of hierarchically enforcing 
the rules of the game, the institutional design of the IMF is such that its largest constituents, 
and in particular the US and the G7, retained the power to discretionally break or amend 
these rules. In this context, whether the negotiations of specific IMF programs were 
constrained by rules was ultimately presented as an empirical question. 
 
The core of this dissertations’ empirical analysis was presented in Chapters 4 to 7.  The 
Argentine and the Uruguayan experiences were initially analysed separately, adopting a 
process-tracing approach to unearth the causal paths that explain the longitudinal variation 
observed in the Fund’s interventions in these two countries from 1995 until 2005. Given its 
longitudinal approach, the within-case analysis provided in chapters 4 and 5 focused 
primarily on those explanatory variables that varied more clearly over time, such as the 
outcome of electoral processes, the strength and cohesion of governing coalitions, 
bureaucratic interests or multilateral rules. In turn, Chapter 6 presented a comparative 
analysis, focusing on the cross-sectional variation between the Argentine and Uruguayan 
case studies and, therefore, on more permanent explanatory factors such as some of the 
structural features that differentiate these two countries’ political systems or their size and 
importance in the world economy. Finally, Chapter 7 adopted a hypothetical counterfactual 
approach to approximate the medium-term economic, political and institutional 
consequences of the multilateral decisions adopted during the 2001-02 crisis.  
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8.2 Main empirical findings 
 
Starting with the recapitulation of this dissertation’s most relevant empirical results, the 
evidence provided by the within case longitudinal analysis is consistent with the hypothesis 
of a non-linear association between the intensity of domestic ratification constraints and 
borrowing countries’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the IMF. In line with Stone (2008), during 
the crisis prevention phase and the initial stages of the crisis both the Argentine and the 
Uruguayan governments exploited their limited political room for manoeuvre on various 
occasions in order to moderate the scope of the conditionality demanded by the IMF and to 
obtain waivers for the non-observance of some specific conditions. In the Argentine case, 
however, the gradual intensification of these ratification constraints ended up eliminating 
the overlap between the government and the Fund’s win-sets, and hence the possibility of 
sustaining the negotiations’ cooperative equilibrium. Once that point of rupture was 
reached the Argentine government lost the bargaining power that it had previously had, 
illustrating the risks associated with exploiting domestic political divisions as a bargaining 
tool in the negotiations of an IMF program.   
 
But why didn’t the Uruguayan win-set contract to the same extent even though that country 
was undergoing an equally devastating financial crash in 2002? The explanation for this 
diverging outcome is to be found primarily in the different propensity to cooperate 
exhibited by Argentine and Uruguayan political actors during the crisis. That the Argentine 
government’s stakeholders refused to compromise during the months that led to the 2001 
default made it impossible to gather the political support that would have been needed to 
articulate a coherent response to the crisis and, by extension, to comply with the demands 
of the international community or to bargain for the adoption of a different course of action. 
By contrast, the Uruguayan opposition’s willingness to collaborate with the government in 
order to maintain the support of the international community preserved a larger win-set, 
thus avoiding the collapse of the cooperative equilibrium in the two-level game.  
 
The question then becomes, why was political actors’ propensity to cooperate greater in 
Uruguay than in Argentina during the worst phase of the crisis? Cross-sectional variation in 
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this analytical dimension was related with certain differences in the systems of checks and 
balances that were allowed to emerge from these two countries’ democratization and 
market reform processes. The structural constraints faced by the Uruguayan executive after 
the fall of the military regime forced successive administrations to move by consensus. 
Although this slowed down the pace of economic reform in tranquil times, it encouraged 
political actors to engage in inter-temporal bargaining processes, which fostered 
cooperation when the country was teetering on the brink of collapse. By contrast, President 
Menem centralized power and marginalized the opposition in order to expedite the 
structural transformation of the economy. This brought about a more conflictual decision-
making culture that was not conducive to the sort of inter-temporal bargaining dynamics 
that catalysed political cooperation in Uruguay during the crisis. That both Argentina and 
Uruguay exhibited policy stability and policy adaptability at different points in time 
challenges the view that there is an inevitable trade-off between these two outcomes 
(Tsebelis, 2002; Haggard and McCubbins, 2001). In line with Scartascini et al. (2010), if 
countries with stronger systems of checks and balances are better prepared to respond to an 
emergency, the concepts of policy stability and policy adaptability may be complementary 
rather that substitutive. 
    
The position of veto-players within the Argentine and the Uruguayan polities is another 
variable that contributes to explain cross-sectional variation in some relevant analytical 
dimensions, such as the content of conditionality. Given that these actors are primarily 
focused on the measures that affect their interests, but not necessarily on the complete 
policy package associated with IMF programs, they impose localized rather than global 
constraints on the negotiations with the Fund. As a result, conditionality tends to be weaker 
in areas where veto players’ capacity to block departures from the status quo is stronger. 
This is why the veto power of the provinces resulted in a weaker fiscal conditionality in the 
Argentine case while the right of specific interest groups to trigger referendums resulted in 
a weaker structural conditionality in Uruguay. Mapping out the location of veto actors and 
anticipating how conditionality is likely to impact them, therefore, may help identify which 
components of an IMF program will be more difficult to negotiate and to implement. 
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Previous paragraphs have focused on borrowers´ ratification constraints as an explanatory 
variable, but the Argentine and the Uruguayan case studies suggest that the causal 
association between domestic politics and the negotiation of multilateral lending operations 
can also go in the opposite direction. Depending on the government’s preferences and on 
public perceptions about the IMF, a program relationship can serve different domestic 
political purposes. Consistent with Vreeland (2003b), if the preferences of both sides’ 
negotiators converge and the Fund is not too stigmatized in the domestic political debate, 
the conditionality associated with IMF programs can be exploited by borrowing 
governments as an instrument to legitimize certain courses of action, as was the case during 
the De la Rúa and the Batlle administrations in Argentina and Uruguay. But the Argentine 
case also shows that if negotiators’ preferences diverge and the IMF is stigmatized in the 
domestic political debate, a conflictive program relationship can be exploited to garner 
public support for courses of action that depart from the Fund’s prescriptions, which tended 
to be the case during Néstor Kirchner’s presidency. In both situations the government has 
an incentive to overstate the importance of the Fund’s prescriptions in its decision-making 
process. However, whereas in the first scenario this incentive tends to sustain cooperation 
with the Fund, in the second scenario it tends to undermine it.  
 
Focusing next on the multilateral ratification arena, the Argentine and the Uruguayan case 
studies suggest that there is an association between the cost of no agreement perceived by 
the Fund’s constituents and the autonomy of IMF officials in the negotiations with 
borrowing countries. If the cost of no agreement is perceived to be high, powerful states are 
more likely to interfere in the negotiations, which is broadly consistent with the conditional 
delegation model outlined by Stone (2008). Instead, when the cost of no agreement is 
perceived to be relatively low, technical considerations and bureaucratic politics at the level 
of the IMF tend to dominate the process. Borrowing governments have some leeway to 
influence the cost of no agreement perceived by the Fund’s constituents. For instance, 
Finance Minister Cavallo tried to manipulate international public opinion, Finance Minister 
Machinea threatened to default on Argentina’s debt with multilateral institutions and 
President Batlle exploited his government’s transnational alliance with the US. The extent 
to which these actions tipped the balance in the multilateral decision-making process, 
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however, is not entirely clear, suggesting that borrowing governments’ room for manoeuvre 
is relatively limited in this respect. 
 
This dissertation shows that the causal association between rules and the design of specific 
IMF programs is more complex and bi-directional than at first might be expected. On the 
one hand, rules have been found to impose a generally soft constraint on the negotiation of 
multilateral rescue operations. This was particularly clear in the Uruguayan case when the 
Bush administration did not hesitate to breach recently adopted rules on exceptional access 
to the Fund’s resources and to provide a bridge loan in spite of having committed not to put 
American money at risk in emerging market rescue operations. On the other hand, powerful 
creditors tend to link specific IMF programs to broader normative considerations, which 
can increase the explanatory significance of rules in certain contexts. Some interventions 
may come to be perceived by the Fund’s constituents as an opportunity to change rules 
according to their policy preferences, which will be more likely to occur when important 
reform proposals are on the table, as was the case during the SDRM discussions. That the 
course of action to be adopted in the Uruguayan crisis was linked to the debate about the 
statutory vs. contractual approaches to reforming the sovereign debt regime enabled that 
country’s government to punch above its weight. This contributes to explain why Uruguay 
received a better multilateral treatment than Argentina. 
    
Another variable that had an impact on the Fund’s ratification process was the different size 
of the Argentine and the Uruguayan economies. However, this factor’s overall effect on the 
negotiations is ambiguous. On the one hand, the perception that Argentina had become an 
important emerging market influenced the position of the G7 and the Fund’s internal 
bureaucratic political process, resulting in a prompt reaction to the financial difficulties that 
began to be experienced in 1999. This observation is consistent with a realist view of the 
world according to which the distribution of power is crucial to explain most international 
outcomes. On the other hand, the small size of the loan that was needed to rescue the 
Uruguayan economy made it easier to bail out that country than Argentina, which was a 
decisive factor in 2002. This implies that being large or small constituted an advantage for 
Argentine and Uruguayan negotiators at different points in time. Borrowers’ economic 
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might, therefore, does not appear to be a consistent predictor of the multilateral response to 
financial crises, although the Argentine and the Uruguayan case studies confirm that this 
variable can play an important role in the Fund’s decision-making process.  
 
Moving on to the consequences of the Fund’s interventions in Argentina and Uruguay, the 
contrasting multilateral response to the two crises had a relatively minor impact on the 
evolution of real economic variables such as GDP growth or unemployment. However, 
these IMF interventions had other important economic implications. More specifically, the 
Argentine and the Uruguayan experiences support the hypothesis that the Fund can catalyze 
cross-border capital flows in the medium term. By allowing the government to restructure 
pre-emptively and on market-friendly terms, the multilateral rescue helped preserve 
Uruguay’s integration into the global financial system. By contrast, the suspension of the 
Fund’s support led to a massive sovereign default that contributed to turn Argentina into a 
pariah state for private creditors. A comparison between the aftermaths of the 2001-02 
crises also suggests that, partly through their impact on the medium-term evolution of 
cross-border capital flows, IMF programs can have a disciplining effect on the conduct of 
monetary policy, which was significantly laxer in Argentina than in Uruguay after 2002. By 
contrast, the Fund had a minor impact on fiscal and exchange rate policies, two analytical 
dimensions that exhibited little cross-sectional variation in the aftermath of the crises.  
 
The last relevant result of the empirical analysis presented in this dissertation is that the 
contrasting multilateral response to the Argentine and the Uruguayan crises had important 
consequences on these two countries’ political and institutional trajectories. In the short 
term, the suspension of the Argentine program was one of the factors that triggered the 
collapse of the De la Rúa administration. By contrast, the Uruguayan multilateral rescue 
package was crucial for President Batlle to be able to complete his term in office. Of more 
subtle significance is the argument that over the medium term variation in the Fund’s 
interventions contributed to shape the post-crisis policy preferences and policy space of the 
Argentine and the Uruguayan governments. This is why the multilateral response to the two 
crises helps to explain the moderation of the Uruguayan left while in government and the 
radicalization of the discourse of the Kirchners’ Peronist administrations. In addition, the 
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drastic measures that the Argentine authorities were forced to adopt after the suspension of 
the Fund’s support had negative institutional consequences, which were by and large 
avoided in the Uruguayan case partly as a result of the August 2002 bailout.  
 
8.3 Extensions 
 
Focusing next on the identification of avenues for future research, a first natural extension 
of this dissertation could be to test the external validity of the hypotheses that have been 
discussed in this dissertation. Encapsulating the complexities of the two-level game 
analytical framework in a large-N analysis, however, would be nearly impossible, which 
makes it difficult to find an alternative to the case study approach applied in previous 
chapters. Nevertheless, at least some of the causal associations that have been generated 
and explored in previous chapters could be examined in a larger sample of multilateral 
interventions using a well-defined econometric specification. For that purpose, an 
appropriate codification of the Fund’s Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA) 
database, which tracks the evolution of all programs approved from 1993 onwards, could 
be particularly useful. This database provides comparable data on the evolution of some of 
the defining characteristics of IMF interventions, such as their objectives and the extent to 
which program targets were met, their conditionality and the waivers conceded by the 
Executive Board in successive reviews and whether there were delays in the disbursement 
schedule.
168
  
 
The MONA database could be used to proxy debtor governments’ bargaining power vis-à-
vis the IMF in order to regress this variable against a relevant set of explanatory factors. 
For instance, the number of waivers conceded in subsequent program reviews or the 
proportion of the resources committed under a program that were disbursed could be used 
as the dependent variable. In turn, the intensity of the constraints imposed by domestic 
ratification politics, as measured by the POLCON or the CHECKS variables (see Chapter 
                                                          
168
 Although the complete MONA was only released in 2011, it has already been used by some scholars who 
were given access to it prior to that date (Ivanova et al., 2003; Stone, 2008). These contributions illustrate the 
potential usefulness of this research tool to conduct econometric studies about the determinants of multilateral 
interventions’ success or about the factors that shape the negotiation of IMF conditionality. 
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6), could be included among the regressors. This would be instrumental to test some of the 
predictions of the adapted two-level game framework, such as the presence of a non-linear 
association between the intensity of domestic ratification constraints and borrowers’ 
bargaining power.  
 
Alternatively, the extent to which the location of veto players within domestic polities 
influences the content of the policy strings attached to IMF programs could be examined 
through the 19 categories under which the MONA classifies conditionality. This could be 
done by fitting a categorical dependent variable capturing these various types of conditions 
into a multinomial logit model. The regressors included in such a specification could 
include proxies to locate the position of veto points, such as dummy variables capturing 
whether borrowing countries have a decentralized structure of government or whether 
referendums can be triggered by labour unions or other interest groups. Such a set-up could 
be used to test whether fiscal conditionality (or compliance with fiscal conditionality) is 
weaker in more decentralized states, and whether structural conditionality (or compliance 
with structural conditionality) is weaker in countries in which triggering a referendum is 
possible, as the Argentine and Uruguayan case studies suggest. 
 
An econometric approach could also be used to explore the medium-term impact of IMF 
programs on borrowing countries’ political economies. For that purpose, the dependent 
variable could be derived from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) or the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which 
provide measures of political stability and polarization, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, the rule of law, corruption, democratic accountability or bureaucratic 
quality among others. In turn, some of the dependent variables included in this econometric 
specification could be obtained from the MONA database, which would be instrumental to 
detect correlations between some of the specific features that characterize IMF 
interventions and the evolution of the aforementioned political and institutional outcomes. 
For instance, in line with Ivanova et al. (2003) a proxy for the “success” of IMF 
interventions could be constructed in an attempt to determine whether this variable is 
statistically associated with “better” institutional trajectories in the medium term.   
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Finally, another extension of this dissertation could be the application of its analytical 
framework to study other more recent multilateral rescue operations. As was the case in the 
Southern Cone, the programs that have been approved to support European countries 
evidence the complex inter-connections between domestic and international factors that are 
present in this particular issue area. Therefore, a two-level game analytical framework 
would be appropriate to study these interventions.  
 
However, there are important differences between the Argentine and Uruguayan 
experiences and the Eurozone crisis that are especially apparent at the international level of 
analysis. Whereas Argentina and Uruguay are at the periphery of the world economy, the 
current crisis has unfolded at its core, affecting countries that belong to a coalition with a 
heavy weight in the Fund’s decision-making architecture. As a result, the cost of no 
agreement perceived by the Fund’s most powerful constituents has been much higher 
during this crisis. This is why even in relative terms the Argentine and the Uruguayan 
programs pale in comparison with the volumes of financial assistance that have been 
mobilized to support Ireland, Portugal or Greece.  
 
Another difference between the two situations is that the management of the Eurozone 
crisis has involved various supra-national institutions like the European Commission or the 
ECB, with which the IMF has formed a so-called Troika in charge of the negotiations. 
Given the peculiarities of the European decision-making architecture, the level II game has 
been extremely complex, empowering not only large creditors such as Germany and France 
but also much smaller players such as Finland or the Netherlands. The multiplicity of veto 
players and of ratification arenas present in this complex institutional framework has 
generated a sense of sclerosis, and European leaders have often been blamed for their 
inability to gain the upper hand on economic issues and to address the contradictions of the 
monetary union.  
 
In spite of these differences, some of the causal mechanisms outlined in this dissertation 
could be at play in the Eurozone crisis. For instance, domestic political divisions may have 
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been exploited by some of the governments in distress in order to gain leverage in their 
negotiations with the Troika. A case in point is Georges Papandreu’s decision to hold a 
referendum on the conditions of the Greek rescue package. This move might have been 
aimed at gaining some political room for manoeuvre domestically in order to expand 
Greece’s win-set at a time in which the cooperative equilibrium of the negotiations with the 
Troika had come under intense pressures. However, it might also be that the referendum 
was announced in order to put the spotlight on the narrowness of the Greek win-set and, in 
this way, to press the Troika into softening the policy conditions of the rescue package. 
Such episodes deserve an in depth analysis in order to deepen our knowledge about the 
causal link between domestic ratification constraints and the negotiation of financial 
rescues. 
 
In light of this dissertation’s empirical results, another question that would merit a close 
examination is whether differences in borrowing countries’ configurations of political 
institutions are having an impact on the various crisis mitigation operations in place. The 
location of veto-players within these countries’ polities together with differences in 
political actors’ propensity to cooperate could contribute to explain the cross-sectional 
variation observed in these processes. A preliminary interpretation of events suggests that 
this has been the case. For instance, the veto-power exerted by labour unions and other 
vested interests in the Greek bureaucracy has been emphasized as one of the main factors 
that have made it difficult to progress with structural reform in that country. In turn, 
political actors’ inability to cooperate in order to pass a fiscal consolidation plan is one of 
the reasons why the Portuguese government ended up being rescued in April 2011. 
Similarly, the polarization and fragmentation of the Italian party system has stood on the 
way of macroeconomic adjustment, triggering various rounds of financial instability. 
Finally, the decentralized structure of the Spanish state is making it difficult to reign on 
public finances in that country. 
 
The Argentine and the Uruguayan case studies are also useful to speculate about the 
potential consequences of alternative courses of action. It is likely that if official support 
was to be suspended, the Greek government would be forced to adopt emergency measures 
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similar to those implemented by the Argentine authorities after December 2001. A 
sovereign debt default would be unavoidable, the euro would most likely be substituted by 
a new currency and strict controls would have to be enacted in order to avoid the complete 
bankruptcy of the banking system. In addition, contracts would have to be redenominated 
into a new currency, which would probably entail a re-allocation of the costs of crisis 
among debtors, creditors and other economic interests. If the Argentine experience is of any 
guide, all these measures would result in an economic, political and institutional collapse 
with profound consequences. However, a sharp devaluation of the new drachma could also 
become an engine for economic growth that is currently missing, as was the case in 
Argentina when the convertibility regime was dropped. 
 
Alternatively, maintaining or expanding the Greek rescue package could make the 
resolution of that crisis look closer to the Uruguayan case. A pre-emptive rather than a post-
default debt restructuring might be successfully completed, the euro could be maintained 
and hence the economy’s contracts would not have to be re-denominated and the 
aforementioned banking and capital controls could be avoided. This might mitigate the 
political and institutional costs of the crisis. However, keeping the euro would make it 
much more difficult to regain competitiveness. This constitutes a crucial difference with the 
Uruguayan experience, where the recovery was primarily fed by a terms-of-trade shock in 
the absence of which the outcome of the crisis could have been very different. Therefore, 
the Uruguayan case study provides an imperfect guide of what may occur in Greece or in 
any of the other European country in distress if the financial muscle of the rescue packages 
was to be maintained or reinforced. Indeed, the policy trade-offs that are being confronted 
in the management of the Eurozone crisis look even starker than those faced in the 
Southern Cone a decade ago.  
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Buenos Aires 
 
 Eduardo Amadeo, Ambassador to the United States (2002-2003). July 26, 2010. 
 Daniel Artana, Chief Economist at Fundación FIEL (Fundación Investigaciones 
Económicas Latinoamericanas). July 27, 2010. 
 Jorge Baldrich, Secretary of Finance (2001) and IMF economist (2003-2005). 
August 2, 2010. 
 Lisandro Barry, Secretary of Finance (2002-2003). September 13, 2010 
 Andrés Borenstein, British Government´s Chief Economist for South America. 
July 16, 2010. 
 Domingo Cavallo, Economy Minister (1991-1996 and 2001). July 21, 2010. 
 Aldo Ferrer, Economy Minister, founder of Grupo Fénix, a group of Argentine 
economists opposed to neo-liberal economic policies. July 20, 2010. 
 Sebastián Katz, Head of Research at the Argentine Central Bank, BCRA. July 
19, 2010. 
 Miguel Kiguel, Undersecretary of Finance and Chief Advisor to the Minister of 
the Economy (1996–99). July 29, 2010. 
 Roberto Lavagna, Economy Minister (2002-2005). July 20, 2010. 
 Eduardo Levy Yeyati, scholar, banker, former IMF economist. September 6, 
2010.  
 José-Luis Machinea, Economy Minister (1999-2001). July 13, 2010. 
 Leonardo Madcur, Under-Secretary of Finance (2002-2006). July 29, 2010. 
 Daniel Marx, Finance Secretary (1999-2001). June 28, 2010. 
 Federico Molina, Financial Representative of the Argentine Government in the 
United States (2002-2006). July 26, 2010. 
 Carlos Rodríguez, Secretary of Economic Policy (1997 - 1998) and Chief of the 
Cabinet of Economic Advisors (1996-1998). September 20, 2010. 
 Roberto Russell, scholar UTDT. June 21, 2010. 
 Jorge Todesca, Economy Vice-Minister (2002). July 19, 2010. 
 Jorge Tokatlian, scholar UTDT. June 25, 2010. 
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Montevideo 
 
 Isaac Alfie, head macroeconomic advisor at the Finance Ministry (1995-2003). 
23 July 2010. 
 Alejandro Atchugarry, Finance Minister (2002-2003). July 5, 2010. 
 Jorge Batlle, President of the Uruguayan Republic (2000-2005). July 4, 2010. 
 Alberto Bensión, Finance Minister (2000-2002). July 6 2010. 
 Julio de Brun, President of Uruguay´s Central Bank (2002-2005). July 27 2010. 
 Ariel Davrieux, Director of the Planning and Budget Office (1985-2004). July 7, 
2010. 
 Luis Alberto Lacalle, President of the Uruguayan Republic (1990-2005), Leader 
of the Partido Nacional (1999-2005). July 23, 2010. 
 Claudio Paolillo, Journalist, Director of Búsqueda Magazine. July 23, 2010. 
 Carlos Steneri, Financial adviser, Uruguayan embassy, Washington DC (1989-
2010). September 16, 2010. 
 Ernesto Talvi, Academic Director of CERES (Center for the Study of Economic 
and Social Affairs), Chief Economist of Uruguay´s Central Bank. July 27, 2010. 
 
Washington DC 
 
 Luis Cubeddu, IMF economist, Resident Representative in Buenos Aires (2001-
2003). April 22, 2011. 
 Claudio Loser, Director of the Western Hemisphere Department (1994-2002). 
April 26, 2011 
 Ernesto Ramirez, IMF economist, Resident Representative in Buenos Aires 
(2004-2005). April 28, 2011. 
 Anoop Singh, Director Western Hemisphere Department (2002-2007). April 27, 
2011. 
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 Teresa Ter Minassian, Deputy Director of the Western Hemisphere Department 
(1997-2000), Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department (2001-2007). April 28, 
2011. 
 Gilbert Terrier, IMF Senior Advisor, Economist at the Western Hemisphere 
Department, Chief of Mission of the Uruguayan Program (2002-2004). April 26, 
2011. 
 
Madrid 
 
 Paulina Beato, Head of the International Financial Markets Division, Inter-
American Development Bank (1995-2005). June 8, 2010. 
 Enrique Iglesias, President of the Inter-American Development Bank (1988-
2005). June 9, 2010. 
 Federico Poli, Argentina´s Finance Ministry Chief of Staff (2002-2003). June 2, 
2010. 
 
London 
 
 Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Research Economist, IMF (1994-2005). April 22, 2010. 
 
Phone Interviews 
 
 Nancy Jacklyn, US Executive Director at the IMF (2002-2006). May 16, 2011 
 John Taylor, Under-Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (2001-
2005). 5 April, 2011. 
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The Reform of the International Financial Architecture: Key Decisions 
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 G7 summit - Halifax, 
 1995 - June 
IMF Board 
1995 - September 
G7 summit - Lyon,  
1996 - June 
Rey Report issued 
 by the G-10 
Official Finance • In the aftermath of the 
Mexican financial crisis, the 
G-7 urges the IMF to create 
an “International Financing 
Procedure”.  
• Call for doubling the 
resources available through 
the General Agreement to 
Borrow. 
 • Urge to complete the 
quota review. 
• The Board approves the 
International Financing 
Procedure. 
•The new procedure was 
expected to accelerate 
program negotiations in a 
situation of emergency. 
•It has been used on 6 
occasions by the Philippines, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Turkey 
and Georgia.  
• Few mentions to 
financial crises. 
• However, the 
communiqué raises the 
issue of the possible 
issuance of SDRs. 
 
Private Sector 
Involvement 
• There are no explicit 
mentions to PSI. However, 
the G10 Ministers and 
Governors are encouraged 
to explore “other” ways to 
address financial crises.  
  • The Report rejected 
Jeffrey Sachs proposal of 
creating an international 
bankruptcy court. 
• Collective Action Clauses 
proposed for the first time. 
• The IMF urged to lend 
into arrears also on bonded 
debt. 
Conditionality • The new Emergency 
Financing Mechanism will 
be subject to a 
“strong”conditionality. 
   
 271 
 G7 summit - Denver,  
1997 - June 
Annual meetings, Hong-
Kong, 1997 - September 
IMF Board 
1997 – December 
G7 summit - Birmingham, 
1998 - May 
Official Finance • Again, little mention to 
the reform of the 
International Financial 
Architecture. 
• However, the need for an 
equity” allocation of SDRs is 
mentioned. 
• Agreement for a quota 
increase, pending approval 
from US Congress. 
• The Board approves the 
SRF in order to help 
countries facing 
“exceptional” pressures in 
their BoP. 
• “Normal” access limits 
were not to apply to the 
new facility, which would 
be subject to higher 
charges. 
• The Asian financial crisis 
has already erupted. 
• The G7 welcomes the SRF 
as the right instrument to 
address exceptional BoP 
pressures. 
Private Sector 
Involvement 
  • Although no mention to 
PSI is made yet, the Board 
emphasizes the need to 
ensure the participation 
of private creditors until 
the BoP pressures are 
overcome. 
• For the first time, the 
emphasis is placed on PSI 
as a crucial instrument to 
address financial crises.  
• Influenced by the Korean 
experience, the idea of 
coordinated bank roll-overs 
is high on the agenda. 
Conditionality     
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 G7 Leaders' Statement on 
the World Economy  
1998 – October 
IMF Board 
1998 – October 
IMF Board 
1999 – April 
G7 summit - Cologne,  
1999 - June 
Official Finance • They welcome the 
establishment of a 
“precautionary facility, 
which was the first step 
towards the establishment 
of the CCL. 
• A mention is made about 
the desirability of an 
emergency facility at the 
World Bank. 
• Reform of the policy of 
Lending Into Arrears. 
• The Fund is allowed to 
countries that have fallen 
into arrears in their bonded 
debt. 
• Introduction of the 
Contingent Credit Line 
(CCL), a “precautionary 
line of defense against 
future balance of 
payment problems that 
may arise from 
contagion”. 
• Demanding eligibility 
criteria, as a result of 
which no country 
requests it. 
 
 
• The G7 states that no 
financial assistance should 
be provided to countries 
that are heavily intervening 
in F/X markets if the 
exchange rate is not 
considered to be 
sustainable. 
 
Private Sector 
Involvement 
 • This measure seen as 
crucial step to reinforce the 
Fund’s potential role in 
sovereign debt restructurings 
in contexts of securitized 
debt. 
 • Much emphasis placed on 
PSI. Wherever possible, 
crisis management should 
be aimed at promoting 
cooperative agreements 
between debtors and 
creditors. 
•It is stated that CACs 
should be promoted in 
bond contracts. 
•Claims on bondholders 
should not be senior to 
bank loans. 
Conditionality    • Enhanced monitoring to 
succeed program 
conditionality introduced. 
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 Meltzer Commission 
Report, 2000 - March 
G7 summit – Okinawa 
 2000 - July 
Prague Framework 
2000 - September 
Interim Guidance Note 
2000 - September 
Official Finance • The Commission argued 
that the IMF should act as a 
quasi lender of last resort 
to solvent but illiquid EMEs. 
• It also recommended 
shortening the maturity of 
IMF loans, which should 
carry a penalty rate. 
• Streamlining of IMF 
facilities: CCL; SBA/EFF; SRF; 
PRGF 
• Reform of the CCL to make 
it more attractive financially, 
and more automatic. 
However, eligibility 
standards remained 
unchanged. 
• Welcomed the review of 
IMF facilities. 
• In pure liquidity crisis in 
which the combination of 
catalytic official financing 
and policy adjustment 
should allow the country 
to regain market access. 
•Fund conditionality should 
cover only structural 
reforms that are relevant 
for a program's 
macroeconomic objectives. 
• Among the structural 
reforms that maybe 
considered macro-relevant, 
only thosethat are critical 
to meet the program's 
macroeconomic objectives 
should be included. In 
other words, to be part of 
conditionality, reforms 
should be both relevant 
and critical. 
• If certain structural 
reforms are critical for the 
program but outside the 
Fund's core area of 
responsibility, the Fund 
should seek advice from 
the World Bank or other 
institution both to design 
and monitor that condition. 
Private Sector 
Involvement 
• The Meltzer Report made 
little mention to PSI. 
• Promotion of CACs. 
• All programs should 
include DSAs. 
• Distinction between pure 
illiquidity situations, 
intermediate cases and 
situations of insolvency. 
• Emphasis on comparability 
of treatment to private 
creditors. 
 
• In intermediate cases 
emphasis should be 
placed on encouraging 
voluntary approaches to 
overcome credit 
coordination problems. 
• In pure solvency crises a 
comprehensive debt 
restructuring should be 
considered. 
Conditionality • The commission 
advocated for the 
introduction of an ex ante 
conditionality articulated 
through a number of pre-
conditions establishing 
countries’ financial 
soundness.  
•Conditionality should focus 
on macro issues and on 
structural reforms that have 
a macro impact. 
• Ownership critical for 
success of IMF programs 
•Post program monitoring to 
keep track of policies 
implemented while IMF loan 
is still outstanding. 
• EB urged to review all 
aspects of policy 
conditionality. 
• The IMF must focus on 
its mandate of macro 
stabilization and 
adjustment,  
monetary, ER, fiscal 
policies, financial 
sector issues, especially 
systemic issues. 
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 Review of Fund Facilities 
2000 - November 
G8 Finance Ministers 
Meeting, Rome 
 2001 - June 
G8 summit – Genoa 
 2001 - July 
Anne Krueguer launches 
first SDRM proposal. 2001 - 
November 
Official Finance • Elimination of a few 
obsolete facilities. 
• Further attempts to 
enhance CCL. 
•Changes in the EFF's Time-
Based 
Repurchase Expectations. 
• Changes in the charges on 
the use of Fund resources. 
In particular, increase of 
the charges on exceptional 
access credit, and reduction 
in the charges of the CCL. 
The surcharge was now to  
start at 150 bp rising with 
time up to 
350 bp. 
• Calls for a review the  
requirements and 
procedures used to 
determine access to IMF 
financing. 
• Commitment not to top-up 
the resources provided by 
the IMF 
 
• Few mentions to IFA 
issues, reflecting 
the relative calm of the 
moment (the Argentine 
crisis yet to erupt). 
 
Private Sector 
Involvement 
• Calls for a review of the 
policy of Lending Into 
Arrears. 
• Emphasis placed on the 
need for Debt Sustainability 
Assessments. 
• Emphasis on CACs and 
information sharing. 
 • The debate about the 
contractual vs. statutory 
debt restructuring 
mechanism begins. 
Conditionality • Post-program monitoring: 
presumption that countries 
will engage in PPM 
after the program's 
expiration when 
outstanding credit 
surpasses 100% of quota. 
   
 275 
 Second SDRM proposal.  
2002 - April 
Taylor's speech at the 
Institute of International 
Economics. 2002 - April 
G8 Finance Ministers 
Action Plan on Crisis 
Prevention and Crisis 
Resolution. 2002 - April 2 
G7 summit – Kananaski 
 2002 - July 
Official Finance   • The agenda for the 
exceptional access 
framework is set. 
• Few mentions to IFA.  
• Briefly mentions the 
Argentine crisis without 
saying anything 
substantive. 
Private Sector 
Involvement 
• Second proposal 
somewhat limited the role 
that the IMF would play in 
an SDRM. 
• Just one day after the 
second SDRM proposal was 
issued, John Taylor made a 
speech which made clear 
that the US was in favor of 
CACs rather than a statutory 
solution to the debt 
restructuring issue. 
 
• Clear support to the 
promotion of  
CACs in debt contracts. 
• At this stage they still 
support the IMF's efforts 
to develop a new 
approach to sovereign 
debt restructurings 
(SDRM). However, they 
also state that such work 
should not delay the 
adoption of CACs. 
 
Conditionality     
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 IMF Board 
2002 - September 
IMF Board 
2002 - September 
Mexico issues first bond 
issuance with CACs. 2003 
- September 
G8 Finance Ministers 
Meeting, Washington. 
2003 - April 
Official Finance • Adoption of the 
exceptional access 
framework.  
• It defined four criteria for 
the IMF to lend above 
normal access limits. First, 
members should be 
experiencing exceptional 
pressures in their capital 
account. Second, their debt 
should be sustainable and 
expected to remain so in 
the future. Third, they 
should have a high 
probability of regaining 
access to international 
financial markets quickly 
after the IMF’s 
interventions. Fourth, the 
policy roadmap backing 
these IMF program should 
have a strong prospect of 
success. 
   
Private Sector 
Involvement 
 • Successful first issuance 
of bonds with CACs 
torpedoes the debate 
about the adoption of an 
SDRM. 
• Renewed support to the 
promotion of CACs in 
sovereign bonds. 
• Mentions the Code of 
Good Conduct, a voluntary 
attempt at guiding debt 
restructuring processes. 
Conditionality • Approval of new 
Conditionality Guidelines. 
•  Expected to lead to fewer 
and more focused structural 
conditions and to greater 
involvement of national 
authorities in program 
design. 
 • Assessed progress with 
the reform of 
conditionality. 
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 G7 summit – Evian 
 2003 - July 
IMF Board 
2003 - November 
G7 summit – Sea Island 
 2004 - July 
G7 summit – Gleneagles, 
 2005 - July 
Official Finance • Few mentions to the IFA 
process. 
• Support to the Brazilian 
program. 
• Due to lack of demand, the 
Contingent Credit Line is 
eventually let to expire. 
• Global economy in good 
shape, no financial crisis 
anywhere in the world. 
• No mention to IFAs 
apart from the usual 
support to CACs  
and to the Code of 
Conduct. 
• No mention to IFA issues. 
Private Sector 
Involvement 
    
Conditionality     
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The Argentine Financial Crisis: Key Decisions 
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SBA approval 
1996 – April 
EFF approval 
1998 - February 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Russian 
 
Default 
 
 
1998  
August 
 
 
New Labor Law Passed 
1998 – September 
1st Program Review 
 1998 - September 
• SDR 720 mn.  
• 46.8% of quota. 
• 21 months 
• Focused primarily on 
fiscal reform and on 
privatizations. 
• It also envisioned a labor 
market reform. However, it 
did not set formal 
benchmarks on this reform. 
• Structural conditionality  
not very demanding. 
• Fiscal targets unmet, in 
spite of which the program 
was never interrupted. 
• Approved in precautionary 
terms. Argentina never made 
use of the resources committed 
under the program 
• SDR 2080 mn. (135.3% of 
quota). 
• Staff had serious misgivings 
about this EFF due to a lack of 
progress with labor market 
reform. However, management 
acquiesced to the Argentine  
demands. 
• Structural conditionality 
focused on labor market 
reform. 
• Emphasis on fiscal 
adjustment. In hindsight, 
however, the IMF recognizes 
that it failed to press the 
government into adopting a 
counter-cyclical macroeconomic 
stance. 
• This is the last time a 
discussion about a possible exit 
from the convertibility regime 
was seriously considered. 
• This labor law fell far short of 
expectations and the Fund's 
staff considered it highly 
Inadequate. Initially, the Fund´s 
staff argued in favor 
of postponing  the review of 
the program. 
• Management and the EB, 
however, did not share that 
view, and the first review was 
approved soon afterwards.  
• This was partly due to 
concerns about conditions in 
international financial markets 
following Russia's default. 
• The IEO report considers that 
this law epitomizes the Fund's 
failure at being tough on 
structural conditionality. 
 
• In spite of the 
disappointment with the 
labor law, the Fund’s 
document stated that  
"all quantitative 
performance criteria 
have been met and 
substantial progress has 
been made in the 
implementation of 
structural reforms” 
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Brazilian 
Crisis 
(massive 
devaluation 
of the real) 
 
1999 
January 
 
 
Fiscal Responsibility 
Law passed 
1999 - August 
Presidential Elections 
1999 - October 
1st Program Review 
 1998 - September 
SBA approval 
2000 - March 
New Labor Law  
2000 - April 
• It established a 
schedule to reduce the 
deficit at all levels of 
government, starting in 
1999 until 2003.  
• It failed. 
• Fernando de la Rúa 
and the Alianza wins. 
• The presidential 
election gave rise to  
a small spending spree. 
• Duhalde, the 
Governor of the 
Buenos Aires 
Province, was the main 
contender. He 
spent a lot on 
patronage. 
• Menem also spent a 
lot on the campaign, 
although he 
eventually did not 
contend in the 
elections. 
• In 1999 the debt to 
GDP ratio rose from 
41% to 47%. 
• As a result, 
departures from the 
Fund´s fiscal 
conditionality became 
increasingly apparent. 
• In spite of the 
disappointment with 
the labor law, the 
Fund’s document 
stated that 
 "all quantitative 
performance criteria 
have been met and 
substantial progress 
has  
been made in the 
implementation of 
structural reforms” 
• Originally treated as 
precautionary 
• SDR 5.4 billion 
(US$7.2 bn). 
• GDP growth 
expected to rebound 
to 3.4% in 2000. It 
ended up being  close 
to 0.8%. 
• Focus on fiscal 
consolidation. 
• Emphasis on 
structural reform, and 
especially on the 
reform of the labor 
market. 
•The new law was 
aimed at complying 
with the SBA’s 
structural 
conditionality. 
• A corruption scandal 
related with the 
approval of this law 
would later result in 
the resignation of 
Vice-President 
Alvarez. 
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13% reduction in 
civil servants wages  
2000 -May 
Change in the 
program’s targets 
2000 - September 
The “Blindaje” 
2001 – January 
Minister Machinea 
resigns 
2001 - March 
Minister Lopez 
Murphy resigns 
2001 – March 
• This wage 
reduction was not 
contemplated in the 
conditionality of the 
2000 SBA. 
• However, the 
Fund’s staff 
welcomed this 
measure 
• The IMF agrees 
to accommodate a 
higher than 
expected deficit 
for year 2000.  
• Brought the total resources committed by the 
IMF to US$13.7 bn, SDR 10.6bn equivalent to 
500% of quota 
• One fifth provided under the SRF 
• Additional  commitments from other IFIs 
(US$5bn) and from the government of Spain ( 
US$1bn). 
• The headline figure associated with the 
program was US$40bn 
• The program was quite frontloaded: 106% of 
quota disbursed immediately and 3 more 
installments of 46% of quota disbursed in 2001.  
• The package was supposedly backed by other 
US$20bn committed by Argentine financial 
institutions and pension funds. However, these 
resources failed to materialize. 
• The emphasis that was placed on PSI in the 
“Blindaje” is explained by the Prague Framework 
for Crisis Resolution, which had just been 
approved.  
• The program relaxed fiscal conditionality, 
while emphasizing the need to stabilize debt 
dynamics in the near term. 
• However, 5 out of 6 Performance Criteria were 
related with fiscal variables. 
• Federal deficit targeted at US$6.5bn. 
• In return for this looser fiscal conditionality, the 
Argentina government committed to implement 
an ambitious agenda of structural reforms in the 
medium-term measures (pension system 
reform, fiscal, health system reform, etc…) 
• The Blindaje was 
followed by a few 
weeks of relative 
stability.  
•However, the 
situation 
deteriorated in 
February as 
sovereign spreads 
resumed their 
escalation partly 
because of concerns 
about contagion 
from the Turkish 
crisis. 
• When Congress 
fails to pass some of 
the structural 
reforms 
contemplated in the 
Blindaje, Minister 
Machinea resigns. 
• Ricardo Lopez 
Murphy takes over 
the Finance Ministry. 
 
• Right after taking 
office, Lopez 
Murphy announces 
a deficit reduction 
package of 
 US$2 billion. 
• Various senior 
Argentine officials 
react by tendering 
their resignation, 
rendering LM’s 
position untenable. 
• After less than 
three weeks in 
office, LM is forced 
to resign. 
• Domingo Cavallo 
takes over the 
Finance Ministry. 
• On March 27, 
Cavallo obtains 
“superpowers” from 
the Argentine 
Congress 
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Third review of the program 
approved 
2001 – May 
Introduction of the 
“Convergence Factor” 
2001 - June 
Megaswap 
2001 – June 
“Zero deficit plan” 
Announced 
2001 - July 
Augmentation of the 
program 
2001 - August 
• In spite of the controversial 
measures introduced by Cavallo 
and of the fact that the program 
was clearly off-track, the Board 
approved the review. 
• The main reasons alleged by 
staff were: 
1- The strength of the new 
measures adopted by Cavallo, who 
was given the benefit of the doubt 
2- The authorities new found 
commitment to the program 
suggested in a show of support of 
Congress granting exceptional 
powers to  the executive 
3- Fear of the impact of an 
Argentine collapse on the region 
and on other EMEs. 
• Waiver for the non-completion 
of the fiscal target approved. 
 
 
• The convergence factor was 
aimed at mimicking the  
impact of a devaluation 
through a system of taxes on 
imports and subsidies on 
exports.  
• Both the subsidy and the 
tax would be calculated 
according to the difference 
between 
the prevailing exchange rate 
and a basket X/R. 
• There was a discussion at 
the Fund to determine 
whether this did constitute 
an (illegal) system of multiple 
X/R.  
• The market interpreted this 
measure as a clear sign that 
the convertibility regime was 
no longer sustainable. 
• Voluntary debt 
exchange aimed at 
moderating short-term 
debt servicing 
obligations. 
• The swap yielded a 
reduction of debt 
service obligations of 
US$12bn in between 
2001-05 
• The swap carried a 
long-term cost US$66bn 
in higher debt service 
obligations after 2005. 
• It was conducted at a 
time in which spreads 
were in the range of  
900-1000bp. 
•This was another 
decision taken 
unilaterally by the 
Argentine authorities. 
• However, the Fund 
has been heavily 
criticized for not 
opposing it more 
adamantly. 
• This measure 
followed a failed 
treasury bill auction. 
•The zero deficit plan 
mandated the 
government  to 
introduce across-the-
board proportional 
cuts in primary 
expenditure in order 
to meet any deficit. 
This would ensure an 
automatic response to 
any deficit. 
• Congress eventually 
passed it as a law. 
• Utter failure to 
reduce country risk: 
spreads jumped from 
1200 bp to 1600 bp. in 
the aftermath of the 
plan. 
• A total amount of US$ 
8 billion of new money: 
sdr 6.3 BN. 
• SDR3.97 bn made 
available through the 
the SRF. This amount 
was disbursed 
immediately. 
• It raised the size of the 
program to 800% of 
quota - SDR17.5 bn 
($22bn) 
• This was the second 
largest disbursement 
in the history of the IMF 
• US$1000mn provided 
by IADB and WB. 
• US$3 bn set aside for 
eventual debt 
Restructuring, an 
explicit demand from 
Paul O’Neill 
• The zero deficit rule. 
• Commitment to 
introduce legislation to 
reform Argentina's 
revenue-sharing 
arrangement with the 
provinces. 
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Dismal fiscal figures 
released 
2001 - October 
Legislative 
elections 
2001- October 
The debt restructuring is 
announced 
2001 - November 
Review of the 
program 
2001 - December 
Phase I of the debt 
restruct. completed 
2001 – December 
The government 
collapses 
2001 - December 
• The government 
announces that 
revenue have fallen by 
14% and that, in 
accordance with the 
zero deficit rule, 
public expenditures 
will have to be cut by 
$900 million. 
• The resulting fiscal 
restraint on the part 
of the central 
government forces 
various provinces 
to start issuing their 
own currencies, such 
as the PATACON 
issued by the province 
of Buenos Aires to pay 
pensioners, suppliers, 
etc… 
• The Justicialist 
Party wins 
majority at both 
chambers of 
Congress. 
• The Peronists 
also win most 
governorships. 
• The election´s 
results greatly 
result in a drastic 
weakening of the 
Alianza´s political 
position. 
• President De la Rúa 
addresses the nation to 
announce the launching of 
a debt restructuring. 
• The debt restructuring is 
to be articulated in two 
steps: the first one for 
domestic debt and the 
second one for external 
obligations. 
• Standards and Poors 
downgrades Argentina to 
"selective default". 
• Spreads surpass 2300 bp. 
• The IMF disagreed with 
the discrimination between 
domestic and external 
creditors. 
• The IMF pulls the 
plug off. 
• A successful 
completion of that 
review would have 
allowed the  
disbursement of 
US$1.24 billion in 
December. 
•By the time of the 
review, the Argentine 
government had 
acknowledged that 
the 2001 budget 
deficit would be much 
larger than the target 
agreed with the IMF 
($7.8bn as opposed 
to$6.5bn). 
• In addition, the 
government had failed 
to reach a convincing  
agreement with the 
provinces. 
• Domestic debt with 
a face value of 
US$41bn and an 
additional US$10 bn 
of provincial debt was  
exchanged for loans 
collateralized with 
revenues from the 
financial transaction 
tax. 
• NPV loss of 26%.  
• Various incentives 
attached to this 
exchange, including 
the tax collateral, 
the possibility for fin 
institutions to value 
the debt at par rather 
than marked to 
market 
• Also, an option was 
given to claim back 
the original bonds if 
any further change 
was added to the 
terms of this exch. 
In fact, many pension 
funds would claim 
these bonds back 
later. 
• State of 
emergency declared 
on December 19. 
• President De la 
Rúa resigns on 
December 21. 
• The Justicialist 
Party takes over, 
with a rapid 
succession of short-
lived governments. 
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Default 
2001 - December 
¨Economic Emergency Law¨ 
passed 
2002 - January 
¨Corralón¨ approved 
2002 – January 
¨Amparos¨begin 
2002 - January 
Mario Blejer becomes 
President of the CB 
2002 - January 
• On December 23 
Rodríguez Saá 
announces the 
Argentine default. 
• Originally, the default 
amounted to 
US$66 billion. 
•  It barely affected  
residents given that 
phase I had already 
been completed. 
 • Later, however, and 
especially following 
the pesoization, the 
volume of domestic 
debt in default became  
substantial. 
• The peso is devalued, and 
fixed to 1.4 per dollar.  
• A"free dollar" market 
established for financial 
transactions. This measure 
established a dual exchange 
rate system: the 1.4 pesos per 
dollar would only apply to 
trade.  
• Multiple exchange rate 
regimes are explicitly 
prohibited under the Fund's 
articles of agreement. 
• Ratification of the Corralito. 
• The price of utilities is also 
peso-ized. 
• Debts with a value of less 
than 100,000 dollars are also 
peso-ized.  
• In order to avoid the 
liquidation of bankrupt firms, a 
new bankruptcy law passed. 
 
 
• The corralón was the 
re-programming 
of time deposits.  
• According to Levy 
Yeyati, this is what 
Cavallo should have 
done because time 
deposits corresponds 
to "savings", which 
were being drained 
out of the system and 
converted to dollars. 
Instead, sight deposits 
were crucial for day to 
day transactions. 
• These deposits were 
returned in pesos 
at an exchange rates of 
1.4 to the dollar 
and indexed to the CER, 
Coeficiente de 
estabilización de 
referencia, which did 
essentially capture 
inflationary pressures 
• Judges begin to order 
the so-called amparos¨, 
forcing banks to return 
deposits in their original 
currency denomination.  
• This resulted in a 
constant leak from the 
banking system, 
which was on the verge 
of resulting in its 
collapse. 
• The Amparos 
triggered a bitter 
Conflict between the 
Executive and the 
Judiciary. 
• Before returing to 
Argentina he was an 
IMF official. 
• It is broadly 
recognized that he 
made a good job , 
refusing to print money 
to finance the 
government. This was 
one of the reasons 
behind the stabilization 
that was achieved by 
the Argentine economy 
in 2002: the dreaded 
hyperinflation that 
never materialized. 
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Modification of the 
Bankruptcy Law 
2002 - January 
Remes Lenicov announces a new set of emergency 
measures 
2002 - February 
The exchange rate 
regime is unified 
2002 - February 
IMF creates a Special 
Department to deal 
with the Arg crisis 
2002 - February 
• The Argentine 
government weakens  
creditors rights in order 
to avoid the widespread 
bankruptcy of firms 
to generate a further 
transnationalization 
of the economy.  
• The basic idea was 
to reduce the right for 
creditors to become the 
owner of bankrupt 
debtor firms. 
• This was a 
controversial move, 
which was supposed to 
be temporary.  
• The IMF 
strongly opposed it. 
•  Asymmetric pesoization: banks liabilities were converted 
at a rate of 1.4 pesos to the dollar while their assets were 
converted at a rate of 1 peso to the dollar. This imposed 
huge losses on banks, triggering a huge debate on whether 
bansk should be compensated.  
• The government was eventually forced to compensate 
banks through Bonds (according to Bonelli, there was an 
agreement from the beginning to compensate banks). This 
measure proved to be very costly for the Argentine 
government, which throughout 2002 had to issue massive 
amounts of debt to compensate banks for the losses 
incurred as a result of the asymmetric pesoization. 
• Loser argues (pp248) that the asymmetric pesoization 
was the result of the pressures exerted by important 
debtors such as Clarin, which wanted to see a substantial 
portion of their debts written off. 
• The Argentine peso is floated. According to Amadeo, the 
floating of the peso was partly aimed at reaching a deal 
with the IMF. By that time, a dual X/R was de facto 
functioning: the "parallel" peso was exchanged at more 
than 2 to the US$. Still, the central bank continued 
to intervene, which was a source of discussion with 
Argentina. Later, Argentina was forced to let the peso truly 
float. 
•  Additional measures of fiscal austerity are announced. 
• This enabled 
Argentina to comply 
with a legal 
requirement from the 
IMF, which bans 
countries from 
running dual exchange 
rate regimes. 
• This is a crucial 
development at the 
IMF.  
• It effectively  
took the WHD out of 
the way. Anoop 
Singh is appointed 
head of this 
department, signaling 
the much tougher 
stance that the Fund 
was to adopt on 
Argentina. 
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Agreement with the 
Provinces 
2002 - February 
Argentina floats the 
peso 
2002 – February 
Pesoization of 
guaranteed loans 
2002 - March 
Export taxes 
introduced 
2002 – March 
IMF mission to 
Buenos Aires 
2002 – March 
The run on the 
peso aggravates 
2002 - March 
• The Federal 
government takes over 
the debt of the 
provinces. 
 • In return for financial 
assistance from the 
central government, the 
provinces with the 
greatest imbalances sign 
"Programas de 
financiamiento 
ordenado" 
• In essence, the federal 
government made its 
financial support 
conditional on the 
implementation of a 
number of provincial 
policies, among which 
was the commitment 
not to use "semi-
currencies" 
• The argentine 
government claims in 
the 2004 paper that 
the IMF forced it to 
take this step.  
• The IMF did not  
want Argentina to use 
its reserves, which in 
fact belonged to the 
Fund given that 
Argentina's net 
reserve position with 
the Fund was 
negative. 
• According to the 
government, this 
move had significant 
inflationary 
consequences. 
• The guaranteed 
loans that were 
exchanged by 
domestic creditors 
during phase I of 
Cavallo´s exchange are 
pesoized at an 
exchange rate of 1.4 
pesos to the US$. 
•As a result, many 
domestic creditors 
exerted their right to 
claim back the 
original bonds.  
• Some other 
creditors (such as 
pension funds) were 
forced to do so when 
they become too 
vocal of their criticism 
about the 
government. 
• These taxes were 
imposed on 
primary products, 
oil and agro- 
industrial products. 
• This measure 
turned out to be 
crucial, especially 
with the increase in 
the price of 
commodities that 
was about to 
begin. 
• Revives hopes 
for an IMF 
arrangement 
• Amadeo 
describes the 
many 
reservations 
that the IMF still 
had, especially 
with regards to 
judicial safety 
and to provinces´ 
bonds.  
• A crucial point 
of agreement 
was that the 
Fund allowed 
Argentina to 
negotiate a social 
safety financial  
package with the 
WB and IADB for 
an amount of 1.7 
to 2% of GDP. 
• Partly as a result 
of the increasing 
pace of the 
"amparos" and of 
the lack of 
progress with the 
IMF, the peso 
accelerates its 
depreciation vis-a-
vis the dollar.  
•  This fed the risk 
of a hyperinflation 
not only because 
of the surge in 
liquidity, but also 
because many 
prices were 
indexed to the 
dollar. 
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Program ¨jefes y jefas 
de hogar¨ launched 
2002 - April 
Pre-conditions for an 
IMF program clarified 
2002 - April 
¨Plan Remes¨ 
launched 
2002 - April 
Minister Remes 
Lenicov resigns 
2002 - April 
14 points pact 
2002 - April 
¨Ley Antigoteo¨ 
passed 
2002 - April 
 A crucial step to 
soften the social 
impact of the crisis.  
• It was a program of 
fiscal transfers to poor 
families. 
• Anoop Singh tells 
the press what the 
Fund expects from 
Argentina in order to 
sign a new program:  
• Fiscal consolidation 
(zero deficit) 
• Control over 
provincial finances, 
and especially over 
provincial bonds and 
quasi-money issuance. 
• Normalization of the 
financial system 
with a gradual 
eradication of the 
Corralito. 
• Changes in the "Law 
of Economic 
Subversion" and the 
"bankruptcy law". 
• The Plan Remes was 
aimed at closing 
the Corralon by 
comulsorily 
exchanging 
the reprogrammed 
time deposits by  
bonds (Bodenizacion).  
• The parliament 
rejected it. 
• Largely because 
of the 
Parliament´s 
rejection of his 
plan, Remes 
Lenicov resigns at 
a time in which 
the banking 
system is one 
more time on the 
verge of 
collapsing due to 
the Amparos. 
• Roberto 
Lavagna takes 
over. 
• Duhalde´s 
government reaches 
a pact with the 
provinces. It outlined 
a strategy to address 
the crisis: 
• Integrate Argentina 
in the world econ. 
• Sign individual 
fiscal pacts with all 
the provinces within 
15 days. 
• Submit a new 
coparticipation law 
to Congress 
• Maintain prudent 
fiscal and monetary 
policies to combat 
hyperinflation 
• Find a suitable exit 
to the Corralito 
• Take actions to 
bring about a solid 
financial system. 
• Change the 
bankruptcy law and  
withdraw the 
economic subversion 
law.  
Etc… 
• This law was 
aimed at stopping 
the amparos from 
being enacted. 
 288 
Interventions in FX 
markets begin 
2002 - May 
New Bankruptcy Law 
2002 - May 
Derogation of the 
Economic Subversion 
Law 
2002 - May 
Compensation to 
banks agreed 
2002 - May 
Mario Blejer resigns 
2002 – June 
 
The Avellaneda 
Crimes 
2002 - June 
• In order to stop the 
depreciation of the 
peso. 
• In addition, capital 
controls are 
introduced. 
• This was done 
against the will of the 
IMF, which signals the 
adoption of a tougher 
negotiating stance on 
the part of the 
Argentine authorities. 
• This was one of the 
precondition that the 
Fund ask for a 
program. This step 
might have been 
aimed at softening the 
impact of the FX 
interventions. 
• As opposed to the 
derogation of the  
law of economic 
subversion, the 
modification of this 
law did not carry 
a substntial political 
cost for the 
Duhalde 
administration. 
• This law had been 
introduced by the  
Military, enabling the 
State to take judiciary 
actions against those 
involved in harmful 
economic activities.  
• This law had never 
been used during the 
democracy. However, 
after the crises, there 
was a popular 
demand to use it to 
punish the capital 
flight that preceded 
the collapse.  
• The IMF insisted 
that Argentina 
should eliminate this 
law as a prior  
action to approving a 
new program. 
• This was a very 
tense negotiation in 
Congress, and 
eventually the 
government managed 
to derogate it.  
• The government 
agrees to 
compensate banks 
for the asymmetric 
conversion of their 
assets and 
liabilities. 
• In order to do so, 
they will issue new 
domestic bonds: 
the BODENs. 
• Aldo Pignanelli 
takes over as head of 
the Central Bank. 
• Pignanelli proposed 
a plan to free the 
corralito which was 
substantially 
different from that of 
the Ministry in that it 
was much faster. 
 • This created 
important rifts 
between the BCRA 
and the economy 
ministry, especially 
because Pignanelli 
held parallel talks 
with the IMF 
 
• Police kills two 
piqueteros in 
Avellaneda. 
• These crimes 
greatly weakened  
Duhalde's political 
position. It would 
be crucial for him 
to take the decision 
to anticipate 
presidential 
elections. 
 289 
¨Expert commission¨ 
travels to Buenos 
Aires 
2002 - July 
The financial system 
begins to stabilize 
2002 – July 
Duhalde calls for early 
elections 
2002 – July 
Paul O´Neil travels to 
Buenos Aires 
2002 – August 
Negotiations of a 
Letter of Intent with 
the IMF 
2002 – August 
Extension of 
Repurchase 
Expectations 
2002 - September 
• This commission, 
which was Kohler´s 
idea, was expected to 
mediate and come up 
with a basis for an IMF 
program. It was yet 
another failure in the 
negotiating process. 
• It was formed by 
Andrew Crocket, John 
Crow, Hans 
Tietmeyer and Luis 
Angel Rojo. 
• Primarily through its 
interventions in  
F/X markets and 
through the new 
LEBAC, the BCRA 
accumulates  
reserves for the first 
time, and the stock 
of deposits in the 
banking system 
begins to expand. 
• The President finally 
concluded that  
democratic legitimacy 
was crucial to 
go forward with the 
reforms. 
• Amadeo describes 
how, early on in the 
process, Roberto 
Lavagna tried to build 
a consensus among 
the candidates on  
some central points of 
consensus about 
how to manage the 
economy. 
• Lavagna told him 
that Argentina was 
not asking for "fresh" 
resources, but only for 
a rollover of existing 
obligations.  
• Apparently, this 
greatly softened 
O'Neill's stance, and 
after that he began 
supporting a new 
program for 
Argentina. 
• The program 
proposed by the  
government included 
an ambitious set of 
structural reforms,  
a prudent 
macroeconomic policy 
and a plan to free the 
financial system. 
• And yet, a series of 
worrisome 
developments in 
August reinforced the 
sensation of a lack of 
juduciary security in 
Argentina: the courts 
declared Cavallo's 
reduction of 13% in 
the salaries of civil 
servants 
unconstitutional. 
This raised the 
question of whether 
the government 
would have the space 
to implement its 
programs.  
• The repayment 
expectations of 
obligations for an 
amount of SDR 
2.8 billion were 
extended by one year. 
• These repayment 
expectations arose 
from the SRF. 
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New disagreements 
emerge 
2002 - October 
Argentina delays 
payment to the IMF 
and the World Bank 
2002 - November 
End of the Corralito 
2002 - December 
G7 decides to support 
Argentina 
2002 - December 
The Board discusses 
the Argentine 
program 
2002 – December 
Argentina threatens 
to default on IADB. 
2003 – January 
• These disagreements 
were centered on the 
prior actions that the 
IMF demand: a primary 
surplus of no less than 
4% of GDP. Argentina 
was willing to reach 3% 
of GDP. The Fund 
demanded tax spikes 
which the government 
refused to adopt. 
The BCRA interventions 
in F/X markets 
continued to be 
controversial. The IMF 
wanted prices to reach 
their market  
equilibrium. 
•  The IMF wanted 
Argentina to drop all F/X 
and capital controls. 
•  The IMF wanted 
Argentina to classify 
banks into three 
categories: solvent, 
undercapitalized, 
insolvent. 
• In the words of 
Nielsen: 
"That was properly 
interpreted as 
preparation to 
default to a Bretton 
Woods institution, 
sending a signal 
to the G7 that there 
would be a price 
to be paid by the 
international  
community for 
cornering Argentina 
and the surrender of 
policy design 
to a few hardliners 
in Washington". 
• Sight deposits are 
finally liberated. 
• The liberation of 
sight deposits was a 
success. Not only was 
it not followed by a 
run on the peso with 
the liberated deposits, 
but most deposits 
stayed in the banking 
system. 
• The Fund's 
management is 
instructed  to  
soften its position and 
to adopt a more 
cooperative stance 
with Argentina. 
• The Fund's 
management and 
staff argued AGAINST 
the approval of the 
program arguing that 
inconsistencies 
persisted in the policy 
mix to which the 
Argentines were 
committing. 
• More specifically, it 
was feared that  
the Supreme Court 
could order  the 
re-dollarization of all 
deposits, which would 
cause a collapse of the 
banking system. 
• No consensus could 
be reached to approve 
the program, as some 
European EDs 
opposed it. 
 
• The week before the 
IMF program was  
Approved, substantial 
Argentine following 
repayments were due 
to Washington’s IFIs: 
US$681mn to IADB 
US$998mn to IMF 
US$ 805mn to WB 
(the 805mn in default 
since November). 
• This happened two 
days before the 
program was signed, 
as new demands 
emerged on the side 
of the IMF. 
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A new transitory 7 months SBA approved 
2003 – January 
SBA’s first review 
2003 - March 
Kirchner’s victory 
2003 - April 
SBA’s second review 
2003 - June 
Argentina misses 
payment on IMF 
2003 - September 
• Amount: SDR2174.5mn (US$2980 or 103% of 
quota). Together with further extensions of 
repurchase expectations, this amount fully 
covered Argentina's repayment expectations 
until August 2003. To all effects, it was a roll-
over of existing obligations. However, it did not 
compensate for the net repayments that the 
Argentina was forced to make in 2002. 
• The program carried a soft conditionality, 
setting a quantitative PC for the first two 
months: primary surplus of 2.5% of GDP. 
• Few well-targeted structural conditions: 
draft legislation for fiscal reform, regulatory 
actions targeted at the banking system, 
appointment of an external advisor for the debt 
restructuring. 
• This program was approved under the 
LIA policy. Disbursements, therefore, required 
good faith in the negotiations with private 
creditors. 
• The overall purpose of the program was to 
help the political transition in Argentina. It 
would give the new government resulting from 
the April elections some space (three months) 
to negotiate a new "long" agreement with the 
IMF. 
•Disbursement of 
SDR226mn or 
US$307mn. 
• The Federal 
Government’s primary 
surplus exceeded the  
program's targets, in 
stark contrast with 
previous programs. 
• However, the Board 
approved waivers of 
non observance of the 
structural 
performance criteria 
on the issuance of 
new banking 
regulations and on the 
congressional 
approval of the fuel 
tax conversion to an 
ad valorem tax. 
• The new 
administration had 
three months to 
negotiate a new 
program before the 
expiration of the 
January SBA. 
• Kirchner took an 
even tougher 
negotiating stance 
than his predecessor.  
 
• SDR 226.2 mn 
(US$320mn released). 
• Again, some waivers 
for the non-
observance of certain 
structural criteria had 
to be granted. 
• Argentina missed a 
payment of US$2.9 
billion.  
• This is the largest 
payment ever missed 
to the IMF. 
• It was a 24 hours 
default. 
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3 year SBA approved 
2003 - September 
¨Dubai Terms¨ 
disclosed 
2003 – September 
SBA’s first review 
2004 – January 
Kohler resigns 
2004 - March 
Argentina on the 
verge to miss another 
payment to the Fund 
2004 – March 
• SDR8.98bn (US$12.55bn or 424% of quota). 
• Again, a de facto roll-over of Argentina's 
Obligations to the Fund. 
• Fiscal conditionality defined as a floor of 3% 
of GDP primary surplus for 2004. Undefined 
fiscal targets for 2005 and 2006. As opposed to 
traditional IMF programs, the fiscal adjustment 
path was therefore left undefined. 
• Because the program restrained from 
specifying a fiscal adjustment path, it provided 
no guidance as to what the Fund expected the 
debt exchange to look like. 
• Few structural conditions including fiscal 
reform and the modernization of tax 
administration, establishment of an 
intergovernmental revenue sharing system, 
phasing out of distortionary taxes, 
compensation to banks for asymmetric 
pesoization. 
• Hector Torres argues that the weight that the 
IMF attributed to the negotiation of a new 
revenue-sharing law with the provinces 
constituted an obstacle to the approval of such 
a law, because it provided political weight for 
the smaller provinces to oppose it, arguing that 
it was an IMF imposition. 
• Another point of contention was monetary 
policy. The Fund argued in favor of a monetary 
contraction. Instead, Prat-Gay opted for a 
loosening of monetary policy. 
• Coinciding with the 
IMF/WB meetings in 
Dubai, the  
government makes its 
first restructuring 
offer to bondholders. 
• The government 
was offering 25 cents 
to the dollar. It did not 
recognize past due 
interests. 
• The offer was 
received with dismay 
by bondholders. 
Because of the non 
recognition of past 
due interests, 
investors valued it as 
10 cents to the $. 
• This review was 
delayed as a result of 
the slow progress with 
the debt restructuring 
(bad faith criterion 
under the LIA policy). 
Initially, this review 
was scheduled for 
December 18. 
• Various countries 
abstained from voting 
in the EB. Some of 
these countries (Japan, 
UK, Italy) were 
members of the G7.  
• This anticipated the 
much tougher position 
that the G7 was about 
to adopt in the 
negotiations with 
Argentina. 
• He was always 
perceived as a 
hardliner in the 
negotiations with 
Argentina. 
• Rodrigo Rato 
becomes the new 
Managing Director. 
•The Argentine 
government threatens 
with missing  a 
payment of US$3100 
mn unless staff 
recommends the 
Board to approve 
the second review. 
• The G7 is initially 
opposed to accepting 
this pressure  and 
Argentina is on the 
verge of defaulting. 
• John Taylor 
intervenes and 
Argentina does 
eventually make the 
payment, as staff 
commits to 
recommend the 
approval of the  
second review. 
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SBA’s second review 
2004 – January 
“Dubai plus” terms 
disclosed 
2004 - May 
The Fund tells the 
government that the 
third review will not 
be approved 
2004 – July 
Pseudo suspension of the 
SBA 
2004 – August 
Fiscal Responsibility 
Law passed 
2004 - August 
Extension of 
repurchase 
expectations 
2004 – September 
• The key points of 
contention for the 
approval of the second 
review of the SBA were 
centered on  the debt 
restructuring 
negotiations. 
• The Fund asked the 
Argentine  government 
to accept the Global 
Committee of Argentine 
Bondholders as the valid 
counterpart of the debt 
negotiations. 
• It also asked the 
government to change 
the Dubai terms. 
• These demands were 
drafted in deliberately 
ambiguous terms. 
• New debt 
restructuring offer. 
• Investors valued it 
at close to 25 cents 
to the dollar. 
• The government 
offered three bonds: 
a par 35 years bond 
with very low yields; 
a discount bond 
with a 66.3 nominal 
haircut and a higher 
yield; a quasi par 
bond designed for 
pension 
funds with a 30% 
nominal haircut, 42 
years and low 
interest rates. 
• This new offer 
included past due 
interests until 31 
Dec 2001 and from 
31 Dec 03. 
• The bonds offered 
by the government 
were linked to GDP 
growth. 
• The reason was 
Argentina´s slow 
progress with 
structural reform, and 
especially with the 
renegotiation of 
utilities´ prices and 
with the new fiscal 
pact with the 
provinces. 
• The impression that 
the government was 
not acting in good 
faith in the 
negotiations with 
private creditors also 
played a role. 
• The conflict between 
Argentina and the IMF 
reaches its apex. 
• It was not referred to as a 
suspension as such, although 
disbursements were 
discontinued. 
• In the words of Nielsen: 
"We also had to stop the 
leaks coming out of the IMF. 
In August we decided to 
continue to make payments 
to the IMF as they fell due, 
but would refuse to get 
involved in program reviews. 
We had enough of these 
time-consuming and futile 
exercises" 
• Marcelo Bonelli is more 
objective: his claim is that the 
Argentine government tried 
to turn a failure (non-
completion  
of the program) into their 
decision to interrupt the 
program, with the excuse 
of not interfering with the 
ongoing debt re-negotiations. 
• This  was an 
imperfect" 
substitute to the  
co-participation 
which the IMF had 
asked the 
government to 
adopt.  
• Still, it introduced 
some additional 
discipline over 
provincial finances. 
•It established limits 
on the indebtedness 
of the various levels 
of the Argentine 
administration. 
• It also set GDP 
growth as a ceiling 
to primary spending 
growth. 
• It covered an 
amount of SDR779 
mn (US$1.1bn). 
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New offer to bondholders 
2004 - November 
The debt exchange is 
launched 
2005 - January 
Parliamentary elections 
2005 - November 
Argentina cancels the 
SBA 
2006 - January 
• Bondholders were given 3 options: 
1. A par option: old bonds exchanged 
at par for a new bond with a 3.2% coupon 
and 35 years maturity. Choice of currency  
denomination: CPI indexed pesos, $, yen, € 
2. Discount option: exchange for a new bond 
at a nominal haircut of 66% with an 8.28 
coupon and a 30 years maturity. Choice of 
currency  denomination: CPI indexed pesos, $, 
yen, € 
3. Quasi-par option: exchange for a consumer 
price indexed argentine peso denominated 
bond. It implied a 31% nominal haircut due to 
pesoization. 3.31% coupon and 42 years 
maturity.  
• In addition, a small strip of GDP linked 
securities was attached to each bond in order 
to increase payments in case of fast economic 
growth. 
• The government tried to discourage holdouts 
by creating legal obstacles to reopen a 
restructuring in the future. 
• All past due interests included in this final 
offer. 
• It was established that 
it would last until 
February 25, although it 
was left open until April 
2005. 
• Participation in the 
exchange reached  
76.15%. 
• 63% of foreign 
bondholders 
• 90% of Argentines 
living abroad 
• 98% of residents. 
• US$62.300 million out 
of a total of US$ 81.800 
million were 
restructured 
• New debt issued 
worth US$35.300 mn 
• Simplification in the 
debt structure: from 152 
to 11 bond series; 
from 8 to 4 governing 
laws; from 6 to 4 
currency denom. 
• Without taking into 
account holdouts, 
the debt to GDP ratio 
fell from 148% in 
Dec 2002 to 72% in April 
2005. 
• Kirchner wins with a 
larger majority. 
• This is widely believed 
to have legitimized his 
government, leading 
to a change in course in 
Argentina's policy 
making.  
• This effectively closed 
the relationship 
between Argentina and 
the IMF. In the words of 
Nielsen: "Better to pay 
than follow its advice 
is a sad conclusion for 
the institutions 
of world finance but a 
realistic sacrifice for 
Argentina." 
• Argentina repurchased 
obligations for a total 
amount of US$9.9 
billion 
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The Uruguayan Financial Crisis: Key Decisions 
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SBA approved 
1996 - March 
SBA approved 
1997 – March 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Russian 
 
Default 
 
 
1998  August 
 
 
Uruguay draws 
from the IMF 
1997 - September 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brazilian 
Crisis 
(massive 
devaluation of 
the real) 
 
1999 
January 
 
SBA approved 
1999 - March 
First review SBA 
1999 - June 
• Precautionary 
arrangement. 
• SDR 100 million or US$ 
148 million 
•To cover a period of 13 
months 
• Macroeconomic 
conditionality focused 
on deficit reduction: 
budget deficit projected 
to fall from 1.7% GDP in 
1995 to 0.5% GDP in 
1996. 
• Structural measures 
also contemplated: 
reform of the pension 
system; reform of the 
central gvt aimed at 
achieving efficiency 
savings. 
• Continued de-
indexation of the 
economy. 
• The Fund’s ex-post 
assessment criticized 
this SBA for the 
weakness of its 
structural conditionality, 
especially on the 
management of the 
banking system. 
• Precautionary 
arrangement. 
• SDR 125 million or US$ 
174 million 
•21 months 
• Macroeconomic 
conditionality: 
continued fiscal 
consolidation. 
Combined public sector 
deficit projected 
at 1.7% GDP for 1997 
and to 1% GDP for 1998. 
• Weak structural 
conditionality focused 
on the continuation of 
the pension system 
reform. 
• Continuation of the 
reform of public admin 
and of the effort to de-
index the economy 
• In the letter of intent 
for the 1999 SBA 
the government claims 
that all the conditions 
for the program were 
met. 
 
•Conditions begin 
to deteriorate 
with the Russian 
default and with  
problems piling up 
in Brazil. 
•Uruguay made a 
single cumulative 
draw under the 
program. 
 
  
• Precautionary 
arrangement. 
• SDR 70 million 
or US$ 95 
million 
•  Designed to 
cope with the 
Recession: GDP 
projected to fall 
by 1% in 99 
• Consolidated 
public sector 
deficit target: 
1.8% GDP in 
1999 
• A few 
structural 
benchmarks 
considered 
in the program, 
but structural 
conditionality 
was overall 
weak. 
 
• The recession 
worsens, and 
the gvt predicts 
GDP to fall by 
2% instead 
of the 1% 
originally 
predicted. 
• The gvt. asked 
for an increase 
in the target for 
the fiscal deficit 
to 2.1% of GDP. 
• When 
approving the 
review in July, 
EDs mentioned 
that Uruguay 
had slowed 
the pace of 
structural 
reform. 
• The deficit did 
eventually reach 
4.1% 
of GDP in 1999. 
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World Bank 
approves a Financial 
Sector Adjustment 
Loan. 
2000 - February 
Jorge Batlle 
becomes President 
2000 – March 
SBA approved 
2000 – May 
Government asks for 
waiver for the 
nonobservance of 
fiscal target 
2000-December 
First review of the 
SBA completed 
2001 - February 
Change in the 
exchange rate regime 
2001 - June 
• Aimed at 
supporting a reform 
of the banking 
system: (i) to 
establish a level-
playing field between 
public and private 
banks; (ii) reduce role 
of public sector in the 
financial system; (iii) 
strengthen banking 
regulation/supervisio
n. Obviously, this was 
either too timid or  
implemented too 
late. 
• Some of the 
measures considered 
in this reform 
became structural 
benchmarks for the 
Fund's arrangement. 
• Colorado party 
Liberal outlook 
However, he 
presided over a 
hang parliament: it 
was a coalition 
government 
with Partido 
Nacional. 
• According to 
Bension, this 
weakened 
the executive’s 
ability to handle 
the crisis. 
• Precautionary 
program aimed at 
sheltering Uruguay 
from the instability in 
Argentina and Brazil. 
• 22 months 
• SDR 150 million 
(US$197 million) 50% 
of quota 
• Macroeconomic 
conditionality focused 
on fiscal adjustment. 
Target: halving the 
fiscal deficit to 1.8% of 
GDP. 
• Stronger structural 
conditionality 
including measures to 
improve transparency 
and disclosure, 
increase efficiency in 
public enterprises and 
secure a  
strong and more 
competitive banking 
system 
 
• The fiscal deficit and 
public sector 
overall debt targets 
were missed. the 
consolidated public 
sector deficit reached 
3.7% GDP. However, 
all the other 
quantitative targets 
were met. 
• This was a result of 
the fact that the  
economy did not 
improve as originally 
envisioned. As 
opposed to the 
projected growth 
of 2% under the 
program, GDP  
contracted by more 
than 1% in 2000. 
• The new letter of 
intent was also based 
on overtly optimistic 
Projections: it  
projected a growth 
rate of 2% for 2001. 
• The government still 
treating it as 
precautionary 
• This review made it 
possible for Uy 
to borrow up to 
SDR74 million if 
needed. 
• Fiscal deficit target 
of 2.6% of GDP in 
2001 (from 3.7% in 
2000). 
• Quantitative 
performance criteria 
were introduced for 
end-March and end- 
June; indicative 
quantitative targets 
were established for 
end-September and 
end-December. 
 
 
• As a result of the 
combined effects of 
the devaluation of the 
Brazilian real and of 
the change in the 
Argentine X/R 
regime (which was 
seen as a devaluation) 
Uruguay introduced a 
change in its 
crawiling peg: 
1) the pace of the 
crawl is accelerated  
from a monthly 0.6% 
to a monthly 1.2%  
(or a yearly 15%) 
2) the band was 
widened from 3% to 
6% 
 • Bension mentions 
that the dollarization  
of the financial system 
prevented Uy from 
adopting more drastic 
measures at this 
stage. 
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Second review of the 
SBA completed 
2001 - October 
New change in the 
exchange rate 
regime 
2002 - January 
Scandal unearthed at Banco 
Comercial 
2002 - January 
The operations of Banco Galicia 
suspended 
2002 - February 
Congress passes a 
fiscal adjustment law 
2002 - February 
• Further deterioration 
of economic activity 
Outbreak of food and 
mouth disease. A 
contraction of 1% now 
expected for 2001 
• The government still 
treating it as 
Precautionary. This 
review made it possible 
for Uy to borrow up to 
SDR144 million if 
needed. 
• Performance targets 
met with the exception 
of the public debt 
ceiling.  
• Uy requested a 
waiver for this PC. 
Fiscal deficit target for 
2001 revised upward 
to 3.3% GDP. (this 3.3% 
was actually the  
quantitative limit under 
the program) 
• Some delays with the 
structural benchmarks 
 
 
 
• The band is 
widened from 6 to 
12%. 
• The pace of the 
crawl is accelerated 
from a yearly 15% 
to a yearly 33%. 
• This was a direct 
response to the 
drop of the 
convertibility 
regime in 
Argentina. 
• Vice-president Carlos Rohm is 
arrested. It was discovered that 
fraudulent practices had depleted 
the bank's capital. 
• This fed a run on Banco 
Comercial. 
• The Rohm brohers had three int'l 
partners: JP Morgan, Credit Suisse 
and Dresdner Bank. When the 
scandal  is unearthed, these Banks 
are asked to provide funds to 
recapitalize Bco Comercial. Their 
first reaction is not to commit to 
anything, and quite simply to argue 
that they are going to leave 
Uruguay. This gave rise to the 
beginning of the storm in the 
financial system, with the banking 
run intensifying gradually. 
• The government, however, 
maintained the negotiations with 
the international banks, and an 
agreement was eventually 
signed 
 
• This was the most exposed bank to 
the Argentine crisis. It was owned by 
Banco Galicia, an Argentine bank, 
and it mostly took deposits from 
Argentines and lent to Argentines. 
• As opposed to Banco comercial, the 
suspension of the operations of  
Banco Galicia were a direct 
consequence of what was going on in 
Argentina. 
• But the suspension was 
controversial. The first controversy 
aroused around the legal status of 
the bank. It had always 
been an off-shore institution with 
deposits from Argentine nationals. 
However, during the Sanguinetti 
government it was licensed as a 
bank, receiving the same legal status 
and  rights as other domestic 
institutions. Yet, in 2002 the 
authorities were not willing to 
provide LOLR assistance 
because of scarce reserves and 
becauseit would have been terribly 
unpopular. This decision contributed 
to erode Argentine savers confidence 
in the Uruguayan financial system. 
• The first one. Very 
partial: in less than 
three months the 
government would 
be forced to pass a 
new one. 
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Uruguay loses 
investment grade 
2002 - February 
Agreement to recapitalize 
Banco Comercial 
2002 – February 
Batlle launches talks 
with the US to sign an 
FTA 
2002 – February 
Uruguay requests a loan 
from IADB in support of 
its financial sector 
2002 – February 
Third and final review of 
the SBA 
2002 – March 
• This downgrade was 
mostly due to the 
abandonment of the 
Covertibility regime in 
Argentina and to the 
crisis with Banco 
comercial. 
• This agreement was reached 
between the Government and 
the major three international 
shareholders of Banco 
Comercial. 
• The government provided 
33mn dollars and the 
international partners 
provided 100 million. The 
conditions in this 
agreement were quite 
stringent: 
1- the government would 
manage the bank. 
2- they could claim back the 
100 mn should the Bank 
eventually fail. In other words, 
they did not accept any 
risk in this operation. 
3- the government committed 
not to initiate legal action with 
the banks. 
• This step did eventually fail 
to avoid the bankruptcy of 
Banco Comercial. The 
conditions in the contract 
turned out to generate a 
scandal. Minister Bension was 
its main victim, and would 
eventually have to resign. 
• This was a challenge to 
Uruguay´s Mercosur 
allies which, as a custom 
union, is not compatible 
with individual countries 
signing FTAs. However, 
Batlle felt that 
Uruguay was being 
harmed by its neighbors  
given that the 
devaluations of the 
Argentine peso and the 
Brazilian 
real had dramatically 
affected 
its exports. 
• Brazil was opposed to 
these parallel 
negotiations. 
In the end, the Uruguay-
US FTA would not 
fructify. Only a BIT was 
eventually 
signed. 
• They obtain firm 
commitments from 
IADB, WB and IMF at the 
IADB annual meetings in 
Fortaleza. 
• Overall, they secured 
official financial  
support for an amount of 
US$1,000 million for 
2002. 
• Again, the situation 
continued to deteriorate 
beyond what was 
forecasted. By that time the 
banking crisis was 
already raging. 
• The authorities draw the 
full amount that Uruguay 
had accumulated under 
the SBA: SDR 150 million 
(about US$188 million) 
• The government 
requested waivers  
for the non observance of 
two PC:the debt ceiling, 
which was larger than 
expected as Uy prefinanced 
its 2002 financing needs and 
the deficit PC, which was 
larger than expected as a 
result of the economic 
contraction. 
The consolidated deficit 
reached 4% of GDP. 
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New SBA approved 
2002 – April 
Moody downgrades 
Uruguay (again) 
2002 - May 
New fiscal adjustment 
announced 
2002 - May 
IMF announces 
negotiations for an 
augmentation of the SBA 
2002 – May 
President Batlle´s famous 
“gaffe” on Bloomberg TV 
2002 - June 
• SDR 594.1 million (US$743 
mn) 194% of quota. These 
resources were provided on 
top of the resources drawn 
under the previous 
precautionary SBA. 
• In 8 instalments of 93 
million. It's been often 
argued that the tranching 
structure of IMF loans was 
not appropriate to deal with 
a banking problem. 
• The initial SBA failed to 
stabilize the situation and it 
had to be augmented twice. 
• Fiscal consolidation: overall 
deficit targeted to fall to 2.5% 
of GDP in 2002. 
• Structural measures: 
rationalization of the tax 
system; reinforcement of the 
banking system. Requirement 
not to reopen intervened 
banks until the restoration of 
their viability and fulfilment 
of all prudential 
norms. 
• Fitch followed suit later 
that month. 
• For an amount of 
approximately US$ 
250mn. This announcement 
was made on a Sunday, 
with the President 
almost crying on national 
TV. 
• Rather than reassuring 
markets, it sparked a new 
mini panic, accelerating the 
run on banks and the 
rise in spreads.  
• US$250 mn was far from 
the required adjustment. 
Too low to restore 
confidence, it simply 
signaled the gravity of the 
problems facing Uruguay. 
• These successive fiscal 
adjustments 
have been heavily criticized 
for relying primarily on tax 
increases, and not on the 
contention of public 
expenditure and a 
reduction in the  
size of the large Uruguayan 
public administration. 
• The main cause was a 
deterioration of 
the banking crisis: in 
between April 
and May there was a 20% 
reduction 
of deposits in the 
Uruguayan financial 
system. 
• His sentence "Los 
argentinos son una manga 
de ladrones desde el 
primero hasta el último" 
sparks a diplomatic incident 
with Buenos Aires which 
would further feed market 
distress. 
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First augmentation of the SBA 
2002 – June 
Uruguay floats the peso 
2002 – June 
Banco Montevideo and 
Caja Obrera intervened 
2002 - June 
The FFSB is created 
2002 - June 
Aninat calls Batlle to call 
for drastic action 
2002 - July 
• SDR 1.16 billion (about close to 
$1.5 bn) Total amount committed: 
SDR1.75 bn equivalent to 
US$2.28bn or 571% quota 
SDR 386.1 mn made available 
under SRF. Uy allowed to draw SDR 
386.1mn ($508mn) immediately. 
Resources used to feed the FFSB 
together with resources committed 
by IADB and WB (they committed 
to disburse $500 mn a year in 2002 
and 2003)US$2100 mn 
• Much more emphasis on 
structural conditionality. Focus on 
the restructuring of the banking 
system 
• The Uruguayan authorities were 
initially told that the augmentation 
would only be possible if the 
government agreed to change its 
banking crisis resolution strategy: 
bank holiday, reprogramming 
of bank deposits, etc… 
 
• This was a response to a 
Fund´s request. The gvt 
forced to do that because 
the stock of F/X reserves 
reached a low of US$650 
million (vs. 3.1 bn in Dec 
01) 
• Various Uruguayan 
officials consider  that this 
decision was essentially 
misguided because the CB 
was not intervening in F/X 
markets. The problem in Uy 
was the LOLR assistance of 
the CB in a dollarized 
system. 
• Floating the peso 
contributed to feed the run 
on banks, and therefore to 
deplete the stock of 
reserves. (Julio de Brun) 
• The exchange rate 
depreciates by 27%  
almost immediately. 
• Bension also argues that 
this was a  
pro-active move to better 
prepare Uy 
to cope with a crisis in 
Brazil, which looked 
increasingly likely. 
• Both banks belonged 
to Grupo Velox, owned 
by the Peirano family 
with 
operations in Argentina 
and Paraguay. 
• The Peiranos were 
accused of mismanage- 
ment and fraud and 
would finish in jail. 
• Paolillo argues that 
they did not really 
mismanage. However, 
facing a regional run, 
they began to transfer 
resources from their 
different firms, breaking 
Uruguayan laws.  
• This further fed the 
run 
on banks. 
• Aimed at 
supplementing the 
decreasing LOLR 
resources of the CB. 
• It was a $2.5 bn facility 
fed mostly by the 
multilateral resources. 
• This Fund, however, 
failed to restore  
confidence, and by late 
July it had already 
provided US$450 mn. 
• The establishment of 
this fund was the 
centrepiece of the 
strategy submitted 
by the government in its 
letter of intent. 
• Aninat tells Batlle that 
the run on deposits 
is unsustainable. 
• The Fund was pressing 
for some sort of Bonex 
plan: exchange deposits 
for bonds. 
• Very rough discussion.  
• Batlle tells him that he 
will never follow that 
path, which was too 
similar to the Argentine 
experience. 
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The Economy Minister 
resigns 
2002 – July 
IMF officials threaten to 
suspend the program 
2002 - July 
Uruguay and US officials 
work out an “alternative” 
plan 
2002 – July 
Final agreement 
imposed on the IMF 
2002 – July 
A new augmentation is 
announced 
2002 – August 
• Batlle was very much 
opposed to his resignation 
because of the good 
relationship he had 
developed with the IMF. 
The key reason behind  
• Bension´s resignation was 
that the Blancos forced a 
change in the economic 
team. 
• The President of the CB 
Rodriguez Batlle also 
resigned. 
• This caused an 
acceleration of the run on 
deposits. 
• Alejandro Atchugarry takes 
over the Ministry. He was 
seen as a political 
profile which could gather 
the support of the blancos 
to conduct economic Policy. 
• Alejandro Atchugarry 
mentioned that he 
found a total amount of 
"usable" foreign exchange 
reserves of only 
100-150 million dollars at 
the CB. 
• The Uruguayan 
authorities are told that 
no further IMF 
resources will be made 
available unless the 
government takes the 
following actions: 
1- Freeze deposits 
2- Bank holiday 
3- Exchange controls 
4- Sovereign default 
• The situation is 
deteriorating fast, and 
Uruguayan officials meet 
Taylor's team to put pressure 
on the Fund. 
• Uruguayans believed that 
default would further 
aggravate the run on 
deposits. 
They did not want to 
undermine Uy's reputation as 
a regional financial centre. 
• The key to the plan was 
that enough multilateral 
resources be provided to 
fully back dollar checking and 
savings deposits. 
US$1.5 bn required for the 
plan to work 
• The US was willing to use 
the exchange stabilization 
fund until multilateral 
resources were made 
available. 
• The other controversial 
issue that the Fund´s demand 
to convert deposits into 
bonds. 
• Three key elements: 
1- Creation of the 
"Fondo de Estabilidad 
del Sistema Bancario" 
with enough 
money to cover all 
dollar denominated 
current and sight 
accounts. 
2- reprogramming the 
time deposits held in 
the two public banks 
BROU and BHU 
3- Suspension of the 
activities of the  four 
intervened banks 
(Montevideo, 
Comercial, Caja Obrera, 
Crédito). 
• A bank holiday is 
immediately 
announced. It would 
only be lifted after 
the loan with the IMF 
was agreed, and 
especially after the US 
Treasury provided the 
bridge loan. 
• Announcement aimed at 
eliminating uncertainty 
regarding the Fund's stance 
• The stated goal was to 
facilitate the reopening of 
the banks. 
• Further support also 
announced from WB and 
IADB, bringing total 
financial assistance to US$3.8 
bn.The Fund also announced 
the acceleration of a 
disbursement amounting to  
US$150 million under the 
SBA. 
• In addition, the SRF 
component of the SBA was 
cancelled and made available 
in credit tranches terms. This 
made the Fund's support 
cheaper. 
• Overall, Uruguay obtained 
a disbursement of US$1500 
mn. 
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Second augmentation of 
the SBA 
2002 – August 
Ley de Fortalecimiento del Sistema 
Bancario 
2002 - August 
National Party 
abandons the 
government´s coalition 
2002 - October 
Delays in the approval 
of the second review 
of the SBA 
2002 - October 
Uruguayan senior 
officials travel to 
Washington 
2002 - December 
• SDR 376mn ($494mn) 
Total program: SDR2.13bn 
($2.8bn) 695% quota. 
• In addition, all SRF 
purchases were 
cancelled and rephased 
under SBA terms. 
• The Fund's ex post 
evaluation argues that 
by that te time of this 
augmentation it was 
clear that Uruguay's debt 
was excessive. It was 
therefore understood that 
in order for the 
augmentation to be 
granted, the debt overhang 
issue would have to be 
addressed. 
 
• It established the Fondo de 
Estabilizacion del Sistema Bancario (FESB) 
of US$1.4 billion. This was sufficient to 
back the entire stock of US dollar sight and 
savings deposits at public and intervened 
banks. 
• The US dollar time deposits of the public 
banks were reprogrammed (for an amount 
of US$2.2 bn). The terms of the 
reprogramming included 
repayment of 25% of principal by the end 
of the first year, repayment of 35% after 
two years, and repayment of the 
remaining 40% in the third year. It carried 
an interest rate of 6% payable quarterly.  
• Depositors had the option of converting 
their deposits into 
tradable securities. 
• No restrictions to be applied on foreign 
banks as long as they relied on 
their own resources to obtain liquidity 
support. This essentially required the  
home banks to take care of their 
subsidiaries. 
• The operations of four banks was also 
suspended in August 2002: Banco 
commercial, Banco de Montevideo, Banco 
Caja Obrera, Banco de Credito. 
• These measures finally managed to put 
an end to the run on banks. 
 • This was a hugely 
controversial moment 
in the negotiations. 
• The reason behind 
postponement  
was the insufficient 
progress with the  
restructuring of the 
financial system as  
well as the remaining 
large residual 
financing needs for 
2003 and for the 
medium term. 
• These two concerns 
were addressed in  
early 2003 with a more 
concrete plan 
to restrucrture the 
financial system and 
with the idea of the 
debt restructuring to 
cover financing 
assurances. 
• This meeting did not 
unblock the disburse- 
ment of the Fund's 
resources. 
• Allegedly, the Fund's 
staff was centered on 
how to operationalize 
the default.  
• The Uy's 
authorities did not 
accept this possibility. 
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New banking law is 
passed 
2002 – December 
The Fund announces 
that a deal has been 
reached with Uy 
2003 - February 
Letter of Intent 
2003 - February 
Government announces 
comprehensive debt 
restructuring 
2003 - March 
Supplementary Letter of 
Intent 
2003 - March 
• It established 
procedures for bank 
restructuring 
and liquidation. This 
was aimed at dealing 
with the four banks 
which were intervened 
in August. 
• It also re-defined and 
expand the role of the  
CB in strengthening the 
regulatory and 
supervisory system. 
 • It would make available an 
amount of  SDR 218.5 million 
It also requested a rephasing of 
the remaining repurchases under 
the program. 
• No mention to the debt 
restructuring.  
• It very vaguely states that 
Uruguay is "working on the 
financing assurances for the 2003 
program". It seems to  
assume that this will be possible 
thanks to the assistance from 
IFIs. 
• Request of waiver for the non 
observance of two performance 
criteria on the cumulative 
balance of the combined 
public sector and the non 
financial public sector debt. 
Another waiver for the 
nonobservance of the 
performance criterion on 
exchange restrictions in 
connection with the 
reprogramming of time 
deposits at BHU and BROU. 
 • In this letter the 
government adds to  
the previous one dated 
Feb 24 that it is going to 
restructure debt. 
• The question is 
whether this delay 
was due to ongoing 
negotiations or whether 
the decision had already 
been taken and the 
government simply 
wanted some time to 
announce it. 
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Second review of the 
SBA approved 
2003 - March 
Nuevo Banco Comercial 
created 
2003 - March 
The debt exchange is 
launched 
2003 - April 
IMF Managing Director 
addresses a letter to the 
financial community 
2003 – April 
The exchange is officially 
closed 
2003 - May  
• SDR 218,5 million made 
available. The SBA 
extended by one year. 
• Repayment 
expectations under the 
SRF shifted to an 
obligation basis. 
•This delayed the 
repayment of SDR 128.7 
million (178mn) from 
2003 to 2004 
• Primary surplus targets 
for 2003, 2004 
and 2005: 3.2% of GDP. 
• The new bank was 
created with the assets of 
all the suspended banks. 
• This was another 
requirement of the SBA. 
• The government 
specified upfront that a 
minimum participation of 
90% would be required 
for the exchange to be 
completed. 
• The letter made clear 
that the third review of 
the program was 
conditional on a 
successful completion of 
the debt exchange (it 
reaching the 90% 
benchmark). 
• This was a crucial 
support for the debt 
restructuring. 
Participation surpassed 
92% 
The total face value of 
exchanged bonds 
reached US$ 5 billion. 
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Third review of the SBA 
approved 
2003 – July 
Finance Minister 
resigns 
2003 - July 
Article IV published 
2003 - August 
Uruguay issues 
debt  
2003 - October 
Fourth review of the SBA approved 
2004 - February 
• Allowing a purchase of 
SDR 145.7 mn (US$204 
mn.) 
• It mentions the fact that 
the completion of the debt 
exchange has eliminated 
residual financing needs. 
• Primary surplus target of 
3% of GDP for 2003, 
reduced from the 
originally planned 3.2% as 
a result of the need to 
pay the restructuring's 
commissions. 
• Uruguay on track with 
fiscal condition. 
• However, the IMF 
criticized delays 
with the reform of the 
banking  system. In 
particular, a benchmark 
was missed with regard to 
the completion of a  
strategic plan for the 
disposal of the remaining 
bad quality assets of the 
liquidated banks 
• Some disagreement 
about the repayment 
pace of the reprogrammed 
time deposits 
• Atchugarry is 
broadly considered 
to have been an 
excellent minister. 
• Interestingly, the Fund 
clearly underestimated 
Uruguay's capacity to 
return to growth. 
• It also states at some 
point that Uruguay's 
consensus building politics 
helped it during the crisis. 
At the same time it states 
that this consensus 
building culture may slow 
down the adoption of 
important reforms. This 
claim is especially 
substantiated by the  
report's analysis of the 
banking crisis resolution 
strategy: "The authorities 
did very well in claiming 
ownership on policy 
initiatives and were very 
successful in garnering 
political and social 
consensus to take action. 
However, on balance this 
required too much time in 
a situation where the need 
for quick decisions and 
actions were also of great 
importance". 
• Bond issuance 
worth US$200 
mn. 
•Oversubscribed 
• The currency 
denomination 
was Uruguayan 
pesos  
adjusted by CPI.  
• With some delays as a result of 
disagreements with the banking reform. 
• Much more optimistic macro outlook. 
Growth expected at 5% in 2004. Inflation set 
to fall to 7-9%. Primary surplus of 3.2% 
projected for 2004. Overall, the recovery 
was faster than anticipated in the program. 
• This made SDR93.2 million available 
(US$141 mn). 
• In its letter of intent, the govern 
asked to rephase all remaining 
repurchases under the agreement for  
a total amount of SDR559.2 million. 
Eventually, the Fund agreed to rephase 
repurchases arising during 2004 for 
an amount of SDR227mn (US$343mn) 
• Most quantitative PCs were met and the 
IMF praised Uy for its effort. 
• However, uruguay had to ask for 
three waivers: 
1. for the end-december PC on the 
cumulative primary balance of the 
combined public sector (2.8% instead of 3%) 
2. for the nonfinancial public sector debt 
3. structural PC to outsource to third 
parties the disposal of the assets of 
liquidated banks in at least two asset 
groups. In other words, the reform of the 
banking sector still lagged behind. 
The restructuring of the public banks 
clearly took longer than expected (BROU) 
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Fifth review of the 
SBA completed 
2004 - August 
Tabaré Vázquez wins 
the elections 
2004 – October 
Sith review of the 
SBA completed 
2004 - November 
New SBA approved 
2005 - June 
Uruguay begins to 
accelerate its exit 
from the Fund's 
financial support 
2006 – July 
Uruguay anticipates 
the repayment of all 
its outstanding 
obligations 
2006 - November 
• Waivers for the  
nonobservance for 
two structural 
performance criteria 
related with the 
reform of the  banking 
sector system.  
• However, the review 
praises the Uruguayan 
government for its 
good compliance with 
the program. 
• First leftist 
government (Frente 
Amplio) in the 
country's history. 
• The new 
government did not 
held 
drastically different 
views about the 
IMF. 
• Good compliance 
with all the 
program´s 
conditions. 
• Three years 
• SDR 766.3 mn 
($1.13bn, 250% 
quota) 
• Mostly aimed at 
smoothening 
Uruguay's 
exit from the Fund's 
financial support. 
• Uruguay advanced 
obligations due 
from july 
2006 to August 2007 
amounting to SDR 
619.9 bn (US$916.4 
bn) 
• The government 
advances obligations 
amounting to 
SDR 726.7mn (close to 
US$1.08bn) 
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